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ABSTRACT 
The subject of innovation inspires much inquiry due to its lucrative and strategic applications in 
industry, its exciting means of continually engaging consumers as well as its potential to create a 
desirable basis for a modern competitive advantage. The mergers and acquisitions (M&A) literature 
shows that these transactions are increasingly driven by innovation, which may be undertaken for 
the purpose of acquiring innovative value offerings, for instance. Scholars submit that 
commercialisable, innovative value offerings are most effectively created through an innovation 
execution process undertaken by a skilled innovation team. Among the prescriptions for developing 
this team is the undertaking of a small innovation acquisition. Yet, M&A are known for their high rate 
of failure; one common cause is the strategy and implementation of the post-acquisition integration 
process (PAIP), which is arguably the most problematic stage of the M&A process. Scholars advance 
that, for successful integration to be achieved, forms of both management and leadership are 
necessary. As the PAIP is a common cause of failure in M&A, it is likely necessary that this process 
of integrating the small innovation acquisition at the team level requires attention by the managers 
and leaders of the team.  
As it pertained to the team level of post-acquisition integration, the existing research was found 
lacking. As such, the study had the overarching aim to explore managerial and/or leadership 
considerations for the process of integrating small innovation acquisitions (with more than one 
individual) at the team level. A cross-case study was undertaken with three cases selected through 
purposive sampling; these cases availed five research subjects with managerial and/or leadership 
responsibilities in their teams to the study, all of whom acquiesced to participate anonymously. These 
cases are referred to as “Egypt”, “Greece” and “Rome” to protect the identity of the organisations, 
natural persons and innovations examined within these cases. The reviewing of literature led to 
devising an in-depth, semi-structured interview guide with which the research subjects were 
interviewed and probed. The data collected through the audio-recorded interviews was transcribed 
verbatim and analysed using interpretative phenomenological analysis. This presented eight key 
thematic findings that were of interest across two or more of the cases studied.  
The cross-case key thematic findings that emerged from the primary research were: unaltered 
process approach; relationship-building as integration; innovative teams need complementary skills; 
weekly meetings manage expectations; founder-only meetings; entrepreneurs want autonomy; team 
consensus; and technology readiness level. These were translated into recommendations for team 
level integration managers and leaders with a view to benefit future integrations. The main 
contribution of this study is in its exploration of an underrepresented area. Thus, it contributed 
findings regarding managerial and/or leadership considerations for team level integrations of small 
innovation acquisitions and served to initiate a dialogue about the subject.  
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As M&A often fall prey to failure as a result of unsuccessful PAIPs, this study was undertaken to 
endeavour to further the collective knowledge of researchers and practitioners undertaking the PAIP, 
with a focus on integration at the team level. It identified how three cases of small innovation 
acquisitions, partial or full, can provide a starting point for enlightening other organisations. A failed 
innovation acquisition may lead to eroding the value of the investment as well as strained 
relationships with the acquired organisation. To honour the innovation that consumers will purchase 
and the individuals who made that value offering possible, small innovation acquisitions should be 
given more attention in future studies and practice.  
Keywords: innovation; innovation execution process; innovation acquisitions; leadership; 
management; mergers and acquisitions; post-acquisition integration process; teams. 
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OPSOMMING 
Die onderwerp van innovasie trek aandag as gevolg van die winsgewende en strategiese 
toepassings in die bedryf, die opwindende manier om voortdurend verbruikers te betrek, asook die 
potensiaal om 'n wenslike basis vir 'n moderne mededingende voordeel te skep. Die literatuur van 
samesmeltings en verkrygings toon dat hierdie transaksies toenemend deur innovasie gedryf word; 
dit kan byvoorbeeld onderneem word om innoverende waardeaanbiedings te verkry. Geleerdes 
beweer dat kommersiële, innoverende waardeaanbiedings mees effektiewelik geskep word deur 'n 
innovasie-uitvoeringsproses wat deur 'n vaardige innoveringspan onderneem word. Een van die 
voorskrifte vir die ontwikkeling van hierdie span is die onderneming van 'n klein innovasie-verkryging. 
Tóg is samesmeltings en verkrygings bekend vir hul hoë persentasie van mislukking; een algemene 
oorsaak is die strategie en implementering van die ná-verkryging integrasie-proses, wat waarskynlik 
die mees problematiese stadium van die samesmeltings-en-verkrygings-proses is. Geleerdes stel 
voor dat, om suksesvolle integrasie te behaal, vorms van bestuur en leierskap nodig is. Aangesien 
die ná-verkryging integrasie-proses 'n algemene oorsaak van mislukking in samesmeltings en 
verkrygings is, is dit waarskynlik nodig dat hierdie proses van integrasie van die klein innovasie-
verkryging op spanvlak die aandag van die bestuurders en leiers van die span vereis. 
Die bestaande navorsing, met betrekking tot die ná-verkryging integrasie op spanvlak, is beperk. 
Dus het die studie die oorkoepelende doel gehad om bestuurs- en/of leierskapsoorwegings te 
ondersoek vir die proses om klein innovasie-verkrygings (met meer as een individu) op spanvlak te 
integreer. Om dit te ondersoek, is 'n kruisstudie onderneem met drie gevalle wat deur doelgerigte 
steekproefneming gekies is en vyf navorsingsvrywilligers met bestuurs- en/of 
leierskapsverantwoordelikhede. Almal van hulle het verneem om anoniem aan die studie deel te 
neem. Hierdie word na verwys as die Egipte, Griekeland en Rome gevalle om die identiteit van die 
organisasies, natuurlike persone en innovasies binne hierdie gevalle te beskerm. Die hersiening van 
literatuur het gelei tot die samestelling van die in-diepte, semi-gestruktureerde onderhoudsgids 
waarmee die navorsingsvakke onderhoude gevoer en ondersoek was. Die data wat deur die 
klankopnames van onderhoude versamel was, was woordeliks op skrif gestel en geanaliseer met 
behulp van interpretatiewe fenomenologiese analise. Dit het agt sleutel-tematiese bevindinge 
aangedui wat oor twee of meer van die gevalle van belang was. 
Die tematiese sleutel-tematiese bevindings wat uit die primêre navorsing na vore gekom het, was: 
onveranderde proses benadering; verhoudingsbou as integrasie; innoverende spanne benodig 
komplementerende vaardighede; weeklikse vergaderings bestuur verwagtinge; stigter-alleenlike 
vergaderings; entrepreneurs wil outonomie hê; span konsensus; en Tegnologie Gereedheidsvlak. 
Hierdie is omskryf in aanbevelings vir spanvlak-integrasiebestuurders en leiers met die oog daarop 
om toekomstige integrasies te bevoordeel. Die belangrikste bydrae van hierdie studie is in die 
verkenning van 'n onderverteenwoordigde area. Die doel van die studie was om bevindinge oor 
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bestuurs- en/of leierskapsoorwegings vir spanvlakintegrasies by te dra en om 'n sinvolle dialoog 
daaroor aan te moedig.  
Aangesien samesmeltings en verkrygings dikwels as gevolg van onsuksesvolle ná-verkryging 
integrasie-prosesse misluk, is hierdie studie onderneem om die gesamentlike kennis van navorsers 
en praktisyne wat die ná-verkryging integrasie proses onderneem te bevorder, met die klem op 
integrasie op spanvlak. Dit het aangedui hoe drie gevalle van klein innovasie-verkrygings, 
gedeeltelik of volledig, 'n beginpunt van insig kan wees vir ander organisasies. 'n Mislukte innovasie 
verkryging kan lei tot die erosie van die waarde van die belegging sowel as gespanne verhoudings 
met die verkrygde organisasie. Om die innovasie wat verbruikers koop en die individue wat daardie 
waardeaanbieding moontlik gemaak het te eerbiedig, moet klein innovasie-verkrygings meer aandag 
geniet in toekomstige studies asook in praktyk. 
Sleutelwoorde: innovasie; innovasie uitvoering-proses; innovasie verkryging; leierskap; bestuur; 
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CHAPTER ONE 
OVERVIEW OF THE STUDY 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
In the new millennium, gaining a sustainable competitive advantage (SCA) has become far more 
challenging than in previous years (DeNisi, Hitt & Jackson, 2003). In fact, recent academic discourse 
has suggested that the traditionally impenetrable strategic strength, the SCA, has become 
increasingly transient and irrelevant; that is to say, presently strategic advantages could arguably be 
characterised as transitory and brief (Conner, Manogharan, Martof, Rodomsky, Rodomsky, Jordan 
& Limperos, 2014; McGrath, 2013; McLay, 2014). While many forces have led up to this altered 
organisational reality, the onus is now on organisations to take note of these changes for the purpose 
of effective future competition; particularly, organisational capabilities and value propositions in the 
innovation milieu are being recognised as the growth frontier for the years to come (Taylor, 2016). 
However, organisational innovativeness is often the product of an organisation’s knowledge base 
and it relies on the ability to question conventional wisdom openly (Kuratko, Morris & Covin, 2011).  
Various solutions have been advanced in literature, such as hiring outsiders with fresh perspectives, 
creating less-hierarchical organisational structures, making resources more freely available to 
employees who show initiative and undertaking small innovation acquisitions which develop and add 
to the acquirer’s portfolio of innovation ventures and value offerings (Govindarajan & Trimble, 2010a; 
Schmidt, Rosenberg & Eagle, 2015). The latter solution is of interest to the current study. However, 
a failed innovation acquisition may lead to an erosion of the value of the investment and strained 
relationships with acquired human resources.  
This study proposes that managing and leading the integration of these acquisitions possibly pose 
unique considerations for managers and leaders; thus, the aim of this study is to isolate and explore 
the managerial and/or leadership considerations for the process of integrating small innovation 
acquisitions at the team level. Considerations might assist the managers and/or leaders of the team 
integration in honouring the innovation that consumers will purchase and the people who made that 
possible with the innovative idea they built their organisation around. 
1.2 BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY 
This section provides the reader with a background of the study by way of discussing and stating the 
problem the study is occupied with as well as defining concepts relevant to the thesis.  
1.2.1 Problem statement  
Mergers and acquisitions (M&A) have been conducted in waves since the late nineteenth century 
(Viviers et al., 2014). More recently, they have increasingly centred on innovation acquisitions as the 
push for innovation as the basis for a modern competitive advantage grows (Ahuja & Novelli, 2014). 
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Yet, for successful innovation to be achieved, Tidd and Bessant (2013) advance that it is primarily a 
matter of managing the process well, considering that most innovation failures result from issues of 
process. If organisations are considering executing an innovation that requires more research and 
development, for example, then relying only on historical data is inadequate; in which case 
organisations should consider embarking on simple business experiments (Anderson & Simester, 
2011). Moreover, Govindarajan and Trimble (2010a) have put forth a framework for operationalising 
the execution and experimentation of innovation through internal corporate venturing (Virta, 2017). 
This framework allows established organisations to execute innovations through a partnership 
between a dedicated team (DT) and the performance engine (ongoing operations) of an 
organisation. Highly effective dedicated teams are made up of both insiders and outsiders to the 
organisation and all promising sources should be considered to find the best possible team 
members. Internal transfers, external recruitment and acquisitions of smaller organisations should 
be considered in order to formulate the dedicated team (Govindarajan & Trimble, 2010a; 2010b). 
The latter source of small acquisitions is relevant to this study.  
Small innovation acqusitions provide larger organisations with a number of advantages, such as 
bringing in outsiders who can challenge widely-held assumptions, as well as acquiring patents and 
other intellectual property rights (Govindarajan & Trimble, 2010a; 2010b). Despite the popularity of 
acquiring innovative start-ups and SMEs, acquiring organisations continually find that post-
acquisition integration can erode the very innovative capabilities which initially justified the 
acquisition (Birkinshaw et al., 2000; Graebner, 2004; Puranam et al., 2009; Puranam, Singh & Zollo, 
2003; Ranft & Lord, 2002). Moreover, scholars have cited the integration process as a reason for 
smaller acquisition failure, drawing attention to the significance of the decision on integration 
approach, which further shapes subsequent integration actions (Haspeslagh & Jemison, 1991; 
Pablo, 1994; Puranam et al., 2009; Zollo & Singh, 2004). Therefore, as such small acquisitions may 
fail due to a problematic integration process, the implementation of this process requires careful 
consideration.  
Little is known about the managerial and/or leadership considerations necessary to address the 
unique challenges posed by integrating small innovation acquisitions (with more than one individual) 
at the team level. Thus, the broad aim of the study was to explore the managerial and/or leadership 
considerations for integrating small innovation acquisitions at the team level. Given this discussion 
of the research problem of interest to the study, the following section defines key concepts. 
1.2.2 Definition of key concepts 
In this section, the key concepts of the study are defined to acquaint the reader with its broad subject 
matter given the background to the research problem presented above. As little is known about the 
managerial and/or leadership considerations necessary to address challenges posed by team 
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integrations of small innovation acquisitions (with more than one individual), concepts relevant to the 
research problem are defined in this section. Firstly, a distinction is made between the definitions of 
management and leadership, which are considered here as this study is concerned with managerial 
and/or leadership considerations. This section is followed by defining the team as the team level of 
analysis is considered in the study. Moreover, concepts related to mergers and acquisitions are 
defined as the study aims to uncover considerations for integration undertakings. Finally, relevant 
innovation concepts are defined as innovation acquisitions are of interest to the study. 
1.2.2.1 The concepts of management and leadership  
As this study focusses on the managerial and/or leadership considerations for the process of 
integrating small innovation acquisitions at the team level, the concepts of management and 
leadership are discussed in this section. The terms management and leadership are often used 
interchangeably, which is erroneous as they differ (Maccoby, 2000); therefore, these concepts are 
defined and discussed.  
(a) Management  
Henri Fayol (1955) was one of the earliest to apply their minds to defining management. In 1916, he 
advanced the definition of management as follows (cited in Ward, 2009:78):  
To manage is to forecast and plan, to organise, to command, to coordinate and to 
control.  
Thus, Fayol draws attention to and identifies different elements which make up management, namely 
planning, organising, commanding, coordinating and controlling (Fayol, 1955). Fayol details the 
former three elements as follows (cited in Ward, 2009:78): 
To foresee and provide means of examining the future and drawing up the plan of 
action. To organise means building up the dual structure, material and human, of the 
undertaking. To command means maintaining activity among the personnel.  
Planning for potential eventualities, organising human and physical inputs for organisational 
processes and continuing productivity among human resources are the first of Fayol’s five 
management elements (Fayol, 1955). The final two elements are as follows (cited in Ward, 2009:78): 
To coordinate means binding together, unifying and harmonising all activity and 
effort. To control means seeing that everything occurs in conformity with established 
rule and expressed command.  
Coordinating the efforts of all human resources as well as controlling the standardising of outputs 
are the last two elements of management of Fayol’s (1955) five. However, Maccoby (2000) describes 
management as a task-orientated and, predominantly administrative role, encompassing planning, 
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budgeting, evaluating and facilitating. More expressly, he intimates that management should be 
conceptualised as a function whereas, in contrast, leadership should be considered a relationship 
(Maccoby, 2000). Thus, the concept of leadership will be explored in the following section.  
(b) Leadership  
Conkright (2015) states that two of Fayol’s elements of management – commanding and 
coordinating – can together be understood as leading. Other authors perceive the concept of 
leadership as entirely independent, such as Maccoby (2000) and Zaleznik (1992). The concept of 
leadership can further be described as an influential tool for change at various levels of analysis, 
including the organisation, the team/group and the individual, which can be accomplished through 
providing motivated direction, as effective leadership is in many cases defined as energising and 
motivating people (Maccoby, 2000; Zaleznik, 1992). Lopez (2014) puts forth that ideal leadership 
qualities include vision, influence and the ability to motivate themselves and others, which together 
make up the foundation for an effective leader-follower relationship. In the team level of analysis, 
which this study is concerned with, team leaders are responsible for attaining team engagement and 
motivating them to accomplish goals (Pauleen, 2003); therefore, the following section defines the 
concept of the team itself.  
1.2.2.2 The concept of the team    
Through their synthesis of previous research on teams, Cohen and Bailey (1997) arrive at a definition 
for the concept of the team, which is accepted as the standard definition in the current study. They 
describe the team as: a collected assembly of individuals who interdependently work on tasks; who 
share accountability for results; who view themselves and who are viewed by others as a separate 
social unit that forms part of a larger social system(s); and who navigate their relationships with team 
members across boundaries of the organisation (Cohen & Bailey, 1997). As the process of 
integrating small innovation acquisitions is of interest to the study, concepts related to mergers and 
acquisitions are defined in the following section.  
1.2.2.3 Mergers and acquisitions concepts  
Mergers and acquisitions (M&A) can be primarily defined as corporate finance transactions that can 
be both successful and beneficial given that they are strategically planned and managed (Mulherin, 
2012). Today, many organisations are undertaking mergers and acquisitions for various strategic 
reasons, one of which is to incorporate innovations of other organisations in the portfolio of value 
offerings of the acquirer (Hagedoorn & Duysters, 2002; Hitt, Hoskisson & Ireland, 1990). Although 
mergers and acquisitions represent a combined discipline, the two differ from one another (Nandy & 
Baag, 2009). As a result, this section serves to define mergers, acquisitions and partial acquisitions 
as well as M&A activity, innovation acquisitions and acquisition champions.  
 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
  
5 
    
   
(a) Mergers 
Mergers are essentially corporate financial transactions that see two organisations join forces to 
become a new economic unit (Bruner, 2004; Coyle, 2000; Dangelo, 2005; Viviers, Erasmus & Mans-
Kemp, 2014). Two organisations are brought together by mutual negotiation and agreement on the 
acquiring organisation buying up the stock of the target organisation. The acquiring organisation 
achieves this through offering the securities of the merged organisation to the target organisation’s 
stockholders (Bruner, 2004; Nandy & Baag, 2009). Viviers et al. (2014) also put forth that the smaller 
of the two organisations usually dissolves into the larger organisation; most commonly the target 
organisation is the former and the bidder organisation is the latter. Gaughan (1996) points out that 
the concept of a merger differs from consolidation, in which case an entirely new organisation is 
formed. In this case, the previously sovereign organisations lose their individuality and continue as 
one post-merger (Galpin & Herndon, 2007). In addition, Viviers et al. (2014) propose that they are 
only undertaken if they meet technical, legal and regulatory requirements, due to their potentially 
anti-competitive nature. Mergers are one component of the concept of M&A. Acquisitions are a 
related yet different form of the same phenomena, and are discussed in detail below.  
(b) Acquisitions 
Acquisitions, also referred to as ‘takeovers’ (Viviers et al., 2014:7), describe the purchase made by 
one organisation of another, either in full or in part. As such, it can be said that one organisation 
takes over another by securing and controlling a majority interest in the acquired organisation, or 
target organisation (Bruner, 2004; Coyle, 2000; Galpin & Herndon, 2007; Nandy & Baag, 2009). 
Thus, in an acquisition, the acquirer effectively subsumes the target organisation into the broader 
corporate parent (Nandy & Baag, 2009).  
According to Viviers et al. (2014), the majority of acquisitions conclude in the target organisation 
becoming a subsidiary of the acquirer or parent organisation. Acquisitions are similar to mergers in 
that they can also be horizontal, vertical and conglomerate in nature (Haunschild, 1993). Moreover, 
the acquisition or takeover can occur by friendly or hostile means (Morck, Shleifer & Vishny, 1988). 
Friendly acquisitions are deals that are negotiated between parties and are, essentially, mutually 
beneficial agreements for all involved (Aiello & Watkins, 2000; Viviers et al., 2014). Hostile takeovers, 
however, are often the result of acquisition proposals that are rejected by the target organisation. 
Rather than withdrawing efforts to acquire the organisation, the bidder circumvents the target board 
of directors to approach target stockholders to solicit and buy a controlling interest from them. In this 
way, the acquirer has secured a majority share through somewhat nefarious means, or “hostile”, as 
the literature puts it (Duggal & Millar, 1994:387).  
Nonetheless, Vasilaki and O’Regan (2008) describe acquisitions as dynamic, enduring phenomena 
that directly impact both the members and performance of an organisation. Acquisitions can be 
undertaken by full or partial means (Jakobsen & Meyer, 2008), the latter of which is discussed below.  
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(c) Partial acquisitions  
Similar to a full acquisition, a partial acquisition is dependent on an existing organisation and enjoys 
the various advantages and disadvantages associated with this dependence (Jakobsen & Meyer, 
2008). The acquirer, however, does not secure a full claim to the partially-acquired organisation’s 
earnings, nor does the former hold full equity control: the acquisition is only partially undertaken 
through the acquiring organisation purchasing an equity stake in the target organisation, rather than 
securing full ownership of it (Jakobsen & Meyer, 2008). Mergers, acquisitions and partial acquisitions 
are among the terms that are encapsulated under the umbrella term known as M&A activity, which 
is discussed below. 
(d) M&A activity 
M&A activity involves that of both mergers and acquisitions as well as everything that accompanies 
such dealings; the terms “mergers” and “acquisitions” are commonly used interchangeably due to 
the realisation of the same eventual state: one organisation taking over another (Malik, Anuar, Khan 
& Khan, 2014:521). Given the definitions of the concepts of mergers, acquisitions, partial acquisition 
and M&A activity, the following section serves to discuss the concept of the innovation acquisition.  
(e) Innovation acquisitions  
According to Aguilera and Dencker (2004), one other type of M&A that is practised by industry is a 
substitute for research and development (R&D) in the organisation. In this case, the acquirer pursues 
the target to gain entry to new R&D knowledge as well as to secure capabilities that it likely would 
not have without the procurement. These procurements can be referred to as “innovation 
acquisitions” (Chaudhuri, 2004:12) and they are undertaken to save the acquirer from expending 
time and valuable resources to ideate and create these innovative value offerings in-house (Aguilera 
& Dencker, 2004). Typically, the acquirer is larger than the target and has significant experience in 
M&A; examples of acquirers of innovative organisations are Cisco Systems and Microsoft (Aguilera 
& Dencker, 2004; Granstrand & Sjolander, 1990).  
(f) Small innovation acquisitions  
Graebner, Eisenhardt and Roundy (2010) have put forth that acquisitions undertaken for innovative 
purposes – such as for gaining technological innovations and related capabilities within the 
workforce of the acquired organisation (Toppenberg, 2015) – are commonly small and are targeted 
because they are entrepreneurial initiatives with potential for growth if effectively developed. Thus, 
this study refers to these procurements as small innovation acquisitions. Moreover, in some 
acquisitions, a champion of acquisition is the leader of the integration post-acquisition (Dagnino & 
Pisano, 2008:51).  
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(g) Champions of acquisition  
Dagnino and Pisano (2008) describe the acquisition champion as a strategic individual (or group 
thereof) that is charged with leading the process of integration and being held accountable for its 
success and performance. A study by Teerikangas, Véry and Pisano advances the importance of 
this figure, calling them the “integration manager” (2011:651). Effective integration managers play 
several roles, including: “maverick” (Dagnino & Pisano, 2008:53), transformational leader; 
organisational buffer; and network facilitator (Dagnino & Pisano, 2008). The maverick role of the 
effective integration manager is carried out in their unconventional behaviour supporting the 
championing of the acquisition; acting as a transformational leader for those who are being 
integrated; being an organisational buffer between the previously separate entities; and, lastly, 
facilitating the network of individuals that are interacting with the acquired employees (Dagnino & 
Pisano, 2008).  
As a result of the definition of this role, this study refers to the innovation acquisition champion as 
the individual held accountable for integrating the small innovation acquisition (with more than one 
individual) at the team level; this is further discussed in section 1.2.2.4(d), which defines the concept 
of the champion of innovation. Given this discussion of the acquisition champion, the following 
section deals with the integration process.  
(h) The post-acquisition integration process   
According to Meglio, King and Risberg (2017), the post-acquisition integration process (PAIP) 
commences when a deal is legally finalised and results in a pair of previously sovereign 
organisations becoming one consolidated organisation. These authors emphasise it as being the 
phase with the most complexity, as it requires the management of both human and task integration 
simultaneously (Birkinshaw, Bresman & Håkanson, 2000) to achieve the aims of the acquisition. The 
PAIP only culminates at such a time when the preferred integration level and goals are achieved 
(Meglio et al., 2017). As small innovation acquisitions of interest to this study, relevant concepts 
related to innovation are defined in the subsequent section.  
1.2.2.4 Innovation concepts 
Concepts regarding innovation are hereafter defined and briefly deliberated on, including innovation 
itself, innovative ideas, innovation execution and champions of innovation.  
(a) Innovation 
Earlier definitions of innovation draw attention to novel applications or changes made to existing 
value propositions by entrepreneurs. Schumpeter (1934), for instance, introduced a new dimension 
to the definition of the entrepreneur in the mid-1930s when he suggested that entrepreneurs are 
essentially opportunists who achieve novel combinations of resources to offer something different 
and original – a concept that would be classified as innovation today (Carland, Hoy, Boulton & 
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Carland, 1984; McCraw, 2007). This reference to novel applications in the marketplace is the 
essence of innovation (Davila, Epstein & Shelton, 2013).  
Schilling (2008) describes innovation as the pragmatic implementation of a novel idea to eventuate 
in a marketable product or service offering. According to Smith (2010), an innovation can only be 
considered as such if it is indeed commercialised and diffused into the market. Tidd and Bessant 
(2013) draw attention to the importance of the process of implementation that transforms innovative 
ideas into commercialised value offerings; this process is considered successful if value is captured 
from the innovations in market. Furthermore, the main thesis of Tidd and Bessant (2013:21) is that 
the whole process of innovation must be managed effectively for the likelihood of success to be 
made probable.  
 
Govindarajan and Trimble (2010a:3) advance an overarching formula for the definition of innovation, 
which is the sum of the innovative “idea” and its execution, the latter being a combination of an 
innovation “leader”, “team” and “plan” (Govindarajan & Trimble, 2010a:15). To illustrate this, Figure 
1.1 below depicts the innovation formula that Govindarajan and Trimble (2010a) have advanced; the 
following section discusses the concept of the innovative idea.  
  
 
FIGURE 1.1: The innovation formula 
(Source: Adapted from Govindarajan & Trimble, 2010a:15)  
(b) Innovative ideas 
Innovative ideas are novel ideas with commercial application(s) that range from incremental to 
breakthrough in nature; incrementally innovative ideas build on the current value proposition to add 
something that organisations are certain consumers may desire in their products and services 
(Smith, 2010; Tidd & Bessant, 2013). However, breakthrough ideas can be described as more 
radical, disruptive ideas, which have the potential to upend industries or even go as far as to create 
new industries (Henderson & Clark, 1990; Kim & Mauborgne, 2005).  
Govindarajan and Trimble (2010a; 2013) as well as Kaye and Klepic (2012) put forth that there is a 
key misconception about innovation with regards to innovative ideas. The fundamental 
misapprehension is that people mistake innovation for the idea alone rather than considering the 
  Idea   Leader   Team   Plan  
  Innovation 
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challenging process that must take place to commercialise the idea (Govindarajan & Trimble, 2010a; 
2013; Kaye & Klepic, 2012).  
(c) Innovation execution and the innovation execution process 
The innovative idea is essentially translated into an offering of value for the consumer, the 
commercialisation of which is considered challenging enough to be problematic (Gans & Stern, 
2003:333). Furthermore, Howell (2005:108) suggest that the vast majority of raw ideas – 90 per cent, 
in fact – never make it past the desk of the idea generator. Of those that do succeed in being 
submitted, only three per cent manage to get the funding and resources necessary to establish the 
proposed project (Howell, 2005:108). Of those undertakings, only one third of these are 
commercialised and make it to market; therefore, one per cent of innovative ideas eventuate in 
marketed innovations (Howell, 2005:108).  
Thus, it can be said that founding a project for the purpose of commercialising an innovative idea 
(Howell, 2005) is similar to innovation execution, which requires an initiative to be established 
(Govindarajan & Trimble, 2010b): including a “team”, “plan” and “leader” as well as the innovative 
“idea”, according to Govindarajan and Trimble (2010a:15). This is what Govindarajan and Trimble 
(2010a) refer to as the “innovation execution process” in the copy displayed on their book jacket for 
The Other Side of Innovation: Solving the Execution Challenge (Govindarajan & Trimble, 2010c). 
Thus, the execution of innovation is referred to in this thesis as the implementation of a project or 
initiative that serves to create and develop a marketable or commercialisable innovation. According 
to Lokuge and Sedera (2014), the execution of innovation is a significant area of study as it ensures 
that innovations reach their full potential, which Govindarajan and Trimble (2010a) state is the 
challenging part of innovation. Thus, Lokuge and Sedera (2014) define the innovation execution 
process as the means by which organisations bring the innovation potential info effect.  
Although the innovation execution process is a way of exploiting the potential of novel ideas, few 
ideas eventuate in a project resourced for this purpose; Howell (2005:108) maintains that a possible 
reason for the abovementioned high rate of failure of novel ideas is that they failed to attract a 
“champion of innovation” (Dagnino & Pisano, 2008:51), without which innovative ideas might remain 
undeveloped and latent for future innovation execution projects and processes (Frost & Egri, 1991).  
(d) Champions of innovation 
“Champions of innovation” advocate for an innovation they are passionate about, and are dedicated 
to its success (Dagnino & Pisano, 2008:51). For the innovation to be executed, champions must 
have the support of their organisation, as they will need access to various human and project 
resources to get the idea to market (Dagnino & Pisano, 2008). Mansfeld, Hölzle and Gemünden 
(2010) explain the role of the innovation champion as an exponent for the innovation endeavour 
within an organisation, acting as a role model and an intrapreneur. These scholars put forward 
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personal traits that generally characterise the innovation champion, including enthusiasm for the 
innovation, altruism towards organisational peers and a strong intrinsic motivation (Mansfeld et al., 
2010). As a result of the definition of the role of champion of innovation, this study refers to the 
innovation acquisition champion as the individual held accountable for integrating the small 
innovation acquisition (with more than one individual) at the team level, which was previously 
discussed in section 1.2.2.3(g), which defined the concept of the champion of acquisition.  
Given the background of the study and the definitions of key concepts presented in this section, the 
following presents the research questions the study poses.  
1.3 RESEARCH QUESTIONS  
The study’s overarching primary and secondary research questions determined the direction of the 
research undertaken. In exploratory studies, research questions should be broad in order to gain 
insightful and wide-ranging early findings on the topic (Zikmund & Babin, 2010). The exploratory 
research questions, both primary and secondary, are presented below.  
1.3.1 Primary research question 
What managerial and/or leadership considerations exist for integrating small innovation acquisitions 
(with more than one individual) at the team level?  
1.3.2 Secondary research questions  
The secondary research questions of the study are outlined below.  
1.3.2.1 Secondary research question 1  
Do innovation acquisition champions integrate small innovation acquisitions (with more than one 
individual), either fully or partially, similarly or differently to how they integrate acquired individuals 
into the team?  
1.3.2.2 Secondary research question 2 
What managerial and/or leadership considerations should innovation acquisition champions take 
into account while integrating small innovation acquisitions (with more than one individual) at the 
team level?  
As this section has presented both the primary and secondary research questions of the exploratory 
study, the following argues for the importance of the study.  
1.4 IMPORTANCE OF THE STUDY  
Through an extensive review of the literature pertaining to innovation-related M&A, Ahuja and Novelli 
(2014) have identified a number of significant gaps in scholarly research. One such underexplored 
gap deals with mergers and acquisitions undertaken for innovation purposes. These appear to have 
been under-studied in terms of corporate transactions which are conducted so as to gain a high-risk, 
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high-reward value proposition, or to obtain new technology that can become commercialisable within 
a wider portfolio of innovation ventures managed by the acquirer (Ahuja & Novelli, 2014). This gap 
in the literature is noteworthy as the proposed study aims to add to the literature of small innovation 
acquisitions.  
In the realm of scholarly research – particularly regarding acquisitions – emphasis has recently been 
placed on purchases made of an innovative nature that are mostly accompanied by technological 
innovations and related capabilities within the workforce of the acquired organisation (Toppenberg, 
2015). According to Graebner et al. (2010) these acquisitions are usually very small in stature and 
are targeted on the basis that they are entrepreneurial organisations with growth potential if 
developed effectively, which are the small innovation acquisitions referred to in this study.  
Moreover, Sitkin and Pablo (2004) pointed out that the field of mergers and acquisitions was found 
lacking with regards to a focus on leadership. Govindarajan and Trimble (2010a; 2010b) have 
devised a framework for the successful execution of innovation ventures within established 
organisations in which the authors deal with many leadership principles and prescriptions for 
implementing their framework. However, these exclude any potential recommendations around 
sourcing skilled outsiders for innovation acquisition champions who must deal with the process of 
integrating a small acquisition in a dedicated team.  
Ahuja and Novelli (2014) put forth that in the effort to realise innovative goals and objectives, 
significant amounts of valuable corporate resources are expended. The more resources the 
corporate parent invests in the venture, the more risk it carries for a substantial payoff (Ahuja & 
Novelli, 2014). For these reasons, carefully carrying out the execution of innovation is important so 
that the organisation pursuing these goals and objectives is not losing money, time or other 
resources if the innovation initiative is not undertaking the demands of innovation execution as 
effectively, efficiently and inexpensively as is required (Govindarajan & Trimble, 2010a). This poses 
important research and managerial implications. For researchers, the means of conducting the 
execution of innovation to gain the greatest reward in relation to the risk taken by the organisation 
should be studied. For the top management of organisations, instituting the recommendations that 
result from these types of studies may lead to greater value capture and creation.  
This study is exploratory in nature as the researcher has endeavoured to discover if any research 
has been done on the basis of leading the integration of an acquisition from a team perspective. The 
search for an existing study of this subject matter has resulted in finding a study of this nature. 
Therefore, the apparent lack of available literature on the subject, particularly as it takes place in 
teams aimed at executing innovative ideas, leads the researcher to assume that the exploratory 
study is specifically appropriate and essential to undertake (Collis & Hussey, 2014).  
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Graebner, Heimeriks, Huy and Vaara (2017) argue that M&A activity remains rampant in the industry, 
despite many poor past outcomes. These authors believe that the post-acquisition integration 
process is a vital factor in successful M&A, like many others (Haspeslagh & Jemison, 1991). 
Teerikangas et al. (2011) put forth that the importance of effective management of the acquisition 
process is widely acknowledged in literature, whereas there has been less focus on the issue of the 
integration manager’s actions in this process. These researchers make an argument for studies that 
are more actor-based and conducted at the micro-level (Teerikangas et al., 2011), which is in 
keeping with the problem statement of the current study, as well as the research methodology 
undertaken in this study (see the next section 1.6 below).  
In addition, Puranam, Singh and Chaudhuri (2009) advance that bidder organisations undertaking 
small innovation acquisitions for their technological capabilities often find that post-acquisition 
integration can erode or entirely eradicate the technological and innovation capabilities which first 
made the target organisation attractive. Moreover, Braun, Peus, Weisweiler and Frey (2013) state 
that teams dominate modern organisational structures and that leadership at the team level of 
analysis is scant and needs to be more strongly considered across the literature (Avolio & Bass, 
1995; Yammarino, Dionne, Chun & Dansereau, 2005). As such, it is argued that the undertaking of 
this study is important as it considers leadership at the team level.  
Lastly, West, Hirst, Richter and Shipton (2004) submit that developing innovation at the more micro 
level of the team contributes to augmenting the consolidated organisation’s ability to apply and 
concentrate resources effectively, fittingly and faster than its rivals. This is because it allows and 
qualifies all organisational members to react to the need for change as well as to make apposite 
changes at a more localised level (West et al., 2004). As this section has presented a discussion of 
the importance of the study, the following provides an overview of the research methodology 
undertaken in the study.  
1.5 RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODS 
The methodology explains the techniques and means by which the research study has been 
undertaken. These have been deployed to gather and consider the desired information for the 
identified research problem and objectives (Collis & Hussey, 2014). The existing body of knowledge 
has been examined to afford this thesis a review of the body of literature as it pertains to the research 
problem. Various relevant sources were consulted, including academic journal articles, scholarly and 
other non-fiction books as well as credible internet sources, as determined by the researcher. The 
secondary research undertaken culminated in the form of a literature review, which is presented in 
the three chapters following this introductory chapter.  
Moreover, the primary research design of the study has emerged from the consideration of the most 
appropriate factors relevant to the nature of the research. This exploratory study was designed and 
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conducted with a view to realise its purpose of initiating a dialogue regarding the unique or 
idiosyncratic considerations innovation acquisition champions take into account (or ought to) when 
integrating a small innovation acquisition into a full or partial acquirer (Zikmund & Babin, 2010). 
Moreover, the process of the research study was qualitative in nature and entailed a series of semi-
structured, in-depth interviews (Flick, 1998:368; Roberts, Hopp, Sørensen, Benrimoj, Williams, 
Chen, Aslani & Herborg, 2003; Zikmund & Babin, 2010) with innovation acquisition champions. As 
no existing framework or specified problem exists in the field, in which case applied research would 
be more appropriate, the research outcome of the study was basic or pure in nature (Collis & Hussey, 
2014).  
In addition, the interpretivist research paradigm was used in this study, which deals with social 
studies and undertakes humanistic, qualitative methods (Maxwell, 2012) to attempt to understand 
subjective perceptions and experiences from the individual’s point of view (Krauss, 2005). 
Interpretivists use methodologies oriented around meaning and implication (such as interviews or 
observation), methods which rely on subjective relations between researchers and research subjects 
(Hirschman, 1986). The interpretivist paradigm was relevant to the study as it seeks to engage by 
means of personal interaction so as to understand social phenomena in a specific context (Collis & 
Hussey, 2014). According to Collis and Hussey (2014), there are four interpretivist approaches to 
choose from, including qualitative, subjective, humanist and phenomenological. The latter was 
selected for the study. The phenomenological approach aimed to explore and describe the essences 
of the phenomena (Creswell, 1998; Dahlberg, 2006; Patton, 2002) related to how the innovation 
acquisition champion deals with the team consisting of both insiders and outsiders to the 
organisation.  
Furthermore, the qualitative research method selected was a series of semi-structured, in-depth 
interviews (Flick, 1998:368; King & Horrocks, 2010; Roberts et al., 2003; Zikmund & Babin, 2010). 
The resulting qualitative data from the execution of these techniques were in the form of verbatim 
transcriptions (Collis & Hussey, 2014) and observed notes (Ritchie & Spencer, 2002). This collected 
data was analysed according to interpretative phenomenological analysis (IPA) (O’Neil & 
Koekemoer, 2016), which was used to design a cross-case study format in which the findings were 
discussed (Collis & Hussey, 2014).  
Few innovation acquisition champions availed themselves to the study. A cross-case was designed 
with three cases and five research subjects, three of which were innovation acquisition champions. 
The case study research design undertaken was an exploratory cross-case study, which served to 
address the lack of knowledge existing on the subject matter (Collis & Hussey, 2014). Research 
questions with a main focus on “what?” can be justifiably well-answered by the research design of 
an exploratory case study, especially in cases where the study hopes to develop important 
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hypotheses from the research questions and propose future avenues of research (Yin, 2003), such 
as this study. As such, the overarching research question of this study was answered by means of 
an exploratory case study, as recommended by Yin (1994). Analysing the primary qualitative data 
was approached by means of cross-case and interpretative phenomenological analysis. The former 
concerns analysing data for a number of cases. This form of analysis allowed the researcher to 
amass independent accounts of events and perspectives as well as phenomena, which together 
were employed to determine patterns (Collis & Hussey, 2014).  
Moreover, the latter, interpretative phenomenological analysis, was conducted by searching through 
the first of the interview transcripts and identifying findings that arose in it. Thereafter, the researcher 
forged connections, which led to the isolation of superordinate findings for the first case. Once the 
initial case had been analysed, the researcher moved on to the second and repeated the above IPA 
analysis strategy until all three cases had been systematically searched through. Thereafter, the 
researcher sought patterns between the cases with the goal of finding themes across the Egypt, 
Greece and Rome case studies, which are presented with quoted examples of each theme to 
support it in the findings chapter (Smith & Osborn, 2004), culminating in cross-case key thematic 
findings. Thus, the primary research methodology undertaken in this exploratory study eventuated 
in a cross-case study format with phenomenological findings. Given the argument for the emerging 
primary research methodology presented above as well as the secondary research undertaken, the 
following section provides an orientation of the thesis.  
1.6 CONFIGURATION OF THE STUDY 
The study culminated in seven chapters; this section concisely details each chapter and serves to 
outline the sequence in which the study is presented.  
1.6.1 Chapter one: Overview of the study 
The first chapter has served as an introductory chapter, providing an overview of the study in the 
following matters: defining key concepts; stating the problem; posing research questions; arguing 
for the importance of the study; briefly providing context regarding the emergent exploratory research 
methodology undertaken; noting both the ethical considerations and DESC risk classification of the 
study; and, finally, presenting a chapter configuration to the thesis.  
1.6.2 Chapter two: The innovation execution process 
The second chapter is the first of three chapters that serve to present the reviewed literature. In this 
chapter, levels of analysis are first discussed. Secondly, organisational level elements that support 
innovativeness are addressed. Moreover, the dedicated team and its externalities as well as the 
framework for experimenting with and executing innovation as put forth by Govindarajan and Trimble 
(2010a; 2010b) are presented. Furthermore, the rigorous innovation experimentation prescribed by 
these scholars and the criteria for holding the innovation team leader accountable for learning are 
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also dealt with in this chapter. Finally, the chapter is concluded with a summary of the Govindarajan 
and Trimble (2010a; 2010b) framework. As the framework suggests that organisations should 
consider procuring and integrating small acquisitions into a team, a subject which has not yet been 
addressed in the literature, the next chapter reviews the literature pertaining to mergers and 
acquisitions. 
1.6.3 Chapter three: Acquisitions, the post-acquisition integration process and its 
challenges  
This chapter deals with mergers and acquisitions, beginning with M&A motives and M&A failure. 
Secondly, as the process perspective was selected for the study, the post-acquisition integration 
process is reviewed. Various challenges and tasks in the post-acquisition integration process are 
discussed.  
1.6.4 Chapter four: The team development process and relevant theories of management 
and leadership to the study  
This is the final chapter pertaining to the literature review. It deals with organisational management 
and leadership, focusing specifically on strategy, innovation, projects, transformation, change and 
teams. The various prescriptions given to managers and leaders from these styles are summarised.  
1.6.5 Chapter five: Research methodology 
This chapter involves the thorough explanation of the research methodology undertaken in the study. 
The secondary research design is discussed. Subsequently, the exploratory primary research 
methodology is detailed; it was an exploratory cross-case study arrived at by means of a series of 
qualitative, semi-structured, in-depth interviews (Flick, 1998:368; Roberts et al., 2003), which were 
transcribed verbatim and underwent interpretative phenomenological analysis by the researcher to 
uncover key thematic findings across the cases under analysis. Finally, conclusive remarks follow.  
1.6.6 Chapter six: Findings 
The research undertaken has eventuated in key findings within each case and eight key thematic 
findings across two or more of the cases. However, as the study's nature is exploratory, these 
findings are expected by no means to be conclusive, quantifiable or exhaustive. Thus, they might 
simply provide an impetus for the possible inception of a dialogue about the study’s findings.  
1.6.7 Chapter seven: Summary, recommendations, limitations and future research 
The final chapter summarises all earlier chapters and provides several early recommendations in 
the sub-field founded in the overlap of the three literature reviews. In addition, the limitations of the 
study are considered and future research suggestions are proposed. To culminate, a final conclusion 
is presented.  
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1.7 CONCLUSION 
This introductory chapter presented an overview of the study. This included: a background of the 
study; defining the key concepts; stating the research problem; delineating the research questions; 
discussing the importance of the study; presenting an overview of the research methodology 
undertaken; and, finally, providing an orientation of the thesis. Given this overview of the study, the 
following chapter is the first in a series of three which presents the reviewed literature relevant to the 
current study. Particularly, the literature related to innovation and the innovation execution process 
will be reviewed and presented. Moreover, the levels of analysis under consideration in the second 
chapter are the organisational and team levels as both of these are related to the organisational 
structure put forth by Govindarajan and Trimble (2010a).  
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CHAPTER TWO 
THE INNOVATION EXECUTION PROCESS  
2.1 INTRODUCTION  
If successfully executed, innovations which require greater levels of research and development 
(R&D) than simple incremental improvements can add to organisations’ short-term financial 
performance, long-term profitability and the creation or continuation of competitive advantage, 
perhaps significantly (Alexander & van Knippenberg, 2014). The prevalent vehicle organisations use 
for executing innovation activities, such as R&D, is the dedicated team (Barczak, Griffin & Kahn, 
2009). In addition, the management of teams, such as dedicated teams, is vital for successful 
innovation execution to take place (Hülsheger, Anderson & Salgado, 2009).  
This chapter reviews literature related to the subject of managing innovation execution. Firstly, levels 
of analysis found in organisations are introduced. Secondly, the link between the organisation level 
of analysis and elements that support innovation is discussed. Thirdly, the team level of analysis is 
considered with regards to the dedicated innovation team, particularly its formation. Moreover, given 
the thesis’ process perspective, the six generations of innovation management processes since the 
mid-twentieth century are examined and more recent twenty-first century models are also discussed. 
From this review of innovation management process models, the framework for innovation execution 
proposed by Govindarajan and Trimble (2010a; 2010b) is adopted in the study. This is because it is 
the only model that instructively encompasses the process of innovation execution that a dedicated 
team undertakes. Thus, innovation experimentation as well as its criteria for assessing this team’s 
organisational learning are discussed.  
2.2 ORGANISATIONAL LEVELS OF ANALYSIS  
Research studies in the milieu of organisational management have taken place at various levels of 
analysis (Vergne & Wry, 2014); the commonly used levels are presented in Figure 2.1 below. These 
consist of: the organisational level; the group (or team) level; and the individual level (Litchfield, Ford 
& Gentry, 2015). The current study explores post-acquisition integrations of small innovation 
acquisitions at the team level of analysis, a research gap which appears scant. The literature 
regarding the organisational level is considered first in the reviewing of previous research in this 
chapter. Thereafter, literature on the lower level of the team is reviewed.  
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FIGURE 2.1: Levels of analysis  
(Source: Adapted from Litchfield et al., 2015:287)  
Studies regarding innovation at varying levels of analysis have been undertaken to date (Anderson, 
Potočnik & Zhou, 2014; Gupta, Tesluk & Taylor, 2007; Hülsheger et al., 2009). Thus, this chapter’s 
review of the literature deals firstly with organisational level elements and thereafter with the team 
level (Barczak et al., 2009), such as the dedicated team (Govindarajan & Trimble, 2010a).  
In addition, the literature review related to the innovation execution process presented in this chapter 
is concerned with organisational level elements as a result of the institutional leadership which 
operates in top management positions (Washington, Boal & Davis, 2008) as these individuals play 
an important role in the post-acquisition integration process (Datta, 1991; Haspeslagh & Jemison, 
1991; Li, 2014). In addition, organisational management is considered important in the stakeholders 
of the innovation project team, especially the positions of chief executive officer and chief operations 
officer (Govindarajan & Trimble, 2010a:28-48). As a result, this chapter serves to present reviewed 
literature on innovativeness and relevant subject matter as pertains to the organisational level of 
analysis.  
Moreover, the team level of analysis is considered in the literature reviewed on innovation and the 
innovation execution process, particularly regarding the dedicated team as put forward by 
Govindarajan and Trimble (2010a) (Virta, 2017). The team level of analysis is relevant to the study 
as the research problem concerns managerial and/or leadership considerations for team integrations 
of small innovation acquisitions. Thus, subject matter relevant to both the organisational and team 
levels is presented in this chapter.  
2.3 ORGANISATIONAL LEVEL: ELEMENTS FOR ORGANISATIONAL INNOVATIVENESS  
Many organisations today are investing large amounts of money and time in the pursuit of innovation 
initiatives even though these often fail (Pisano, 2015). Thus, pursuing innovation is very seldom an 
 
 
Organisational level of analysis 
 
Group/team level of analysis 
 
Individual level of 
analysis  
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easy task (Holmstrom, 1989) because its various process components are a challenge to manage 
(Saren, 1984). At its core, it requires questioning long-held assumptions and mobilising human 
efforts behind the cause, which is a complicated strategic task that requires a certain amount of 
diplomacy and a proclivity for risk-taking (Morris, Kuratko & Covin, 2008; Naldi, Nordqvist, Sjobërg 
& Wiklund, 2007). If any given organisation succeeds in achieving a portfolio of innovations and 
exhibits these requirements, it can be said to be an innovative organisation (Morris et al., 2008).  
Organisational innovativeness is determined by its different, novel or unique organisational activities; 
in addition, organisations that evaluate innovativeness on a continuous basis are more likely to 
improve overall innovation performance over time (Morris et al., 2008). Therefore, analysing the 
innovativeness of an organisation is important due to its relationship with organisational strategy and 
performance (Borocki, Orcik & Cvijic, 2013).  
Successfully fostering innovativeness demands the attention and focus of senior management to 
promote it throughout the organisation by setting an agenda for strategic innovation to which all 
aspects of the organisation are aligned for the purpose of achieving this strategic intent 
(Govindarajan, 2011). Figure 2.2 below presents a synthesis of the literature pertaining to 
organisational level elements that facilitate organisational innovativeness, presented as a useful top-
down lens with which to view the management’s task of fostering innovation throughout the 
organisation (Davila et al., 2013). In the figure, this can be seen at both a macro- (organisational) 
and micro level (team and individual). The figure below demonstrates the strategic alignment 
necessary for the top management team (TMT) to drive innovativeness forward in an organisation 
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FIGURE 2.2: Process cycle for TMT to foster organisational innovativeness  
(Source: Adapted from Anderson et al., 2014:28; Choi & Chang, 2009:246-247; Claver-Cortés, Zaragoza-Sáez 
& Pertusa-Ortega, 2007:45; Davila et al., 2013:xxxii; di Fiore, 2014; Govindarajan, 2011; Isaksen & Tidd, 
2006:329-344; Johnson, 2010; Kim, Min & Cha, 1999:153; Leiponen & Helfat, 2010:224-235; Markham, Ward, 
Aiman‐Smith & Kingon, 2010:402; Tidd & Bessant, 2013:146-154; Yadav, Prabhu & Chandy, 2007:1) 
This section serves to discuss the elements for innovativeness that may exist at the organisation’s 
macro level, including: organisational and innovation objectives realised through operational models; 
innovative organisational structures; innovative cultures and climates; the role of management, 
including the top management team, chief executive officer and the chief innovation officer; the roles 
that facilitate innovation internal and external to the innovation team; and, lastly, availing slack 
resources for innovation. 
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2.3.1 Achieving organisational and innovation objectives through institutionalising 
operational models for innovation 
In the innovation management literature, strategy is recognised as a key element required at the 
organisational level to drive innovation in organisations (Anderson et al., 2014). Davila et al. (2013) 
suggest that fostering organisational innovativeness begins with incorporating innovation in the 
organisational strategy and prioritising it as a strategic objective (Hough, Thompson, Strickland & 
Gamble, 2007) if innovation is intended as a corporate growth strategy (Pisano, 2015). Leiponen 
and Helfat (2010) propose that instituting innovation objectives is helpful in directing sometimes 
broad innovation activities. Pursuing a number of innovation objectives is likely to eventuate in more 
commercialisable value propositions that the organisation can produce and profit from than if there 
were no objectives (Leiponen & Helfat, 2010).  
However, driving innovation solely by including the goal in the organisation’s strategy and objectives 
is insufficient: to actualise innovativeness within an organisation, the strategy and objectives must 
be instituted by means of operational models to succeed (Davila et al., 2013; Pisano, 2015). 
Institutionalising innovation processes internally makes them both sustainable as well as legitimate 
in the eyes of employees (Coblence, Pallez, Vivant & Weller, 2017); Herrera (2015) similarly 
advocates for institutionalising operational structures and processes. Furthermore, Anthony, 
Johnson and Sinfield (2008) argue that these internal institutions are necessary to set organisations 
apart from rivals. Infrastructure is seen as necessary to actualise the innovation organisation 
direction (Innovation Enterprise, 2013).  
Such operational models for innovation processes encompass various factors, such as metrics, 
goals of individuals and teams, as well as motivators and incentives (Davila et al., 2013). One model 
for executing innovation has been adopted in the current study, namely that of Govindarajan and 
Trimble (2010a; 2010b), which is reviewed and synthesised in this chapter. However, at this juncture, 
it is significant to note that this model is in keeping with the factors mentioned above. Moreover, 
while processes should be institutionalised, the overarching organisational structure should be a 
conducive environment for innovativeness and innovation activities to take place.  
2.3.2 Innovative organisational structures   
In addition to innovation strategy and objectives, the element of organisational structure is also 
commonly considered in innovation management studies (Anderson et al., 2014). Structures of 
organisations determine the internal environment of the organisation as it pertains to the enduring 
relations between the employees and work teams (Harrison, 2005) and refer to formalised patterns 
connecting these constituents together through specialisation, distribution of power, 
departmentalisation and shape (Scott & Mitchell, 1976).  
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2.3.2.1 Flat organisational structures  
For innovation to be stimulated within an organisation, some flexibility must be within the structure 
(Chakrabarti, 1974) and flatter structures have been shown to be more conducive to actualising 
innovativeness (Smith, 2010) as they offer this flexibility (Claver-Cortés et al., 2007). However, as 
an organisation grows, it becomes increasingly difficult to maintain this flatness as managers have 
many more people reporting to them. If achieved, however, it can be a success factor or a basis for 
continued innovativeness and profitability (Kastelle, 2013).  
2.3.2.2 Structures that facilitate dedicated teams  
Moreover, among Govindarajan’s (2011) key success factors (KSFs) for executing innovation, one 
is an organisational structure that supports dedicated innovation teams with capable champions at 
the helm. Despite being an innovation KSF, flattening an established corporate structure, which is 
likely to be complex and somewhat bureaucratic (Smith, 2010), is a challenge. Moreover, a causal 
relationship exists between organisational structure and culture: changing one will cause the other 
to change as well (Janićijević, 2013). However, cultural change may be desired and indeed 
necessary to pursue and achieve widespread organisational innovativeness (Büschgens, Bausch & 
Balkin, 2013).  
To solve this trade-off, operational models that enable organisations to achieve organisational 
ambidexterity – the ability of an organisation to explore and exploit simultaneously (O’Reilly & 
Tushman, 2013) – without disrupting the current operations, should be considered for 
implementation (O’Sullivan & Dooley, 2009). These models include continuing with organisations’ 
exploitative, daily operations while simultaneously pursuing exploration of innovative value 
propositions, which is implemented by fostering a structure that supports semi-autonomous 
dedicated innovation teams (Virta, 2017). Thus, objectives and organisational structures have been 
discussed; the subject of cultures and climates that lend to innovativeness are reviewed below.  
2.3.3 Innovative cultures and climates 
The questions of culture and climate have been found to be important in the innovation literature 
(Anderson et al., 2014). Both constructs are used to conceptualise how people experience and 
characterise their work settings but these differ from each other (Schneider, Ehrhart & Macey, 2013).  
2.3.3.1 Organisational culture and innovativeness  
Firstly, corporate culture can be understood as a deeply embedded and widely accepted system of 
beliefs and values across an organisation (Ahmed, 1998; Morgan, 2006; PwC, 2017). Developing 
an innovative culture within an organisation requires leaders with the right mindset, expecting the 
unexpected as well as being open to change (Grant, 2016). As an organisational culture is 
institutionalised to some extent by the leaders, the upper echelons (Hambrick & Mason, 1984), the 
leaders who fail to value the importance of innovation are likely to lead ongoing operations and staff 
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at large to devalue innovativeness as well (Grant, 2016; Hambrick & Mason, 1984; Yoo & Kim, 2015). 
While culture operates at a far deeper level than does climate in organisations, climate is more easily 
observable (Ahmed, 1998; Tidd & Bessant, 2013).  
2.3.3.2 Organisational climate and innovativeness  
Secondly, climate is understood as the shared impressions and meanings employees attribute to 
the codified rules and the practices carried out daily with the organisation (Schneider et al., 2013). 
These perceptions are more objective and observable than those of the phenomenon of culture 
(Castro, 2008) and climate is more receptive to efforts of improvement and change than is culture 
(Stone, Harrison, Feldman, Linzer, Peng, Roblin, Scott-Cawiezell, Warren & Williams, 2005).  
While many authors have used the terms of “culture” and “climate” interchangeably, Tidd and 
Bessant (2013:146) advance that this is erroneous as they differ. Firstly, climate differs vastly from 
culture in that it can be perceived at a surface level – in other words, it is more clearly visible or 
observable for researchers to study in comparison to culture, which is far more hidden from view as 
a result of being deeply embedded (Castro, 2008). Thus, if change or improvement in climate is 
necessitated, the factors necessary to achieve these efforts are also more easily understood (Tidd 
& Bessant, 2013). Secondly, whereas culture is a widespread and pervasive organisational force 
which ought to be studied at the organisation level, climate can be observed at different levels of 
analysis. Individuals can be surveyed and studied for shared impressions of groups (teams), 
divisions, departments and other analysis levels (Tidd & Bessant, 2013).  
(a)   Factors of team climate that can influence innovation  
Furthermore, six main factors of climate can influence innovation critically at the team level, 
including: openness and trust; involvement and challenge; space and support for ideas; debate and 
conflict; risk-taking propensity; and freedom (Isaksen & Tidd, 2006:329; Tidd & Bessant, 2013:147). 
The team level of analysis is important and relevant to the study as the research problem concerns 
managerial and/or leadership considerations for team integrations of small innovation acquisitions. 
Thus, the first factor of team climate that can influence innovation is openness and trust, which refers 
to internal team relationships that have emotional safety; in these contexts, members feel that there 
exists an open platform for suggesting ideas without judgement. Secondly, involving team members 
in decision-making and challenging them to have a stake in the success of the organisation represent 
the involvement and change factor; this factor leads to high intrinsic motivation and commitment to 
the organisation and team (Isaksen & Tidd, 2006:329-344; Tidd & Bessant, 2013:146-154).  
Thirdly, creating space and support for ideas, such as through availing organisational slack, gives 
employees the platform to experiment to find a feasible and profitable idea. Furthermore, conflict 
refers to tensions that exist between team members, which should be fostered at a constructive 
level. Debate is about exchanging various opinions and viewpoints in a healthy manner to arrive at 
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the best possible solutions in the project’s endeavours. Risk-taking propensity comprises of 
tolerance for ambiguity and uncertainty. Lastly, freedom is evidenced in an organisation or team as 
the independence in behaviour people have (Isaksen & Tidd, 2006:329-344; Tidd & Bessant, 
2013:146-154). Team development is further discussed in Chapter Four due to its salience and 
relevance to the current study, while the roles of various top management stakeholders are 
examined in the next section.  
2.3.4 The role of top management  
Various factors related to the role of management have been studied in the innovation literature 
(Anderson et al., 2014). The role of organisational level management is significant to the literature 
review as a result of the institutional leadership which operates in top management positions 
(Washington, Boal & Davis, 2008) because these individuals play an important role in the post-
acquisition integration process (Datta, 1991; Haspeslagh & Jemison, 1991; Li, 2014). Moreover, 
organisational management is considered important in the stakeholders of the innovation project 
team, especially the positions of chief executive officer and chief operations officer (Govindarajan & 
Trimble, 2010a:28-48).  
Therefore, as it relates to the role of top management, Tidd and Bessant (2013) emphasise the 
importance of proactive, participatory management and its role in the context of innovative 
organisations. Govindarajan (2011) underscores the significance of managerial participation as a 
critical innovation success factor, especially in the cases of less incremental, more radical 
innovations. Thus, the proactive roles of the top management team (TMT), chief executive officer 
(CEO) and chief innovation officer (CINO) are considered in this section.  
2.3.4.1 The role of top management team 
In the event that an organisation is increasingly under highly competitive market conditions and 
changing macro-environmental pressures, innovation may become a strategic necessity for the 
organisation’s survival and increased competitiveness; in this case, senior management should 
proactively lead the charge (Davila et al., 2013; Govindarajan, 2011; Hambrick, 1987; Hambrick, 
Cho & Chen, 1996; Tidd & Bessant, 2013). The visibility of the TMT’s involvement in innovation 
initiatives has been emphasised as important (Govindarajan, 2011). The visible support of 
management is conducive to innovation efforts (Choi & Chang, 2009). Moreover, Damanpour and 
Schneider (2006) found that demonstrating a favourable attitude concerning innovation by the TMT 
also leads to facilitated innovation. Top managers, particularly CEOs, have significant power over 
their organisations; in addition, they are also charged with the weighty obligation to utilise that power 
for the growth of the organisation they control (Hambrick & Mason, 1984); as such, the following 
section deals with the role of the CEO in innovation activities.  
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2.3.4.2 The role of the chief executive officer  
CEOs have one singularly scarce resource: that of their time and attention (Yadav et al., 2007). As 
one ascends the organisational hierarchy to the upper echelons of top management, the bottleneck 
effect increases; in other words, the more senior the manager, the more they must oversee, which 
means the less gets through to them (Yadav et al., 2007). Thus, the CEO should do everything in 
their power to ensure news on innovation reaches them or the relevant member of the top 
management team (Yadav et al., 2007). If organisational learning does not reach the CEO or TMT, 
it is highly unlikely that the information will be diffused through the organisation (Vera & Crossan, 
2004). One suggestion to prevent this is the hiring of a chief innovation officer (CINO) (Koetzier & 
Alon, 2009); the role is discussed below, regarding the study.  
2.3.4.3 The role of the chief innovation officer  
A relatively recent addition to the ranks of top management is the position of the chief innovation 
officer (CINO) (Johnson, 2010). A white paper by Innovation Enterprise (2013) puts forth that its 
relative novelty as an executive position means that the role of the CINO is still largely unclear, which 
is understandable. However, what is clear is that the institution of this position assists the CEO’s role 
in innovation by combatting the bottleneck effect for innovative organisational learning; in other 
words, the CINO is more likely to have the time and infrastructure necessary to bring innovative 
ideas and learnings to the fore and to diffuse them into the organisation (Innovation Enterprise, 
2013).  
Whereas Johnson (2010) and Innovation Enterprise (2013) believe the role to be an uncertain one, 
di Fiore (2014) and Meige (2016) have sought to identify tasks this individual is to carry out, which 
serve as relatively early descriptions of the role. Meige (2016) describes the CINO role as, firstly, 
spearheading the pursuit of opportunities or ideas for developing innovations. Laurent and Chollet 
(2013) agree and suggest that executive leaders should not be reluctant to search for innovation 
prospects beyond the organisation and industry boundaries in which the CINO operates. Secondly, 
Meige (2016) also advocates that CINOs should optimise organisation and employee learning from 
the innovation experiments undertaken. Thirdly, the CINO should envision the demise of the core 
organisation as a mental exercise to plan for an uncertain future in a rapidly transforming 
marketplace. Moreover, Meige (2016) argues that this executive should foster the generation of 
ideas and create the opportunity for rapid experimentation.  
According to di Fiore (2014) the duties of the CINO role include: cultivating skills; ascertaining new 
market gaps; assisting idea generation; overseeing seed funding; encouraging and ensuring best 
practices; supporting new product development units’ innovation initiatives; and fashioning safe 
spaces (‘shelter’) for promising projects. Of these roles, the latter three are relevant to the current 
study. Project managers will directly cultivate the skillsets of team members they oversee; will be 
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assigned to the innovation project or, alternatively, be a part of the acquired workforce (in which case 
the market gap has already been identified); will be directly involved in facilitating the generation of 
ideas; and will not be responsible for seed funding. All these responsibilities of the CINO fall beyond 
the requirements of the innovation team and its leader. The remaining CINO duties are therefore 
relevant to the study; these reasons are discussed below.  
Thus, the latter three duties CINOs should undertake with reference to the team are, according to di 
Fiore (2014): encouraging and ensuring best practices; supporting new product development units’ 
innovation initiatives; and fashioning safe spaces for promising projects. Firstly, best practices 
should be instituted; in this role, di Fiore (2014) states that the CINO is tasked with actively scouting 
the practices currently used in innovation initiatives. With regards to market research and business 
experimentation methods, innovation teams will need to be held accountable for results, indicating 
that resources are being deployed for the achievement of organisational learning (di Fiore, 2014; 
Thomke & Manzi, 2014).  
Wedell-Wedellsborg (2014), however, argues that there is only one aspect that unifies the majority 
of the job descriptions in the relatively new realm of innovation leadership; this is how they measure 
their progress in the role. The first manner of measurement is the real-world impact of their efforts; 
this means of measurement is likely only applicable for incremental innovations which are soon 
marketed. The second is that they define metrics of their innovation leadership success by 
developing them over a year or so. Moreover, the most successful of innovators in resourceful 
organisations create short-term means of measuring innovation successes, such as creating a 
feedback pipeline from users in a matter of days (Wedell-Wedellsborg, 2014). Thus, best practices 
for evaluating the portfolio of innovation experiments should emerge from an iterative process.  
Secondly, the CINO should support new product development (NPD) units and innovation initiatives. 
This role involves facilitating the methodologies employed by critical innovation teams in the 
organisation (di Fiore, 2014), such as the prevalent dedicated team vehicle (Barczak et al., 2009). 
The CINO also coaches other managers to act in this capacity (di Fiore, 2014). Thirdly, the CINO 
provides shelters for projects with promise and di Fiore (2014) argues that innovations that have the 
potential to be disruptive in nature may require special shielding from premature resource cuts or 
idea dismissal as these may turn out to be industry-changing products or services for the 
organisation. Kanjanabootra (2017) goes one step further and maintains that CINOs must 
proactively seek out these disruptive ideas. Given the discussion of the innovation-related roles of 
the TMT, CEO and CINO, other roles that facilitate innovation ventures, such as gatekeepers, 
sponsors and champions, are discussed in the following section.  
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2.3.5 Additional roles facilitating innovation  
For successful facilitation of innovation to take place, scholars have argued that certain role players 
are necessary to the initiative both externally and internally, such as those that assist the project’s 
introduction into the formal R&D processes (Markham et al., 2010) and those that effective 
innovation leaders exhibit (Kim et al., 1999). Furthermore, Klerkx and Aarts (2013) put forth that 
several diverse actors, or role players, are necessary to the organisation’s staff as individuals but 
that, for innovation to be supported, they coordinate and collaborate for best results.  
2.3.5.1 Roles that facilitate the innovation project    
The empirical work of Markham et al. (2010:402) argues that three major roles exist that contribute 
significantly to the formal development of innovations in projects, namely innovation sponsors, 
gatekeepers and champions.  
(a)  Sponsors 
Firstly, sponsors of innovation avail and deliver resources to the project to assist it in eventuating at 
a commercialisable offering (Ettlie and Rosenthal, 2012). Kuratko et al. (2011:234) also term this 
role a “facilitator” who pushes for other organisational players to accept the venture through to its 
fruition by engaging them as well as by mentoring the leader of the project. Sponsors have been so 
successful, in fact, that some organisational model innovation scholars have called for basing a 
competitive imitator model solely on sponsors availing resources to peers internal to the organisation 
(Casadesus-Masanell & Zhu, 2013).  
(b)   Gatekeepers 
The gatekeeper role serves to stipulate various yardsticks the project must meet to be successful in 
moving to the formal development stage of the organisation (Markham et al., 2010; Ter Wal, 
Criscuolo & Salter, 2017). It has also been argued that these actors play an important role at an 
organisational level, as their role affords them the opportunity to have a universal view of the 
knowledge base of the organisation, information they can use to improve it (Harorimana, 2009). Kim 
et al. (1999) put forth that this actor requires significant technical, organisational and market 
information to execute their role with a view to facilitating transformation in value creation efforts. 
Moreover, the information gatekeeper role of the R&D team leader, like the champion (discussed in 
section 2.3.5.1c), is played in the levels external to the team, such as individual members of the TMT 
(Kim et al., 1999).  
(c)   Champions 
Champions are organisation employees charged with identifying opportunities for innovation and 
campaigning for their development (Sergeeva, 2016). Kuratko et al. (2011) characterise the 
champion as a driver and director of the venture who supervises implementation, augmentation of 
concept and supporting the project through any hurdles it may face through to its completion. The 
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greatest power and responsibility of this role is possibly the first pitch of the concept to management 
and whether it is then approved for R&D and commercialisation (Chakrabarti, 1974). Howell (2005) 
argues that these players emerge in manners that are informal, which is to say beyond the 
systematic authorisation of managers, or hierarchy.  
Given the roles that facilitate the innovation project from externally and internally, the roles of the 
innovation project leader, or R&D leader, are examined below.  
2.3.5.2 Roles that the leader of the R&D project must play  
Kim et al. (1999:153) put forth that four roles positively influence the performance of R&D teams, 
including: gatekeeper; team builder; technical expert; and strategic planner. As the gatekeeper role 
has been addressed in section 2.3.5.1b, this section deals only with the latter three of the four roles. 
The study of Kim et al. (1999) also included the role of the innovation champion, but did not find that 
leaders championing the project with external parties to the team to be important to the internal 
functioning to the team level, the latter of which is important to the study because of the team level 
of integration.  
(a)  Team-building 
The concept of team-building can be defined as those activities undertaken which aim to enable a 
group to come to be a unified working entity capable of operating at the highest levels of performance 
(Constantine, 1993). Furthermore, de Meuse and Liebowitz (1981) define team-building as an 
intervention undertaken over the long run that aims to develop skills related to working together 
effectively as a team in a structured approach. Moreover, team-building promotes team cooperation, 
friction resolution and the facilitation of trust among group members (Wand & Howell, 2010).  
Team-building is arguably necessary in the early stages of team formation but this significance 
decreases over the lifespan of the project (Kim et al., 1999) as teams establish trust (Turaga, 2013), 
which takes time (Hut & Molleman, 1998). Kim et al. (1999) also argue that an R&D team leader’s 
team-building role is less important than strategic planning (discussed in section 2.3.5.2(c) below) in 
uncertain projects – ergo team-building is the most important role in certain projects. Furthermore, 
the team-building role is an internal one, undertaken by the project leader (Kim et al., 1999).  
(b)   Technical expert  
The leader’s role often requires a level of technical expertise, which involves idea generation and 
recognition, complex problem-solving and stimulation of the innovation process, all of which are 
necessary for R&D team members to esteem these leaders (Kim et al., 1999).  
(c)   Strategic planner  
Kim et al. (1999) argue that the strategic planning role of an R&D team leader is debatably most 
important in projects characterised by high levels of uncertainty. In a conventional sense, project 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
  
29 
    
   
leaders set venture goals, develop action plans with deadlines, allocate resources, assign 
responsibilities to team members and evaluate the process. However, project leaders in innovation 
and R&D experience difficulty in establishing strategic goals and organising the mechanisms 
necessary to realise these goals, as transformative projects seek to conquer the unfamiliar and the 
new (Kim et al., 1999). Thus, the leader’s strategic planning role is critical to effective innovation 
efforts as the role which undertakes the specification of strategic focal areas and flexible planning 
for the purposes of managing unforeseen and unavoidable contingencies that arise during the 
innovation execution process (Barczak & Wilemon, 1989).  
Additionally, one-way managers, such as the CINO and innovation leaders, can provide shelter for 
promising innovation initiatives by making slack resources available to employees for 
experimentation (Keegan & Turner, 2002), which is discussed in the following section.  
2.3.6 Availing slack resources for innovation experimentation 
Anderson et al. (2014) hold that the matter of availing slack resources to employees for the purpose 
of innovation experiments has been examined in the literature. Slack resources refers to various 
corporate resources that top management provides employees access to for experimentation 
purposes (Keegan & Turner, 2002; Tidd & Bessant, 2013). Experimental slack resources, such as 
time, can lead to new ideas with marketable potential from within the organisation (Malhotra, 
Majchrzak, Kesebi & Looram, 2017). Slack includes but is not limited to: freed up working time 
(Lichtenthaler, 2016; Rasmussen, Mosey & Wright, 2014) and available workspaces, such as 
laboratories (Schneider-Sikorsky, 2014).  
Moreover, innovation scholars (such as Levinthal & March, 1981) have been interested in the 
effectiveness of the practice of availing human and financial resources to employees for 
experimentation; this has been the case since a seminal work of the resource-based view (RBV) 
proposed by Penrose (1959). In fact, organisational slack has been seen as both a positive and a 
negative in the literature (Nohria & Gulati, 1996). Regarding the latter, some researchers indicate 
that slack may be wasteful and unjustified (Bradley, Wiklund & Shepherd, 2011; Mosakowski, 2002). 
The former, however, has been more widely accepted by the managerial community, evidenced by 
the continued availing of slack resources in organisations today (Govindarajan & Srinivas, 2013); 
some discoveries have successfully eventuated from this practice, such as the Post-It (Chesbrough, 
2003a).  
It has, however, been argued that slack resources are less wasted and put to more valuable use if 
allocated to teams rather than simply made available to individual employees alone (Bunduchi, 
2009). This argument has been underscored elsewhere in the literature, namely in Jalote, Palit, 
Kurien and Peethamber (2004), where these scholars suggest that reduced resource wastage is 
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achieved by allocating resources to teams dedicated to the project. Thus, it can be argued that 
availing slack resources to teams pursuing innovation execution can be successfully undertaken.  
Nevertheless, wherever the promising idea for an innovative value proposition originates, once it is 
approved, it is often taken through to the formation of a team, such as a dedicated team, which acts 
as the primary vehicle for research and development (Barczak et al., 2009). As such, the framework 
advanced by Govindarajan and Trimble (2010a; 2010b), as mentioned in Virta (2017), is utilised to 
explain the formation of the dedicated team in the following section. The dedicated team these 
authors put forth is relevant to the study as , the team level of analysis is considered in the literature 
reviewed on innovation and the innovation execution process, particularly regarding the dedicated 
team as put forward by Govindarajan and Trimble (2010a) (Virta, 2017). The team level of analysis 
is relevant to the study as the research problem concerns managerial and/or leadership 
considerations for team integrations of small innovation acquisitions. 
2.4 TEAM LEVEL: THE DEDICATED TEAM AND ITS EXTERNALITIES 
Innovation initiatives requiring experimentation are best executed by project teams (Magnusson & 
Berggren, 2001) or dedicated teams (Barczak et al., 2009; Bianchi, Richtnér & Modig, 2014; Cooper 
& Sommer, 2016). Satell (2016) argues that established organisations should employ and facilitate 
dedicated teams because the organisation may struggle to innovate given that its focus is likely on 
improving operational efficiencies (Parmar, Mackenzie, Cohn & Gann, 2014; Porter, 1996; Velamuri, 
Bansemir, Neyer & Möslein, 2013). However, this team operates as a lean start-up and focuses on 
iterative product development through trial-and-error experimentation (Bianchi et al., 2014; Satell, 
2016). As a result, the formation and support of DTs can lend to an organisation’s ability to be 
ambidextrous in both exploiting current operations and strengths as well as exploring lucrative 
opportunities (Virta, 2017).  
In the operational model proposed by Govindarajan and Trimble (2010a:27-28; 2010b:79-80), the 
DT and the established organisation are connected by means of a partnership.  The DT is made up 
of individuals that are exclusively focused on the non-routine tasks that an innovation initiative 
requires (Bagno, Salerno & Dias, 2017). The established organisation should assemble a shared 
staff, which includes people working in operations, to partner with the DT to provide it with access to 
resources which it will need to execute the innovation “plan” (Govindarajan & Trimble, 2010a:15-16).  
2.4.1 Stage one: Divide the labour 
At the inception of an innovation initiative, the breakdown of responsibility and labour should be 
divided and distributed between the branches of the partnership: the DT and the shared staff, both 
of which are overseen by the innovation leader (Govindarajan & Trimble, 2010a; 2010b), in this study 
the innovation acquisition champion. The situation of the shared staff, the innovation team leader 
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and the DT in the organisational structure is graphically illustrated in Figure 2.3 below; thereafter, 







FIGURE 2.3: Organising the innovation project team in the organisational structure 
(Source: Adapted from Govindarajan & Trimble, 2010a:28-48)  
2.4.1.1 Dedicated team  
The DT is comprised of a diverse group of employees who are committed to carrying out atypical 
job tasks related to innovation execution, which the rest of the organisation is not involved in, trained 
for or otherwise able to take on (Bagno et al., 2017). The types of tasks the DT is responsible for 
may include research and development, design thinking processes and rapid prototyping, as 
examples (Govindarajan & Trimble, 2010a; 2010b; Hamel & Tennant, 2015; Leavy, 2012). 
Furthermore, the DT approaches experimentation without bias insofar as team members collaborate 
to eventuate at a feasible, marketable product (Torres & Galvis, 2017).  
Govindarajan and Trimble (2010b) argue for hiring outsiders to the DT as it mitigates the risk of 
recreating a group of conventional wisdom within DTs. This can be caused by the far-reaching 
consequences of organisational memory, also known as organisational ‘DNA’ (Govindarajan & 
Trimble, 2010b:80; Yoo & Kim, 2015:74), which many full-time employees have embedded in their 
understanding of corporate culture (Schein, 2004).  
Thus, if only internal transfers are considered for this team, these scholars argue that the DT will 
likely turn out similarly to the permanent ongoing operations of the organisation and not deviate from 
the corporate status quo sufficiently to be considered very innovative (Govindarajan & Trimble, 
2010a; 2010b; Yoo & Kim, 2015).  
2.4.1.2 Shared staff 
The shared staff (SS) are comprised of employees from the performance engine (PE), which 
essentially encompasses all employees involved in ongoing operations. Shared staff members liaise 
with the DT and perform two main functions. Firstly, they undertake routine tasks in the execution of 
Chief executive officer 
Chief operations officer Innovation project leader 
Dedicated team Performance engine 
Shared staff Partnership 
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innovation; these are simply tasks that are commonly found on their job description as a part of the 
ongoing operations of the organisation. Secondly, they are also empowered by management to gain 
access to valuable resources on behalf of the DT, which the leader cannot. This may include access 
to factory lines during non-peak production times or materials and other resources that the DT can 
use for their experiments (Govindarajan & Trimble, 2010a; 2010b; Thomke & Manzi, 2014). 
2.4.1.3 Innovation project leader  
Florén and Frishammar (2012) emphasise the importance of a strong project manager heading the 
DT as this individual can rally support and gain access to resources for the team’s experiments in 
creating a commercialisable innovation. As can be seen in Figure 2.3, the innovation project leader 
is responsible for managing the DT directly as well as reporting to top management positions, such 
as the CEO and chief operations officer (COO) (Govindarajan & Trimble, 2010a; 2010b).  
Furthermore, this manager oversees the shared staff, which is in a partnership with the DT 
(Govindarajan & Trimble, 2010a; 2010b). The rationale of this leader cooperating and networking 
with the CEO, COO, DT and SS for the purposes of facilitating the execution of innovation has been 
argued for by Beckett and Berendsen (2015:1) as well, who term this role that of an “interaction 
champion”. Similarly, Edmondson (2003) advances that effectively undertaking this boundary-
spanning role is associated with implementing technology. It has also been suggested that this role 
is most effectively performed when assumed by leaders, and not teams.  
Additionally, the innovation team leader is responsible for integrating the various insiders and 
outsiders of the DT as well as running a series of disciplined experiments to arrive at a 
commercialisable value proposition that is innovative and can capture value for the organisation 
(Govindarajan & Trimble, 2010a; 2010b). The duty of integrating members and building the team 
has been argued as particularly important in the early stages of an R&D project (Kim et al., 1999) to 
build relationships between team members (Pirola-Merlo, Härtel, Mann & Hirst, 2002). Disciplined 
experimentation in teams is more effectively conducted if strong project leadership is at the helm 
(Yukl, 2009). Given the discussion of the division of labour in the DT-shared staff partnership and its 
selection of the innovation project leader, the second stage, build the team, is discussed below.  
2.4.2 Stage two: Assemble the dedicated team 
In assembling a DT, Govindarajan and Trimble (2010a; 2010b) prescribe three critical steps: firstly, 
to identify the skills needed; secondly, to hire the best people the leader can find; and, thirdly, to 
match the initiative to the project team’s organisational model (Govindarajan & Trimble, 2010b). 
Prior to hiring individuals based on their capabilities, the skills required for the innovation initiative 
should be identified. This modus operandi will ensure that the DT is characterised by all necessary 
personal know-how (tacit knowledge), practical previous experience, technical competencies and 
creativity. Once the skills have been identified, the pool of insiders should be reviewed for potential 
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candidates as well as considering capable outsiders who possess skills that are perhaps not as 
prevalent in the organisation at the time (Govindarajan & Trimble, 2010a; 2010b). 
Dussauge, Hart and Ramanantsoa (1992), Galbraith (1982) as well as Magnusson and Berggren 
(2001) have advocated for the superiority of using a dedicated team, which is separate from the day-
to-day operating functions of the wider organisation, as these scholars believe that it is a superior 
vehicle to use in the pursuit of commercialisable, more radical innovations, given that they are led 
by a strong project manager.  
2.4.3 Stage three: Manage the partnership 
Developing a symbiotic, synergistic partnership is challenging due to the divergent perspectives, 
opinions, interests and priorities of the team, which require active managing and leading for the 
initiative to achieve success (Govindarajan & Trimble, 2010a; 2010b; Morgan, 2006). This is perhaps 
why many organisational difficulties originate from strained relationships (Ilgaz, 2014). In innovation 
teams, leaders dedicate more than 20 per cent of their time to resolving team conflict alone (Kratzer, 
Leenders & van Engelen, 2006:97).  
Thus, an additional sub-model has been put forth, which deals with anticipating and mitigating the 
strains in the partnership of the DT and SS. These two groups do not work together naturally, which 
means that a collaborative approach with the performance engine is necessary. To foster such a 
synergetic relationship, Govindarajan & Trimble (2010a) suggests three challenges (see Figure 2.4 
below) that should be anticipated before they can be managed.  
 
 
FIGURE 2.4: Common challenges faced in managing the partnership 
(Source: Adapted from Govindarajan & Trimble, 2010a:78) 
The DT competes for scarce resources from the performance engine, as they depend on the time, 
energies and attentions of shared staff, which can create disharmony in partnerships between the 
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a small project team has been created and assembled, opportunities must be founded for managing 
experimentation and succeeding in attainment of small wins early on. Similarly, Govindarajan and 
Trimble (2010a) advance that rigorous innovation experimentation must take place at the team level. 
Hülsheger et al. (2009) have reasoned that the management of these teams is vital for successful 
innovation to take place.  
The following section discusses the part of the framework that these researchers advance, which 
they call innovation execution, and combines other prescriptions present in the literature. It is salient 
to note that the literature, by and large, refers to the innovation process rather than innovation 
execution as proposed by Govindarajan and Trimble (Virta, 2017); therefore, the wider literature 
pertaining to the innovation process is reviewed in the following section as well as innovation 
execution and the dedicated team’s role therein.  
2.5 THE INNOVATION PROCESS  
Many innovation processes have been proposed by multiple scholars, culminating in several 
generations of innovation processes (Abidin, Mokhtar & Yusoff, 2013; Rothwell, 1994). Moreover, 
recent examples will be presented and discussed, including the generic processes of Tidd and 
Bessant (2013) and Smith (2010) as well as the DT-driven process of Govindarajan and Trimble 
(2010a). This section presents existing knowledge on the various innovation processes that have 
been advanced by scholars since the start of innovation as a discipline. As Govindarajan and 
Trimble’s innovation execution process is considered in this study as a result of its focus on teams 
dedicated to developing innovations, perhaps made up of small acquisitions (Govindarajan & 
Trimble, 2010a:53). It is also the case that small innovation acquisitions that are integrated into 
teams may be charged with undertaking an innovation execution process to develop an innovation, 
making innovation processes and innovation execution processes relevant to the study.  
2.5.1 Innovation process generations  
The work by Rothwell (1994) that actualised the identification of evolving innovation processes from 
the 1950s has been called a seminal work by scholars such as Meissner and Kotsemir (2016) as 
well as Zajkowska (2015). As such, Rothwell’s five generations are reviewed in this section, as well 
as the sixth generation advanced by Chesbrough (2003b:35) which is known as “open innovation” 
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TABLE 2.1: The six generations of innovation management processes  
Generation  Innovation 
process 
model 
Period  Nature of the model  
1 Technology 
push  
1950s–Late 1960s Linear process  
2 Market 
(demand) pull  
Late 1960s–Mid-1970s Research and development on the desires of 
the customer  
3 Coupling  Mid-1970s–end 1980s Interaction between organisational functions  
4 Integrated End 1980s–early 1990s Parallel processing with feedback loops  
5 Networking  1990s Systems integration and networks (SIN) 
6 Open 
innovation 
2000s Collaborating and exploiting multiple paths for 
innovation  
(Source: Adapted from Chesbrough, 2003b:35-41; Rothwell, 1994:8-12; Smith 2010:114-123)  
2.5.1.1 The first generation: Technology push  
For nearly two decades spanning the 1950s and 1960s, the dominant process model employed by 
innovating organisations was linear in nature, with sequential stages to follow, and the driving force 
behind this process was scientific discovery (Rothwell, 1992; 1994). New or improved technologies, 
research and technological possibilities lead to refined design and engineering, and if this is 
successful to mass production, marketing to the target customer and promoting the new product on 
the market, meaning that it is immaterial whether a demand exists in the market or not to the 
innovator organisation (Brem & Voigt, 2009). This sequential process model is presented in Figure 
2.5 below.  
 
FIGURE 2.5: First generation technology push process 
(Source: Adapted from Rothwell, 1994:8)  
Smith (2010) argues that the base assumption of this model is that additional investments in research 
and development increase the likelihood of discovering more technologies, which then leads to more 
innovation. While this model was successfully and widely implemented in the middle of the twentieth 
century, it gave way to the market pull model, the second generation. 
2.5.1.2 The second generation: Market pull  
In many cases, consumers are inadequately satisfied with the value offerings on the market at any 
given point in time, which they are aware of and want (or need) producers to create, manufacture 
and sell these products and services that consumers demand (Brem & Voigt, 2009), which is to say 
that they are marketed and sold at prices consumers are both willing and able to buy at (Meszaros 
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& Evans, 2010). Therefore, the impetus to the market pull innovation process, popular from the late 
1960s to the mid-1970s, was in gaining market insights to determine the needs and wants of 
consumers; once the demand of the consumer was identified, innovators went to work developing 
the desired value proposition and once it was commercialisable, it was produced en masse and sold 
to the market (Rothwell, 1994; Smith, 2010). This process is presented in Figure 2.6 below.  
 
FIGURE 2.6: Second generation market push process 
(Source: Adapted from Rothwell, 1994:9)  
Given the discussion of the chiefly linear, sequential innovation process models of the first generation 
(technology push) and second generation (market pull), the more dynamic, third generation process 
is presented hereafter.  
2.5.1.3 The third generation: Coupling  
As many industries faced significant levels of complexity in their value creation processes, scholars 
asserted that the two previously discussed linear processes were arguably too oversimplified to 
encompass and fully serve the tasks of idea generation and innovation implementation in the mid-
1970s to late 1980s (Rothwell, 1994; Smith, 2010). This is especially true for organisations operating 
in macro environments characterised by challenging socio-economic and market demands and 
rapidly advanced technologies and production processes (Hobday, Boddington & Grantham, 2011; 
Schwab, 2016; Smith, 2010). In response to these criticisms of the first and second generation 
models, the third was born: “coupling” (Godin & Lane, 2013:10-11; Smith, 2010:116).  
Essentially, the coupling model is so named because combines the prior two generational models 
and show the direct impact socio-economic needs and technological advances should have on both 
the innovation process and the innovations the organisation puts into the marketplace to solve 
problems or exploit opportunities (Nacu & Avasilcai, 2015). It aims to ‘couple’ or build a relationship 
between the various activities and role players involved in innovation and its execution (Godin & 
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FIGURE 2.7: Third generation coupling process 
(Source: Adapted from Rothwell, 1994:10)  
As can be seen in the above model’s various relationships (graphically illustrated using arrows), this 
process allows for several feedback loops between the linear, sequential stages of innovation 
implementation (refer to the green boxes) and responsive loops to the external environmental forces 
of the needs of the market and society as well as highly advanced technology and process innovation 
in production (refer to the blue boxes) (Rothwell, 1994; Smith, 2010).  
This model allows for high levels of interaction and interdependence between the internal innovation 
execution stages, indicated by feedback loops, which represent lines of open and clear 
communication between role players within, while simultaneously maintaining an outward view as 
well (Smith, 2010). However, as can be seen in the above figure, this model has a significant 
constraint: there is very little attention paid to integrating functions, such as marketing, R&D and 
operational production (du Preez, Louw & Essmann, 2006). Another example of a third-generation 
linear innovation process is the “stage-gate model” (Cooper, 1990:44; du Preez et al., 2006:4), which 
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FIGURE 2.8: Stage-gate model  
(Source: Adapted from Cooper, 1990:46)  
In keeping with the third-generation tradition of innovation models, the stage-gate model proposed 
by Cooper (1990) was linear, sequential (du Preez et al., 2006) and allows for the clarification of 
individual and team accountability (Cooper, 2006), which is important to determine formally for the 
innovation to successfully eventuate (Brem & Voigt, 2009).  
2.5.1.4 The fourth generation: Integrated/parallel processing   
The movement towards the fourth generation had the disadvantage of more complex 
conceptualising and managing of innovation execution as a result of responding to the levels of 
complexity existing in society, the marketplace and the customer base (Ortt & van der Duin, 2008). 
The more complex processes introduced in the late 1980s through the early 1990s were integrated 
or parallel processing models (Rothwell, 1994) that can be characterised as having an iterative 
orientation (Hobday, 2005). The model of the fourth generation fostered more cost effective and 
expeditious new product development processes, which is advantageous for achieving a rapid time 
to market; the model of this era also promoted integration and cross-functional projects (Neely & Hii, 

























     
Idea 













Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
  
39 
    











FIGURE 2.9: Fourth generation integrated/parallel processing model  
(Source: Adapted from Neely & Hii, 1998:14; Smith, 2010:117)  
Heightened competition in the 1980s led to the need for a more integrated perspective on managing 
innovation execution from the initial idea to commercialisation (Smith, 2010). Rothwell (1994) asserts 
that this integrated, overlapping approach of bringing the different innovation functions together in 
the early stages of the meetings of managers and engineers (refer to the triangles which represent 
these meetings in the above figure) was inspired by innovative Japanese organisations, which they 
accomplish in a parallel rather than in a serial manner, which is more linear. Correspondingly, Neely 
and Hii (1998) also relate the influence Japanese organisations had on this generation of innovation 
processes. Terziovski (2002:6) identifies the influential Japanese process-orientated principle of 
“kaizen” as a key success factor of this generational model, which refers to the practice of using 
problem-solving techniques for detecting and solving issues that arise in innovation execution 
processes.  
2.5.1.5 The fifth generation: Network innovation  
The 1990s saw an increased interest in gaining an understanding of the external stakeholders that 
either directly or indirectly influence the various organisational and innovation functions, which in 
turn affect knowledge creation (du Preez et al., 2006); this can be seen in Figure 2.10 below. External 
inputs by various stakeholders can be seen in the figure, such as: societal needs; relations with 
suppliers; customers; rivals; distributors; scientific discoveries; new technologies; and tertiary 
education departments (du Preez & Louw, 2008). Thus, effective networking with these stakeholders 
can be beneficial for the accumulation of organisational and innovation knowledge (du Preez & Louw, 
2008). 
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FIGURE 2.10: Fifth generation network innovation model  
(Source: Adapted from du Preez & Louw, 2008:550)  
As can be seen in the figure above, the model is far less linear and process-orientated than the 
previous four models as it is cyclical; it seeks to understand the wider external network in which 
knowledge creation takes place (du Preez & Louw, 2008).  
Rothwell (1994) identified the fifth generation innovation process in the mid-1990s and wrote a 
seminal work on the subject (Meissner & Kotsemir, 2016; Zajkowska, 2015). From a strategic 
management point of view, the model this scholar advanced encompassed many elements. Firstly, 
a focus on efficiency in developing new products is a strategic objective. Secondly, centring on 
quality over price is important. Thirdly, responsible and adaptable corporate citizenship is significant. 
Furthermore, a customer orientation is used in the NPD process. In addition, integrating important 
suppliers and customers into the design process (Rothwell, 1994), which is today more widely known 
as co-design (Hanafy & ElMaraghy, 2014).  
Fundamentally, Rothwell (1994) advocated for the fifth generation networking model for innovation 
as primarily geared towards making innovation leaner than in previous waves. Lean innovation refers 
to removing waste in the process of innovation execution, essentially implementation from idea 
through to experimentation, to create the most value from the most purposeful investment (Radeka, 
2013). The fifth generation of innovation was the first that could be considered an open system, 
where various external stakeholders and their influences on the continuous internal knowledge 
accumulation process were included in the conceptualisation of the model (Smith, 2010:121). Thus, 
the preceding four were all closed to external influence (Smith, 2010). The sixth generation, open 
innovation, was first proposed by Chesbrough (2003b).  
 
 













































Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
  
41 
    
   
2.5.1.6 The sixth generation: Open innovation  
Chesbrough (2003b) proposed the concept of open innovation as the new innovation process which 
extends externalisation further (Smith, 2010; Tidd & Bessant, 2013); the model of open innovation 
is presented in Figure 2.11 below. As can be seen in the figure, various innovative research projects 
are underway at any given time, both within the internal realm of the organisation boundary as well 
as externally to the organisation. Whether the project is within the organisation or external to it, each 
project is at a different stage of completion, which can be seen in the figure: some may be early in 
the research and development process whereas others may already be in the commercialisation 












FIGURE 2.11: Sixth generation open innovation process  
(Source: Adapted from Chesbrough, 2003b:37; Smith, 2010:121-123; Tidd & Bessant, 2013:271)  
Organisations pursuing open innovation models offer them multiple options for either ending the 
venture (represented by the stationary blue dots in the figure) or approving the research project. If 
so, those projects which are relevant to the organisation’s customer base or potential customer 
bases (considered the new market) are researched and developed within the organisation’s 
boundaries to deliver the offering to the current market. In cases where the innovative value 
proposition is deemed inappropriate for the marketing of the organisation, it is commercialised 
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means of strategic alliances and other external strategic options (Chesbrough, 2003b; Smith, 2010; 
Tidd & Bessant, 2013).  
This section has discussed the six generations of innovation management processes that have 
spanned decades from the mid-twentieth to the early twenty-first century, which are summarised in 
Table 2.1. Given the discussion of these models, the following section introduces and discusses 
innovation processes that have been more recently advanced in the literature.  
2.5.2 Recent innovation processes  
Resulting from the legacies of the six generations of innovation management models put forth in the 
literature and applied in industry, relatively more recent processes are discussed below (du Preez & 
Louw, 2008; Govindarajan & Trimble, 2010a; 2010b; Nolan & Williams, 2010; Tidd & Bessant, 2013).  
2.5.2.1 Generic four-phase innovation process  
Firstly, a generic innovation process comprising four phases has been put forth by Tidd and Bessant 
(2013): search; select; implement; and capture (refer to Figure 2.12 below). Salerno, Gomes, da 
Silva, Bagno and Freitas (2015) have argued that these four phases encompass a one-size-fits-all 
approach that has been traditionally adopted by innovation management scholars, such as Cooper 
(1990) and Utterback (1971). However, the four-phase process has largely endured in Tidd and 
Bessant’s (2013), the first edition of which – Tidd, Bessant & Pavitt (2005) – has been cited 7856 
times, according to Google Scholar on 31 August 2017 (Google Scholar, 2017).  
 
FIGURE 2.12: The four-phase generic innovation process 
(Source: Adapted from Tidd & Bessant, 2013:21-47) 
In this process, the first phase is known as “search” (Tidd & Bessant, 2013:22) and “idea generation” 
(Utterback, 1971:78). According to this model, for the innovation process to be started, an idea is 
necessary to begin and these can originate from various sources, including the research and 
development department, ‘Eureka’ moments (sudden flashes of discovery), signals from the 
marketplace, updated regulations and behaviour of rivals (Tidd & Bessant, 2009:19).  
Secondly, “select” (Tidd & Bessant, 2013:22) and “problem solving” (Utterback, 1971:78) comprises 
the next phase. If a pool of ideas is constantly being generated, one is strategically chosen for 
innovation execution, if deemed viable and marketable (Tidd & Bessant, 2013). Conversely, 
   Search  Select  Implement   Capture  
Do we have a clear innovation strategy? 
Do we have an innovative organisation? 
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Utterback (1971) contends that this step deals with developing a novel technical solution that is ready 
to go to market.  
The third phase is “implement” (Tidd & Bessant, 2013:22) and “implementation” (Utterback, 
1971:78). Whereas Tidd and Bessant (2013) explain the phase of implementing as the strategic 
commitment of resources to creating a marketable value proposition, Utterback (1971) sees this 
implementation as market introduction, or early diffusion (Hsueh, 2011; Nejad, Sherrell & Babakus, 
2014).  
The final phase is “capture” (Tidd & Bessant, 2013:22) and “diffusion” (Utterback, 1971:78). Although 
Tidd and Bessant (2013) view capture as profiting from introducing the innovation to the market for 
the first time, Utterback (1971) describes this phase as increasing marketing promotion efforts with 
consumers to stimulate demand, purchases and majority diffusion (Hsueh, 2011; Nejad et al., 2014). 
With reference to Figure 2.12, Tidd and Bessant (2013) pose two significant questions on the 
peripheries of the figure. The first is: “Do we have a clear innovation strategy?” and the second is: 
“Do we have an innovative organisation?” (Tidd & Bessant, 2013:47) Innovation strategy and 
organisational innovativeness are significant factors for the creation of effective innovation 
processes and successful marketed innovations. The importance of top-level strategic planning and 
fostering innovation strategy and innovativeness throughout the organisation is important (Tidd & 
Bessant, 2013).  
2.5.2.2 The Fugle process of innovation 
The Fugle process of innovation comprises two phases, which are centred on the development and 
exploitation of a portfolio of prospective innovations (du Preez & Louw, 2008). As can be seen in 
Figure 2.13 below, ideation is the first stage of phase one and encompasses generating and filtering 
ideas to arrive at the stage of defining the concept. The third stage involves refining the possible 
ideas and concepts to arrive at only feasible possibilities for innovative value offerings to be 
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FIGURE 2.13: Fugle innovation process  
(Source: Adapted from du Preez et al., 2006:15)  
The second phase is also made up of three stages, the first of which sees the organisation deploy 
(or launch) projects in which they design, execute and test the idea in the market. Secondly, the 
success of the launch is then monitored to ensure the proposition lives up to specifications and 
anticipated performance in the market. The formalised offering is expanded and exploited in the 
market to generate additional value as much as possible (du Preez & Louw, 2008).  
2.5.2.3 Two process mindsets   
Organisations striving to operate efficiently in fast changing environments and compete effectively 
engage in two modes of thinking, operational and innovative, which continually feed into each other 









FIGURE 2.14: Two process mindsets  
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In Nolan and Williams’ (2010) operations cycle, the procedures, routines and rules drive the daily, 
expected operations, all of which are knowns; the thinking in this cycle is based on logic and facts 
as well as analysing present scenarios of mainly confirmed knowns. On the reverse side, the cycle 
of innovation requires being easy with various unknowns; for example, a new idea may arise, which 
will need to be developed and further conceptualised until it can be included as a possible innovation 
to be experimented on until it is commercialisable, at which stage the innovation is input into the 
operations cycle. The thinking in this cycle is speculative, exploratory and future-orientated and 
focussed on ideas that are yet untested (Nolan & Williams, 2010).  
In summary, modern innovation processes in organisations are iterative, non-linear, cyclical and 
taxing on those involved, whether they are initiators or implementing innovators with a role to play in 
innovation execution (Anderson, de Dreu & Nijstad, 2004). However, the processes put forth in this 
section (du Preez & Louw, 2008; Govindarajan & Trimble, 2010a; 2010b; Nolan & Williams, 2010; 
Tidd & Bessant, 2013) while comprehensible, logical and applicable, lack any prescriptive, concrete 
recommendations for managers on how to organise people and develop a dedicated team within the 
innovation initiative and the leadership challenges that accompany this endeavour. As such, the 
operational model proposed by Govindarajan and Trimble (2010a; 2010b), which has a focus on the 
DT for innovation experimentation in the innovation execution process, is considered because of this 
inclusion and focus.  
2.5.3 An innovation execution process undertaken by a dedicated team 
Virta (2017) has advanced the Govindarajan and Trimble (2010a; 2010b) framework as a useful 
model for both explicating and achieving an ambidextrous approach to innovation, which undertakes 
both exploitation of daily operations as well as exploration of future opportunities. Thus, this 
framework guides the execution of innovation in established organisations, which are relatively less 
equipped to innovate effectively as a result of maintaining their focus on operating efficiencies 
(Porter, 1996) and be somewhat bureaucratic (Virta, 2017), by establishing a link between 
operations and a team dedicated to innovation execution (Govindarajan & Trimble, 2010a; 2010b; 
Virta, 2017). This framework facilitates the work of DTs, which allows established organisations to 
gain organisational ambidexterity (Chen, 2017; Sætre & Brun, 2013; Virta, 2017), which is the 
simultaneous exploration of potential profitable innovations (new knowledge) as well as a 
continuation of the exploitation of current knowledge, resources and processes (Raisch, Birkinshaw, 
Probst & Tushman, 2009). According to Euchner and Ganguly (2014), this model has identified 
critical success factors for developing capable and prolific new innovation ventures within 
organisations and encompassed these factors in their model. Figure 2.15 below depicts this largely 
mutually exclusive nature of innovation execution.  
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FIGURE 2.15: The separation of ongoing operations and innovation 
(Source: Adapted from Govindarajan & Trimble, 2010a:16)  
As can be seen in Figure 2.15, these scholars’ framework for executing innovation is made up of two 
phases: firstly, “build the team” and, secondly, “run a disciplined experiment” (Govindarajan & 
Trimble, 2010a:vii-99), which can be seen in Figure 2.16 below. The three stages of the first phase 
are: firstly, dividing the labour; secondly, assembling the dedicated team; and, lastly, managing the 
partnership (Govindarajan & Trimble, 2010a:27-28; 2010b:79-82). The second phase, rigorous 
innovation experimentation, is discussed in the following section. 
FIGURE 2.16: Phases and stages of innovation execution  
(Source: Adapted from Govindarajan & Trimble, 2010a:vii-99; 2010b:79-82)  
Given the discussion of literature regarding the elements of organisational contexts that support 
innovation and the innovation processes proposed by various authors, the team level of analysis is 
considered hereafter. The assemblage of the DT, the formalisation of the innovation experiment and 
the criteria for holding innovation leaders accountable, namely for organisational learning, are 
discussed and reviewed in the rest of the chapter.  
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2.6 TEAM LEVEL: RIGOROUS INNOVATION EXECUTION AND EXPERIMENTATION 
Thomke and Manzi (2014) argue that the problem of developing a proposed innovation as a complex 
task. Due to the absence of existing tested data and organisational learning in cases of inventive 
novelty, managers often reflexively revert to their personal intuition and experience and to their 
organisation’s conventional wisdom. Thus, these researchers suggest rigorously applied scientific 
tests (Thomke & Manzi, 2014), which is in keeping with Govindarajan and Trimble’s (2010a:14-19) 
prescription that successful outcomes of innovation initiatives eventuate from disciplined planning 
and experimentation – innovation execution. The learning process is essentially made up of three 
steps: firstly, formalise the experiment; secondly, break down the hypothesis; and, thirdly, seek the 
truth (Govindarajan & Trimble, 2010a). Regarding the research problem of the current study, 
innovation execution and experimentation are of interest as integrated teams may be dedicated to 
these tasks during the integration process.  
2.6.1 Stage one: Formalise the experiment  
Thomke and Manzi (2014) put forth five conditions for effective experimentation in organisations, 
which is addressed first in this section. These authors argue that if these conditions are met, the 
project can go forward requiring two processes. The four-phase process of formalising such an 
experiment, according to Govindarajan and Trimble (2010a), is presented. In addition, the ten 
principles that should steer organisations’ experiments to achieve organisational learning optimally 
are also discussed (Govindarajan & Trimble, 2010a). 
2.6.1.1 Conditions for effective business experimentation  
Thomke and Manzi (2014:5) offer guidance for organisations embarking on experiments. For these 
experiments to be successful, even insofar as bringing about valuable organisational failures, five 
conditions should be met; these are presented in the form of questions the organisation must ask 
itself, from the top management team to the ranks of those carrying out the experiment (Thomke & 
Manzi, 2014).  
(a)  Clear purpose 
The first question is: “Does the experiment have a clear purpose?” (Thomke & Manzi, 2014:4). 
Experiments are often costly to the organisation conducting them in terms of financial and human 
(time) resources. Thus, they should only be conducted if only sensible manner of answering the 
questions necessary (Thomke & Manzi, 2014).  
(b)  Stakeholder commitment 
The second question is: “Have stakeholders made a commitment to abide by the results?” (Thomke 
& Manzi, 2014:5). Whatever the results turn out to be, stakeholders must act in accordance with 
them and not cherry-pick the findings that support their sense of reality or viewpoint. Therefore, if an 
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excitedly-anticipated project is not supported by the experiment’s ensuing data it should be 
discarded, which requires stakeholder commitment to results (Thomke & Manzi, 2014).  
(c)   Feasibility and achievability 
The third question is: “Is the experiment doable?” (Thomke & Manzi, 2014:6). For this question to be 
answered in the affirmative, the experiment would need to have a testable prediction, a realistic 
sample size and feasibility in conducting the experiment (Thomke & Manzi, 2014).  
(d)   Reliable results are ensured  
The fourth question is: “How can we ensure reliable results?” (Thomke & Manzi, 2014:7). As 
experiments require often-significant trade-offs (including time, cost, reliability and other 
pragmatisms), three methods can increase reliability and diminish trade-offs. Firstly, the marketable 
value offering can be tested in a randomised field trial to see how potential customers and consumers 
will respond. Secondly, blind tests can also be used, which involves test subjects not knowing that 
they are part of an observation while responding to a product or service. Moreover, big data can also 
be analysed for trends; however, big data usually point to existing industry trends, which don’t 
encompass very novel propositions (Thomke & Manzi, 2014). The method chosen will 
understandably be dependent on the value proposition. Davenport (2009) also emphasises that 
contemporary business experimentation, if conducted properly, produces valid and reliable results.   
(e)   Derived sufficient value from experimentation 
The fifth and final question is: “Have we gotten the most value out of the experiment?” (Thomke & 
Manzi, 2014:9). Due to the expense and trade-offs necessary for business experiments, 
organisations must get the most out of them by gaining and diffusing as much organisational learning 
as is possible (Thomke & Manzi, 2014). He suggests the creation of a ‘learning library’ for other 
employees to have access to, which will prevent repeating similar experiments and wasting valuable 
resources (Davenport, 2009:71).  
By conducting business experiments that produce results which managers and employees trust, 
outdated, inflexible conventional wisdom becomes eroded to the benefit of organisational 
innovativeness (Thomke & Manzi, 2014). Thus, to gain credibility in the organisation, 
experimentation should be formalised; Govindarajan and Trimble (2010a) propose a process to this 
end, discussed in the following section.  
2.6.1.2 Steps in formalising the experiment 
Formalising the experiment requires critical strategic thinking regarding the most efficient and 
effective course to follow in the innovation initiative’s experimenting. Figure 2.17 below displays the 
generic process, which innovation initiatives can assume, adjust and carry out given their 
experiments’ specific needs (Govindarajan & Trimble, 2010a). 
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FIGURE 2.17: The process of formalising the experiment 
(Source: Adapted from Govindarajan & Trimble, 2010a:106) 
Firstly, at the start of planning the innovation initiative, early predictions are made in the initiative’s 
process of devising a business or innovation experiment. To experiment effectively and learn from 
trialling, logic should be recorded at the start to ensure fruitful learning. Secondly, the testing stage 
of formalising the experiment deals with predicting outcomes as well as documenting auxiliary logic 
and assumptions. At this point, testing focuses on trials that allow for increasingly informed estimates 
to be made in experimenting. Thirdly, the measuring stage of the experiment’s formalisation is 
comprised of comparing initial predictions with results and gathering main learnings from the 
assessments. Lastly, after the particular experiment is conducted, the “plan” should be revised so 
that the next trial should then aim to test the innovation on the basis of new learnings, which 
influenced variables of the experiment itself (Govindarajan & Trimble, 2010a:103-106). Davenport 
(2009) states that if the experiment concludes in success, statistical significance should be ensured 
by testing market readiness. If this condition is met, market rollout can then be planned and gradually 
executed, which will allow the market diffusion to act as a test by itself (Davenport, 2009). However, 
for the innovation initiative to reach the market rollout stage, the “innovation plan” must be robust in 
that it rigorously carries out experiments (Govindarajan & Trimble, 2010a:12); to develop such a 
“plan”, Govindarajan and Trimble (2010a:107-116) propose ten principles.  
2.6.1.3 Principles for developing a robust innovation plan 
Innovation initiatives are subject to an entirely different set of rules to those of ongoing operations 
(Govindarajan & Trimble, 2010a:13). Therefore, they require their own exclusive plans to execute 
experiments (Govindarajan & Trimble, 2010a:107-108). Table 2.2 below presents the ten principles 
put forth by Govindarajan and Trimble (2010a:99-116) for robust innovation plans. This section 
serves to discuss these ten principles in turn as they ought to manifest in project teams, while 
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TABLE 2.2: Ten principles for robust innovation plans 
Number Principle 
1 Invest in front-end planning heavily 
2 Create a project-specific plan  
3 Discuss findings and assumptions  
4 Clearly document evolving hypotheses for each experiment 
5 Identify ways of spending little and learning a great deal  
6 Establish an independent forum for discussing results  
7 Reassess the plan often  
8 Conduct trend analysis  
9 Formally allow for revisions to predictions 
10 Subjectively evaluate innovation leaders  
(Source: Adapted from Govindarajan & Trimble, 2010a:106-115)  
(a)   Invest in planning heavily 
As can be seen in the above table, top management’s willingness to invest significant resources in 
front-end planning is the first principle for developing rigorous innovation plans (Govindarajan & 
Trimble, 2010a:108-109). It can be said to be because the early stages of the new product 
development (NPD) process are known as the “fuzzy front end” (Florén & Frishammar, 2012:20), 
where ‘fuzzy’ refers to high levels of uncertainty that distinguish earlier parts of the NPD, which 
makes managing difficult and who is accountable challenging to identify (Koen, Bertels & 
Kleinschmidt, 2014:35). At this stage of an innovative initiative, it is challenging to estimate future 
costs accurately (Backlund, 2013).  
Therefore, the organisation is willing to invest a great deal in the beginning, with the expectation that 
capital outlays will decrease as learnings increase and disciplined experimentation comes to an end 
(Perotti & Pray, 2002). To ensure that choices made at the front-end are both feasible and will not 
necessitate expensive efforts at redesign (at later stages), managers proactively invest time as well 
as resources (Poskela & Martinsuo, 2009). Florén and Frishammar (2012) similarly emphasise the 
importance of top management involvement but these scholars underscore the significance of 
management lending its credibility to the project to assist in building commitment among employees.  
Davenport (2009:70) puts forth that organisations hoping to execute innovations that are the result 
of business experiments invest with a view to develop a ‘test and learn’ organisational capability. 
Employee training, time to support initiatives and availability of equipment facilitate rapid 
experimentation and are examples of the types of investments top management makes to expedite 
organisational learning and new value propositions to take to market (Davenport, 2009).   
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(b)   Construct the plan from scratch  
The innovation is developed through the use of an emergent “plan” and manner of measuring the 
experiment’s progress; in other words, a fresh outlook is taken on planning (Govindarajan & Trimble, 
2010a:108-116). Davenport (2009) suggests management begin each experiment with an entirely 
new hypothesis for facilitating learning, whether it succeeds or fails.  
All the experiment’s stakeholders, including the chief executive officer (CEO), have awareness of 
the ratio of knowns to unknowns at the various stages of the innovation project, which stands at a 
ratio of ten per cent knowns to 90 per cent unknowns at the outset (Govindarajan & Trimble, 
2010a:110). Several critical unknowns exist at the start of uncertain projects, such as market, 
technological and cost estimates; innovators turn their attention to these first and address more 
detailed, relatively less urgent unknowns at later stages (Govindarajan & Trimble, 2004).  
(c)   Catalogue all experiment failures and successes 
A clear hypothesis of record should be kept by the innovation leader and initiative; the “hypothesis 
of record” is the account kept of the hypotheses and findings of each failed experiment (Govindarajan 
& Trimble, 2010a:111-112). This rigorous documentation of learnings and failures is undertaken to 
ensure that every person involved in the experiment has a point of reference for information 
regarding historical experiments, which serves to foster more disciplined experimentation 
(Govindarajan & Trimble, 2010a). Davenport (2009) focuses attention on this principle by 
underscoring the importance of making the information surrounding failures widely available in the 
organisation through a learning library where all the information has been catalogued.  
(d)   Seek ways of spending little and learning a lot  
New product development and innovation endeavours can become a significant expense for the 
organisation if cheaper avenues of experimenting are not explored. Moreover, these undertakings 
can be particularly costly if the experiments result in an innovation which is not marketable 
(Govindarajan & Trimble, 2010a). Similarly, Schrage (2014) regards inexpensive learning as a 
priority for innovation initiatives and Humphreys (2015) identifies the purpose of exploring innovative 
ideas as cheaply and expeditiously as is possible to realise their potential in the market.  
(e)   Form a separate forum for discussing results  
The objectives of the innovation initiative are much different than those of the performance engine. 
As such, these must be treated as if they are mutually exclusive while the innovation is being tested 
and developed. To accomplish this, the meetings with innovation executive leaders are held to 
discuss experiment outcomes, which must be entirely separate from but in addition to meetings held 
by the operations department (Govindarajan & Trimble, 2010a). Such a forum is best utilised for 
identifying, discussing and learning from the experiments’ failures (Cannon & Edmondson, 2005). 
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(f)   Repeatedly re-examine the plan  
The innovation experimentation plan follows an iterative process (Anderson et al., 2004:113-114); 
thus, this “plan” must be continually reassessed as new information comes to light so that if an 
experiment failed due to a specific cause, it should be documented and the experiment should be 
amended and repeated (Govindarajan & Trimble, 2010a:108-109). It has been suggested that one 
structure which facilitates the building of innovation capabilities is that of implementing a plan that is 
evaluated, reassessed and modified when such action is made necessary (Johnson, Hays, Center 
& Daley, 2004). An experimental approach is undertaken by means of flexible improvisation to attain 
real-time know-how and experience; instituting this approach eventuates with testing extensively on 
iterative product designs that are subject to continual milestones headed by a project leader and 
carried out by a cross-functional team (Eisenhardt and Tabrizi, 1995).  
(g)   Analyse trends  
The primary trend of the innovation initiative should be analysed to see if the new value offering will 
be successful or not in the market (Govindarajan & Trimble, 2010a). Keeping abreast of external 
trends in the market or amongst competitors is seen as important by Florén and Frishammar (2012) 
who emphasise the importance of absorptive capacity, which regards the ability of an organisation 
to appreciate valuable new information that is available externally, input it into the organisation’s 
knowledge base and employ it in execution exercises, particularly in innovation initiatives (Cohen & 
Levinthal, 1990). If undertaken effectively, achieving absorptive capacity translates into knowledge 
breadth, which means that diverse sources have been consulted and knowledge has been 
transferred to the organisation’s base (Ireland & Webb, 2007:53).  
(h)   Allow for official revisions to earlier predictions   
The team should be able to formally revise and adjust the plan as data is uncovered from 
experimenting; therefore, the hypothesis of record should be updated as early as is possible once 
findings replace initial predictions (Govindarajan & Trimble, 2010a:114-115). Davenport (2009) also 
suggests that revisions are necessary when one version of an experiment results in failure, but an 
alteration of hypotheses can eventuate in a successful outcome in another experiment. Wedell-
Wedellsborg (2014) argues that committing to a metric for success before fully understanding what 
the project’s experiment will demand is imprudent as organisational learning and the project could 
eventuate in premature and unusable failure to the organisation.  
(i)   Subjectively appraise innovation leaders  
Early assumptions about innovation initiatives are often no more than wild guesses (Wedell-
Wedellsborg, 2014), as is presented graphically in Figure 2.18 below (Govindarajan & Trimble, 
2005). In addition, John Friend’s work on uncertainty has afforded the literature insight into complex 
decision-making; specifically, it may be thought of as an evolution of incremental purposeful 
decisions which are made sequentially and take both historical and future options into account 
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(Burns, 2004). Discovering the commercialisable idea for an innovation is challenging and complex, 
innovation leaders should instead be evaluated on whether they add value to organisational learning 
and produce evidence regarding an innovation’s potential in the marketplace (Govindarajan & 
Trimble, 2010a). Wedell-Wedellsborg (2014) agrees that demonstrating flexibility in decision-making 
in the early stages is important for innovation leaders in order to gain true insight into the learnings 
resulting from experiments. This insight is deployed in the incremental decisions taken which evolve 
over time to address the complex problem and arrive at a solution (Burns, 2004), which is graphically 















FIGURE 2.18: Predictions better with time  
(Source: Adapted from Govindarajan & Trimble, 2005:66)  
Moreover, senior management should train, coach and empower innovation leaders to foster and 
support the efforts of their immediate teams (Hamel & Tennant, 2015). A proficiency at exploiting 
innovation tools ought to be reinforced by the TMT. Frequently, opportunities for unconventional and 
highly creative thinking should be invented by leaders. Rash judgements when evaluating new 
options are to be avoided. Furthermore, a strong inclination for original ideas must be demonstrated. 
Distinguishing innovators and applauding their smart failures should be acted on by leaders. A 
personal mentorship role to members of innovation teams should be carried out by leaders. 
Resources should be secured and freed up by innovation leaders, such as time and money, for 
innovation experimentation. Moreover, hires and endorsements for more creativity should be made. 
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understanding and applying the inexpensive experimentation route of rapid prototyping ought to be 
undertaken rapidly to ensure that innovators fail fast in order to eventually succeed (Hamel & 
Tennant, 2015). Given the discussion of principles for rigorous innovation plans (Govindarajan & 
Trimble, 2010a:101-121) necessary to formalize business and innovation experiments, the next 
section discusses the hypotheses of the innovation project at the outset.  
2.6.2 Stage two: Break down the hypothesis  
At the start of an innovation project, it is necessary to turn the initial assumptions the team has about 
the innovation experiment into actionable, testable hypotheses to guard against vague theories that 
make experiments challenging to execute rigorously (Govindarajan & Trimble, 2010a). In cases 
where highly uncertain projects are first ideated, the people involved invariably formulate 
assumptions about the idea despite the high uncertainty characterising the project’s outset 
(O’Connor & Rice, 2001). These assumptions are made about hypotheses yet to be tested; the team 
postulates at the start of the experimentation process, documents and tests hypotheses and, finally, 
reflects on and learns from experiments, all the while documenting actions taken and outcomes 
realised (Bodislav, 2012; Govindarajan & Trimble, 2004). 
2.6.3 Stage three: Seek the truth  
Efficiency in innovation initiatives is necessary to eventuate at the “moment of truth” (Govindarajan 
& Trimble, 2010a:144-151) as soon as possible; this moment refers to the eventual point where the 
leader and the team realise whether the innovation is feasible and possible to commercialise. Rather 
than staving off this moment, it should be resolutely pursued and caused at the earliest possible 
opportunity, especially if it is made impossible to bring with the innovation to market because the 
venture would only continue haemorrhaging valuable organisation resources. Seeking this moment 
of truth and increasing the initiative’s efficiency in reaching this point of realisation is supported by 
holding the venture and the innovation leader accountable for learning; to this end, the Govindarajan 
and Trimble (2010a) propose a set of criteria, which are discussed in the following section.  
2.7 CRITERIA FOR HOLDING INNOVATION INITIATIVES ACCOUNTABLE FOR LEARNING  
Magnusson and Berggen (2001) state that in cases of incremental innovation where less creative-
thinking and experimentation are necessary, more formal processes, such as the stage-gate model 
(see Figure 2.8) (Cooper, 1990; 2000), are appropriate. However, in innovation initiatives where the 
product under development is more radical than incremental, formal processes are less appropriate. 
In these circumstances, more informal, exploratory and iterative processes are recommended 
(Magnusson & Berggen, 2001). However, as these organisational activities often require significant 
resources, it is necessary that the innovation initiative be held accountable for organisational 
learning. Govindarajan & Trimble, (2010a) put forth nine criteria for the evaluation of learning in 
innovation projects, which are used to keep leaders and teams accountable to learning rigorously 
from the experiments they undertake. As being charged with undertaking innovation projects may 
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be what the integrated team will be held accountable for during the course of the integration process, 
the criteria Govindarajan and Trimble (2010a) put forward for holding the team accountable is 
reviewed and presented in this section.  
2.7.1 Take planning seriously  
The initiative’s team and leader should demonstrate to the organisation that they are rigorously 
experimenting by structuring their learning (Govindarajan & Trimble, 2010a). Analogously, Hamel 
and Tennant (2015) state the importance of enlisting capable and accountable leaders for innovation 
in the organisation as being high. These researchers emphasise that some organisational leaders 
must be formally held accountable for innovation through providing them with incentives (Hamel & 
Tennant, 2015). As has been previously mentioned, effective senior managers should dedicate time 
to the initiative’s success, thereby demonstrating their commitment to the outcome (Florén & 
Frishammar, 2012; Poskela & Martinsuo, 2009). One way in which planning is taken seriously by the 
initiative and the innovation leader is by producing a well-defined hypothesis of record.  
2.7.2 Create a clear hypothesis of record  
Govindarajan and Trimble (2010a:111) advance that all initial experimental hypotheses should be 
recorded concisely and all causes and effects should be clearly mapped graphically to map or display 
visually the causes and effects of the innovation experiments. Regarding the former, hypothesis of 
record, Leavy (2011) elaborates on this chronicling of rigorously testing original assumptions team 
members may have about the potential outcomes of experiments. This makes it a clearer and more 
scientifically trustworthy process, which justifies the use of resources in an “unknowable” future, in 
the words of Vijay Govindarajan (Leavy, 2011:10).  
Regarding the latter, the cause-and-effect maps, Govindarajan and Trimble (2004) argue for a 
movement from vertical thinking to influence mapping, which has also been put forth by Kaplan and 
Norton (2000; 2004) as well as Marr, Schiuma and Neely (2004). Whereas the cause-and-effect 
maps advanced by Govindarajan and Trimble (2004) are applicable in the microcosmic environment 
of the DT’s execution and experimentation processes, the balanced scorecard of Kaplan and Norton 
(2000; 2004) is applicable for the organisation at large. Nevertheless, other scholars (Gama, da Silva 
& Ataíde, 2007) have argued for Innovation Scorecards, which seek to systemise the management 
of innovation by instituting this scorecard measuring relationships between causes and effects.  
The purpose of the Govindarajan and Trimble (2004) cause-and-effect map undertaking is twofold. 
Firstly, ease of reference for the team members is enabled. Secondly, these illustrations of past work 
lend to demonstrating to top management that resources are being used for salient organisational 
learning resulting from experimentation (Govindarajan & Trimble, 2010a). Similarly, Hauser and 
Luca (2015) assert that business experimentation is a lengthy, robust process that serves to inform 
its various stakeholders about its variables; each trial that is carried out will lead the team to the next 
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hypothesis for the following experiment until either success or infeasibility is concluded (Hauser & 
Luca, 2015). In initiatives where effective learning takes place, comprehensive understanding of the 
hypotheses across the team is evident.  
2.7.3 Everyone understands the hypotheses 
The team should be working together cohesively and collaboratively on hypotheses that are 
understood across the team (Govindarajan & Trimble, 2010a). Hauser and Luca (2015) also put 
forward how important it is that all stakeholders, particularly members of the experiment team, are 
informed about the plan. Full team understanding and transparency are especially useful to avoid 
pitfalls that may have surfaced in past experiments (Hauser & Luca, 2015). De Souza (2010:77) 
similarly argues for full understanding of the research problem and hypothesis among the members 
of what this scholar refers to as the “research team” with a view to expend profound intellectual 
energies in the experimental testing phases. These phases of the experiment add new evidence to 
the team’s learning and should be amended to encompass new learnings, which is discussed below.  
2.7.4 Revise when new evidence arises  
As new evidence comes to light through rigorous, disciplined experimentation, the hypothesis of 
record and the cause-and-effect map should be amended to reflect the new evidence (Govindarajan 
& Trimble, 2010a). Hauser and Luca (2015) also suggest that each new experiment should begin 
with a new hypothesis that has been informed from the previous experiment’s learnings. This 
research strategy is corroborated elsewhere in the literature, namely by Reynolds (1999:388), who 
argues for “cyclical” experimentation as experiments either prove or disprove the hypothesis; in the 
case of the latter, a new hypothesis and experiment are designed and executed (Reynolds, 1999).  
Weissbrod and Bocken (2017:2665) propose that the concept of “start-up thinking” is necessary in 
innovation activities seeking to go to market quickly. To operationalise this, these scholars argue 
that the action of “pivoting” proposed by Ries (2011:143-147) is useful to apply for rapid 
experimentation (Humphreys, 2015). Pivots are strategic changes made to concepts and value 
offerings the organisation is researching and developing (Bajwa, Wang, Duc & Abrahamsson, 2017; 
Ries, 2011), which take place once a significant learning has eventuated from a business experiment 
(Weissbrod & Bocken, 2017). Therefore, pivoting (Ries, 2011) can be likened to revising the 
innovation experiment when new evidence has arisen (Govindarajan & Trimble, 2010a); the 
following section discusses what should be prioritised: recognising and resolving the most critical 
unknowns.  
2.7.5 Every team member recognises the most critical unknowns  
The remaining unknowns that need to be revealed after initial experimentation are understood 
among the team’s members. Conducting experiments to uncover these unknowns are done as 
cheaply and as systematically as possible for best organisational results (Govindarajan & Trimble, 
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2010a). Full transparency across the project will lead to everyone appreciating the key unknowns 
and understanding what experimentation is aiming to learn (Hauser & Luca, 2015). In fact, early 
investments of resources are aimed at developing resolutions to the prioritised unknowns of the 
initiative (Anthony, Eyring & Gibson, 2006). The resources expended on these experiments close 
with findings which need responding to by the team, which is discussed in the next section.  
2.7.6 The team reacts quickly to new information 
If new data comes to light through experimentation, the team should meet soon after to review the 
information and adjust the plan and experiments so that organisational learning and innovation can 
become a reality (Govindarajan & Trimble, 2010a:157). If, however, the business experiment is 
rooted in the social sciences – in that it is testing potential customers and consumers’ responses to 
a novel offering – commitment to the experiment is necessary to eventuate at unbiased results 
(Hauser & Luca, 2015). New information that comes to light is acted on to further organisational 
learning and to reinforce the mindset of learning in the team (Song, Joo & Chermack, 2009). 
2.7.7 The team has a learning mindset  
The team should be open to learnings and agree to address any evidence they uncover, even if not 
initially predicted or in contrast to original assumptions (Govindarajan & Trimble, 2010a). In fact, 
much knowledge learning, transfer and exploitation is undertaken in a team setting across 
organisations (Matthews & Candy, 1999). It has been proposed that knowledge transfer leads to 
team learning by means of four actions, which include experimentation, effective communication, 
post-experiment reflection and documentation of the learning that has occurred (Mingfei & Jie, 2010). 
These multiple actions undergone by the team are interdependent (Gibson & Vermeulen, 2003) and 
effectively lead the team to a post-experiment situation where knowledge has been accumulated 
(Mingfei & Jie, 2010) and is ready to be deployed for commercialisation (Smith, 2010; Tidd & 
Bessant, 2013). These learnings may culminate in facts that contradict the early assumptions of the 
innovation team.  
2.7.8 The team faces uncomfortable facts  
Sometimes the findings from experimenting may be in direct contrast to initial predictions; in this 
case, the team and leader should be comfortable enough in their logic and critical thinking that they 
should adjust the hypothesis of record and cause-and-effect maps (Govindarajan & Trimble, 2010a). 
Moreover, Furr and Dyer (2014) suggest that bringing these facts to the attention of innovators is 
operationalised by experimenting on the initial assumptions in liaison with potential customers 
(Kristensson, Gustafsson & Archer, 2004; Matthing, Sandén & Edvardsson, 2004) or prospective 
early adopters (Viki, 2017). Although uncomfortable facts may make team members uneasy, their 
continual discovery indicates that the initiative’s predictions are bettering. 
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2.7.9 Predictions are getting better  
The first few innovation initiatives the organisation undertakes may prove useful in improving 
predictions in the future (Govindarajan & Trimble, 2010a). Figure 2.19 has illustrated this process of 
early predictions becoming more reliable over the course of time; investing heavily early on thus is 
an astute action for successful experimentation to take place (Govindarajan & Trimble, 2005) to 
resolve the most critical unknowns (Anthony et al., 2006). Given the discussion of the criteria for 
holding innovation initiatives accountable for learning in this section, the following section serves to 
create a summary of the model.  
2.8 GOVINDARAJAN AND TRIMBLE’S INNOVATION EXECUTION PROCESS SUMMARY 
As the Govindarajan and Trimble (2010a) model has been shown to be a useful vehicle for achieving 
organisational ambidexterity in established organisations that are focused on ongoing operations 
and face barriers to organic innovation, it has been examined and reviewed in this chapter (Virta, 
2017). In addition, this model is both relevant and salient to the current study as it encompasses the 
innovation execution that is undertaken by a DT, which does not exist elsewhere in the research. 
For this reason, it is summarised in Figure 2.19 below, including the principles for developing robust 
innovation plans (Govindarajan & Trimble, 2010a:101-121) (refer to section 2.6.1.3), steps for 
formalising the experiment (refer to section 2.6.1.2) and criteria for holding the initiative accountable 
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FIGURE 2.19: Innovation execution process for experimentation  
(Source: Adapted from Govindarajan & Trimble, 2010a:106-115)  
Furthermore, Govindarajan and Trimble (2010a) suggest that hiring outsiders is necessary for DTs 
to create truly innovative value propositions, even if outsiders are sourced from small acquisitions. 
As such, the figure above presents the experimentation process such teams undertake to arrive at 
a commercialisable offering for the market. However, it is conceivable that the process the innovation 
leader faces in forming and developing such a team that executes innovation experiments while 
simultaneously integrating a small acquisition is likely a complex undertaking due to the myriad 
factors the leader must consider. As such, this underexplored knowledge gap is explored in the 
current study.  
2.9 CONCLUSION 
Innovation has been shown to be far more than simply coming up with the idea; the process 
proceeding the idea is challenging yet crucial to manage effectively, with the end result of bringing 
the novel value offering to market. However, the literature regarding innovation execution has been 
expanding of late. For the purposes of this part of the study, particularly the innovation execution 
process, the model by Govindarajan and Trimble (2010a) has been adopted as it encompasses the 
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dedicated team as well as advances a process for innovation execution.  Thus, it has been 
introduced and discussed in the chapter. These researchers also advance that DTs tasked with 
innovation experimentation and execution should include outside hires, considering even small 
acquisitions. However, the framework and the literature falls short of advising innovation acquisition 
champions what challenges are likely to arise in this scenario and how to shoulder these challenges, 
if they indeed exist. Therefore, the following chapter firstly deals with the broad mergers and 
acquisitions literature and, more narrowly, the process perspective of post-acquisition integration, 
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CHAPTER THREE 
ACQUISITIONS, THE POST-ACQUISITION INTEGRATION PROCESS AND ITS 
CHALLENGES 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
Mergers and acquisitions comprise a diverse, multidisciplinary and complex field of activity which 
has been widely practised since the late nineteenth century (Larsson & Finkelstein, 1999; Viviers et 
al., 2014). M&A are primarily corporate finance transactions that can be both successful and 
beneficial given that they are strategically planned and managed (Mulherin, 2012). The main aim for 
undertaking any M&A-related activity is to generate added shareholder value for the acquirer 
(Vazirani, 2012). The idea is to create synergetic value from the newly combined organisation so 
that the value is greater than the sum of parts (Nandy & Baag, 2009). There are various reasons for 
pursuing any M&A activity, generally including pursuing a corporate growth strategy, defensive 
purposes and profit opportunities (Bruner, 2004; Coyle, 2000; Galpin & Herndon, 2007). Today, 
many organisations are undertaking M&A for such strategic reasons, one of which is to incorporate 
innovations of other organisations in the portfolio of value offerings of the acquirer (Hagedoorn & 
Duysters, 2002; Hitt et al., 1990). Vasilaki and O’Regan (2008) advance that M&A are debatably the 
most popular strategy used by organisations pursue to establish a competitive advantage over their 
competitors.  
This chapter presents the literature reviewed regarding mergers and, particularly, acquisitions, and 
how the latter can be used for the purchase of commercialisable innovative value propositions. 
Throughout the review, additional relevant concepts are defined, the existing literature is discussed 
regarding the study’s background and the main findings of the secondary research are synthesised 
(Mouton, 2001).  
3.2 STRATEGIC METHODS FOR BUILDING INNOVATION CAPABILITIES  
When considering a strategy to pursue, such as an innovation strategy, three strategic methods 
make innovation execution possible, including: organic development (innovating internally), strategic 
alliances (collaborating with an external partner) as well as mergers and acquisitions (innovating by 
purchasing an external concern) (Bresman, Birkinshaw & Nobel, 1999; Hagedoorn & Duysters, 
2002; Koza & Lewin, 2000). Figure 3.1 below illustrates these three strategic options for pursuing an 
innovation growth strategy graphically.  
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FIGURE 3.1: Methods for pursuing the strategic option of innovation 
(Source: Adapted from Bresman et al., 1999:440-443; Hagedoorn & Duysters, 2002:167-168; Koza & Lewin, 
2000:146-147)  
According to Capron and Mitchell (2009) as well as Knott and Posen (2009), in times of rapid change 
in the technological arena, resource-rich organisations adopt development strategies that have an 
external component, such as M&A, in order to achieve corporate renewal without having to 
undertake in-house development, which is often uncertain and time-consuming (Capron & Mitchell, 
2009; Knott & Posen, 2009), in order to manage change effectively and efficiently as well as to be 
prepared to do so pre-emptively (Tidd & Bessant, 2013:83-85).  
3.2.1 Mergers and acquisitions  
As illustrated in Figure 3.1, one of the methods for pursuing the strategic option of innovation, the 
external outlook, is carried out by means of mergers and acquisitions (Koza & Lewin, 2000), both of 
which have been defined in section 1.2.2. While this is a strategic option for organisations, some 
researchers warn against relying too heavily on a strategy of M&A for the purposes of achieving 
innovation, particularly given the task of merging mid-sized to large organisations, which consistently 
presents a plethora of integration challenges (Jones, McCormick & Dewing, 2012:25) and continues 
to produce disappointing outcomes despite over three decades research on the subject since 1985 
(Graebner et al., 2017).  
As a result of the demands M&A pose to acquirers, the choice of target organisation must strongly 
consider both the size and value of the transaction to ensure that the acquirer gains enough from 
the deal to make it a valuable and tenable acquisition (Bruner, 2002). In the following section, 
motives for M&A activity is the focus.  
3.3 MOTIVES FOR MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS 
M&A are undertaken for various reasons (Das & Kapil, 2012; Mukherjee, Kiymaz & Baker, 2004; 
Vasilaki & O’Regan, 2008). Hitt, Ireland and Hoskisson (2007) put forth that there are four main 
objectives that are common among the majority of M&A. Firstly, these authors suggest that these 
are undertaken to gain additional market power by the acquisition of an extra customer base. 









Strategic alliances, joint ventures, 
licensing  
 External    
Mergers and acquisitions (M&A) 
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these. Thirdly, it may be necessary to the organisation to reshape its competitive scope. Lastly, 
organisations also may endeavour to secure innovative capabilities to reduce the risk of developing 
new value offerings in-house, which could be expensive and time-consuming (Hitt et al., 2007).  
Among the myriad reasons for undertaking M&A, it has been put forth by Malik et al. (2014) that 
there is one overarching objective for organisations undertaking M&A activity, which is to join forces 
with another organisation(s) because the collaboration may be more beneficial than operating alone 
in the market. Moreover, the M&A combination must add to shareholder wealth, whether it be in the 
short or the long term (Malik et al., 2014). A similar assertion has been made by Das and Kapil 
(2012) who have stated that the principal motive of M&A is the realisation of synergy to increase the 
value of the consolidated post-M&A organisation. Besides the two aforementioned studies, many 
other studies also cite the motive of synergy realisation as a key reason underlying scores of M&A; 
see for example Birkinshaw et al. (2000), Lubatkin (1983), Vaara (2002) and, more recently, Gupta 
(2013).  
According to Vermeulen and Bakerma (2001), acquisitions are also assumed for the purpose of 
revitalising the organisation through bringing in new knowledge. This is undertaken to gain a 
competitive advantage in the market; sustaining it increasingly relies on innovative recombinations 
of knowledge (Bresman et al., 1999). Grimpe (2007) asserts that many M&A today are engaged in 
for purposes relating to innovation, which are discussed in the next section.  
3.4 MOTIVES FOR INNOVATION M&A 
Ahuja and Novelli (2014) also assert that M&A are undertaken by acquirers for various possible 
reasons relating to innovation. Firstly, the value proposition(s) or patented knowledge of the target 
organisation could add to the product line of the acquirer, as is also upheld by Grimpe (2007). 
Secondly, if a comparable product or service is being developed by both organisations, the acquirer 
can reduce the time to market by pooling resources and harnessing human capital efforts. Thirdly, 
decreasing the unit cost of research and development is another possible motive for innovation M&A 
as a result of gaining economies of scale in research. Moreover, increasing the output rate of 
innovations could be another possible causal link (Ahuja & Novelli, 2014). 
Furthermore, acquirers may undergo an M&A in order to gain access to new technology to better 
existing operations and productivity. In addition, an innovation merger or acquisition could play a 
role in improving an existing organisational capability centred on innovation. Finally, if no such 
capability exists in the acquirer before the transaction, the M&A may make an effort to establish such 
an organisational capability in the existing organisation (Ahuja & Novelli, 2014).  
3.4.1 Motives for small acquisitions in innovation project teams 
Govindarajan and Trimble (2010a) have emphasised the significance of including outsiders in 
innovation project teams as their fresh perspectives afford the venture the capacity to challenge 
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strongly held assumptions by incumbent employees, which would otherwise likely have gone 
unopposed. They suggest that one manner of gaining valuable outsiders is to consider acquisitions 
as an effective way of gaining ideal candidates for executing the innovation process, which is a 
motive for acquiring small organisations to integrate into the DT (Govindarajan & Trimble, 2010a).  
3.5 ADVANTAGES OF AN INNOVATION-DRIVEN ACQUISITION STRATEGY 
Aggressive acquisition strategies are undertaken for several reasons. Based on the corporate 
entrepreneurship and innovation literature in this section, three are presented: fostering 
intrapreneurship within a corporate; acquisitions as recruitment; and acquiring knowledge.  
3.5.1 Fostering intrapreneurship within a corporate 
Corporate venturing is the entrepreneurial behaviour that exists within established medium- to large-
sized organisation (Hayton, 2005). It is also commonly known by the terms ‘intrapreneurship’ and 
‘corporate entrepreneurship’ (Hornsby, Kuratko & Zahra, 2002:253; Kuratko, Montagno & Hornsby, 
1990:49). The extent to which an organisation can be deemed entrepreneurial in nature relies on 
three fundamental dimensions: risk-taking, proactiveness and innovativeness (Craig, Pohjola, Kraus 
& Jensen, 2014; Rauch, Wiklund, Lumpkin & Frese, 2009). There are seven main ways in which 
entrepreneurship manifests in established organisations, including: traditional R&D; ad hoc venture 
team; new venture divisions or groups; champions and the mainstream; acquisitions; outsourcing; 
and hybrid forms (Hoy, 2007:7; Kuratko et al., 2011:46-49). It is salient to note that the authors also 
suggest that each of the approaches can be employed in the same organisation in differing ways 
(Hoy, 2007; Kuratko et al., 2011). As aforementioned, one such way is through pursuing an 
acquisitions strategy.  
3.5.2 Acquisitions as recruiting human resources for knowledge base expansion 
The execution of innovation per Govindarajan and Trimble (2010a) consists of two phases and can 
be achieved in these types of organisations. Both phases have three stages. The first phase, "Build 
the Team", is followed by its second stage, “Assemble the dedicated team”, which deals with bringing 
together a collaborative team that will be solely focused on experimenting and developing the 
innovation. A basic principle which should be followed in assembling the DT is recruiting the best 
and most appropriate individuals available. To find suitable candidates, the pool of applicants is 
reviewed and talent is scouted out from all possible sources. Some of the suggestions for hiring 
include: in-house transfers; external recruiting; and, lastly, small acquisitions (Govindarajan & 
Trimble, 2010a). The latter is the focus of this thesis.  
Ahuja and Katila (2001) have concluded that innovations produced by any organisation are 
essentially the product of the knowledge implicit in the organisation. As such knowledge is regarded 
as tacitly imbibed in the individual natural persons who make up the organisation, these people 
represent the knowledge base which initially founded the innovative idea and carried it through to 
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the developmental stage at which it stands at any given time. Intellectual property rights which the 
organisation has registered for and possesses as intangible assets are also part and parcel of the 
knowledge base. Ergo, knowledge elements can be considered as natural persons, intellectual 
property and other related items (Ahuja & Katila, 2001; Ahuja & Novelli, 2014). Thus, the merging of 
organisations can be considered the uniting of two previously exclusive knowledge bases, as can 





FIGURE 3.2: Post-integrated resultant knowledge base 
(Source: Adapted from Ahuja & Novelli, 2014:581)  
3.5.3 Acquisitions as gaining capabilities  
Christensen (1997) submits that acquisitions are often undertaken for the purpose of adding to the 
portfolio of capabilities. The motivations that managers have for acquiring capabilities are for 
financial and competitive reasons (Rui & Yip, 2008). Oftentimes, they are cheaper to purchase 
through an acquisition than to generate organically within the organisation (Mittra, 2007). As for the 
competitiveness motive, it is more likely that they can be deployed faster, adding to the 
competitiveness of the consolidated entity sooner (Christensen, 1997; Mittra, 2007).  
Puranam et al. (2009) suggest that technology acquisitions, by their definition, are undertaken for 
the capabilities which are technological. The system of routines that exist between people in the 
acquired organisation, the resources they use as well as the explicit and tacit knowledge make up a 
system which underlies the unique capability to develop technology (Puranam et al., 2009). Grimpe 
(2007) contends that innovation acquisitions can lead to an increase in the consolidated 
organisation’s NPD capabilities if successfully executed and integrated. However, M&A regularly 
unsettle the acquirer’s innovation processes, slowing output rates of new products and intellectual 
property rights’ registrations (Grimpe, 2007) because of the significant consumption of managerial 
time these require Cloodt, Hagedoorn and van Kranenburg (2006) qualify this experience in industry. 
If there are few innovative resources acquired through the M&A, the acquirer’s established routines, 
innovation processes and performance are relatively less disrupted than when there are many, which 
require more managerial time (Cloodt et al., 2006).  
Acquirer knowledge base  
Merged, consolidated 
knowledge base 
Acquired knowledge base  
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Despite the numerous advantages of engaging in acquisition activities, M&A also have a host of 
drawbacks, which often act as causes for M&A failure; as such, this is discussed in the following 
section.  
3.6 MERGER AND ACQUISITION FAILURE  
Researchers agree that many M&A fail and suggest that perhaps even as many as the majority do 
not succeed in achieving the objectives stipulated at the outset (Hitt, Harrison & Ireland, 2001; 
Loderer & Martin, 1992; Lubatkin & Lane, 1996; Porter, 1987; Sirower, 1997). More recently, 
Christensen, Alton, Rising and Waldeck (2011:48-49) advance that even as many as 70 per cent to 
90 per cent result in failure. Lewis and McKone (2016) put forth that more than half of these corporate 
transactions erode shareholder value. Many causes of M&A failure exist and the literature has dealt 
with preventing a great number of these, particularly for medium- to large-scale M&A.  
3.6.1 General causes of merger and acquisitions’ failure  
A summary of the various causes of M&A failure is offered by Bellinger and Hillman (2000). Firstly, 
organisations undertaking a merger or acquisition sometimes superimpose M&A strategies without 
understanding the idiosyncratic demands of the one they are dealing with (Haunschild, 1993). 
Secondly, lack of integration efforts are also responsible for M&A failure as cited by many authors, 
including Haspeslagh and Jemison (1991), Nahavandi and Malekzadeh (1988) as well as Weber 
(1996). Thirdly, managerial hubris (overconfidence) is also held responsible for M&A failure, which 
refers to action taken by brash top-level managers in their own ability to succeed in effectively 
combining organisations’ systems, people and processes for the creation of shareholder value; 
alternatively, managerial hubris may eventuate in an M&A failure as managers overestimate the 
strategic fit of the previously sovereign entities (Haunschild, 1993; O’Neill, Pouder & Buchholtz, 
1998).  
Moreover, Haspeslagh and Jemison (1991) put forth several other causes of M&A failure, including: 
poor preliminary valuation and appraisal of target organisations; a lack of commitment to the overall 
success of the integration; deficiency in leadership and strategic guidance subsequent to the M&A 
negotiation; and a reduction in the availability of slack resources to the integration effort. Despite this 
variety of reasons for M&A failures, Haspeslagh and Jemison (1991) suggest that a common 
problem with M&A appears to reside with the strategy and implementation of the integration. 
However, a number of scholars hold that the most problematic stage of the M&A process is that of 
the integration (Koi-Akrofi, 2016). As a result, organisations who intend to pursue a merger or 
acquisition should plan the steps to integration with care (Bruner, 2004; Coyle, 2000; Galpin & 
Herndon, 2007; Nandy & Baag, 2009; Tarasovich, Lyons & Gerlach, 2008).  
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3.6.2 Preventing the failure of small technology-based acquisitions  
Despite the popularity of acquiring innovative start-ups and SMEs, acquiring organisations 
continually find that post-acquisition integration can erode the very innovative capabilities which 
initially justified the acquisition (Birkinshaw et al., 2000; Graebner, 2004; Puranam et al., 2009; 
Puranam, Singh & Zollo, 2003; Ranft & Lord, 2002). Similarly to general M&A failures, scholars have 
also cited the integration process as a failure factor in smaller acquisitions. Those who examine the 
implementation of the acquisition explain that the choice between integration approaches – complete 
absorption to autonomy preservation – is a significant decision that managers have to make at the 
outset. This decision goes towards shaping subsequent integration actions further (Haspeslagh & 
Jemison, 1991; Pablo, 1994; Puranam et al., 2009; Zollo & Singh, 2004). While full integration 
remains a disruptive process, it does have the advantage of generating a potent coordination effect 
in the bidder-target pair, which lends to greater operational synergy realisation (Puranam et al., 2009; 
Thompson, 1967). This section has served to discuss the matter of M&A failure as well as those of 
small technology-based acquisitions; the following section considers the M&A literature’s process 
perspective or research stream, which is relevant to this study. 
3.8 PROCESS PERSPECTIVE OF M&A 
Larsson and Finkelstein (1999) synthesise the theoretical lenses through which M&A are commonly 
studied in the literature; the primary fields include: economics; finance; strategic management; 
organisation theory; and human resource management (Datta, 1991; Zollo & Meier, 2008). In 
addition, Birkinshaw et al. (2000) as well as Haspeslagh and Jemison (1991) recognise the 
theoretical lens provided by another research stream, that of the process perspective. As the process 
perspective of post-acquisition integration has been deemed appropriate for this study, it is 
discussed in this section. A recent review of the PAIP literature undertaken by Graebner et al. (2017) 
has identified the work of Haspeslagh and Jemison (1991) as seminal; this study also referenced 
the works of Birkinshaw et al. (2000), Jemison and Sitkin (1986a), Larsson and Finkelstein (1999) 
as well as Nahavandi and Malekzadeh (1988) as still relevant today, and are included in this section.   
The theoretical lens of organisation theory has also engaged study on M&A. In this field, the primary 
focus has been on the process of integration that takes place after the corporate transaction has 
been concluded. The emphasis has been twofold. Firstly, research has dealt with the clash of 
corporate cultures. Furthermore, the means by which conflict is resolved in a newly combined 
organisation has also been scrutinised (Larsson & Finkelstein, 1999). These authors have also 
acknowledged organisational integration as the chief factor explicating the amount of synergy 
realised post-acquisition (Larsson & Finkelstein, 1999; Yu, Engleman & van de Ven, 2005).  
The process perspective research stream advances that value is created after the acquisition takes 
place and the integration process is undertaken. The stream is underpinned by organisation 
behavioural theory (Birkinshaw et al., 2000). Birkinshaw et al. (2000:397) put forth that the stream’s 
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central proposition is that the extent to which the anticipated benefits of an acquisition are realised 
is determined by managerial actions and integration processes. In the process perspective, the 
issues of strategic fit and organisational fit are recognised as offering great potential for synergies. 
However, this stream argues that synergy realisation is entirely dependent on managerial ability to 
undertake the post-acquisition integration process effectively (Haspeslagh & Jemison, 1991; Hunt, 
1990; Jemison & Sitkin, 1986a; 1986b; Shrivastava, 1986).  
Birkinshaw et al. (2000:397) use the term “organisational behaviour” for this research stream and 
indicate that it is reinforced by acculturation theory (Nahavandi & Malekzadeh, 1988). One of the 
tenets of the research stream is that the similarity between the cultures of the two merged 
organisations will facilitate employee satisfaction and effective integration. Weber (1996:1181) 
defines this similarity as “corporate cultural fit”; Cartwright and Cooper (1993) use the term “cultural 
compatibility”. In this stream, it is argued that success over the long term can be realised only by the 
following means: managing the process; effectively communicating with all employees, existing and 
acquired; as well as understanding of the expectations and the apprehensions on both the bidder 
and target’s sides (Bastien, 1987; Birkinshaw et al., 2000; Blake & Mouton, 1985; Cartwright & 
Cooper, 1993).  
Several studies have developed the acculturation theory, which aims to examine those behavioural 
changes produced from the obligatory interaction of the two corporate cultures that the integration 
managers impose on the employees (Nahavandi & Malekzadeh, 1988; Weber, 1996). Birkinshaw et 
al. (2000) state that acquisition behavioural implications are studied at both the individual and 
organisation levels.  
3.9 MANAGING SYNERGY REALISATION AND EMPLOYEE RESISTANCE IN 
INTEGRATION APPROACHES  
Larsson and Finkelstein’s 1999 study created a process-oriented model for integrating merging 
organisations, which was empirically tested across a sample of 61 sizable M&A. Among their 
findings, they found that the organisations which were most successful had realised the greatest 
quantity and quality of synergies; in addition, these scholars put forth that synergy realisation 
between combining organisations can be attributed to successfully dealing with three important M&A 
issues (Larsson & Finkelstein, 1999). These success factors include: high strategic combination 
potential; a high level of organisational integration; and low levels of employee resistance (see Figure 
3.3 below) (Larsson, Brousseau, Driver & Sweet, 2004; Larsson & Finkelstein, 1999). As the current 
study deals with the post-acquisition integration, the integration process success factors of high 
organisational integration and low employee resistance are considered in this section.  
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FIGURE 3.3: An integrative M&A model for synergy realisation  
(Source: Adapted from Larsson & Finkelstein, 1999:13)  
3.9.1 Organisational integration approaches for synergy realisation 
Zollo and Singh (2004) advance that synergy may be realised only when organisations devise and 
implement post-acquisition integration processes with care and with a focus on obtaining the 
potential gains predicted at the outset. According to Larsson et al. (2004), the choice between 
organisational integration approaches for synergy realisation will influence the amount of synergy 
realised between the consolidating organisations. Larsson (1990; 1993) fused the various typologies 
for improved comprehension, including: soft/avoiding; hard/controlling; and co-competence; all are 
introduced in this section (Larsson, 1990; 1993; Larsson et al., 2004).  
3.9.1.1 Soft/avoiding approach to realising synergy 
The soft, or otherwise known as avoiding, approach aims to conserve and perpetuate the prevailing 
values of the previously separate organisations. This technique has the drawback of putting the 
integration of the organisations largely on hold. However, emphasis is placed on developing the 
relationship between the united organisations gradually as they learn more about one another as 
well as found a sense of trust. This allows the approach to achieve a minimal amount of employee 
resistance. Despite this advantage, lessened resistance eventuates at the expense of postponing 
integration (Larsson et al., 2004).  
3.9.1.2 Hard/controlling approach to realising synergy 
The intention of the hard, or controlling, approach is to quell potential cultural clashes and opposition 
by employees as soon as is possible. While this strategy presents the advantage of swift integration, 
it superimposes the acquirer’s way of operating on the purchased organisation. In spite of the value 
of this rapidity, the unilateral compulsion to change the incoming organisation expeditiously may lead 
to employee resistance. In turn, the amount of synergy realised could be compromised (Larsson et 
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3.9.1.3 Co-competence approach to realising synergy 
The final approach is the co-competence approach. It is recognised as superior when considering 
the drawbacks of the former approaches. Its aim is to exploit the valuable competencies of both 
organisations by focussing attention on combining the capabilities from both sides. The strategy 
presents a challenge, however, which is how to identify which competencies are indeed superior in 
an objective way (Larsson et al., 2004).  
Nevertheless, if it is possible to carry this out successfully by constructively learning about the 
respective organisations, it will give rise to superior management of the human element of M&A. 
Conducting the co-competence approach is made easier through the uniting of similarly sized 
organisations, to lessening potential employee resistance to the adoption of the smaller 
organisation’s ways (Larsson et al., 2004). These three approaches can be instituted during the 
course of the integration process following the M&A transaction.  
3.9.2 Managing employee resistance during integration 
According to Larsson et al. (2004), the most difficult component to manage successfully in M&A is 
the human element, which refers to employees, especially those of the acquired organisation. 
Commonly, employees of the acquired organisation typically react negatively to their organisation 
being purchased for several reasons. Three main causes of employee resistance are shown in the 
Figure 3.4 below; these include cultural clashes, interpreted threats and negative career implications, 
perceived or real (Larsson et al., 2004).  This resistance by new employees lugs down efforts aimed 
at integration and synergy realisation for the newly amalgamated organisation. As can be seen in 
the figure below, three possible solutions exist which can be deployed to prevent or treat employee 
resistance issues, including acculturation, communication and career management through reward 











FIGURE 3.4: Causes of and possible solutions for employee resistance 
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3.9.2.1 Acculturation 
Opposition within the collective is derived from joined corporate cultures which are not necessarily 
always compatible with each other (Larsson et al., 2004). Organisations’ cultures are particularly 
difficult to manage as they are essentially social realities that have been formed over time through 
trial and error and are embedded in the minds of members of a particular society (Morgan, 2006). 
The leadership’s depth of understanding of any incoming culture is prone to be fragmented and 
cursory in comparison to the true nature of the social reality itself, as it is perceived and shared 
between new employees (Larsson et al., 2004; Morgan, 2006).  
Larsson et al. (2004) suggest that M&A require management to initiate and advance a fundamentally 
new, mutual corporate culture (Larsson et al., 2004). In fact, authors suggest that acculturation is a 
key success factor for post-merger integration (PMI) (Larsson & Lubatkin, 2001; Nahavandi & 
Malekzadeh, 1988). However, other researchers propose that this is far easier said than it is done 
(Larsson, 1990; 1993; Larsson & Lubatkin, 2001; Weber & Camerer, 2003). This is as a result of the 
deeply entrenched and complex nature of cultures, which is not easy to develop from scratch, 
especially over the short term (Morgan, 2006). Nevertheless, acculturation should be pursued to 
align the joined employee workforce as much as is possible, given idiosyncrasies. Acculturation is 
the development of a jointly shared, constructive culture that works towards overcoming cultural 
clashes that take place in the collective workforce (Larsson et al., 2004).  
3.9.2.2 Communication 
Problems may result in employee resistance from communications that are not consciously and 
carefully managed and carried out. Employee perceptions and trust can be shaken by issues of 
acquirer-acquisition communication, such as: lack of diffusing information properly; 
misunderstandings; perceived threats; and adverse, damaging rumours (Larsson et al., 2004). At 
the interpersonal level, conflict may fester that results from these disputes. As illustrated in Figure 
3.4 this form of employee resistance lies between the poles of collective and individual causes 
(Larsson et al., 2004).  
Larsson et al. (2004) warns that problems resulting from inadequate communications should be 
managed accordingly, at the team level. Team-building efforts should be undertaken between 
employees from the acquirer and the target as a part of early integration efforts. This should continue 
for quite some time to ensure a cohesive workforce that works toward a solid foundation of trust and 
mutual respect. In addition, early diffusion of pertinent information should be undertaken so as not 
to leave people out who will need to participate in activities that top management deems necessary 
to achieving the amalgamated organisation’s strategy (Larsson et al., 2004).  
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3.9.2.3 Career management through reward systems 
At the individual level, employee reactions can be interpreted and understood through the 
implications of the acquisition on their personal career paths. Resistance can thus stem from the 
perceptions employees have that M&A will curb the progress of their advancement through the 
organisation’s chain of command (Larsson et al., 2004). Namely, the consolidation may have a real 
or perceived negative effect on their personal social capital or the shared networks and interpersonal 
relationships between individual employees and teams that create value for the organisation (Boxall 
& Purcell, 2008). New employees may feel that their prior social capital is now less valuable than 
before the integration took place because of the influx of acquired employees (Larsson et al., 2004). 
Other fears employees have regarding negative career implications include: diminished job security; 
downgraded benefits; hindered opportunities for upward advancement; more substantial workloads; 
and disrupted career planning (Larsson et al., 2004).  
Larsson et al. (2004) advance that combatting the effects of this form of employee resistance should 
include reward systems being instituted and managed by organisation leadership to stabilise 
concerns of individuals on a case-by-case basis, if possible. This is a particularly difficult strategy to 
carry out because of the significant manpower and time expenditure it requires to administer suitably 
(Larsson et al., 2004; Schweiger, Ivancevich & Power, 1987).  
The success factors of communication and career management through incentive and reward 
systems can also be framed as solutions to the problems that manifest at the collective, interpersonal 
and individual levels (see Figure 3.4) should be managed simultaneously throughout the process of 
integration following the acquisition. However, whether these employee resistance causes and 
solutions are applicable to the scenario of a small innovation acquisition which integrates into a team 
is included in the study’s primary research. Resolving the issues of employee resistance requires 
management to first select an organisational integration approach, which is discussed in the 
following section.  
3.10 INTEGRATION APPROACHES  
Haspeslagh and Jemison (1991) also created a typology of approaches to integration based on two 
dimensions, the needs for strategic interdependence and organisational autonomy. This typology 
has stood the test of time, surviving from its introduction in 1991 to recent years in studies such as 
Graebner et al. (2017) and Steigenberger (2016). In fact, Angwin and Meadows (2015:236) have 
identified this typology as the “most prominent and enduring” as they have used it as a basis for their 
extended typology. In this section, both typologies are discussed as the dimensions of strategic 
interdependence and organisational autonomy form a significant part of the approach champions of 
acquisition have to decide on in their efforts to integrate acquisitions into teams.  
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3.10.1 The need for strategic interdependence and organisational autonomy  
Haspeslagh and Jemison (1991) advanced that the approach taken to a post-acquisition integration 
is determined by two dimensions, strategic interdependence and organisational autonomy; these 
essentially unify the strategic requirements that the combining organisations have and the need for 
organisational fit post-acquisition. However, the empirical work undertaken by Angwin and Meadows 
(2015) has added an additional dimension to the classification of integration approaches, that of 
managerial relevance. These three dimensions are reviewed below.  
3.10.1.1 Strategic interdependence/knowledge transfer  
When two organisations are integrated, a potential for synergy exists, which has been shown to be 
a primary motive for M&A (Das & Kapil, 2012; Gupta, 2012; Malik et al., 2014). However, for the 
potential synergy to be realised, the previously sovereign organisations must be sufficiently 
combined; this represents the concept of strategic interdependence (Haspeslagh & Jemison, 1991). 
Angwin and Meadows (2015:248) have updated the term used by Haspeslagh and Jemison 
(1991:139) of “strategic interdependence” to be “knowledge transfer”, which refers to the 
dissemination of knowledge and its provision as stimuli to solving various problems (OECD, 
1996:21). Nevertheless, Haspeslagh and Jemison (1991:142-274) advance that interdependence 
needs to take place for the transfer of capabilities to occur, which in turn is the main antecedent for 
value to be created from an M&A.  
3.10.1.2 Organisational autonomy  
Haspeslagh and Jemison (1991:142) assert that the integration of acquisitions presents a paradox: 
pursuing capability transfer can lead to the attrition or destruction of the capabilities the acquisition 
was initially selected for, leading to the acquirer inadvertently producing its own misfortune (Uzelac, 
Bauer, Matzler & Waschak, 2016). The extent to which an acquired organisation is integrated 
influences whether its culture is retained, in which case the organisation remains autonomous, or 
dissolved, in which case it relinquishes all autonomy and assimilates to the acquirer (Angwin & 
Meadows, 2015:236). Puranam, Singh and Zollo (2006) go further, asserting that autonomous 
targets preserve their keenness and aptitude to innovate, which ensures that they continue to create 
value post-acquisition.  
3.10.2 Traditional and extended approaches to integration   
These two paradoxical needs that acquisitions must fulfil in the post-acquisition phase of the M&A 
process – those of strategic interdependence and organisational autonomy – make up the 
dimensions for selecting an appropriate approach to post-acquisition integration (Haspeslagh & 
Jemison, 1991:142). Of the approaches this two-dimensional typology affords, three are recognised 
as main approaches to integration: absorption, preservation and symbiotic as well as the simply-
retention approach of ‘holding’ (Angwin & Meadows, 2015:236; Haspeslagh & Jemison, 1991:145-
147). Thus, these are recognised main integration approaches in the literature, each of which are 
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introduced and discussed in this section. As can be seen below in Figure 3.5, these are graphically 
illustrated below and discussed subsequently. First, the traditional approaches put forth by 
Haspeslagh and Jemison (1991) and similar typologies in the literature are discussed; following that, 















FIGURE 3.5: A typology of acquisition integration approaches  
(Source: Adapted from Angwin & Meadows, 2015:239; Haspeslagh & Jemison, 1991:145; Nahavandi & 
Malekzadeh, 1988:82-83; Siehl & Smith, 1990:170-172) 
3.10.2.1 Traditional approaches  
The main integration approaches that have survived tradition and conventional wisdom are those of 
Haspeslagh and Jemison’s widely cited 1991 study (Graebner et al., 2017; Steigenberger, 2016), 
which are absorption, preservation and symbiosis (Haspeslagh & Jemison, 1991:145-149). 
However, other scholars have put forth similar typologies in the literature, including: the Marks and 
Mirvis (2001) study which examines the degree of change the bidder and target undergo; the 
culturally-based angle of Nahavandi and Malekzadeh (1988); and the human resource management 
lens introduced by Siehl and Smith (1990) (Angwin & Meadows, 2015:239-240; Ellis & Lamont, 
2004:83), which are discussed below.  
(a)  Absorption approach to integration 
As can be seen the figure above, the absorption approach (bottom-left quadrant) constitutes a strong 
need for strategic interdependence and a low need for the acquired to retain autonomy (Haspeslagh 
& Jemison, 1991). Therefore, it is recognised in the literature that the main objective of absorptions 
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is to consolidate combining organisations’ activities fully (Ellis & Lamont, 2004). Whereas Nahavandi 
and Malekzadeh (1988:82) refer to this as assimilation, Siehl and Smith (1990:170) call it ‘pillage 
and plunder’. Homburg and Bucerius (2005) argue that integrations in high growth industries suffer 
from an approach of full absorption as the focus on internal task reorganisation restrains momentum 
needed to grow fast; this is primarily because the processes, systems and routines are relatively 
primitively developed at the outset (Bauer, Dao, Matzler & Tarba, 2017; Homburg & Bucerius, 2005).  
(b) Preservation approach to integration 
In the preservation approach, the opposite is true: there is little need for strategic interdependence 
and a high need for autonomy, as can be seen in the top-right quadrant of Figure 3.5 (Haspeslagh 
& Jemison, 1991). Nahavandi and Malekzadeh (1988:82) refer to this approach using the term 
‘separation’ while Siehl and Smith (1990:172) call this approach ‘courtship’ or ‘just friends’.  
Ellis and Lamont (2004:84) explain this as a target organisation that maintains its operations 
independently from the acquirer so that its strategic capabilities can be preserved (Haspeslagh & 
Jemison, 1991). Schweizer (2005) argues that the target’s preservation through its high autonomy 
is necessary if the objectives of the acquisition are long-term and originate from strategic capabilities 
and competencies tacit to the organisation.  
(c) Symbiotic approach to integration 
Moreover, Figure 3.5 illustrates the nature of the symbiotic post-acquisition integration approach, 
which thrives under both high strategic interdependence (knowledge transfer) and significant 
organisational autonomy (see the bottom-right quadrant) (Haspeslagh & Jemison, 1991). Although 
Haspeslagh and Jemison (1991) use the term symbiosis, other similar terms have also been used, 
including: ‘integration’ (Nahavandi & Malekzadeh, 1988:82), ‘love and marriage’ (Siehl & Smith, 
1990:172) and ‘best of both’ or ‘transformation’ (Marks & Mirvis, 2001:85-86). 
Ellis and Lamont (2004:98) argue that this approach affords the previously sovereign organisations 
the ‘best of both’ solution. While Teerikangas and Irrmann (2016) argue that symbiotic integration is 
characterised by acquirers seeking mutual learning between their employees and those of targets, 
they claim that in practice, organisations actually wish to absorb acquired organisations into their 
cultures. Haspeslagh and Jemison (1991) and Schweizer (2005) advocate for preserving the target’s 
operations and autonomy for a time initially before symbiotic exchanges can take place naturally, or 
in unforced manners which lend to effectiveness but not necessarily efficiency; Meier and Schier 
(2016) promote the need for an initial approach to symbiosis with a policy of preservation for 
conserving innovation capabilities.  
(d)   Holding approach to integration  
The holding approach is shown in the top-left quadrant of Figure 3.5. In the post-acquisition phase, 
some acquirers have no intention of combining the organisations (Ellis & Lamont, 2004), which keeps 
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the target at a distance. However, this approach is not considered a significant approach in the 
literature as no integration takes place (Angwin & Meadows, 2015; Ellis & Lamont, 2004).  
3.10.2.2 Two additional approaches in an extension of the typology  
Angwin and Meadows’ (2015:247-249) empirical undertaking to review and critique the 1991 
typology of Haspeslagh and Jemison eventuated in an extension of the typology with the additional 
of two more approaches: the intensive care and re-orientation approaches, both of which are 









FIGURE 3.6: A typology of approaches to acquisition integration  
(Source: Adapted from Angwin & Meadows 2015:248; Haspeslagh & Jemison, 1991:145)  
(a)   Intensive care approach to integration 
The approach known as intensive care is identical to the holding approach put forth by Haspeslagh 
and Jemison (1991) in terms of the two dimensions: strategic independence (low) and organisational 
autonomy (low), which is illustrated by its addition to the top-left quadrant of Figure 3.6. However, 
acquiring managers are often actively involved in the strategic direction and financial management 
of the acquired target to bring about a rejuvenation in its operations (Angwin & Meadows, 2015:247). 
Steigenberger (2016) further argues for this approach as a solution for salvaging the strong, healthy 
parts of distressed targets.  
(b)   Re-orientation approach to integration 
The re-orientation integration approach was also found to be used in practice in the empirical work 
of Angwin and Meadows (2015:248) and is illustrated in Figure 3.6 above at the origin of the plane. 
This approach involves the preservation of selected areas of the acquired, which are considered 
significant to the strategic needs of the acquirer, while simultaneously integrating the remaining 
activities (Angwin & Meadows, 2015:248). In fact, this approach allows for the division of acquired 
operations into exploitation and exploration, in other words, to integrate exploitative areas of the 
target into the bidder while maintaining the exploratory innovation areas as they were pre-acquisition 
(Angwin & Meadows, 2015:249; Dao, Strobl, Bauer & Tarba, 2017:196).  
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Aghasi, Colombo and Rossi-Lamastra (2017) put forth one manner in which the re-orientation 
strategy can be successfully implemented: the acquirer gives the target its autonomy while replacing 
its CEO with either an internally or externally recruited manager or executive. These authors argue 
that the valuable strategic capabilities for which the acquisition was assumed remain intact due to 
this “separation and replacement” strategy while the top manager’s replacement allows for tighter 
control by the acquirer’s management (Aghasi et al., 2017:2-3). Given the discussion of innovation 
approaches, the following section serves to provide a detailed discussion of the M&A process.  
3.11 THE M&A PROCESS  
Through their thorough review of the M&A process literature, Gomes, Angwin, Weber and Tarba 
(2013) argue and conclude that a rich representation of the complex M&A process is yet to be 
developed and proposed as the existing understanding of it is inadequate due to compartmentalised 
understanding of the process (Schweizer, 2005). The remainder of the literature reviewed in this 
chapter serves to discuss the complexities of the process’s phases, challenges and success factors, 
among other things, in an effort to provide a more holistic understanding of the M&A process for the 
creation of a theoretical foundation of the PAIP used in the primary research of the study. Firstly, the 
three-phase M&A process is discussed; secondly, the third phase of this process, which is the post-
acquisition integration process is reviewed and synthesised; thirdly, the challenges associated with 
the PAIP considered; and, finally, the PAIP’s critical success factors are contemplated.  
Thus, the literature presents several step-by-step M&A processes. Some researchers advocate for 
a two-phase approach, in which the process is divided into pre-merger and post-merger 
(implementation) stages (Bach, 2014; Boland, 1970; Huang & Zhu, 2016; Schweiger & Weber, 
1989). Conversely, Bach (2014) states that M&A researchers are now moving towards a three-phase 
approach. Simply put, this approach is divided into pre-merger, merger and post-merger stages; the 
various labels given to these stages are presented in Table 3.1 below.  
TABLE 3.1: Three-phase M&A processes  
AUTHOR YEAR THREE-PHASE PROCESS PAGE 
Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3 
Von Krogh 2016 Pre-acquisition Acquisition Post-acquisition 307-308 
Schertzinger  2009 Planning Transaction Integration 10-11 









Proper and Jobin 
2000a Pre-merger During the merger Post-merger 649 
Salus  1989  Pre-merger Merger Post-merger 47 
(Source: Adapted from Appelbaum et al., 2000a:649; Salus, 1989:47; Schertzinger, 2009:10-11; von Krogh, 
2016:307-308; Wuebben, 2007:39-51) 
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For the purposes of this study, the labels of the three-phase process put forth by von Krogh (2016) 
as the topic of acquisitions is most relevant. Von Krogh (2016:307-308) promotes three phases: pre-
acquisition; acquisition; and post-acquisition. However, each phase in Table 3.1 is comparable to 
the corresponding phase proposed by a different author. Thus, each of the three phases are 
discussed below. The M&A process is relevant to the study as the integration process is an important 
component of the third phase of the M&A process, namely the post-acquisition phase.  
3.11.1 Phase one: Pre-acquisition 
In the first stage, the focus is on taking measures internally that will enable the bidder to capacitate 
the acquisition of other organisations. This must be undertaken from a top strategic level that 
specifies a growth agenda by means of acquisition, possibly amongst other tactics. Management 
should identify gaps in the organisation’s current strategy and operations. These gaps could then be 
filled with procured elements that are either added or replaced. Once a top-level acquisition strategy 
is in place and all strategic gaps have been identified, targets can then be considered. The final step 
in phase one is preparing the target profile, inspecting the organisation and then deciding on whether 
to purchase (Bach, 2014; Wuebben, 2007).  
Christensen et al. (2011) suggest scrutinising targets in terms of the four elements that make up 
their organisational models. These are namely: customer value proposition; profit formula; 
resources; and processes. Firstly, the customer value proposition is an important consideration. If a 
value offering can offer consumers a more efficient, convenient or affordable means of 
accomplishing a task than is currently on the market, it may make a valuable addition to the buying 
organisation’s product mix (Christensen et al., 2011). Secondly, the profit formula should be 
reviewed. If the target’s revenue model and cost structure are viable to sustain operations and, 
preferably, to produce a high yield, it should be contemplated as a possible purchase. Thirdly, the 
processes of the acquisition should also be taken into consideration, which may include research 
and development practices, manufacturing, sales and budgeting. However, if the profitability of the 
acquired is reliant on its autonomous functioning, the acquisition should operate as a separate 
organisational unit once bought particularly if the target’s systems and processes are inextricably 
linked to the people of the organisation as it exists pre-acquisition (Christensen et al., 2011). Lastly, 
the target’s resources should also be contemplated. These will likely include technology, products, 
employees, intangible assets, equipment, cash, facilities and customers. If the organisation is bought 
solely for its resources, these will simply be extracted and input to the bidder where they are needed 
as a transfer (Christensen et al., 2011).  
Moreover, an acquisition growth strategy should be accompanied by its own specific objectives 
(Bach, 2014; Wuebben, 2007). Kuratko et al. (2011) suggest a number of important guiding 
principles for orchestrating an acquisitions strategy successfully as well as present the challenges it 
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poses. A number of considerations should be at the fore in selecting the right acquisitions; these 
include (Kuratko et al., 2011): 
● ensuring strategic fit between the acquirer and the target organisation;  
● undertaking acquisitions with relevant core competencies to the acquirer; or  
● acquiring technologies, skills, knowledge and customers that are complementary to the 
organisation’s long-term strategic direction.  
● Kuratko et al. (2011) also counsel organisations considering an aggressive acquisition strategy 
to instil, in each new procurement, the culture and values of the purchaser.  
Thus, the pre-acquisition stage encompasses the organisation’s strategic outlook and objectives for 
acquiring other organisations, which it will conduct due diligence on and ensure has the correct fit 
with the existing organisation. Succeeding the pre-acquisition is the acquisition stage, in which the 
transaction is made and all legally binding agreements are made (Wuebben, 2007).  
3.11.2 Phase two: Acquisition 
The second stage is centred on undertaking the transaction itself (Wuebben, 2007). Three points 
are commonly dealt with in completing the purchase, the first of which is pre-signing. This covers 
drafting and drawing up a confidentiality agreement, sending a letter of intent, carrying out due 
diligence and entering initial negotiations. After pre-signing, pricing is dealt with. This involves 
valuing the target and evaluating how it will be financed if purchased. Finally, the acquisition will then 
be signed off on and closed. An acquisition agreement will be drafted. Antitrust and securities laws 
and regulations will be reviewed. If all previous steps have been conducted with the proper care, a 
final offer will be made. In the case that the offer is accepted, the particulars must be negotiated; 
these will encompass various details which may have been overlooked until that juncture (Bach, 
2014; Wuebben, 2007). Although the financial management literature pertaining to M&A has dealt 
with this phase of the M&A process in significant detail (Birkinshaw et al., 2000; Larsson & 
Finkelstein, 1999), it lies beyond the scope of the current study.  
3.11.3 Phase three: Post-acquisition  
Once the target has been officially acquired, the bidder must implement integration measures which 
are suited to the specific circumstances at play (Bach, 2014; Wuebben, 2007). The primary aim of 
this phase is to make use of the capabilities that exist in the previously separate organisations more 
effectively (Datta, 1991). Obstacles to achieving this aim should be removed to eventuate at an 
effective integration (Haspeslagh & Jemison, 1987).  
A host of researchers have emphasised the importance of the post-acquisition integration process 
in determining acquisition performance (Birkinshaw et al., 2000; Graebner, 2004; Haspeslagh & 
Jemison, 1991; Jemison & Sitkin, 1986b; Nahavandi & Malekzadeh, 1988; Vaara, 2003; Vancea, 
2011; Yu et al., 2005). More recently, Graebner et al. (2017) have highlighted the appeals in the 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
  
80 
    
   
literature for a more substantial focus on the events in post-acquisition integration implementation, 
citing the work of Haleblian, Devers, McNamara, Carpenter and Davison (2009) as well as 
Steigenberger (2016). Significantly, Špaček (2016) argues that the most recent M&A wave has seen 
higher levels of concentration on the PAIP rather than a sole focus on the pre-acquisition and 
acquisition phases. Given the discussion of the acquisition stage, the post-acquisition phase is 
discussed in the next section in some detail as it is under exploration in the current study.  
3.12 THE INTEGRATION PROCESS 
Wuebben (2007) advances that there are three essential steps and activities to assume after closing 
the acquisition deal. These are: integration conception; implementing integration measures; and 
controlling integration (Wuebben, 2007). As the study is concerned with exploring managerial and/or 
leadership considerations that exist for the process of integrating small innovation acquisitions (with 
more than one individual) at the team level, the integration process is a relevant concept to review 
the literature on and present in this thesis.  
3.12.1 Integration conception  
At the outset of combining two organisations, their integration potential should be analysed and 
planned (Wuebben, 2007). A decision must be made regarding the level of integration. Most often, 
scientific inquiry on the small organisation integration has focused on this decision, which is known 
as the integration-autonomy dilemma. Thus, the main question posed in the literature has centred 
on whether the acquired organisation should be entirely subsumed into the bidder (known as full 
integration) or if an independent subsidiary ought to be created that is autonomously run by the 
original members of the target (known as autonomy) or somewhere in between these poles (Aghasi 
et al., 2017; Pablo, 1994; Puranam et al., 2009).  
Bauer and Matzler (2014) warn that the chosen level of integration must be carefully considered as 
it has a causal effect on realising the objectives of the acquisition determined at the outset. For 
example, if full integration is pursued, it is likely that acquired employees will experience demotivation 
and lower productivity as well as that the acquirer will have a high level of employee turnover, thus 
losing human capital assets it sought to include in the larger organisation (Kapoor & Lim, 2007; 
Larsson & Finkelstein, 1999; Paruchuri, Nerkar & Hambrick, 2006; Puranam & Srikanth, 2007; Ranft 
& Lord, 2002). 
Govindarajan and Trimble (2010a) recommend integrating the small innovation acquisition fully into 
the DT of the innovation initiative; however, their proposition falls short of advising innovation 
acquisition champions on the potential problems or challenges they may face in integrating such a 
small innovation acquisition. Thus, the following section addresses the implementation of integration 
post-M&A that exists in the broader M&A literature.  
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3.12.2 Implementing integration measures  
Secondly, Wuebben (2007) suggests that assorted integration measures should be taken, including: 
organisational; strategic; administrative; operative; and cultural. This range suggests that a 
‘workstream’ approach such as the one proposed by Galpin and Herndon (2007:77) for medium- to 
large-scale integrations. Moreover, Patzelt, Schweizer and zu Knyphausen-Aufsesse (2007) 
recognise that the literature spanning the field of M&A is substantially focused on the integration of 
large organisations (Chen & Reuer, 2004). The researchers suggest the existing field of inquiry lacks 
a focus on the study of acquiring small, entrepreneurial organisations (Patzelt et al., 2007).  
3.12.2.1 Integration sub-processes  
A study conducted by Birkinshaw et al. (2000:395) on the process of post-acquisition integration 
argues that it takes place on two planes, which these scholars term “sub-processes”: task and human 
integration, as can be seen in Figure 3.7 below. Effective integration across the study’s three 
observed acquisitions occurred through a process made up of only two phases (Birkinshaw et al., 
2000). 
 
FIGURE 3.7: Post-acquisition integration sub-processes 
(Source: Adapted from Birkinshaw et al., 2000:395)  
Firstly, integrating the two organisations’ tasks led to a satisfactory non-human combination. While 
the task integration was carried out, the units’ interactions were curbed and the human integration, 
aimed at the gradual converging of cultures and eventuating in respect, happened without difficulty 
(Birkinshaw et al., 2000). The second observed phase in the study that proved effective in the post-
acquisition integration process was characterised as recommencing with the integration of 
organisation tasks, which sought to build on the foundation of successful human integration that had 
resulted from phase one; the effectively executed second phase eventuated in substantial 
interdependencies between the previously separate units (Birkinshaw et al., 2000). 
3.12.2.2 The merger integration workstream model  
As a result of the apparent dearth of scholarly literature on the integration process for small 
acquisitions into a DT, the integration process and strategy of medium- to large-sized M&A is 
considered here, as this is the most instructive model the author has been able to find. It was devised 
by Galpin and Herndon (2007). Therefore, according to Galpin and Herndon (2007), the full 
integration of organisations, particularly in the case of two similar sizes merging, encompasses at 
 
 Post-acquisition integration  
 Human integration   Task integration  
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least nine interdependent, concurrent workstreams; these can be seen in Figure 3.8 below. These 
comprise the differing focal areas which M&A integration managers should address for the most 
successful and effective M&A outcome. Each of these and all of them, collectively, are important for 
a sound sizable integration to take place; as such, M&A management should influence and lead all 















FIGURE 3.8: The merger integration workstream model 
(Source: Adapted from Galpin & Herndon, 2007:77)  
(a)   Executive leadership roles and responsibilities 
Firstly, delineating who of the executives is accountable for each of the succeeding M&A functions 
must be prioritised for successful integration in each workstream (Galpin & Herndon, 2007). The 
executive’s direct and effective involvement in the organisation is necessary for continued good 
performance (Cannella & Hambrick, 1993; Certo, Lester, Dalton & Dalton, 2006). Moreover, Vasilaki 
and O’Regan (2008) put forth that one of the most prominent issues in the literature regarding 
acquisition success is the effect of the executive leadership; indeed, one of the earliest studies on 
acquisition success, by Kitching (1967), single managers out as a vital source of this success.  
Vasilaki and O’Regan (2008) adduce that the top management team (TMT) should effectively 
employ and manage resources and group processes to enhance post-acquisition performance of 
the combined organisation. The TMT should also display group task leadership and personal 
integration to the task. If the TMT assumes these executive leadership roles and responsibilities, the 
Executive leadership roles and responsibilities  
Business integration and implementation   
Communication 
Structure and staffing  
Cultural integration  
Human capital-related integration  
Measurement and feedback   
Integration planning and project management  
Recruiting 
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integration process will benefit. Firstly, decision-making will be more effective; secondly, a clear 
vision will be exemplified; thirdly, the TMT will be qualified to influence and commit to the goal 
(Vasilaki & O’Regan, 2008).  
In an earlier publication, Buono and Bowditch (1989) delineate the priorities the TMT should have. 
Firstly, it should emphasise the acquisition objectives; secondly, determine the organisational and 
strategic fit; lastly, it should devise how to gain the commitment of all employees for a successful 
acquisition (Buono & Bowditch, 1989). Hitt et al. (1990) and Hitt, Hoskisson, Ireland and Harrison 
(1991) argue that the demands of the M&A process engage most of the TMT’s energy and time, to 
the detriment of core functions. In this case, core tasks of R&D and innovation, for example, may 
suffer if not prioritised (Hitt et al., 1990; Hitt et al., 1991). The longitudinal study by Yu et al. (2005) 
found support for this argument. By this logic, if the acquisitions scouted out and pursued are those 
that will bring R&D and innovative capabilities and value propositions to the buying organisation, 
then management would justifiably be spending time and resources on M&A activity. However, Yu 
et al. (2005) found that TMTs are prone to lose focus on the integration effort and then ineffectively 
manage it.  
(b)   Organisational integration and implementation  
Secondly, implementation should be stressed as each steps’ deliverables should be actionable and 
executed carefully; this step encompasses the planning that goes into an integration and the 
execution of those strategic plans (Galpin & Herndon, 2007). The planning should ensure that 
integration hindrances do not exist; these may exist in various forms, such as: reward and evaluation 
systems; management styles; organisational cultures or structures (Datta, 1991; Lubatkin, 1987; 
Marks, 1997).  
(c)   Communication 
Thirdly, successful M&A boast the ability to communicate thoroughly with a view to align all 
stakeholders’ visions for successful outcomes on strategies and objectives (Galpin & Herndon, 
2007). This workstream aligns with the HRM (human resource management) lens, which 
emphasises effective communication (Larsson & Finkelstein, 1999; Yu et al., 2005). The risk of not 
addressing communication during this process renders the acquisition vulnerable to ‘we-they’ 
interaction dynamics, breakdowns in communication between players and reduced commitment 
(Buono & Bowditch, 1989; Napier, 1989; Shin & DeNisi, 2004; Yu et al., 2005).  
(d)   Structure and staffing 
Fourthly, structure and staffing is necessary for all steps proceeding from launching integration 
planning as execution needs to take place within a previously determined human resources pool 
that is organised with a goal in mind (Galpin & Herndon, 2007).  Špaček (2016) argues that very little 
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attention is devoted to issues of reorganising, especially with regards to human resources, which is 
often the most significant shortcoming of the M&A process that leads to failure. 
(e)   Re-recruiting 
Moreover, re-recruiting (whether internally or externally) key talent within the integration is essential 
for the best hopes of success; influential employees should be included in the management of the 
merger to achieve good interpersonal relationships between merging groups (Galpin & Herndon, 
2007).  
(f)   Cultural integration 
Furthermore, clashes in culture often occur and pose a substantial risk to successful integration 
(Galpin & Herndon, 2007). According to Larsson and Finkelstein (1999), issues relating to conflicting 
cultures is often studied through the organisation theory lens. It has been demonstrated how 
challenging it is to combine the cultures of two established corporates because they have built up 
their shared realities over time and these are deeply embedded in the minds of employees (Morgan, 
2006; Weber & Camerer, 2003). In order to circumvent this ‘hazard’, careful attention should be paid 
to retaining some of the aspects of the organisational culture of both parties to ensure buy-in from 
all personnel (Larsson et al., 2004; Nahavandi & Malekzadeh, 1988). It is suggested that a cultural 
analysis of each should be undertaken by management consultants in large-scale mergers to evade 
this threat as much as possible (Galpin & Herndon, 2007).  
(g)   Human capital-related integration 
Besides, human capital-related integration is significant to undertake as new roles should be codified 
and understood across the new organisation to keep relational misunderstandings to a minimum 
(Galpin & Herndon, 2007).  
The eighth and ninth workstreams advanced by Galpin and Herndon (2007) are those of 
measurement and feedback as well as integration planning and project management, respectively. 
These steps align with Wuebben’s (2007) integration-controlling step of the acquisition process. 
Therefore, both are discussed in the following section.  
3.12.3 Integration control 
The third and final stage which Wuebben (2007) recommends is that certain integration controls are 
fulfilled, such as a post-acquisition audit. Similarly, Galpin and Herndon (2007) propose that two 
integration controls are instituted by means of workstreams. The first is measurement of the specific 
integration and giving feedback; the second is continuous learning about integration processes for 
future successes (Galpin & Herndon, 2007).  
3.12.3.1 Measurement and feedback  
Measurement of M&A performance and feedback of integration effectiveness is critical to furthering 
the organisational learning regarding successful integrated M&A for the success of future M&A 
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integrations that acquiring organisation will undertake (Galpin & Herndon, 2007). Bauer and Matzler 
(2014) have argued that M&A performance and success is a function of and can be measured by its 
antecedents, which these scholars argue are strategic and cultural fit as well as the speed and 
degree of post-acquisition integration. While these have been identified as key success factors, 
Gomes et al. (2013) have similarly proposed several KSFs of the PAIP, which are discussed in more 
detail in section 3.14.  
Nevertheless, M&A performance can be measured in multiple ways, depending on the aim of the 
measure (Meglio & Risberg, 2011), which is summarised in Table 3.2 below. As can be seen in this 
table, two main performance domains exist: financial and non-financial. Financial performance can 
be measured on the bases of market measures, including the dimensions of risk and market value, 
as well as accounting measures, which include the dimensions of profitability (Ma, Liu, Ning, Liu & 
Liu, 2014), growth, cash flow (Thanos & Papadakis, 2012), liquidity (Sinha, 2010) and leverage 
(Bouraoui & Li, 2014). Non-financial performance can be measured on the bases of operational 
measures, including marketing (or market share) (Venkatraman & Ramanujam, 1987), innovation 
(Ahuja & Katila, 2001; Zollo & Meier, 2008) and productivity (Andriuskevicius & Ciegis, 2017), as 
well as overall performance, including success and survival (Meglio & Risberg, 2011).  
TABLE 3.2: Measures of merger and acquisition performance  
Performance 
domain 























(Source: Adapted from Meglio & Risberg, 2011:422)  
3.12.3.2 Integration planning and project management  
Galpin and Herndon (2007) state that integration planning and project management is the final step. 
This encompasses learning from the combined organisation and continued commitment to the long-
term success of integrations in the future; it is largely dependent on sustained emphasis of the 
preceding steps because of reliance on the collective success for the overall effectiveness of the 
consolidation (Galpin & Herndon, 2007). Given the discussion of the M&A process as put forth by 
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Wuebben (2007) and the post-acquisition integration process of workstreams (Galpin & Herndon, 
2007) and sub-processes (Birkinshaw et al., 2000), the following section discusses seminal theme-
based acquisition integration process advanced by Haspeslagh and Jemison (1991).  
3.12.4 Acquisition integration process per Haspeslagh and Jemison (1991)  
Figure 3.9 below presents the theme-based post-acquisition integration process as put forth by 
Haspeslagh and Jemison (1991). The bidder and target interact for the purposes of operationalising 
integration to realise the objectives of the acquisition. Simultaneously, these interactions in the 
integration process serve to create and sustain an atmosphere that supports capability transfer. 
These present the overarching conditions that should be met for strategic capabilities to be 
transferred to improve competitive advantage. Thus, in summary: if interactions are positive, if 
process problems are addressed and mitigated as well as if a capability transfer-friendly environment 
is shaped, the bidder’s competitive advantage can be augmented by the successful transfer of 







FIGURE 3.9: Haspeslagh and Jemison’s acquisition integration process  
(Source: Adapted from Haspeslagh & Jemison, 1991:123)  
The process problems put forth by Haspeslagh and Jemison (1991), as can be seen in the above 
figure’s highlighted green box, are essentially managerial and/or leadership issues associated with 
the PAIP. As such, these considerations are included in the primary research methodology of the 
current study. Therefore, given the post-acquisition integration process as presented in this section, 
the following serves to discuss the challenges that arise during it, with reference to those discussed 
previously as well as those illustrated in the figure above in the green box.  
3.13 INTEGRATION PROCESS CHALLENGES  
Haspeslagh and Jemison (1991) identify a major challenge in the management of acquisitions, which 
is the management of the post-acquisition integration process to realise the value creation estimated 
at the outset of the transaction. These authors also indicate that the post-acquisition integration 
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process, in turn, habitually gives rise to three challenges (see Figure 3.8) which managers must 
address for effective integration and thus successful value creation (Haspeslagh & Jemison, 1991). 
As the study is concerned with exploring managerial and/or leadership considerations for team 
integrations of small innovation acquisitions, challenges associated with the integration process 
provide possible items for discussion in the semi-structured interview guide of this study.  
3.13.1 Determinism 
The problem of determinism refers to the tendency managers have of steadfastly clinging to the 
initial reason for the acquisition rather than facing sometimes altered realities, which result from 
changed internal and external conditions (Haspeslagh & Jemison, 1991). Such changes can include: 
new information coming to light; unexpected events in industry, competitors and technology; internal 
organisation changes; as well as resistance between the opposing sides: the bidder and the target’s 
employees. This deterministic and inflexible view identified by Haspeslagh and Jemison (1991) is 
entrenched in a fictitious sense of security and inured to recurring confusion and frustration, which 
are discussed below.  
3.13.1.1 A false impression of security  
For the corporate transaction to take place originally, it requires a persuasive selling point that 
justifies both the expense and risk of the acquisition (Haspeslagh & Jemison, 1991).  The false 
security shared by all stakeholders is rooted in the persuasiveness of the reason for acquiring. It 
also clouds the judgement of managers regarding external changes (Haspeslagh & Jemison, 1991). 
3.13.1.2 Unanticipated events  
Shocks that originate externally can damage the acquisition. Thus, managing the acquisition’s 
integration effectively relies on appreciating and comprehending the intricacies of industry and 
organisation context. Haspeslagh and Jemison (1991) also express that the most challenging 
unexpected incidents are those arising from conflict and antagonistic behaviour between the 
employees of the acquiring and the acquired organisations (Haspeslagh & Jemison, 1991). 
3.13.1.3 Confusion and frustration  
It is suggested by Haspeslagh and Jemison (1991) that integration is generally operationalised by 
the lower level managers, while the more senior managers hold them accountable to achieve the 
results anticipated at the acquisition’s outset. Assumptions about the probable outcomes of an 
acquisition are formed at the start of the M&A process, which can potentially be too ambitious to 
achieve, which in turn necessitates modifications to the original thinking about how to execute 
successful integration as external changes occur and either make these goals more difficult to 
achieve or altogether unattainable. If these early assumptions are clung to by integration managers 
despite changing external forces without responding appropriately, the view can be considered 
deterministic in nature. This problem is further exacerbated when integration managers’ feelings of 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
  
88 
    
   
confusion and frustration trigger managers to intensify their commitment to original goals rather than 
applying themselves to the causes that signal change and how to respond adequately to these 
forces. The causes of this inflexibility to change may create a deterministic view held by managers 
characterised by hubris, insecurity and stubbornness (Haspeslagh & Jemison, 1991).  
3.13.2 Value destruction 
Arguably, all large-scale acquisitions change the status quo of both organisations – particularly that 
of the acquired. One manifestation of such change in the status quo of the buyer-acquirer and the 
acquired is that, in the acquisition integration, destruction of value can occur, which is the negatively 
impact that the acquisition may have on the people it affects, both managers and employees 
(Haspeslagh & Jemison, 1991). The affected people may feel uncertain, insecure, fearful and, at the 
extreme, feel the subconscious need for survival instinct. It is further argued that if people feel this 
way, they may actively or passively resist the integration, which can erode the shareholder value 
intended for the acquirer. Ways in which employees resist the organisation combination efforts 
during the process of post-acquisition integration include: working against or not in favour of the 
success of the acquisition; leaving the consolidated organisation; recoiling from new modes of 
behaviour; acting with a lack of initiative; reduced commitment; averseness to change; and even 
sabotaging operations (Haspeslagh & Jemison, 1991:130-131).  
All these actions and non-actions by employees damage the acquisition and the new organisation, 
by extension; therefore, there is a need for managers to demonstrate empathy (Haspeslagh & 
Jemison, 1991). Acting empathetically means gaining an understanding of the culture, the emotions 
and the politics of the acquired organisation, which is exhibited and comprehended only by spending 
time with the existing and new employees (Marks, 1997; Nguyen & Kleiner, 2003). However, this 
poses a trade-off in managing and leading the PAIP, which occurs as a choice between efficiently 
achieving the strategic objectives that form the justification for the M&A and ensuring the optimal 
well-being of all personnel involved in the effort. As such, integration managers must work towards 
balancing the tasks of empathy and efficient integration without letting one entirely supplant the other 
(Haspeslagh & Jemison, 1991).  
3.13.3 Vacuum of leadership   
Integrations can suffer from a lack of appropriate leadership. Haspeslagh and Jemison (1991) found 
that lacking institutional leadership will need to be supplemented with interpersonal leadership. 
Institutional leadership refers to top management’s direct involvement with the integration. All 
employees must be made aware of the acquisition’s vision and purpose as well as their individual 
roles in accomplishing these. The TMT should shape an identity for the amalgamated entity, which 
the workforce can equate themselves with on a personal level. If these responsibilities are eschewed 
by senior executives, acquired employees are likely to revert to past behaviours that are incongruent 
with the new organisation and its aims (Haspeslagh & Jemison, 1991). 
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In the absence of sufficient institutional leadership, a great deal of interpersonal leadership from 
middle management is requisite for filling the void (Haspeslagh & Jemison, 1991). It is a time-
consuming endeavour. The demands of integrating two previously independent organisations that 
lack a shared purpose compels those middle managers charged with directing the integration to veer 
their focus. This comprises a shift from the arguably more important value-creating aspects to the 
protracted matters of interpersonal leadership. Furthermore, the dearth of a common purpose has 
been found to bring about inferior performance. Therefore, in summary, integration leadership 
becomes misdirected from their intended purpose (Haspeslagh & Jemison, 1991). This section has 
shown how the challenges of determinism, destruction of value and leadership vacuities affect the 
post-acquisition integration process; the following section reviews critical success factors of the 
PAIP.  
3.14 SUCCESS FACTORS OF THE INTEGRATION PROCESS 
The review undertaken by Gomes et al. (2013) emphasise the importance of establishing critical 
success factors (CSFs) across the wider theoretical lenses that intersect with the M&A process 
literature. These scholars draw attention to the significance of the post-acquisition integration 
process and explaining performance by citing Haspeslagh and Jemison’s (1991) assertion that 
creating value from acquisitions occurs from successful integrations. Moreover, effective integration 
practices that lead to long-term success post-M&A are driven by integration processes that consider 
both human and financial factors as well as combine CSFs (Bertoncelj & Kovač, 2008).  
Regarding the latter, Gomes et al. (2013) identified seven critical success factors for the post-
acquisition integration process, including: integration strategy and approach; post-acquisition 
leadership; speed of integration implementation; post-acquisition-leadership team and disregard of 
daily activities; communication during implementation; managing corporate and cultural differences 
(Gomes et al., 2013:18); and human resource management (Gomes et al., 2013). Each of these are 
reviewed in this section. Furthermore, as the study is concerned with exploring managerial and/or 
leadership considerations for team integrations of small innovation acquisitions, CSFs associated 
with the integration process provide possible items for discussion in the semi-structured interview 
guide of this study. 
3.14.1 Integration strategy and approach  
Effective post-acquisition integration processes are necessary for the creation of value from the M&A 
transaction (Haspeslagh & Jemison, 1991; Schweiger & Goulet, 2005). The extent of integration (full 
integration to autonomy) may negatively influence the performance of the acquisition or indeed 
cause it to fail in two ways: too little integration (Schweiger & Weber, 1989) and too much integration 
(Weber & Schweiger, 1992). The approach towards integration is a complex decision and 
undertaking, which justifies the various typologies found in the literature, summarised in Figure 3.5 
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and Figure 3.6 (Angwin & Meadows, 2015:239; Haspeslagh & Jemison, 1991:145; Marks & Mirvis, 
2001; Nahavandi & Malekzadeh, 1988:82-83; Siehl & Smith, 1990:170-172).  
Significantly, Birkinshaw et al. (2000) observed that the integration strategy and approach selected 
and implemented for a given post-acquisition phase was most successful when the sub-processes 
of task and human integration are consciously managed and led by management, which has been 
discussed and illustrated in Figure 3.7. Similarly, integrating human and financial factors in 
integration processes and practices are both necessary to accomplish long-term effectiveness post-
acquisition (Bertoncelj & Kovač, 2008). Both the secondary and primary findings of Birkinshaw et al. 
(2000) indicate that multiple theoretical lenses need to be considered for the complex phenomenon 
of post-acquisition integration to be understood and analysed appropriately. This is in keeping with 
other assertions in the M&A literature, see for example: Cartwright and Schoenberg (2006), who 
argued for more holistic conceptions of post-M&A performance, as well as Larsson and Finkelstein 
(1999), who have promoted the need to gain multidisciplinary understandings of realising synergy. 
This section has discussed the CSF of strategy and approach to integration, the first identified by 
Gomes et al. (2013); the following section deals with the CSF of leadership post-acquisition.  
3.14.2 Post-acquisition leadership  
According to Gomes et al. (2013), leadership has been a prominent and enduring theme in the M&A 
literature and is identified as a critical success factor for the post-acquisition integration process. As 
early as the late 1960s, Kitching’s (1967) work on diagnosing merger failure identified the success 
factor of a relationship between leaders of the consolidating organisations. Other scholars argue for 
the importance of demonstrating managerial decisiveness in setting strategic direction for effective 
integration and leading the change which existing and new employees experience (Angwin & 
Meadows, 2009; Gomes et al., 2013; Nemanich & Keller, 2007; Vasilaki, 2011a; 2011b). Schweizer 
and Patzelt (2012) stress the important role of PAIP leadership in expediting the integration process 
and gaining the commitment of acquired and existing employees to remain as a part of the 
consolidated organisation both during and after the integration process. The cross-border M&A 
integration literature has also stressed the importance of leadership as a CSF (Erez-Rein, Erez & 
Maital, 2004).  
Moreover, most successful integrations are characterised by a clear relationship at the boundary 
that exists between the acquiring and acquired organisations, which is effectively localised in an 
appointed executive of the acquiring management’s choosing (Angwin, Stern & Bradley, 2004; 
Kavanagh & Ashkanasy, 2006; Kitching, 1967). Similar to the assertion by Govindarajan and Trimble 
(2010a) of the importance of hiring outsiders to the initiative with fresh perspectives, Angwin and 
Meadows (2009) argue for the appointment of an outsider to the acquired unit to lead it if significant 
change is needed in the unit. This is not an unusual assertion for the field of M&A as changes in top 
management have been often cited (Aghasi et al., 2017; Krug & Hegarty, 2001; Walsh, 1988). 
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Vasilaki (2011a; 2011b) has advanced that instead of a comprehensive set of leadership qualities 
that are central to successful PAIPs across the board, different approaches to leadership may be 
necessary for different integrations strategies, approaches and styles. This reasoning is particularly 
salient to the current study as the primary objective involves an integration approach at the team 
level which has not yet been researched. This section has discussed the CSF of post-acquisition 
leadership, the first identified by Gomes et al. (2013); the following section deals with the CSF of 
implementing integration efficiently.  
3.14.3 Speed of integration implementation  
The speed of executing PAIPs is important in fast-changing industries, such as those driven by 
technological innovation (Vester, 2002). Ernst and Young (2014:4) have emphasised the recent 
importance and focus that 80 per cent of practitioners have on integration speed. However, this 
report states: “After all, the sooner you integrate, the sooner you can get back to focusing on your 
core organisation and increasing earnings” (Ernst & Young, 2014:16), which is not a goal associated 
with the procurement of small technology-based organisations made for effective innovation 
execution, including R&D and commercialisation, of an acquisition’s value proposition (Ahuja & 
Novelli, 2014; Govindarajan & Trimble, 2010a).  
While innovation-driven M&A necessitate expeditious, consistent PAIPs because of the need of a 
response to market demands (Vester, 2002), the human component made up of directly involved 
managers and employees does not integrate as fast as is required by deadlines of getting to market 
(Gomes et al., 2013; Vester, 2002). Thus, a trade-off between speed and effective human integration 
is clear, which was also identified by Haspeslagh and Jemison (1991) in their discussion of the 
process problem of integration managers’ deterministic worldview. To solve for this choice, Light 
(2001) argues that one cost outweighs the other: losing momentum on new product development of 
a feasible and potentially profitable product poses a greater risk to the acquirer than the costs 
associated with rapid decision-making, which may negatively affect the sensibilities of employees.  
In contrast, Ranft and Lord (2002) have found that slower integration speeds lead to establishing 
trust between employees. Notwithstanding, Gomes et al. (2013) argue that the gains on either side 
of this trade-off mean that there is no superior speed at which to integrate: it is entirely dependent 
on the variables unique to the acquisition and the PAIP so the integration speed should be 
determined, planned for and executed on a case-by-case basis. This section has examined 
integration speed, the first identified by Gomes et al. (2013); the following section deals with the CSF 
concept of the integration team.  
3.14.4 Post-acquisition-leadership team and disregard of daily activities  
The complexity of the PAIP often forces managers to spend much of their time solving issues that 
arise from the changeover period rather than the daily operational activities, for which the acquisition 
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was initially undertaken (Ghemawat & Ghadar, 2000; Gomes et al., 2013). This drawback motivates 
organisations to develop capabilities and value propositions in-house rather than pursue external 
strategic options, namely in the M&A milieu (Ghemawat & Ghadar, 2000), which suggests that 
greater understanding is necessary to enable managers and organisations to execute the PAIP 
effectively in order to reap the potential rewards of the combination.  
As a result of the challenge of simultaneously managing the integration and organisational activities, 
scholars have suggested the creation and deployment of post-acquisition-leadership teams that 
focus their energy, time and effort on the coordination alone, which leaves the daily organisational 
activities as the highest priority of organisational managers (Epstein, 2004; Gomes et al., 2013; 
Jemison & Sitkin, 1986b; Savovic, 2012).  
Teran (2012) has discussed the advantages of forming and deploying a centralised integration team, 
which is tasked with outlining methods, processes and tools to be implemented across the PAIPs of 
the various acquisitions, as is operationalised in Cisco Systems. Similarly, Deloitte (2015:7) revealed 
that 82 per cent of study respondents considered the formation and functioning of teams dedicated 
to integration processes a critical success factor. Largely, these teams have more than ten members 
and are cross-functionally populated, including members from the organisation’s different divisions 
and departments (Deloitte, 2015). This section has discussed the CSF of integration teams, the first 
identified by Gomes et al. (2013); the following section deals with the communication CSF. 
3.14.5 Communication throughout integration implementation  
An additional critical success factor widely put forth in the M&A process literature (Schweiger & 
DeNisi, 1991; Weber & Tarba, 2010) is that of communication in the post-acquisition phase, which 
Weber, Rachman-Moore and Tarba (2012) argue as essential to post-acquisition performance. 
Schweiger, Csiszar and Napier (1993) take the importance of communication further, emphasising 
that it is integral to stabilising the workforce directly involved in acquisitions from early in the PAIP, 
which lends to decreasing uncertainty and diffidence. Epstein (2004:177) emphasise the importance 
of “significant, constant and consistent” communication throughout the process, starting as early as 
is possible. Schweiger et al. (1993) warn that employee uncertainty in the transitional time of change 
can bring about various disadvantageous outcomes, such as declines in productivity, organisation 
loyalty and job satisfaction as well as increases in stress, absenteeism and employee turnover.  
Communications with subordinates especially should be delivered by an appropriate method, timed 
aptly and allow for interactiveness (Gomes et al., 2013; Weber & Tarba, 2010). However, Weber et 
al. (2012) warn against managers over-communicating, which decreases their own flexibility by 
keeping them to their promises. Despite this, Epstein (2004:177) identifies over-communication as 
a success factor. This section has discussed the importance of the communication CSF, the first 
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identified by Gomes et al. (2013); the following section deals with the CSF of managing cultural 
differences existing between corporate and nations.  
3.14.6 Managing corporate and national cultural differences  
Several researchers have analysed cases of acquisition performance in which the strategic fit 
between combining organisations seemed satisfactory but the acquisition performed poorly and 
found that the concept of cultural fit explains this dichotomy (Chatterjee, Lubatkin, Schweiger & 
Weber, 1992; Weber, 1996; Weber et al., 2012). Thus, the issue of culture in M&A and managing it 
have been identified in the literature in the corporate or organisational sense (Melewar & Harrold, 
2000) as well as a national sense (Chakrabarti, Gupta-Mukherjee & Jayaraman, 2009), which has 
been discussed in sections 3.9.2.1 and 3.12.2.2(f).  
The differences between cultures have been identified by Gomes, Angwin, Peter and Mellahi (2012) 
at differing levels of analysis, which include the macro-environmental levels of nation, region, 
industry and organisation as well as the more micro level of the professional (Gomes et al., 2013). 
A critical factor determining post-acquisition performance in cross-border M&A is that of national 
culture (Graebner, 2004; Puranam et al., 2006; Puranam et al., 2009; Puranam & Srikanth, 2007; 
Weber et al., 2012); however, cross-border M&A activity falls beyond the scope of the current study.  
Thus, the assertion made by Gomes et al. (2013) of managing the differences that exist between 
corporate cultures of the combining organisations must be actively undertaken to mitigate adverse 
effects on M&A performance is relevant to the study. Relatively recently, scholars have called for 
gaining an understanding of fit between the chosen integration approach (that considers differences 
in corporate culture) and the potential for synergy (Weber et al., 2012) as their findings have 
indicated that these M&A perform better than those that have selected a more ill-considered 
approach to integration (Gomes et al., 2013). This section has discussed the CSF of managing 
cultural differences, the first identified by Gomes et al. (2013); the following section deals with the 
CSF of managing human resources.  
3.14.7 Human resource management  
The final critical success factor that Gomes et al. (2013) draw attention to is that of managing human 
resources. Many studies have been undertaken in the milieu of HRM in M&A, including: Nahavandi 
and Malekzadeh’s (1988) identification of human resource problems; conceptual studies by Weber 
and Drori (2011) as well as Weber and Schweiger (1992); and Weber’s (1996) empirical study on 
human factors and cultural fit’s relationship with M&A performance. Moreover, Gomes et al. (2013) 
argue that the reason why PAIP challenges associated with human resources are important is 
because these can restrain the potential synergy that may be realised from the combination.  
Larsson et al. (2004) identify an important barrier that prevent synergies as employee resistance, 
which these scholars believe have three causes, including: cultural causes; interpreting the M&A 
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integration as a personal and collective threat; and construing the M&A as likely to impact the 
individual’s career negatively. As cultural integration management as a CSF has been discussed in 
section 3.14.6, managing the final two causes is necessary. These scholars suggest that instituting 
communication and reward systems are necessary to solve employee resistance from an HRM 
perspective (Larsson et al., 2004).  
Gomes et al. (2013) further assert that improving upon HR practices may motivate and commit both 
managers and employees for achieving the integration purposes of strategic capability and 
knowledge transfer. HRM practices that are also recognised as effective integration capabilities 
include: conflict training for employees; addressing uncertainty, insecurity and stress through 
communication; and adjustment of other practices, such as rewards and incentives, labour relations 
and recruitment (Gomes et al., 2013; Weber & Tarba, 2010).  
The seven critical success factors identified by Gomes et al. (2013) – integration strategy and 
approach; post-acquisition leadership; speed of integration implementation; post-acquisition-
leadership team and disregard of daily activities; communication during implementation; managing 
corporate and cultural differences; and human resource management – have been reviewed in this 
section. The following section serves to consolidate the reviewed literature pertaining to the PAIP.  
3.15 CONSOLIDATING THE INTEGRATION PROCESS LITERATURE REVIEWED 
The M&A literature has been deemed fragmented in several respects (Capasso & Meglio, 2005), 
including: disconnected M&A research streams (Larsson & Finkelstein, 1999); success factors of an 
M&A deal (Miczka & Größler, 2004); as well as the PAIP (Graebner et al., 2017). As such, the 
literature reviewed in this chapter has firstly focused on the field of mergers and acquisitions in a 
broad sense, serving to examine: motives for M&A in general and for innovation M&A; advantages 
of acquisition strategies; and causes of M&A failure; as well as the research stream of M&A process 
regarding synergy realisation, acquisition performance and approaches to integration.  
Secondly, it served to discuss the complexities of the phases of the post-acquisition integration 
process, its challenges and success factors to eventuate at a more holistic understanding of the 
M&A process for the creation of a theoretical foundation of the PAIP used in the primary research of 
the study. Regarding the chapter’s review of the PAIP, Table 3.3 below summarises and synthesises 
the relevant phases, sub-processes, workstreams, challenges and critical success factors presented 
and considered in sections 3.11, 3.12, 3.13 and 3.14 as a means of synthesising the fragmented 
literature to create a theoretical framework for the PAIP. It is salient to note at this point that the table 
is irrelevant to a holding integration approach (see section 3.10.2.1d) but will only inform cases where 
integration takes place post-acquisition.  
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3.16 CONCLUSION 
This chapter has served to introduce and discuss the literature reviewed regarding the broad M&A 
literature as well as challenges and success factors of M&A integrations. The process perspective 
lens has been discussed, which is important as the primary research can be framed by addressing 
managerial and/or leadership considerations that arise during the various stages of the integration 
process. Thus, the process of integration has been discussed through synthesising the relevant, 
existing research. During the discussion of this process, the various challenges that arise in the 
integration process have been identified and considered, such as communication, structuring, 
acculturation, human capital integration and career management issues. In addition, the process 
challenges advanced by Haspeslagh and Jemison (1991) have also been discussed. These issues 
are important to the study as they offer some broad managerial and/or leadership considerations for 
the post-acquisition integration process. Given the review of the literature on M&A and the PAIP, the 
following chapter deals with the concepts of management, leadership and team development insofar 
as they are relevant to innovation, the integration process as well as teams. Team development is 
relevant to the current study as it sets out to explore managerial and/or leadership considerations 
for integrating small innovation acquisitions into teams because small innovation acquisitions are 
integrated into teams, which are developed at a similar time. Moreover, the literature relating to 
management and leadership as these concepts relate to strategy, innovation, projects, change, the 
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CHAPTER FOUR  
THE TEAM DEVELOPMENT PROCESS AND RELEVANT THEORIES OF 
MANAGEMENT AND LEADERSHIP TO THE STUDY 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
In recent decades, considerable and growing attention has been given to the subject matters of the 
team construct (Bonebright, 2010), management (Yadav & Sagar, 2013) and leadership (Dionne, 
Gupta, Sotak, Shirreffs, Serban, Hao, Kim & Yammarino, 2014). With regards to management, Tidd 
and Bessant (2013) have advanced that the appropriate and effective management of the innovation 
process throughout the organisation’s hierarchy is paramount to successful performance; 
Haspeslagh and Jemison (1991) have also underscored the significance of effectively managing and 
leading the post-acquisition integration process for successful organisational combinations. 
Moreover, leadership has also been identified as a critical challenge for organisations to unpack and 
succeed at for augmented organisation competitiveness in a constantly changing world context 
(Dugan & O’Shea, 2014). Moreover, innovative and learning organisations are often characterised 
by structures in which people are organised into teams; in such teams, conflict, constructive dissent 
and debate are viewed as positive learning and collaboration opportunities (Serrat, 2009). Therefore, 
since the current study aims to explore unique managerial and/or leadership considerations for the 
process of integrating small innovation acquisitions at the team level, the literature as it concerns the 
concepts of teams, management and leadership is reviewed.  
Thus, this chapter’s initial focus is on the team, specifically the process perspective of its 
development. Further, the inclusion of both concepts of management and leadership is necessitated 
because of the current study’s multidimensional nature, encompassing: innovativeness and the 
innovation process; acquisitions and the post-acquisition integration process; as well as the team 
development process and performance. Furthermore, firstly, the concepts of management and 
leadership are defined, discussed and compared and, thereafter, the theories of management and 
leadership that are deemed most relevant to this study are summarised and argued for. Secondly, 
the succeeding sections in the chapter discuss both concepts insofar as they are relevant to strategy, 
innovation, projects, change, the PAIP, transformation and teams. Finally, the chapter culminates in 
a summary of the broad prescriptions identified at the theoretical intersections uncovered through 
the review of literature.  
4.2 THE TEAM DEVELOPMENT PROCESS  
Teams are often formed as finite entities made up of a practicable number of people who work 
together towards a common purpose (Ferrán-Urdaneta, 1999; Isaksen & Tidd, 2006; Tidd & Bessant, 
2013). The body of knowledge on teams and teamwork is a large and growing one; as such, the 
review of the literature has been deliberately limited to review concepts and arguments relevant to 
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the study. The development of the team is relevant to the current study, which aims to explore 
managerial and/or leadership considerations for team integrations of small innovation acquisitions; 
in these scenarios, as small innovation acquisitions are integrated into teams, teams are developed 
at a similar time. Firstly, the process perspective of developing teams is dealt with; secondly, success 
factors for complex and innovation-driven teams are discussed; and, thirdly, the team charter and 
its value is addressed.  
4.2.1 The process of developing groups and teams 
According to Rickards and Moger (2000), Tuckman (1965) initially proposed a developmental model 
for groups at a time when they were increasingly emerging in organisational structures and little to 
no research had been done on the process of developing them. As such, he first introduced a four-
stage process, which initially included only the stages known as forming, storming, norming and 
performing, which is the classic model in the field (Kozlowski & Bell, 2013). In 1977, Tuckman worked 
with Jensen to revisit the original model and added an additional stage to the process at the very 
end, that of adjourning; the revised model can be seen below in the Figure 4.1.  
 
FIGURE 4.1: Team development stages  
(Source: Adapted from Bonebright, 2010:114; Tuckman & Jensen, 1977:419-427)  
The simplicity and universality of this process has been recognised in the literature for over four 
decades (Bonebright, 2010) and continues to be relevant still (Humphrey & Aime, 2014; Kozlowski 
& Bell, 2013). Despite the apparent linearity of the above model, Tuckman did not evince that all 
team developments would progress sequentially through the phases (Humphrey & Aime, 2014). As 
such, this section defines and describes the phases while providing a critique of the process and a 
brief reflection on the intersection of theory.  
4.2.1.1 Stage one: Forming  
The stage at which members of a team are brought together at its inception is known as “forming” 
(Tuckman, 1965:396). At the start, group members focus their energies on orientating themselves 
around both the task behaviours and interpersonal relationships that will be required of them 
throughout the remainder of the team’s existence (Tuckman & Jensen, 1977:421).  
4.2.1.2 Stage two: Storming  
Once the team has been formed, a period of resolving conflicts and differences commonly ensues, 
which is referred to as “storming” (Tuckman, 1965:396). Team unity often succumbs to conflicts 
stemming from polarisation on issues, which is especially the case when individual team members 
  Forming   Storming    Norming    Performing    Adjourning  
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are required to change and adapt for the sake of accomplishing goals specific to the team purpose 
(Bonebright, 2010).  
4.2.1.3 Stage three: Norming  
Once the team progresses through the second stage, a commitment to mutual norms and values is 
fostered, a stage known as “norming”, which facilitates an understanding and expectation of team 
leadership (Tuckman, 1965:396). Employee resistance is reduced when leaders stimulate 
cohesiveness and unity in the interpersonal relations of the group as well as allow team members to 
express thoughts and opinions on team tasks (Tuckman, 1965). Moreover, members start to accept 
the idiosyncrasies of their peers to coordinate efforts more effectively and harmoniously (Bonebright, 
2010).  
4.2.1.4 Stage four: Performing  
Thereafter, the team is ready to progress to “performing”, the fourth stage, in which effective task 
implementation takes place (Tuckman, 1965:396). The interpersonal relational structure initiated and 
developed from the forming to norming stages becomes the basis for executing tasks, which 
necessitates a strong foundation of internal team relationships (Bonebright, 2010). Until the revision 
of the 1965 process model, which was undertaken a dozen years later, the small group development 
stages remained at a total of four, which increased by one stage in 1977, that of adjourning (Tuckman 
& Jensen, 1977:419), which is discussed in the subsequent section.  
4.2.1.5 Stage five: Adjourning  
Assuming the team is assembled for a finite duration only, it “adjourns” (Tuckman & Jensen, 
1977:419-427), which is the final stage and represents the culmination of the entire team 
development process (Bonebright, 2010; Natvig & Stark, 2016; Rickards & Moger, 2000; Tuckman 
& Jensen, 1977). Given the discussion of the five stages of the small group development process, 
the succeeding section presents a critique of it.  
4.2.1.6 Critique of the small group development process 
While Kozlowski and Bell (2013) argue that the Tuckman model affords scholars and practitioners a 
useful contribution to help understand group development, other researchers have suggested that it 
suffers from limitations. Although Humphrey and Aime (2014) suggest that the model suffers from 
little empirical testing and bias in the tests that have been undertaken, there have been many other 
models proposed by scholars. However, relatively newer process propositions suffer from high 
similarity to the Tuckman (1965) and Tuckman and Jensen (1977) models. In addition, Rickards and 
Moger (2000) criticise the model for having idealised stages, which do not allow for the levels of 
complexity that exist in interpersonal relations; for example, some teams will never eventuate at a 
performance norm. Despite its shortcomings, it remains a valuable means of understanding team 
dynamics and exploring them in research (Rickards & Moger, 2000). As such, this process model is 
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deemed appropriate as a point of departure for the current study in the same spirit as Natvig and 
Stark (2016). Given the discussion of the team development process, the next section briefly reflects 
on the intersection of team development and the other relevant research streams.  
4.2.1.7  A brief reflection on the intersection of theories  
Regarding the literature on the management of innovation, Tidd and Bessant (2013:133) have put 
forth that the Tuckman and Jensen (1977) process model is also relevant to team development in 
the innovation milieu. However, a search in the body of literature pertaining to the post-acquisition 
integration process saw no intersection with team development processes insofar as the author is 
knowledgeable, which led to the impetus of the study: the key considerations for managing the three 
processes – innovation execution, the PAIP and team development processes – simultaneously.  
4.2.2 Success factors for innovation-driven teams  
A recent study conducted by Natvig and Stark (2016) has produced some valuable success factors. 
Firstly, effective planning by the team leader prior to group formation on striking a balance between 
internal structures and external support systems is important to ensure project completion. Secondly, 
selection of team members and the leader, particularly, is important; the person leading should be 
able to guide members through each stage, which promotes overall team performance. Thirdly, the 
use of a team charter was found to be perhaps the most valuable key success factor (Natvig & Stark, 
2016).  
Natvig and Stark’s (2016) three main findings – namely, the need for boundary spanning (between 
the team and external structures), the selection of a leader and team members as well as the use of 
a team charter – thus overlap with Govindarajan and Trimble’s (2010a) framework for executing 
innovation in DTs that add to an organisation’s ambidexterity (Virta, 2017). This is evident as, in both 
cases, external relations must be proactively managed, such as between the DT and ongoing 
operations (or production function), which make up the project team (Govindarajan & Trimble, 
2010a:27-28). Additionally, the project team must both be led by an identifiable individual vested 
with certain authority and the team must be itself made up of the best candidates available; thus, the 
composition of the team warrants significant attention (Govindarajan & Gupta, 2001). Lastly, the 
team charter has been recommended as a valuable tool for supporting teams (Wilkinson & Moran, 
1998) especially those that strive to accomplish complex goals (Natvig & Stark, 2016), such as 
executing innovation experiments (Schilling & Hill, 1998). Therefore, the team charter concept is 
considered and discussed in the following section.  
4.2.3 The value in a team charter 
Team charters are documents detailing the mission and vision of the team as well as how it is to 
realise these; the major value that charters add to team development and performance is in clarifying 
and centralising the goals early on to prevent confusion and frustration at later stages (Wilkinson & 
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Moran, 1998). A useful example of the components to include in the team charter is summarised in 
Table 4.1 below.  
TABLE 4.1: Team charter components  
Component  Question(s) the component answers about the nature and future of the 
team  
Purpose of the team Why are we forming the team? What is the desired outcome? 
Alignment with 
organisation strategy  
How does the team’s project fit in with organisational goals? 
Team leader and project 
sponsor  
Who is held accountable for team leadership and activities? Who is championing 
the project from top management? 
Stakeholders (key) Who are the stakeholders, both internally and externally? 
Project objectives What are the primary goals and priorities of the team? 
Deliverables What are the outcomes desired at the end of the project? 
Boundaries What lies beyond the scope of the project? 
Member responsibilities  Who are the project’s team members and what roles do they have to carry out? 
Time commitments to 
team 
How much time does each member need to give? 
Performance measures  How will successes be determined (measured)? 
Risks What are the risks to achieving success and how can they be mitigated? 
Communication plan How does the team leader plan to manage team communication? 
Assumptions What are the assumptions surrounding the team’s works? 
Necessary resources Which human, financial and other resources are necessary to gain access to? 
What skill sets are needed in the team? 
Team interaction rules  What are the ground rules of the team, regarding interaction and conduct in 
meetings? 
Signatures agreeing to 
charter stipulations 
Are members of the team demonstrating their commitment to successful 
performance by signing the charter? 
(Source: Adapted from Mathieu & Rapp, 2009:103; Natvig & Stark, 2016:677)  
As can be seen in the above table, various components of team charters are also relevant to the 
organisational innovativeness, innovation execution and team development literature, such as: 
specifying a purpose, delineating team leadership and external boundaries as well as stipulating 
performance measures, recognising assumptions and gaining access to the necessary resources 
(Govindarajan & Trimble, 2010a); alignment with organisational strategy (Davila et al., 2013); and 
team interaction rules as “norming” (Tuckman, 1965:396).  
While Tidd and Bessant (2013:134) view the team development model in Figure 4.1 as necessary 
for team development in the context of innovation, this approach does not adequately address the 
leadership and management of teams of innovative post-acquisition integration cases. Thus, the 
following sections address the literature regarding relevant theories and themes of management and 
leadership, beginning with a definition of both and a critical comparison of these concepts.  
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4.3 COMPARING MANAGEMENT AND LEADERSHIP  
The exploration of managerial and/or leadership considerations for integrating small innovation 
acquisitions into teams is the aim of this study, which makes the concepts and literature pertaining 
to management and leadership. The concepts are often used interchangeably in the literature but 
this is erroneous (Maccoby, 2000). Bočková (2011) makes the salient point, however, that managers 
are always viewed as leaders by their subordinates in practice. It has been consistently advanced 
by scholars that leadership is considered as having a separate purpose in the organisation to 
management (chronologically: Zaleznik, 1992; Gronn, 2002; Nienaber, 2010; Reiche, Bird, 
Mendenhall & Osland, 2017). The concepts of management and leadership are first reviewed 
separately and the section culminates in the form of a critical comparison.  
4.3.1 General management  
The original functions of general management were proposed by Henri Fayol in 1916 (Lopez, 2014), 
which lead to him being considered as one of the founding fathers of classical management (Parker 
& Ritson, 2005). His book, General and Industrial Management (1955), advanced five main elements 
of management, which all remain universally relevant; however, modern researchers such as Lopez 
(2014) and Maccoby (2000) have renovated these slightly. Fayol’s five elements are comprised of 
the following terms (Wren & Bedeian, 1994:221-227): plan; organise; control; command; and 
coordinate.  
4.3.1.1 Planning 
The first of Fayol’s management functions is planning, which operationalises that creation of short- 
and long-term forecasts and plans of action that puts resources to optimal use (Fayol, 1955). Initially, 
Fayol published his work in French, at which time it was referred to as prevoyance, which was 
translated and understood as “planning” by other scholars (Pryor & Taneja, 2010:491). In recent 
years, the understanding of the planning function has been extended to encompass “forecasting” 
and “foresight” (Parker & Ritson, 2005:176-180). This function largely developed in the twentieth 
century literature in the strategic management research stream under strategic planning, which 
should be conducted along with critical strategic thinking to develop sound, executable and effective 
strategies (Mintzberg, 1994); as such, the concepts of strategic management and leadership are 
also considered in the current study in section 4.5.  
4.3.1.2 Organising 
Secondly, organising refers to the efficient administration, structuring and aligning of the 
organisation’s activities and employees (Fayol, 1955). The organising function refers to how top 
managers systematically assemble the reporting relationships of all employees and managers in the 
organisational structure (Scott & Mitchell, 1976). Traditionally, highly formalised hierarchies 
characterised by a bureaucratic, mechanistic organisation were favoured by organisations, which 
simply aimed to increase efficiency and effectiveness (Jain, 2004; Morgan, 1980). However, the 
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modern competitive environment requires organisations to facilitate and develop organisational 
innovativeness, flexibility and a high output rate of innovation value propositions (Claver-Cortés et 
al., 2007; Smith, 2010). Thus, the demand on modern managers to organise is very different today 
than it was when Fayol (1955) first proposed it as a key management function in 1916.  
4.3.1.3 Controlling 
Moreover, the controlling function seeks to realise the overall organisational strategy or strategic 
plan and is undertaken by managers who exert control over activities by supervising employees and 
directing their energies (Fayol, 1955). As Koontz (1959) found the managerial control literature 
fragmented, this scholar argued for a systematic approach to centralising a scholarly understanding 
of the concept. Thus, he put forth the following understanding of the nature of managerial control: all 
divergences in practice from the strategic plan must be recognised by qualified managers who are 
held accountable for the implementation of plans in the early stages of the deviation, so that the 
managerial control may be said to be efficient (Koontz, 1959). This definition is more detailed than 
others that were found in the literature, such as that of Flamholtz, Das and Tsui (1985) who 
understand control as managerial attempts to change employee behaviour to achieve the objectives 
they are charged with realising. However, the Koontz (1959) definition provides a more profound 
explanation of control where deviations are accounted for, as they are changed upon identification 
and redirected to a more appropriate undertaking of the strategic plan. Given the understanding of 
managing employees through controlling their efforts to achieve goals, the functions of commanding 
and coordinating are discussed in the following section.  
4.3.1.4 Commanding, coordinating and leading  
Additionally, Fayol (1955) proposes the functions of commanding, which concerns engaging 
subordinates with directives to the end of achieving strategic goals, and coordinating, which involves 
harmonising and complementing all organisational activities interdependently (Fayol, 1955). 
However, modern scholars have ultimately merged these two functions to form one element – that 
of leading (Conkright, 2015). However, Maccoby (2000) states that leading does not form part of any 
management function and explores this distinction by comparing the core differences of the two 
concepts. Maccoby (2000) goes on to suggest useful differentiating terminology to more certainly 
conceptualise these ideas; more specifically, he suggests thinking of ‘management’ as a function 
and, in contrast, to consider ‘leadership’ a relationship (Maccoby, 2000:57). Moreover, Laufer (2012) 
puts forth that management is simply a starting point for eventually understanding leadership and 
being able to lead effectively. As such, effective leadership in the business context is examined in 
the next section.  
4.3.2 Effective leadership in the business context 
Leadership in the business literature has been defined as the purposeful guidance of followers in a 
relational sense (Nutt & Backoff, 1993). In 1996, Tait investigated the traits common to successful 
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business leaders and identified four foremost qualities: vision, people skills and communication, 
character and integrity as well as ambition and drive (Tait, 1996). Another study was done by 
Drouillard and Kleiner (1996) outlining the characteristics of effective leaders, which is discussed in 
this section, which includes an additional characteristic not identified by Tait: that of competence.  
4.3.2.1 Vision  
Firstly, the vision attribute is explained by Tait (1996) as a long-term strategic inclination, which can 
be thought of as a big picture outlook. By visualising the preferred result with clarity, the leader is 
more able to express it clearly to others, devoid of ambiguity. In addition, the more frequently the 
vision is delivered, the more people will understand what success will look like (Tait, 1996). 
Effectively leading in business requires the creation of a vision and directing followers towards it 
(Goleman, Boyatzis & McKee, 2002), to the point that clearly projecting this picture of what followers 
are working towards is considered as one of the main forces of effective leaders (McMillan, 2010). 
This only emerges from leaders who are idea-oriented, visionary and look to the long run by 
consulting their inner reason and intuition (Drouillard & Kleiner, 1996).  
4.3.2.2 Communication and people skills  
Secondly, communication and people skills represents another area integral to effective leadership, 
as people-oriented and communicative leaders both plainly and captivatingly communicate the vision 
to followers in such a way as to motivate followers into action (Tait, 1996). An aptitude for clear 
communication, with no small emphasis on the importance of actively listening to followers, has been 
argued for as an integral trait of effective leaders, particularly in communicating vision, values, 
philosophies as well as feedback (Drouillard & Kleiner, 1996). Tait’s (1996:28) “people skills” also 
relates to three of Drouillard and Kleiner’s (1996:31-32) characteristics, including: demonstrating an 
authentic interest in followers and others; recognising and rewarding achievement; and being 
orientated around teamwork. Furthermore, the literature recognises the trait of personal integrity and 
credibility of the leader is necessary for successful motivation.  
4.3.2.3 Character and integrity  
Thirdly, Tait (1996) isolates character and integrity together as a significant concept in valuable 
leadership attributes. Integrity is particularly vital and incorporates many honourable personality 
qualities including honesty, strong ethics, fairness, upstanding conduct, candour, compassion, 
sympathy, humility and generosity. Lack of predisposed conformity also signals great character and 
integrity as leaders are those that have ideas for progress (Tait, 1996), as is in the same vein as 
Maccoby’s (2000) view of leaders as change agents. Similarly, Goleman et al. (2002) maintain that 
real leaders radiate trustworthiness, transparency and fairness, all of which are rooted in an ethical 
value system. However, actions speak far louder than words or written value statements; in fact, 
integrity is a demonstrated quality in leaders that acts on all the virtues t professes to have (Drouillard 
& Kleiner, 1996). Moreover, the study of Drouillard and Kleiner (1996) identified an additional 
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characteristic of effective leaders related to character, which is a demonstrated sense of 
decisiveness and accountability.  
4.3.2.4 Ambition and drive  
A final mutual trait amid leaders, according to Tait (1996) is that of ambition and drive as internal: 
self-motivation is doubtless necessary to pursue the course of change and climb the corporate 
ladder. Exceptional commitment and personal drive are put as the defining characteristics of 
ambition. However, she found that a ‘putting organisation before self’ attitude and mentality was the 
only foundation of drive likely to be successful (Tait, 1996:29).  
4.3.2.5 Competence and technical expertise  
Competence as a necessary attribute for leaders (Drouillard & Kleiner, 1996) is somewhat consistent 
with the view of Kim et al. (1999) who argue that research and development leaders must have a 
certain level of technical expertise for team members to follow them. However, Drouillard and Kleiner 
(1996) argue that the settled disposition that emerges from a combination of intellect, knowledge 
and experience is more important to followers than detailed expertise. Given the distinct definitions 
and discussions of management and leadership, a brief critical comparison is given in the following 
section.  
4.3.3 A critical comparison of management and leadership  
Many researchers have substantiated these contemporary interpretations of the differing concepts 
of management and leadership. Fairholm (2004) approves of the perception that management is 
primarily a function carried out when dealing with finite, quantifiable tasks; the same author concurs 
with Maccoby (2000) that leadership describes a discipline far more qualitative, abstract and 
relational in nature (Fairholm, 2004). Similarly, Zaleznik (1992) remarks that leadership requires 
carrying out those abstract duties of disseminating meaning and articulating strategic vision whereas 
management is a concept involving actions of constructing strategies and generating action plans. 
The latter resembles Fayol’s planning element (Fayol, 1955; McLaughlin, 2004; Zaleznik, 1992).  
Leadership, as advanced by authors Maccoby (2000) and Zaleznik (1992), has the capacity to 
transform both whole organisations and employees through providing direction with energy and 
motivation. Maccoby (2000) pronounces leadership a relationship that energises the organisation’s 
personnel. Lopez (2014) emphasises leadership qualities including vision, influence and the 
propensity to be motivational as a basis for creating the type of relationship Maccoby (2000) 
recommends. It also entails talent selection for the organisation, inspiring those selected as well as 
mentoring and coaching them to realise their potential and, finally, building on trust within a people-
valued environment (Maccoby, 2000). Although, Zaleznik (1992) warns that this atmosphere can 
turn out to be emotionally charged and turbulent if not led appropriately. Edgar Schein (2004) 
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distinguishes between leadership and management by arguing that leadership creates and changes 
cultures, whereas management acts within a culture. 
For the purposes of the current study, organisational management can be defined as a strategic, 
functional role that serves to execute plans through organising, controlling and coordinating the 
energies of employees (Conkright, 2015; Fayol, 1955). Organisational leadership can be defined as 
a strategic, relational, motivating role which organisations set in motion to execute the strategic vision 
and mission (Conkright, 2015; Lopez, 2014; Maccoby, 2000; McLaughlin, 2004; Zaleznik, 1992).  
Given the critical comparison of management and leadership themes in literature presented here, 
the literature regarding: general business management, effective business leadership, strategic 
management and leadership, innovation management and leadership, project management and 
leadership, change management, transformational leadership and team leadership, respectively, are 
considered in the sections that follow.  
4.4 RELEVANT THEORIES OF MANAGEMENT AND LEADERSHIP TO THE CURRENT 
STUDY  
This section serves to discuss and justify the theories and concepts included in the current study as 
there is no existing precedent in this exploratory study. Firstly, the three broad research perspectives 
are identified. Secondly, the purpose for including both management and leadership as broad, 
overarching concepts (as discussed in the previous section) is explained. Thirdly, the selected 
theories and styles of management and leadership included in the current study are argued for and 
intersections between them and the three broad research perspectives are identified and argued for.  
4.4.1 Three broad research perspectives considered  
The review of literature in the previous two chapters as well as section 4.2 above has particularly 
discussed the process-orientated subject matters of the innovation execution process, the post-
acquisition integration process and the team development process. It is salient at this juncture to 
note the overarching research question of this study, which is: “What managerial and/or leadership 
considerations exist for integrating small innovation acquisitions (with more than one individual) at 
the team level?” 
Importantly, what has become evident through the review of literature is that the appropriate 
answering of the above research questions requires a multi-disciplinary approach to this exploratory 
question. In other words, gaining deeper insights into the experiences faced by innovation project 
leaders and managers aiming to integrate a small acquisition at the team level requires a broad 
understanding of the secondary research. As such, the three aforementioned process perspectives 
have been discussed; the following section explicates the inclusion of both management and 
leadership in the study.  
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4.4.2 Purposeful inclusion of both management and leadership   
Moreover, through the review of literature on these perspectives, it has become clear that the 
inclusion of both managerial and/or leadership considerations is necessary. For example, 
Haspeslagh and Jemison (1991) have posited that the chief managerial concerns for effective post-
acquisition integration are expectation management, institutional leadership and interface 
management. In addition, the body of existing research relating to innovation initiatives and teams 
has largely emphasised the significance of leadership. As such, it has been deemed incumbent upon 
the researcher, as a result of the literature reviewed thus far, to include a discussion of the relevant 
theories of both management and leadership as they pertain to the study. Therefore, the theories 
and styles of management and leadership relevant to and included in the study are introduced, 
justified and summarised in the following section and further discussed throughout the remainder of 
the chapter.  
4.4.3 Management and leadership theories and styles reviewed in this chapter  
This section culminates in a matrix summary (Table 4.2) that serves to present the various 
management and leadership theories which this study encompasses and a selection of the relevant 
intersections these share with the three broad research streams discussed above. Prior to 
presenting the matrix summary table to the reader, however, the list of concepts and theories is in 
need of introduction and justification, however. First, the overarching theories of management and 
leadership, labelled here as “general business management” and “effective business leadership” in 
section 4.3.1 and 4.3.2 respectively, are argued for. Thereafter the selected theories and styles of 
either of these that exist in the existing literature are justified, including: strategic; innovation; project; 
change; the PAIP; transformation; and team.  
4.4.3.1 General business management and effective business leadership 
The fundamental functions of managers, first proposed by the engineer Fayol in 1916 in a French 
treatise, then translated into English four decades later due to the World Wars preventing 
dissemination of information (Wren & Bedeian, 1994), have been considered in the discussion and 
conceptualisation of management itself in section 4.3.1. The modernisation of these functions has 
been included in the discussion in section 4.3.1 as well as 4.3.3 and what has been made evident 
through the review of renovated management functions is that the idea of organisational leadership 
itself is encompassed and indeed entrenched in the functions advanced by Fayol just more than a 
century ago (Conkright, 2015; Maccoby, 2000). However, leadership as a separate but related 
discipline took some time to eventuate in researcher’s investigations. Nevertheless, both 
management and leadership remain relevant today and indeed to the current study, which is why 
the researcher considers the body of knowledge pertaining to the relevant theories and styles, which 
are discussed in the subsequent sections, beginning with strategic management and leadership.  
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4.4.3.2 Strategic management and leadership  
The importance of strategic management and its relevance to the study became evident through the 
literature review of innovation processes and the factors that facilitate these as well as in the M&A 
literature’s major theoretical lenses. Firstly, from the innovation perspective, the significance of the 
TMT, specifically the CEO, in its role of supporting the creation of organisational innovativeness and 
its ongoing maintenance (Anderson et al., 2014; Davila et al., 2013; Finkelstein, Hambrick & 
Cannella, 2009; Govindarajan, 2011; Tidd & Bessant, 2013), which was discussed at length in 
section 2.3. At this juncture, the active strategic management of innovation objectives (Leiponen & 
Helfat, 2010), cultures (Grant, 2016; Hambrick & Mason, 1984; Yoo & Kim, 2015), climates (Isaksen 
& Tidd, 2006; Tidd & Bessant, 2013) and slack resources (Malhotra et al., 2017; Tidd & Bessant, 
2013), for example, enjoyed especial emphasis.  
Furthermore, the research lens of strategic management has also been drawn from in the creation 
of the fifth generation of innovation processes and models (see section 2.5.1.5) (Rothwell, 1994) as 
well as in the generic and adaptable processes furthered by (chronologically:) Utterback (1971) and 
then Tidd and Bessant (2013). The Govindarajan and Trimble (2010a) model for innovation 
experimentation and execution, which has been identified as useful for achieving organisational 
ambidexterity (Virta, 2017) and has been adopted in this study due to its focus on the dedicated 
innovation team, also emphasises the importance of strategic thinking (see section 2.6.1.2) to the 
formalisation of innovative business experiments. Additionally, strategic thinking, it is advanced by 
Heracleous (1998), precedes strategic planning in a perpetual cyclical relationship to produce 
effective strategic management, which is further examined in section 4.5.1. Moreover, the field of 
strategic management has encompassed studies on M&A as well (Birkinshaw et al., 2000; Datta, 
1991; Larsson & Finkelstein, 1999; Zollo & Meier, 2008). Finally, the corresponding discipline of 
leadership insofar as it regards a strategic point of departure is also considered in the current study 
as the inclusion of both management and leadership is required.  
4.4.3.3 Innovation management and leadership  
Innovation as a managerial discipline has been strongly emphasised by Tidd and Bessant (2013) 
throughout their widely cited work. In fact, these scholars continually referred to and argued that the 
undertaking of innovation is a highly complex and uncertain endeavour, one which must be 
constantly worked on by managers to eventuate at effective environments and systems in which 
innovation can thrive. In contrast, the work of Govindarajan and Trimble, adopted in this study, has 
comparatively less to say on the matter of managers but rather focuses attention on innovation 
leaders (Govindarajan & Trimble, 2010a:9-10,15-16,21,151-158).  
Moreover, in recent years, the management of innovation activities within organisations has become 
more formalised and localised in the addition of a new post in the executive management team, that 
of the chief innovation officer (CINO), a role which has been characterised by (chronologically:) 
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Laurent and Chollet (2013), di Fiore (2014) as well as Meige (2016). Beyond the TMT, additional 
roles that facilitate the innovation project (Markham et al., 2010) or which are performed by effective 
R&D project leaders (Kim et al., 1999). However, it must be said that Govindarajan and Trimble 
(2010a:77-78) underscore the need for a supervisory executive from the level of senior management 
to support the initiative’s effective and efficient execution. In summation, what has become evident 
through the review of literature pertaining to the authoritative control of innovation activities and 
projects within an organisation, management and leadership have both been established as 
necessary for effective administration in the innovation milieu.  
4.4.3.4 Project management and leadership  
As the literature regards project management, it is evident that this concept plays a key role in the 
integration workstream model advanced by Galpin and Herndon (2007:77) (refer to Figure 3.7), 
which is the case as these scholars underscore the significance of continuous integration planning 
as well as project management for sustained acquisition survival, performance and success. The 
insights of the aforementioned model are consistent with the other similar, yet fragmented proposed 
process models found in the literature, synthesised in Table 3.3. Thus, the concept of project 
management is relevant for consideration in the management and leadership literature review in this 
chapter.  
Moreover, in the literature review presented in the second chapter, the demands that innovation and 
R&D projects put on the person(s) who administrate them were presented and discussed. These 
projects required leaders to facilitate the project both externally and internally. Briefly, from the 
external viewpoint, these facilitation roles included: sponsoring the project (for example, by means 
of availing resources); acting as a gatekeeper; and championing the cause (Markham et al., 2010). 
Internally, the roles of gatekeeping (therefore, undertaken both internally and externally), team-
building, technical expertise and strategic planning are emphasised as necessary for effective 
project leadership in innovation team-based initiatives (Kim et al., 1999). Thus, the concept of project 
leadership has been deemed important to the study.  
4.4.3.5 Change management  
The importance of managing change has become apparent in the review on innovation and its 
process as well as the focus on the PAIP. Firstly, regarding the former, areas business administrators 
ought to be cognisant of include, at the organisation level, organisational structures, culture 
(Büschgens et al., 2013; Grant, 2016; Janićijević, 2013) and climate (Schneider et al., 2013; Stone 
et al., 2005) as well as, at the team/group level, team climate (Isaksen & Tidd, 2006; Tidd & Bessant, 
2013) and pivots in the team’s innovation experimentation process (Ries, 2011). Moreover, the 
importance of managing change extends to responding pre-emptively to the ever-changing external 
environment (Tidd & Bessant, 2013). What can be deduced from these focal areas of change is that 
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change management should be conceived of from the TMT through to lower-level managers, such 
as the leader of an innovation initiative.  
Secondly, with reference to the bearing change management has on the broad field of M&A and the 
narrower one of the PAIP, the literature has also clearly addressed the need for managing the 
various changes the acquisition and its integration brings about. The changes to culture, strategic 
independence and organisational autonomy as well as their consequences have been 
conceptualised and investigated in the literature, such as cultural-driven scholars (Nahavandi & 
Malekzadeh, 1988; Weber, 1996) and integration-autonomy dilemma researchers (Angwin & 
Meadows, 2015).  
Moreover, and what is more pertinent to the current study, in the manageable changes that are 
embedded in the process of post-acquisition integration itself. These are most notably referred to in 
section 3.13, which served to discuss the PAIP process challenges posited by Haspeslagh and 
Jemison (1991), and section 3.14, which served to present and examine critical success factors of 
effective PAIPs according to Gomes et al. (2013).  
4.4.3.6 Managing and leading the post-acquisition integration process 
The seminal work on the PAIP by Haspeslagh and Jemison (1991) has put forth that most 
acquisitions fail to meet initial expectations at the least or indeed fail altogether at the extreme, which 
is most often due to poor management and leadership of the process itself. To combat and indeed 
overcome this, more attention should be focused on the PAIP by managing expectations, leading 
from the institutional (organisational) level and managing the interfaces (boundaries) between the 
existing and new organisations. Therefore, the management and leadership concepts which these 
authors propose and advance for effective PAIPs are: expectation management; institutional 
leadership; and interface management. These are thus also deemed relevant to the current study 
and are further considered in this chapter for review.  
4.4.3.7 Transformational leadership  
In the post-acquisition integration process literature, more specifically the integration-autonomy 
dilemma literature, the concept of transformation plays a role (Marks & Mirvis, 2001). Furthermore, 
an empirical study by Vasilaki (2011a) investigated the relationship between post-acquisition 
performance and transformational leadership and found that the latter is highly impactful regardless 
of the decision made on the degree of integration, especially with regards to stimulating the intellects 
of new and existing employees (which is further deliberated later in the chapter in section 4.11). 
Moreover, another empirical study by Nemanich and Keller (2007) determined that transformational 
leadership has positive relationships with job satisfaction, supervisor-rated performance and, 
perhaps most importantly, acquisition acceptance. Additionally, these researchers found that 
transformational leaders lend their abilities and efforts towards clarifying goals and supporting 
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creative thinking (Nemanich & Keller, 2007). As the importance of transformational leadership has 
been explicitly indicated in the PAIP literature reviewed, it is deemed relevant to the current study.  
4.4.3.8 Team leadership  
Finally, team leadership is deemed significant to consider in the current study as the post-acquisition 
integration process and innovation experimentation take place in the context of a team, which is 
characterised as a dedicated team by Govindarajan and Trimble (2010a). As a result, the leadership 
of teams is also designated as within the bounds of this study. What is salient for the reader to note 
at this juncture is that the dedicated team and team referenced above are not related by any means 
to the critical success factors put forth by Gomes et al. (2013) as the post-acquisition-leadership 
team; per these scholars, this team is made up of leaders in the combined organisation that simply 
focus their energies and attentions on coordinating PAIPs and have no other responsibilities to see 
to in their daily tasks.  
4.4.3.9 Management and leadership theories’ intersections found in three broad streams literature  
As aforementioned, the above management and leadership theories and concepts are included in 
the current study and have been justified in this section. Given the argument for their inclusion, a 
further justification was deemed appropriate and necessary by the researcher. This justification is a 
detailed summary that serves to find the intersections of the three broad research streams and the 
above management and leadership theories in the body of existing knowledge, presented in Table 
4.2 below. The first and second rows of the table show the three broad streams of research, 
discussed in section 4.4.1 above. The first and second columns of the table (from the left-hand side) 
lists the management and leadership concepts deemed relevant. These include: general business 
management; effective business leadership; strategic management; strategic leadership; innovation 
management; innovation leadership; project management; project leadership; change management; 
expectation management; institutional leadership; interface management; transformational 








Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
  
113 
    
   
TABLE 4.2: Matrix summary of relevant management and leadership theories intersections 
with innovation, post-acquisition integration and team development processes’ literature  
  Broad streams of research relevant to current study 
  Innovation process 
and/or organisational 
innovativeness  
Acquisitions and the 
post-acquisition 













● Van de Ven, 1986: 
590-591;  
● Winch, 1998: 274-
277 
● Angwin & 
Meadows, 
2015:236-242;  
● Haspeslagh & 
Jemison, 
1991:31-32; 
● Van Grinsen, 
2011:26 
● It appears that no 




● Oke, Munshi & 
Walumbwa, 2009: 
67-71; 







● Schweizer & 
Patzelt, 
2012:298-301 
● Tidd & Bessant, 
2013:122-136; 
● West, Borrill, 
Dawson, Brodbeck, 
Shapiro & Haward, 
2003:393-408;  





● Adams, Bessant & 
Phelps, 2006:30; 
● Barringer & 
Bluedorn, 
1999:426;  
● Hambrick, 1989:13 
● Birkinshaw et al., 
2000:397;  
● Larsson & 
Finkelstein, 
1999:4; 
● Waldman & 
Javidan, 
2009:130 
● Grant, 1996:113; 
● Kim et al., 1999: 
153; 





● Elenkov, Judge & 
Wright, 2005:669; 
● Palladan, Kadir & 
Chong, 2016:1-18 
● Ireland & Hitt, 
1999: 73; 
● Krug & Aguilera, 
2005:142 










● Smith, Busi, Ball, 
& van der Meer, 
2008:655; 
● Tidd & Bessant, 
2013:46-48 
● Dagnino & 
Pisano, 2008:56-
58; 
● Puranam et al., 
2006:263 
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TABLE 4.2: Matrix summary of relevant management and leadership theories intersections 




  Broad streams of research relevant to current study 
  Innovation process 
and/or organisational 
innovativeness  
Acquisitions and the 
post-acquisition 
















● Hirst & Mann, 
2004:147-157; 
● Tidd & Bessant, 
2013:145-150 
 It appears that no 
such study exists 




● Hurley & Hult, 
1998:42-45;  
● Stata, 1989:63;  
● Vera & Crossan, 
2004:230-233 








 Tidd & Bessant, 
2013:80-528 













● Adams et al., 
2006: 21-37; 




 It appears that no 
such study exists 








● Al hmeidiyeen, 
2015:60-65;  







● Van Grinsen, 
2011: 11-16 
 It appears that no 
such study exists 
Expectation 
management   
● King & Burgess, 
2006:66; 
● Patist & Bates, 
2008:152-153 
● Haspeslagh & 
Jemison, 
1991:156-162; 
● Hubbard & Purcell, 
2001:17-22; 
● Yuseph, 2012:6-76 
● Bosch-Sijtsema, 
2007:358; 
● Ginsberg & Hay, 
1994:387-389 
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TABLE 4.2: Matrix summary of relevant management and leadership theories intersections 
with innovation, post-acquisition integration and team development processes’ literature 
(Continued) 
  Broad streams of research relevant to current study 
  Innovation process and/or 
organisational 
innovativeness  
Acquisitions and the 
post-acquisition 













● Taylor, Machado & 
Peterson, 2008:383; 
● Van de Ven, 1986: 
590-605 

















● Reid & de Brentani, 
2004:170-182 







● Haspeslagh & 
Jemison, 
1991:156-164; 








al leadership  
● Gumusluoglu & Ilsev, 
2009:461;  
● Jung, Chow & Wu, 
2003:525; 
● Razari & Attarnezhad, 
2013:228-231; 






















Lam & Cha, 
2007:1020 
Team leadership  ● Pirola-Merlo et al., 
2002:561-578; 
● Thambain, 2003: 297-
308 
 Govindarajan & 
Trimble, 
2010a:53 
● Isaksen & 
Tidd, 
2006:186-192; 
● Tidd & 
Bessant, 
2013:135-139 
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4.4.4 A brief reflection on literature’s intersections  
As can be seen in Table 4.2, intersections were not found in the literature on the following topics:  
● General management and the team development process and/or performance;  
● Innovation management and the post-acquisition integration process;  
● Project leadership and the PAIP; and 
● Change management and the team development process and/or performance.  
 
Thus, the lack of the above intersections are areas of potential research expansion. However, what 
is salient to the current study is that no previous research has addressed the intersection of the three 
fields, no matter the various management and leadership theories and styles delineated above. As 
these have relevance to the study and to the fields separately, they have been summarised in the 
above matrix. The sections that follow, namely 4.5 to 4.12, serve to introduce, discuss and review 
the literature of Table 4.2’s management and leadership theories and styles insofar as they are 
relevant to the current study. The following section discusses strategic management and leadership.  
4.5 STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT AND LEADERSHIP  
The management of strategy is a paradigm that was formally advanced in the late 1970s and has 
served as the impetus to additional research streams and concepts relevant since then, including 
that of strategic leadership (Durand, Grant & Madsen, 2017). The concepts of strategic management 
and strategic leadership are examined in this section.  
4.5.1 Strategic management 
Scholars have suggested that organisations should institute strategic management processes if they 
are looking to undertake transformation and change (Nutt & Backoff, 1993), such as innovations and 
corporate entrepreneurial ventures (Sundbo, 1997). However, it has been said that strategic 
management comprises a fragmented field of academic inquiry (chronologically: Scherer, 1998; 
Koch & Hubbard, 2002; Nag, Hambrick & Chen, 2007; Durand et al., 2017).  
One of the earliest definitions of strategic management refers to it as a process that comprises the 
commercial activities of the organisation, the organisation’s rejuvenation and growth as well as 
supervising current operations for both effectiveness and efficiency; therefore, it is a 
multidimensional task by the managers of any organisation (Schendel & Hofer, 1979). In more recent 
years, a more comprehensive definition has been synthesised and proposed by Nag et al. (2007), 
which is that strategic management is a field dealing with the planned strategic initiatives to be 
undertaken in response to the external environment as well as the internal organising efforts 
assumed by general management to support effective and competitive organisation performance 
(Keupp, Palmié & Gassmann, 2012).  
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It has been suggested that strategic management is made up of two major components: strategic 
thinking and strategic planning (Heracleous, 1998). Strategic thinking is described as “synthetic” (in 
this case, meaning surreal and outlandish), “divergent” (deviating from the norm) and “creative” 
(meaning original, resourceful and innovative) (Heracleous, 1998:485). Conversely to strategic 
planning, the rationale behind the strategic thinking thought process is to realise new, visionary 
competitive strategies, which can essentially create new futures that differ from current operations 
(Heracleous, 1998). Secondly, strategic planning is an “analytical” (diagnostic and investigative in 
nature), “convergent” (concurrent and merging in nature) and “conventional” (conservative and 
orthodox in nature) thought process (Heracleous, 1998:485). Heracleous (1998) advocates that the 
purpose of strategic planning is two-fold: it involves operationalising strategy – that has come to light 
from the thought process of strategic thinking – as well as supporting the process of strategic thinking 
(Haycock, Cheadle & Bluestone, 2012). The interaction of strategic thinking and planning in the 
conducting of strategic management is graphically illustrated below in Figure 4.2.  
Strategic thinking 
Purpose: 
 To discover novel, creative 
strategies that have the capacity to 
change the competitive game; 
 To envisage potential (significantly 












FIGURE 4.2: Components of strategic management  
(Source: Adapted from Heracleous, 1998:485)  
Similarly, Haycock et al. (2012) maintain that the strategy literature has emphasised these two 
distinct but interrelated concepts – strategic thinking as vision and strategic planning as execution – 
since as early as before the Common Era in The Art of War by Sun Tzu (5th century BCE). The 
business literature on strategy refers to these concepts as strategic thinking and planning as can be 
seen in the above figure. These scholars accentuate Graetz’s (2002) reconceptualisation of 
Heracleous’ (1998) model (Figure 4.2) as she enhances the model by suggesting that the attributes 
and roles of strategic thinking and planning respectively are interdependent on each other as well 
Strategic planning 
Purpose: 
 To put the strategies developed by 
strategic thinking into use; 
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as on strategic management (Graetz, 2002; Haycock et al., 2012). Moreover, the importance of 
strategic thinking has also been emphasised in the innovation management literature as an 
important skill and quality of innovation managers (Bočková, 2011), which is further discussed in 
section 4.6.  
Furthermore, one of the main questions in the strategic management literature regards the value 
which strategic leaders, such as the CEO and TMT, add in an organisation (Bergh, Aguinis, Heavey, 
Ketchen, Boyd, Su, Lau & Joo, 2016). As both management and leadership theories are considered 
in the current study, the following section discusses the existing literature regarding strategic 
leadership.  
4.5.2 Strategic leadership 
Strategic leadership takes the definition of business leadership (discussed in section 4.3.2) further: 
the guidance of the strategic leader explicitly directs followers to commit to achieving an explicit 
purpose or motive, which commonly means a new organisation-wide strategy is put into action (Nutt 
& Backoff, 1993). In contrast, Ireland and Hitt (1999:43) define the concept of strategic leadership 
as a leader’s aptitude for anticipating, envisioning, maintaining flexibility, thinking strategically and 
working alongside others for the purposes of initiating changes that will create a sustainable future 
for the organisation. However, Norzailan, Othman and Ishizaki (2016) maintain that strategic 
leadership is chiefly concerned with responding to changes external to the organisation. What is also 
pertinent to note is that researchers such as Elenkov, Judge and Wright (2005) as well as Hambrick 
(1989) advance that strategic management scholars’ writing on the subject of leadership strongly 
emphasise the pursuit and role of vision in gaining followers’ cooperation.  
Schoemaker, Krupp and Howland (2013) conducted a lengthy investigation involving over 20 000 
organisational executives broadly concerning strategic leadership, which led to the identification of 
six essential skills organisational leaders should master and apply to reason strategically as well as 
to traverse through unknowns effectively. These researchers state that each of the skills they found 
have received treatment in the literature; although, they had not been considered collectively in one 
strategic leader at the time. The six skills are as follows: anticipate (trends); challenge (assumptions); 
interpret (data, findings, learning); decide (select an option decisively); align (stakeholder interests); 
and learn (make mistakes or make it big) (Schoemaker et al., 2013:134; Schoemaker & Krupp, 
2015:30).  
4.5.2.1 Anticipate trends  
Firstly, anticipation requires communication with various stakeholders (customers and suppliers, for 
example) both internally and externally to gain a better understanding of their challenges; this skill 
also requires scenario planning, market research and post-mortems on failures. Taking these actions 
enables strategic leaders to get a feel for changing factors in the external environment (Schoemaker 
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et al., 2013; Schoemaker & Krupp, 2015). Planning processes are instituted by strategic leaders that 
allow organisations to predict trends that will shape the future (Williams & Johnson, 2013). For 
instance, keeping abreast of external trends is recognised as necessary for ventures that seek to 
explore potentially novel value offerings (Jansen, Vera & Crossan, 2009). 
4.5.2.2 Challenge assumptions  
Secondly, challenging assumptions involves critically thinking about those deeply rooted 
conventions that make up the internal dominant logic of the organisation, which can also be 
considered as questioning the status quo; executing the skill of challenging assumptions requires 
encouraging debate, questions and other forms of input (Schoemaker et al., 2013; Schoemaker & 
Krupp, 2015) as well as possibly hiring outsiders with different perspectives (Govindarajan & Trimble, 
2010b).  
4.5.2.3 Interpret various information sources  
Third, interpreting refers to making sense of data relevant to the venture; to undertake this effectively 
is to look deeply at details as well as having an eye on the big picture scenario (Schoemaker et al., 
2013; Schoemaker & Krupp, 2015). Groups and teams that are exceedingly capable gain access to 
and scan relevant data and information from the external environment (Ireland & Hitt, 1999).  
This thinking is consistent with the strategy and strategic management literature, such as Michael 
Porter’s five forces that shape strategy (1979; 2008), including competitive industry rivalry, threats 
of new entrants and substitutable offerings as well as bargaining power of suppliers and buyers, as 
well as his books on competitive strategy (Porter, 1980) and competitive advantage (House & Aditya, 
1997:446-447; Porter, 1985).  
4.5.2.4 Decision-making  
Moreover, leader indecisiveness may cost the organisation valuable resources, such as time; a 
sound recommendation that Schoemaker et al. (2013) make regarding leading strategic decision-
making is to consider business experiments in lieu of betting with valuable resources on projects 
with high uncertainty. While strategic decision-making is a key activity undertaken by leaders (Boal 
& Hooijberg, 2000), it is a complex task as those factors that signal external change are often highly 
ambiguous and difficult to comprehend (Norzailan et al., 2016), which leads to lags in taking 
decisions (Vagadia, 2013) as well as often poorly conceived strategies and tactics (Smith, 2014).  
4.5.2.5 Align the interests of stakeholders  
Furthermore, aligning the interests of stakeholders towards the successful completion of the strategy 
or venture is necessary; implementing this requires early communication drives, being wary of 
hidden agendas, addressing misunderstandings and resistance as well as incentivising employees 
(Schoemaker et al., 2013; Schoemaker & Krupp, 2015). Managing the varied interests of several 
stakeholders is also recognised elsewhere in the strategic leadership literature, which must be 
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conducted while simultaneously addressing the organisational needs of effectiveness and efficiency 
(Hambrick, 1989).  
4.5.2.6 Ensure organisational learning is taking place  
Lastly, organisational learning should benefit everyone, even if attempts at innovation result in 
failures. Therefore, in any event, the insights gained from projects should be diffused through the 
workforce. In addition, from a TMT perspective, managers who attempt radical and admirable 
ventures should be rewarded for their efforts; besides, a corporate culture that allows employees to 
view mistakes as results of pursued learning opportunities should be fostered by all levels of 
management (Schoemaker et al., 2013; Schoemaker & Krupp, 2015).  
As has been discussed in section 2.7, learning must be prioritised in order to justify the expenditure 
of valuable resources during rigorous planning for innovation processes, even if business 
experimentation results in failures. Thus, the theories and literature related to innovation 
management and leadership are examined in the following section.  
4.6 INNOVATION MANAGEMENT AND LEADERSHIP  
In the current study, the concepts of innovation management and leadership are deemed relevant 
and salient to review as the innovation experimentation process executed by the dedicated team 
and spearheaded by an innovation acquisition champion must be both managed and led. Tidd and 
Bessant (2013) advance that, from a management perspective, innovation should be thought of as 
a core process, which managers organise and proactively manage to enable and support corporate 
renewal. This belief is consistent with the view of Bočková (2011) as well as complementary to the 
process perspective in M&A that is adopted in the current study. Thus, the concepts of innovation 
management and leadership are discussed in this section.  
4.6.1 Innovation management  
Several tenets senior managers should abide by to drive innovation in the organisation have been 
advanced in the literature (Hambrick, 1987; Hambrick, Cho & Chen, 1996). Moreover, effective 
innovation managers directly involved in the research, development and commercialisation of novel 
value propositions demonstrate various skills and abilities, which are discussed in this section 
(Bočková, 2011).  
4.6.1.1 Innovation management principles throughout the organisation   
Senior managers spearhead innovation throughout the organisation by instituting certain measures 
and fostering behaviours by employees, such as the seven principles put forth by Hambrick (1987) 
and Hambrick et al. (1996).  
(a)   Challenge complacency to delight the customer  
To lead by innovation, the leadership should instil an organisation-wide aspiration which seeks to 
challenge employee complacency and comfort in current performance levels. The overarching aim 
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should be to delight the customer base through novel solutions to issues with products (Hambrick, 
1987; Hambrick et al., 1996).  
(b)   A vision that mobilises the organisation 
A central vision that sets the organisation on one common path is necessary to involve the skills and 
capabilities of all employees in the innovation effort (Hambrick, 1987; Hambrick et al., 1996). 
(c)   Committed to allocating resources to innovation initiatives  
Possibly one of the most important internal strategic moves an organisation’s leadership can make 
is the freeing up of resources for use by entrepreneurial, inventive employees (Hambrick, 1987; 
Hambrick et al., 1996). 
(d)   Create innovation systems, processes and strategy 
An innovation strategy should also be one of the first checkboxes to see to by leadership. To 
accompany this strategy, a set of supporting systems and processes should be established. If 
implemented well, these could ensure that the entire workforce appreciates where and who they can 
go in the organisation to pitch ideas and execute innovations (Hambrick, 1987; Hambrick et al., 
1996). 
(e)   Leadership by example 
Personal credibility in cultivating organisational innovativeness and executing innovations is 
imperative. Thus, the leadership of the organisation should demonstrate their commitment to the 
cause by creating messages directed to all employees (Hambrick, 1987; Hambrick et al., 1996). 
(f)   A well-defined sense of command 
Innovation initiatives are subject to resource constraints and trade-offs in the same way other 
divisions and departments are. Senior managers may have to make tough decisions, such as 
discontinuing an initiative, because of unjustifiable expense (Hambrick, 1987; Hambrick et al., 1996). 
A significant quality of an effective innovation manager is that they utilise their intellectual abilities to 
harness the efforts of subordinates (Bočková, 2011).  
(g)   A receptive culture that encourages original ideas and change  
Culture is a pervasive force that is difficult to impossible to manage (Morgan, 2006). A part of 
managing innovation, however, requires a culture to be created that allows for and supports new 
ideas and change (Hambrick, 1987; Hambrick et al., 1996). However, climate is an easier 
organisational element to manage than culture (as discussed in section 2.3.3). Given the discussion 
of organisation-wide innovation management principles, the following section deals with the more 
localized issue of managing innovation teams.  
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4.6.1.2 Innovation management principles of innovation teams  
Bočková’s (2011) study resulted in four categories of skills and abilities of innovation team managers 
that are relevant and effective in executing the innovation process, including technical, human and 
conceptual skills as well as the ability to empathise.  
(i) Technical skills  
Firstly, effective innovation managers have technical proficiencies in the milieu of their followers and 
demonstrate these through the techniques and methods necessitated to execute the innovation 
(Bočková, 2011:75). This view is consistent with other management scholars, who emphasise 
effective leaders’ comprehension of the tasks and activities undertaken by their specialised 
personnel (Drouillard & Kleiner, 1996; Kim et al., 1999).  
(j) Human skills  
Secondly, human or people skills also go some way towards facilitating interpersonal interactions in 
the innovation execution team and these include collaboration, understanding, motivation as well as 
effective communication (Bočková, 2011). 
(k) Conceptual skills 
Furthermore, Bočková (2011) maintains that conceptual skills are vital for effective management of 
the team, such as their abilities to integrate, manage and mutually bring together the interests and 
activities of members so ensure employee engagement.  
(l) Ability to empathise  
Finally, the innovation team manager has the capacity to empathise with employees and takes the 
time to immerse herself in another’s point of view in order to understand subordinates’ needs, 
concerns and opinions (Bočková, 2011). Empathy, caring and openness are demonstrated to team 
members through communicating with subordinates (Unterschuetz, Hughes, Nienhauser, Weberg & 
Jackson, 2008) as well as recognising, praising and motivating employees on both the collective 
(Gallo, 2013; Schrage, 2015) and individual levels (Li, Zheng, Harris, Liu & Kirkman, 2016).  
4.6.2 Innovation leadership 
Innovation, particularly exploratory innovation, requires strong leadership (Jansen et al., 2009). 
Exploratory innovations are novel and, at some extremes, even discontinuous and radical in nature 
(Henderson & Clark, 1990). In the process of researching and developing these types of innovations, 
institutionalised logic is naturally challenged (Jansen et al., 2009). Logic and assumptions are 
challenged by means of various activities that need to be led in the journey of exploration, such as 
idea search, flexibility, business experimentation and risk-taking (March, 1991). Moreover, Barsh et 
al. (2008) recommend that certain capable managers should be pigeonholed to be turned into 
innovation leaders. However, as is consistent with Tidd and Bessant (2013), managing innovation 
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supersedes leading innovation initiatives as managers must be frugal and disciplined, particularly in 
experimentation initiatives.  
While the literature related to innovation leadership competencies has been found lacking in the 
past, the field is developing (Vlok, 2012). Vlok sought to profile the major competencies of innovation 
leaders, which include the following four: strategist; capability builder; matchmaker; and achiever 
(Vlok, 2012:219-220).  
4.6.2.1 Strategist  
Firstly, as a strategist, the innovation leader produces a vision and converses with followers about 
it; thinks critically about the venture’s offering; shapes the thoughts of the collective; facilitates and 
supports decision-making; sets a respected example for followers and leads by this; and, finally, 
exhibits remarkable leadership abilities and skills (Vlok, 2012).   
4.6.2.2 Capability builder  
As a builder of capabilities, Vlok (2012) advances that the innovation leader must: evaluate and 
manage throughout the value chain of the innovation; support an environment that enhances 
innovativeness; facilitate continuous improvement, development and organisational learning; enable 
the management of knowledge; form and sustain teams that perform well; and, lastly, construct and 
conserve networks.  
4.6.2.3 Matchmaker  
The third profile this scholar identifies is that of matchmaker, a role which serves to: comprehend the 
context of the innovation venture; employ entrepreneurial thinking; communicate in a clear and 
persuasive manner; finally, be an acknowledged influencer in the environment external to the 
venture and organisation (Vlok, 2012).   
4.6.2.4 Achiever 
As an achiever, the innovation leader exercises the following critical competencies: the talent of 
motivating others, particularly followers, to perform effectively; to develop a culture of high 
performance; to manage this performance on individual and team/group levels; and, lastly, to be 
proficient in realising objectives and results (Vlok, 2012).  
The characterisation of the innovation leader by Vlok (2012) has advanced the importance of their 
task of ensuring organisational learning, as has been emphasised by Govindarajan and Trimble 
(2010a) and which is present elsewhere in the literature as well (chronologically: Hurley & Hult, 1998; 
Montes et al., 2005; García-Morales, Jiménez-Barrionuevo & Gutiérrez-Gutiérrez, 2012); as such, 
the following section deals with what the current study regards as learning management.   
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4.7 LEARNING MANAGEMENT  
Organisational learning is generally thought of as a major means of realising the strategic renewal 
of an organisation (Crossan, Lane & White, 1999), which requires the human elements of the 
organisation to explore new domains and opportunities for growth and simultaneously exploit those 
that have already been learned in the past (March, 1991). Crossan et al. (1999) posit that learning 
occurs through the three levels of analysis, including the organisation, the group/team and the 
individual (Litchfield et al., 2015). At the group/team level, the process of learning undertaken is 
referred to as “integrating”, which entails gaining shared understandings of knowledge inputs (such 
as innovative ideas) and developing additional knowledge through interactive systems, which then 
leads to knowledge outputs (Crossan et al., 1999:525).  
Huber (1991) similarly addresses this subject, saying that one means of acquiring new knowledge 
is that of experiential learning in which organisational experiments are undertaken, such as in R&D 
(Das, 2002; Schrage, 2016). The effectiveness and efficiency of these experiments and thus the 
learning that accompanies them is moderated by managing the collecting, availing and accessing 
feedback of such experiments (Huber, 1991). This concept of feedback has also been termed 
“stocks” of knowledge by Bontis, Crossan and Hulland (2002:440), which regards the previous or 
existing cognitively-learned knowledge the organisation possesses; therefore, as new evidence 
arises, the stock of knowledge grows and needs continuous maintenance by a managerial entity 
within the organisation (Bontis et al., 2002; Kogut & Zander, 1992).  
In the framework of Govindarajan and Trimble (2010a), the innovation initiative leader is held 
accountable for adding to the organisation’s learning, which suggests this individual is thus 
responsible for communicating and sending the new knowledge to the managerial entity. This has 
been referred to as “knowledge management” (Mårtensson, 2000:204) and relates to storing 
knowledge systematically for the purposes of sharing and applying it to explorative and exploitative 
organisational activities (Alavi & Leidner, 2001). One means of implementing strategy is through 
projects (Kenny, 2003). This vehicle for the execution of strategy, more specially the innovation 
strategy, is the focus of the current study; thus, project management is also considered in this 
section.  
4.8 PROJECT MANAGEMENT AND LEADERSHIP  
Modern organisations are increasingly using more team-based projects to accomplish their means, 
particularly in the case of innovation (Govindarajan & Trimble, 2010a; Serrat, 2009). Thus, aspects 
of project management and leadership that are of particular interest to the current study are reviewed 
in this section.  
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4.8.1 Project management  
Techniques of project management have been effective in implementing strategy and can be 
versatilely applied across several organisational functions. This is chiefly due to the practice of 
project management being strongly rooted in the highly disciplined application of techniques, skills, 
tools and knowledge to meet often stipulated, inflexible requirements (Kenny, 2003; Project 
Management Institute, 2013).  
4.8.2 Managing uncertain projects  
Problems can arise regarding the monitoring of projects that represent high levels of change and 
innovation (Kenny, 2003). In these cases, imposing conventional rigid accountability measures and 
demanding results at the earliest opportunity – as is consistent with project management practices 
in the traditional sense, especially for non-innovation projects – can be detrimental to the lifespan of 
an innovation initiative (Govindarajan & Trimble, 2010a; Kapsali, 2011; Kenny, 2003).  
Shenhar and Dvir (1996) found that the more complex and uncertain the project in question, the 
more communication channels that were added to support the success of the venture. The 
researchers also found that these teams were comparatively more densely populated by highly 
educated professionals. The managers on these teams assumed flexible management styles and 
anticipated many changes (Shenhar & Dvir, 1996). Sheasley (1999:54-55) suggests that innovation 
projects tend to require an “expectations” management style, which encompasses: continually 
evaluating and reviewing; identifying the learning that has taken place; and improving learning further 
through modifying plans (Govindarajan & Trimble, 2010a; Sheasley, 1999). Kapsali (2011) also 
emphasises the importance of flexibility in the management of innovation projects. Flexible planning, 
controlling and communicating must be applied to support organisational innovativeness, to manage 
complexity and to reduce uncertainty more successfully in innovation projects (Kapsali, 2011). Given 
the discussion of project management, particularly of uncertain ventures, the following section 
introduces and discusses project leadership, which is necessitated because both management and 
leadership in projects are important (Anantatmula, 2008; 2010). 
4.8.3 Project leadership  
Effective project leadership results from a continuous learning process, for which Laufer (2012) 
suggests nine best practices in project leadership whereas Juli (2010) only advances five principles 
of project leadership, which together comprise the project leadership pyramid.  
4.8.3.1 Nine best practices for project leadership  
Laufer’s (2012:214) best practices include the following: embrace uncertainty (‘living order’) at the 
project’s inception; adapt project practices to its context; contest the status quo; staff the project with 
the right people; form the right culture; continuously plan, monitor developments and anticipate 
outcomes; utilise face-to-face communications predominantly; ensure the project is orientated for 
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action; and, lastly, demonstrate leadership to be able to manage. The model is presented in Figure 
4.3 below in graphical form and, thereafter, discussed.  
 
 
FIGURE 4.3: Nine best practices for project leadership  
(Source: Adapted from Laufer, 2012:213-238)  
(a)   Embrace uncertainty  
The first practice involves embracing ‘living order’ at the beginning of any project (Laufer, 2012:214). 
This concept refers to the significant levels of uncertainty that project members face at inception. 
Such uncertainty may be attributed to the demands of a dynamic environment and innovative tasks 
in the project. Effective project leadership requires tolerating the unavoidable living order (Laufer, 
2012).  
(b)   Adapt practices to the context  
Secondly, the project leader should adjust the other practices in the model to the particular context 
to enhance creativity and flexibility. This is a significant project leadership practice as it deviates 
greatly from conventional project management literature which maintains that a standardised, one-
best-way approach is superior (Laufer, 2012). 
(c)   Challenge the status quo  
Thirdly, the leader should pioneer the challenging of the status quo consistently during the project. 
The capability and confidence to challenge dominant logic is the essence of leading project versus 

































    1. Embrace ‘living order' at the start 
    2. Adapt practices to context 
    3. Challenge status quo 
    4. Recruit the best people 
    5. Shape the right culture 
    6. Plan, monitor, anticipate 
    7. Primarily communicate face-to-face 
    8. Have an action orientation 
    9. Lead, in order to manage 
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(d)   Recruit the right people  
Fourth, the leader should do their utmost to enlist the right people for the project. Indeed, people 
seem to be the resounding make-or-break feature across projects. Therefore, it is imperative that 
the hiring of team members is conducted well (Laufer, 2012). 
(e)   Shape the culture appropriately 
Moreover, the right culture should be shaped and nurtured by the leader. A common frame of 
reference and shared behavioural norms contribute to the project culture in an organisation. 
However, projects are often made up of a diverse set of members that originate from various 
disciplines, levels of management, nationalities, demographics and perhaps even external corporate 
cultures, as is the case in acquisitions. As projects are finite in nature and often involve the inclusion 
of temporary recruits, creating and sustaining a single, unique culture is nearly impossible (Laufer, 
2012).  
(f)   Undertake planning, monitoring and anticipating  
Furthermore, the sixth practice involves planning, monitoring and anticipating. These actions are 
closely related to the management literature, going as far back as 1916 when Fayol first introduced 
his elements of general management. Targets are established in the planning stage and 
performance is reviewed (monitored) based on these yardsticks. Lastly, anticipation here involves 
focussing on identifying irregularities so that if a problem arises, the leader may ready the project 
team to respond (Laufer, 2012).  
(g) Communicate verbally and in person  
Moreover, the primary mode of communication recommended for use is face-to-face interactions. 
As project teams are generally finite in nature, communication glues their members together for the 
duration of their term. If projects have conditions of high uncertainty, such as innovation experiments, 
the role of project communication is made far more crucial (Laufer, 2012).  
(h) Orientate the team around action  
Additionally, the eighth practice for project leaders to keep in mind is the assumption of an action 
orientation for the purposes of gaining results. After all, the reason for the project being established 
in the first place is for the achievement of certain intended ends (Laufer, 2012). 
(i) Lead, in order to manage  
The final practice, per Laufer (2012:236), is termed “lead, so you can manage”. The traditional view 
of plan-driven project management is only appropriate in a relatively predictable environment; thus, 
the significant complexity involved with operating in dynamic environments requires both leadership 
and managerial qualities. Managers engage in regular, routine activities; regarding the project 
leadership practices (see the above figure), these include numbers six through eight. Leaders’ foci 
are on non-routine undertakings; these include numbers three through five (Laufer, 2012).  
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At the start of the section it was mentioned that the literature relating to the administration of projects 
is highly focused on the management thereof, not on the leadership. As Laufer’s (2012) nine 
principles have been addressed in the above review, the project leadership pyramid, an additional 
project leadership model – albeit scarce – that of Juli (2010), is considered in the following section.  
4.8.3.2 The project leadership pyramid 
Juli (2010) proposed five key principles, which together comprise a dynamic pyramid model of 
interdependent and interrelated principles, which are also considered critical success factors of 
project leaders. These principles include: building a vision; nurturing collaboration; promoting 
performance; cultivating project learning; and, lastly, ensuring that the project delivers results (Juli, 
2010:81-82). The pyramid is presented in Figure 4.4 below.  
 
FIGURE 4.4: The project leadership pyramid 
(Source: Adapted from Juli, 2010:77-85)  
(a)   Build a vision  
Firstly, effective project leaders build a vision for the project that serves to orientate followers around 
an outlook for the future and sets the overarching direction for the project (Juli, 2010). It is noteworthy 
to recognise the consistent significance of setting a vision throughout various parts of the literature 
thus far, such as at the core of the team charter (section 4.2.3), to lead effectively in an organisational 
milieu (section 4.3.2) and strategically (section 4.5.2) as well as to administrate innovation by means 
of management (section 4.6.1) and leadership (section 4.6.2), by acting as a strategist (section 
4.6.2.1). For the purposes of leading organisational, strategic and innovative pursuits, vision has 
been advanced as a key success factor, which Juli (2010) also emphasises as a necessary 
component to the dynamic endeavour of project leadership.  
(b)   Nurture a sense of collaboration  
Secondly, the cultivation of team collaboration between the project’s members is undertaken and 
linked back to the vision discussed above to realise the project’s purpose, or vision (Juli, 2010). 
Further, the importance of collaboration is emphasised elsewhere in the literature, such as a social 
competence to manage relationships in the project as accentuated by Turner and Müller (2005). It 
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working on a project contribute to the sense of collaboration between members (Hahn, Moon & 
Zhang, 2008). Fostering effective collaboration is also influenced by the project team leader’s 
personality, in which case the trait of open-mindedness particularly prompts idea sharing between 
team members as well as with the leader in question (Gorla & Lam, 2004). Additionally, collaboration 
or interdependent exchanges between people is comparatively more important in projects engaged 
in non-routine activities and tasks (Bhatt, 2002), such as innovation (Chen, 2006; Tyssen, Wald & 
Spieth, 2013).  
(c)   Promote performance  
This principle, the promotion of performance, suggests that maintaining foci on the project vision and 
internal team collaboration leads to the effective promotion of project performance (Juli, 2010). This 
rationale is evident elsewhere in the literature, such as Limerick, Cunninton and Crowther (1998:41), 
in which a project leader with an inclusive, intuitive and collaborative stance towards employees 
succeeds in making them feel motivated and empowered to attain the project vision and, thereby, 
perform well (Bourne & Walker, 2004).  
(d)   Cultivate project learning  
As a result of the previous three principles, the cultivation of a learning-oriented mindset and 
environment is effective in allowing innovativeness and creativity to prosper in the following way: 
members that collaborate as a team to realise the vision of the project leads to higher levels of 
performance, which in turn fosters valuable learning (Juli, 2010). However, in practice problems often 
arise in attaining continuous learning, such as a tendency to project amnesia after the finite venture’s 
conclusion, which often results from not undertaking a debriefing at the time of the resolution 
(Schindler & Eppler, 2003). For project learning to be made valuable, its relevant learnings should 
be disseminated across the other operational projects as well as at an organisational level (McKay 
& Ellis, 2013).  
(e)   Ensure project delivers results  
Projects that can cultivate organisational learning are only truly effective if they succeed in realising 
the vision of the project by delivering the outcomes and results its members set out to at inception 
(Juli, 2010). While the above factors are both important and necessary to manage and lead the 
human element of projects, the main purpose of these finite initiatives is to ensure that their 
objectives are met by the team members dedicated to realising them; as such, the human elements 
should facilitate their realisation rather than become the overarching objective (Anantatmula, 2010). 
The following section deals with the topic of change management as was justified in section 4.4.3.5, 
in which the literature reviewed was found to encompass organisational change in the PAIP as well 
as innovation management and execution literature.  
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4.9 CHANGE MANAGEMENT 
Change management is aptly defined by Moran and Brightman (2000:66) as “the process of 
continually renewing an organization’s direction, structure, and capabilities to serve the ever-
changing needs of external and internal customers.” Todnem (2005) argues that successful change 
management is vital to any concern operating in a constantly evolving and highly competitive 
environment, such as the recent years of the modern era. Truly effective top-level organisational 
managers have a thorough knowledge of the concept of change management (Beer, Eisenstat & 
Spector, 1990) and undertake organisational change efforts effectively by implementing programs 
of change management (Spencer & Mountford, 1997). Therefore, the models of Kotter (1995), an 
eight-stage process for successful organisational transformation, as well as PwC (2017), a model of 
key success factors for managing change during M&A integrations are considered in this section.  
4.9.1 Managing organisational change per Kotter  
Kotter (1995; 2014) is a significant pioneer of leading organisational change, whether the change in 
question deals with a case of innovation or the complexity of integrating an acquisition; his arguably 
more famous model that is prescriptive for change management is presented in Figure 4.5 below 
(Appelbaum, Habashy, Malo & Shafiq, 2012; Kotter, 1995; 2014; Kotter & Rathgeber, 2014; Todnem, 
2005).  
 
FIGURE 4.5: Kotter’s eight-step process of change management  
(Source: Adapted from Appelbaum et al., 2012:765-766; Kotter, 1995:61; Kotter, 2014:82-103; Kotter & 
Rathgeber, 2014:43-122; Todnem, 2005:376)  
Firstly, the need to bring about change needs to be established among all employees initially through 
creating a sense of urgency; in this sense, people will see the change as necessary and justified. 
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Secondly, a group (coalition) should be assembled and empowered with the necessary authority to 
influence and lead organisational change. Thirdly, a change strategy and vision should be developed 
and made available often to guide employees with their operational actions. Moreover, 
communication of the vision should be religiously undertaken and questions should be invited. 
Furthermore, the workforce itself must be empowered to act on the vision and strategy for 
organisational change. Besides, the creation and promulgation of short-term triumphs should be 
disseminated throughout the organisation. Additionally, wins should be pooled and more should 
continue to be produced to generate momentum among employee change agents. Lastly, the novel 
approaches taken must be affixed in the collective corporate culture for institutionalisation of change 
and its long-term survival in the organisation (Appelbaum et al., 2012; Kotter, 1995; 2014; Kotter & 
Rathgeber, 2014; Pollack & Pollack, 2015; Todnem, 2005).  
4.9.2 Change management for successful post-acquisition integration  
A recent report by the global consulting organisation PwC (2017), otherwise known as 
PricewaterhouseCoopers, proposes critical success drivers of change management in integration 
efforts. These include: culture; communications; leadership; organisation; policies and procedures; 
employee ‘onboarding’; and incentives (PwC, 2017), as can be seen in Figure 4.6 below.  
 
FIGURE 4.6: Change management KSFs in M&A integrations 
(Source: Adapted from PwC, 2017:3) 
Firstly, per the PwC report (2017), culture is often the wrong scapegoat for M&A failure. However, 
cultural change should still be proactively managed for the integration to be successful by outlining 
preferred behaviours, utilising central role models and offering incentives that have meaning. 
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all parties informed, while building support for the new entity and the changes needed to bring it into 
being (PwC, 2017).  
Thirdly, the integration leadership must be selected through an efficient process of identifying 
talented, charismatic individuals and appointing them to lead the integration so that employees feel 
comfortable with the new organisational entity. Fourth, organisation involves devising the employee 
interrelationships for the post-acquisition entity. Moreover, new policies and procedures need to be 
instituted for people to follow in day-to-day organisational activities in the post-acquisition phase of 
the M&A process (PwC, 2017).  
Furthermore, ‘employee onboarding’ (PwC, 2017:5) refers to training the workforce in the new 
changes that characterise the post-acquisition organisation. For these changes to take root in the 
minds of employees, all involved must have a thorough comprehension of new systems and 
processes, which can eventuate through broad-based training programs. Finally, incentivising staff 
can support appropriate behavioural changes; such incentives can be financial (a bonus), non-
financial (promotion) or a combination of the two in nature. In summary, managing change must be 
a pre-emptive, centralised program that works towards getting employees on board with all new 
changes (PwC, 2017).  
4.10 MANAGING AND LEADING THE PROBLEMS OF THE POST-ACQUISITION 
INTEGRATION PROCESS 
The process perspective as developed by Haspeslagh and Jemison (1991) requires forms of both 
management and leadership to eventuate in successful integration, which are deliberated in this 
section, including: expectation management; institutional leadership; and interface management 
(Haspeslagh & Jemison, 1991:155-168).  
4.10.1 Expectation management  
According to Haspeslagh and Jemison (1991), at the inception of the post-acquisition integration 
process, varied expectations are at play among the acquiring and acquired employees. Integration 
managers must preside over their own expectations. Haspeslagh and Jemison (1991) found that 
managers often cling to the determinations arrived at during early stages of the M&A (for example, 
during due diligence) as a means of increasing their level of certainty towards the process, goals 
and outcomes of the integration. However, in acquisitions where learning needs to take place, 
“managers are constantly testing and modifying their hypotheses about how things actually work or 
should work” (Haspeslagh & Jemison, 1991:161). Haspeslagh and Jemison (1991) also warn against 
the contrary behaviour, that of exercising disproportionate caution or a blasé approach to achieving 
integration objectives. As such, a balance must be struck between learning during the integration 
and achieving the objectives as they were stipulated at the outset.  
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4.10.2 Institutional leadership 
Institutional leadership denotes the direct participation and interaction of senior management with 
employees involved in the integration; although it is a perennially imperative factor in integration 
processes, it is often found lacking or absent entirely (Haspeslagh & Jemison, 1991). In acquisitions 
that require the resulting of capability transfer and organisational learning, the bidder leadership must 
send evident signals to redefine both organisations’ purposes and to urge capability transfers in each 
direction. The former can be achieved by instilling and inspiring a new vision in the integration 
employees, which will also facilitate the operationalisation of the latter. Establishing such a unified 
vision is not sufficient; it must be credibly and authoritatively communicated by institutional leaders. 
The force of this leadership form is necessary to combat negative effects, such as insecurity, 
uncertainty and value destruction (Haspeslagh & Jemison, 1991). 
However, Haspeslagh and Jemison (1991) warn that if institutional leadership is found highly lacking, 
integration managers are obliged to substitute high levels of interpersonal leadership. This added 
stress on them leads to the impoverishment of time that could have been allocated to achieving 
organisational learning and capability transfer. Thus, institutional leaders should use their position 
to expedite the process of effective integration by engaging with the integration in person 
(Haspeslagh & Jemison, 1991). 
4.10.3 Interface management  
The post-acquisition integration process necessitates the interaction of existing and acquired players 
by its nature, if the procurement is not intended to operate only as an independent subsidiary. 
Therefore, for value creation to eventuate from the acquisition, interactions must be managed 
between the joining parties. Two main goals are specified in achieving this. Firstly, an atmosphere 
that supports the transfer of strategic capabilities must be developed. Secondly, integration 
managers must remove all obstacles to the realisation of strategic objectives and effective 
integration. Therefore, quality interface management is key for creating value for the acquirer. 
Executing interface management requires ‘gatekeepers’ (Haspeslagh & Jemison, 1991:156-164). 
Individuals acting in this capacity are tasked with unlocking value by bridging the differences and 
need support from institutional leaders to manage the interface and the issues that arise in 
integration management and leadership (Haspeslagh & Jemison, 1991). The following section deals 
with transformational leadership.   
4.11 TRANSFORMATIONAL LEADERSHIP  
Braun et al. (2013) intimate that the concept of transformational leadership is likely the most 
investigated concept in leadership (Schaubroeck, Lam & Peng, 2011). Bass (1999) declares that the 
main role of a transformational leader is that they are charged with aligning the interests of the 
employee and the organisation. Scholars, such as (chronologically:) Marks and Mirvis (2001), 
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Nemanich and Keller (2007) as well as Vasilaki (2011a), have advanced the importance of 
transformational leadership during the post-acquisition integration process.  
Moreover, transformational leadership is also important to organisational innovativeness (Jung et 
al., 2003), such as creativity and exploratory innovation. Regarding creativity, this form of leadership 
psychologically empowers and allows followers to be more creative (Gumusluoglu & Ilsev, 2009). 
Jansen et al. (2009) state that the form of transformational leadership is the most suited form to 
exploratory innovations because it facilitates the challenging of widely held assumptions, taking risks 
and inspiring others. In addition, the latter also poses a relevant scenario for the application of 
transformational leadership as a prescriptive tool (Babić, Savović & Domanović, 2014; Nemanich & 
Keller, 2007; Vasilaki, 2011a).  Thus, this form of leadership is applicable to the current study both 
in terms of leading novel innovation experimentation and the PAIP.  
Bass proposed the “Four I’s” of transformational leadership (Hughes, 2014:8), in which Bass 
(1999:11) states the four dimensions of transformational leadership as: intellectual stimulation; 
individualised consideration; idealised influence; and inspirational motivation. A later study on the 
four dimensions focused on how they influence the context of the team and its performance. The 
third broad research stream considered in this study, by creating and fostering the following: shared 
team vision; team commitment; empowerment of the team environment; and creating functional (or 
constructive) team conflict (Dionne et al., 2004:177). As such, the highly studied concept of 
transformational leadership is relevant to the three broad fields studied: innovation execution; the 
PAIP; and the team context.  
4.11.1 Intellectual stimulation  
Firstly, intellectual stimulation involves the transformational leader actively seeking out divergent 
perspectives for problem-solving efforts and emphasising non-traditional and creative thinking 
(Hughes, 2014). Bass (1999) describes this thinking as innovative. It is a stimulating challenge to 
followers to engage their faculties in critical thinking (Gong, Huang & Farh, 2009). The empirical 
study by Vasilaki (2011a) identified this dimension of intellectual stimulation as enhancing post-
acquisition performance.  
4.11.2 Individualised consideration 
Secondly, Hughes (2014) states that transformational leadership requires considering the individual 
on a personal level and is executed by spending time teaching and coaching followers to stimulate 
self-development. The needs, proficiencies and ambitions of each individual should be kept in mind 
and form part of decisions made by the transformational leader to ensure that subordinates’ 
development is prioritised (Bass, 1999). Vasilaki (2011a) advances that they should have regular 
consultations with followers on individual bases. Effective transformational leaders achieve this by 
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building on the self-confidence of each follower and expanding their personal autonomies (Razari & 
Attarnezhad, 2013).  
4.11.3 Idealised influence 
Thirdly, idealised influence refers to instilling a sense of pride in followers for having an association 
with the transformational leader in question as they are a role model (Vasilaki, 2011a). Leaders 
demonstrate to followers that they act not on their self-interest but for the benefit of the team’s greater 
good as well as the more macro levels of the organisation or society (Bass, 1999). At the fore, a 
frequent and charismatic message dissemination of the values and mission of the group should be 
present which infuses people with a sense of purpose; for the message to be taken seriously by 
followers, the leader should be a clear personification of the ideals they preach (Hughes, 2014). 
4.11.4 Inspirational motivation 
Finally, inspirational motivation is carried out through the articulation of an optimistic, compelling 
vision for the future of the team (Bass, 1999) to achieve success in marketing innovations (Razari & 
Attarnezhad, 2013). The leader should motivate the team through addressing what needs to be 
accomplished and, simultaneously, emphasising their confidence in team members’ abilities to 
achieve the vision through inspirationally motivating the team with spirit and zeal (Hughes, 2014). 
Besides, Razari and Attarnezhad (2013) contend that the promotion of employees’ intrinsic 
motivation must be undertaken by transformational leaders to boost the creativity of otherwise 
traditionalist and conforming individuals. To support inspired and motivated followers, the 
organisational climate and structure must both stimulate and support creative, risky ideas to begin 
the initiative stage (Razari & Attarnezhad, 2013).  
4.11.5 Entrepreneurship and boundary spanning in innovation  
A final success factor of transformational leaders that emerged through the review of literature is 
that of entrepreneurship and boundary spanning, whereby these leaders play roles external to the 
initiative; these external roles are necessary for expediting the market success of innovative value 
propositions (Howell & Higgins, 1990a; Razari & Attarnezhad, 2013). Finally, Howell and Higgins 
(1990b) advance that innovation champions most often exhibit transformational leadership 
behaviours in deploying influence tactics external to the venture or initiative to precipitate time to 
production and market. Therefore, given this discussion of transformational leadership, the 
subsequent section deals exclusively with the leadership of teams.  
4.12 LEADING TEAMS  
Teamwork is a significant concern in scenarios when relatively small groupings of people are 
expected to collaborate to achieve a mutual goal, such as researching and developing innovations 
(Isaksen & Tidd, 2006). It has been established that teams are valued vehicles for realising 
innovation objectives (Magnusson & Berggren, 2001). In addition, relevant management and 
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leadership styles have also been discussed. However, an important differentiating factor of the 
current study is the innovation acquisition being integrated at the team level; therefore, this section 
discusses the leadership of teams. Isaksen and Tidd (2006:186-190) put forth a host of 
characteristics which effective teams exhibit. Their work is also cited in the seminal innovation 
management work by Tidd and Bessant (2013:135-136). Thus, these characteristics are presented 
and discussed below.  
4.12.2.1 A clear, shared, uplifting goal  
The primary reason for a team’s grouping should be unambiguous, mutually agreed upon and widely 
understood among all its members. Together, they work towards a commonly desired future state, 
which is illuminated by means of a shared vision (Isaksen & Tidd, 2006; Tidd & Bessant, 2013). West 
et al. (2004) suggest that the fundamental task of the innovation team must be both intrinsically 
motivating and extrinsically demanding for all members to align their personal goals to the 
overarching team goal. Intrinsic motivation can be derived from setting challenging and significant 
tasks; extrinsic motivation can arise from external demands, such as building the case for innovation 
(West et al., 2004).  
4.12.2.2 Results-driven configuration  
Team members of high-performing teams are more likely to produce results in configurations that 
are characterised by the following (Isaksen & Tidd, 2006:186; Tidd & Bessant, 2013:135): 
● open communication;  
● clear task coordination;  
● unambiguous roles and responsibilities;  
● performance monitoring;  
● provision of feedback;  
● judgement based on facts;  
● efficiency; and 
● robust, impartial management.  
 
4.12.2.3 Capable team members  
Competent team members can be described as conscientious and capable. As individuals, they 
should all be knowledgeable on their own tasks. They should strongly desire to contribute to the 
team’s tasks through demonstrating their personal competencies, and everyone ought to be oriented 
towards collaborating to support the process of working together effectively to achieve desired 
results (Isaksen & Tidd, 2006; Tidd & Bessant, 2013).  
West et al. (2004) propose that the group composition of innovation teams should be achieved by 
following two steps. Firstly, people with innovative competencies and experience should be selected: 
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these kinds of people are usually self-disciplined, have high levels of drive and are preoccupied with 
achieving excellence in their work. Secondly, among the people chosen, team diversity should be a 
focal point in terms of both skills and demographic factors. A diversity of skills and knowledge in a 
team is useful to bring together differing perspectives. Divergent demographic factors also add to 
team diversity and are evidenced on the bases of such factors as age, gender, personality, social 
status, nationality and ethnicity (West et al., 2004). 
As has been discussed in section 2.8, hiring outsiders brings new perspectives to the dedicated 
innovation team, according to Govindarajan and Trimble (2010a; 2010b) as well as Yoo and Kim 
(2015). As stated by West et al. (2004), teams such as these are likely to implement new ideas with 
more ease for three reasons. Firstly, the likelihood that potential problems are predicted is generally 
higher. Secondly, team members who can work with people that are somewhat different from them 
are better at networking, which is helpful for accessing the necessary resources. Finally, the team’s 
diverse membership is likely to more fully analyse problems, which is likely to lead to more innovative 
actions (West et al., 2004). 
4.12.2.4 United commitment  
In effective teams, members are unified by means of their shared commitment to the team’s tasks, 
vision and values. Individuals mutually support one another and are dedicated to the anticipated 
outcomes of the venture (Isaksen & Tidd, 2006; Tidd & Bessant, 2013).  
4.12.2.5 Collaborative team climate  
For productive teamwork to fructify, a climate that emphasises collaboration and cooperation should 
be actively cultivated by the team leadership. Mutual trust in the capability and value systems of 
others is necessary for highly effective collaboration to take root (Isaksen & Tidd, 2006; Tidd & 
Bessant, 2013). West et al. (2004) put forth that the organisational context should also be 
characterised by two climates: firstly, that of continuous learning and development and, secondly, 
that of innovation. The former regards continually changing team members’ understandings by 
maintaining an external focus to learn from the outside. The latter can be achieved by encouraging 
risk-taking, generating and supporting new ideas with fairness, as well as allowing information to 
flow freely across the team (West et al., 2004). 
4.12.2.6 Standards that promote excellence  
Team standards are developed by having clear, explicit comprehension of the norms and 
benchmarks that are expected. To arrive at these standards, team members should be committed, 
motivated, confident and should perform effectively at an individual level as well as strive to improve 
performance and productivity constantly (Isaksen & Tidd, 2006; Tidd & Bessant, 2013). West et al. 
(2004) suggest that innovation norms need to be implemented in the team’s process.  
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
  
138 
    
   
4.12.2.7 External recognition and support 
For teams to be successful, several external conditions must also be met. Access to necessary 
resources is a prime example of tangibles that must be externally made available to the team. 
Various intangible conditions should also be met, including the provision of incentive rewards, 
recognition by the organisation, celebration of successes and respect for organisational learning 
(Isaksen & Tidd, 2006; Tidd & Bessant, 2013). West et al. (2004) also emphasise the need for 
rewarding innovative efforts as a tangible means of demonstrating organisational support that 
originates from an overall culture that reinforces innovativeness.  
4.12.2.8 Principled, value-driven leadership  
Effective teamwork is supported by principled leadership and, in the team scenario, a leader may be 
formally appointed or emerge naturally; however, no matter how leaders come to the fore, they are 
consistently characterised by certain principles if they are effective (Isaksen & Tidd, 2006). Principled 
leadership is evidenced by the managing of human differences and protecting the more vulnerable 
members (Tidd & Bessant, 2013). Moreover, forming a fair playing field for each team member to 
provide suggestions or contribute by some other means is also an important action by a team leader, 
who typically guides, supports and encourages the team they lead (Isaksen & Tidd, 2006). In 
addition, they rely on their social capital networks within the organisation to gain access to the 
resources that the team requires to achieve its goals (Isaksen & Tidd, 2006; Tidd & Bessant, 2013), 
a practice which Govindarajan and Trimble (2010a) also emphasise the importance of. West et al. 
(2004) also propose that leadership must support innovativeness within the team.  
4.12.2.9 Proper use of the team  
Teams are highly valuable vehicles when they are led well and when they are relevant for the task(s) 
at hand. If a team is an unnecessary vehicle for achieving certain aims, its destruction is likely 
(Isaksen & Tidd, 2006; Tidd & Bessant, 2013). 
4.12.2.10 Partaking in decision-making  
Encouraging teamwork can be achieved through allowing members to participate in the decision-
making process. This involves including all individuals in activities, such as: identifying improvement 
opportunities and challenges for the team as well as idea generation and putting these ideas into 
action. Allowing and encouraging the team to participate in decision-making increases the likelihoods 
of better teamwork, improved acceptance and superior execution (Isaksen & Tidd, 2006; Tidd & 
Bessant, 2013). 
4.12.2.11 Team spirit  
Team members intimately work together on projects which require a great deal of interpersonal 
collaboration. Thus, the team focus should (at times) be on building friendships and joining in 
recreation events solely assumed for pleasure. Relationship building in the team, especially in its 
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early stages, is necessary for effective listening and communicating in later stages. Teams that suffer 
from ineffectiveness often attribute issues to internal jealousy, hostility and politicking (Isaksen & 
Tidd, 2006; Tidd & Bessant, 2013). A social relations focus in the context of innovation teams has 
been shown to add to successful innovating in large organisations, see for example: Dougherty and 
Takacs (2004).  
4.12.2.12 Embracing suitable change  
Habitually, teams face times of great change and for a multitude of possible reasons. In these times, 
tasks should be appropriately reorganised and redefined. In some cases, unfamiliar preferences, 
norms and values ought to be accommodated and embraced (Isaksen & Tidd, 2006; Tidd & Bessant, 
2013). Thus, this section has served to introduce and discuss the factors relevant to the leadership 
of teams, which are necessary for team leaders to consider. Furthermore, challenges of team 
leadership are dealt with in the section that follows.  
4.12.3 Team leadership challenges 
Zaccaro et al. (2001) summarise the challenges team leaders face in producing effective team 
performance. Firstly, the team leader is tasked with aligning the goals of each team member on an 
individual level with a shared team vision and mission. Secondly, this manager must also manage 
the resources available to the team to mitigate waste. Thirdly, a positive climate that makes members 
feel trusted and supported should be fostered by this individual. Lastly, this leader is also responsible 
for the coordination of information transfer and overseeing the completion of tasks (Zaccaro et al., 
2001).  
Isaksen and Tidd (2006:190-192) also warn leaders to be cognisant of five additional challenges 
they are likely to face in the context of teams, including (Tidd & Bessant, 2013:138-139): the group 
versus the team; the ends versus the means; structured freedom; support systems and structures; 
and assumed competence.  
4.12.3.1 Group versus team 
Firstly, there is clear distinction between the meaning of a group and that of a team. A group is a 
collection of individuals that are loosely and vaguely assembled into a unit, whereas a team is much 
different. Members of a team are connected by virtue of their mutual accountability for the realisation 
of shared goals and the vision (Isaksen & Tidd, 2006; Tidd & Bessant, 2013).  
4.12.3.2 Ends versus means 
Secondly, regarding the challenge of team ends and means, Isaksen and Tidd (2006) state that 
effective teamwork is often undermined by an overshadowing focus on the means (the how) rather 
than the ends (the why and what) to be achieved. This occurs as leaders often verbalise and describe 
the ends inadequately, in terms of clarity and specifications to be achieved. With a clear strategic 
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vision in mind, team members are likely to comprehend the means of achieving it in terms of their 
individual role and responsibility in realising the ends (Isaksen & Tidd, 2006; Tidd & Bessant, 2013).  
4.12.3.3  Structured freedom 
Thirdly, loosely assembling people to undertake a major task requiring high levels of productive, 
effective teamwork puts the goal at risk of not being realised. Therefore, a configuration of “structured 
freedom” is recommended (Isaksen & Tidd, 2006:191). This encompasses structuring members 
around a well-defined task to be completed and specifying an authority figure(s), while allowing 
individuals to be free, autonomous and take initiative as well. Thus, this represents a fine balance, 
which leaders need to be aware of (Isaksen & Tidd, 2006; Tidd & Bessant, 2013). 
4.12.3.4 Support systems and structures  
Furthermore, teams are created to execute important goals for the wider organisation (for example, 
innovation experimentation). As teams are significant to overall organisation performance, support 
systems and structures should be established for team initiatives to attain the objectives laid out at 
their inception. Besides access to resources, a reward system is also considered an appropriate 
mechanism to demonstrate support from the wider organisation (Isaksen & Tidd, 2006; Tidd & 
Bessant, 2013). 
4.12.3.5 Assumed competence  
Lastly, organisations establishing teams may have too much faith in the systems they use to select 
individuals to join the team. People are commonly selected on the bases of technical skills, domain 
experience and expertise as well as other skills and abilities. However, for effective teamwork to 
eventuate, some coaching or experience in teamwork is an additional proficiency that could add to 
team effectiveness. The researchers suggest that the start-up phase is likely the best occasion to 
coach intended team members on how to productively and effectively work together and collaborate 
(Isaksen & Tidd, 2006; Tidd & Bessant, 2013).  
Given the presentation of reviewed literature of teams, management and leadership, sometimes 
regarding innovation and M&A integration the secondary research findings are summarised in the 
following section.  
4.13 SUMMARY OF PRESCRIPTIONS IMPORTANT TO MANAGEMENT AND LEADERSHIP 
OF INNOVATION, THE POST-ACQUISITION INTEGRATION PROCESS AND TEAMS 
Addendum B (refer to page 314) summarises the reviewed scholarly intersections on management 
and leadership as they apply to strategy, innovation, projects, change, the PAIP, transformation and 
teams (discussed in section 4.2 and sections 4.5 through 4.12); these intersections are indicated by 
a marked “x” in the block where the prescription and the corresponding style of management or 
leadership. This summary table has been designed in the same vein as that of Nienaber (2010:666-
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667). Nevertheless, the conceptualised prescriptions in the management and leadership literature, 
as shown in the table below, have need of further explanation.  
Therefore, as can be seen in Addendum B, the first column specifies the chapter section in which 
the prescription was introduced and discussed. The second column identifies the prescription in 
question, which is then related to the rest of the columns. Thus, the third to seventeenth columns 
present the various forms and styles of management and leadership reviewed in this chapter. These 
include: general management; effective business leadership; strategic management; strategic 
leadership; innovation management; innovation leadership; project management; project leadership; 
innovation project management; change management; expectation management; institutional 
leadership; interface management; transformational leadership; and team leadership. In 
synthesising the second column, it is pertinent to note that not all the cited authors utilise precisely 
the same labels or terms to classify these themes or intersections. Additionally, not all the scholars 
explicitly refer to each of these intersections. Nevertheless, these prescriptions are regarded as a 
comprehensive register representing the recommended actions that should be taken by managers 
and leaders.   
4.14 CONCLUSION  
Managing and leading teams charged with undertaking innovation execution comprise a complex 
task. This complexity has served as an impetus for research on how managers and leaders should 
undertake the effort, such as Govindarajan and Trimble’s (2010a; 2010b) framework for 
operationalising the innovation execution undertaken by a team dedicated to experimenting 
rigorously to find viable, innovative value offerings. In addition, developing teams was first 
deliberated on by Tuckman (1965) through his proposed process of group development and to 
assemble the best possible collection of skill-sets, Govindarajan and Trimble (2010a) prescribe 
considering undertaking small acquisitions. However, M&A have high failure rates; indeed, 
managing and leading the process of post-acquisition integration has been identified as a complex 
challenge in the M&A literature, which is one of the reasons for M&A failure (Haspeslagh & Jemison, 
1991).  
Thus, the broad aim of the study is to explore the managerial and/or leadership considerations for 
integrating small innovation acquisitions (with more than one individual) at the team level. Thus, the 
overarching research question of the current study is: “What managerial and/or leadership 
considerations exist for integrating small innovation acquisitions (with more than one individual) at 
the team level?” Given the literature reviewed in this chapter broadly regarding management, 
leadership and teams as well as the previous two chapters (which reviewed the subjects of 
innovation execution and experimentation as well as acquisitions, the PAIP and its challenges), the 
knowledge gap in the literature has been identified and stated above. Thus, the study aimed to 
initiate a dialogue about and contribute some early findings regarding the subject of managerial 
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and/or leadership considerations for the process of integrating small innovation acquisitions at the 
team level. Thus, the following chapter serves to discuss the research methodology undertaken in 
the study to address its overarching research question and to fulfil its aims.  
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The preceding three chapters have furnished the study with a review of literature relevant to the key 
topics of the innovation experimentation process, the post-acquisition integration process and the 
team development process. Additionally, pertinent concepts of management and leadership have 
also been considered, reviewed and argued for (regarding their inclusion in the study) in the previous 
chapter. These have provided a broad context of managerial and/or leadership considerations 
relevant to practitioners. The primary research is driven by one overarching aim: to explore the 
managerial and/or leadership considerations for integrating small innovation acquisitions (with more 
than one individual) at the team level. Accordingly, this chapter serves to detail and argue for the 
research design deployed to address this research purpose.  
The chapter order is as follows: firstly, the problem statement; secondly, the research questions; 
and, thirdly, the research design. The latter is undertaken in three main sections. The first discusses 
the secondary research design used in reviewing the existing body of knowledge considered in 
chapters two through four. The second section relates to the study’s primary research design. As 
the study is exploratory in nature, the former section argues for the research design used in the study 
and the latter serves to explain the exploratory critical case study design undertaken in the paper, 
according to Collis and Hussey (2014).  
5.2 PROBLEM STATEMENT 
The study’s identified problem, in this case a little-examined area of research, is discussed below 
regarding the previously demarcated knowledge gap. Subsequently, the purpose statement of the 
study is concisely summarised, according to Creswell (2016)’s generic format for qualitative studies, 
which is a penned expression of the central question of the research (Zikmund & Babin, 2010).   
5.2.1 Research problem discussion  
It has become clear that mergers and acquisitions have been conducted in waves since the latter 
years of the 1800s (Viviers et al., 2014). Increasingly, acquisitions are undertaken for innovative 
purposes as a result of the growth in pushing for innovation as a basis for a modern competitive 
advantage; organisations pursuing innovation acquisitions wish to procure certain innovative value 
offerings, propositions and capabilities of target organisations (Ahuja & Novelli, 2014). Moreover, 
Tidd and Bessant (2013) advance that successful innovation is primarily a question of managing the 
process, as most innovation failures result from issues of process. If organisations are considering 
commercialising an innovation that requires more research and development, relying solely on 
historical data is inadequate, in which case organisations should consider embarking on simple 
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business experiments (Anderson & Simester, 2011) in its innovation execution process. 
Govindarajan and Trimble (2010a) put forth a framework for operationalising the execution and 
experimentation of innovation through internal corporate venturing (Virta, 2017). Established 
organisations achieve innovation execution through a partnership between a dedicated team and 
the performance engine of an organisation. To assemble a highly-effective team charged with 
innovation execution, the best possible candidates and skill-sets should be reflected in its members. 
For this strategy to be successful, all promising sources for employees should be considered. In 
addition, outsiders should comprise several key positions in this team. Internal transfers, external 
recruitment and acquisitions of smaller organisations should be taken account of in order to formulate 
the DT (Govindarajan & Trimble, 2010a; 2010b). The latter source of outsiders is relevant to this 
study.  
Such acquired organisational elements provide large organisations with many advantages, such as 
enlisting outsiders who possess fresh perspectives with which to challenge widely-held assumptions, 
often deeply entrenched in organisational conventional wisdom, as well as acquiring patents and 
other intellectual property rights (Govindarajan & Trimble, 2010a; 2010b). Notwithstanding the 
popularity of acquiring innovative start-ups and SMEs, acquiring organisations continually find that 
post-acquisition integration can erode those innovative capabilities that justified the acquisition 
originally (Birkinshaw et al., 2000; Graebner, 2004; Puranam et al., 2009; Puranam, Singh & Zollo, 
2003; Ranft & Lord, 2002). The integration process has been stated as a cause of smaller acquisition 
failure, drawing attention to the importance of deciding on an appropriate integration approach, an 
action which further shapes subsequent integration-related decisions (Haspeslagh & Jemison, 1991; 
Pablo, 1994; Puranam et al., 2009; Zollo & Singh, 2004). Therefore, as small acquisitions may fail 
due to a problematic integration process, the implementation of this process requires careful 
consideration.  
Little is known about the managerial and/or leadership considerations necessary to address the 
unique challenges posed by integrating small innovation acquisitions (with more than one individual) 
at the team level.   
5.2.2 Purpose statement  
This phenomenological exploratory cross-case study aimed to explore managerial and/or leadership 
considerations that exist for integrating small innovation acquisitions (with more than one individual) 
at the team level.  
As this section has served to discuss the research problem and affirmed the purpose of the study, 
the following one deals with setting out the questions the study posed.  
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5.3 RESEARCH QUESTIONS  
The study had an overarching primary research question and a couple of secondary research 
questions, which guided the direction of the research undertaken (Mouton, 2001). The study’s 
questions were broad in nature due to the explorative purpose and strategy of the research; thus, 
conclusive, generalisable evidence was not an aim. Wide-ranging inquiries were deliberately utilised 
to reveal deep, possibly profound, insights into the research problem (Zikmund & Babin, 2010).  
5.3.1 Primary research question 
What managerial and/or leadership considerations exist for integrating small innovation acquisitions 
(with more than one individual) at the team level?  
5.3.2 Secondary research questions 
To answer the above primary research question that drives the study adequately, two discrete yet 
interdependent secondary questions are put forth in the current study below. 
5.3.2.1 Secondary research question 1 
Do innovation acquisition champions integrate small innovation acquisitions (with more than one 
individual), either fully or partially, similarly or differently to how they integrate acquired individuals 
into the team?  
5.3.2.2 Secondary research question 2 
What managerial and/or leadership considerations should innovation acquisition champions take 
into account while integrating small innovation acquisitions (with more than one individual) at the 
team level?  
This section has served to elaborate on the purpose statement of the study put forth previously in 
section 5.2.2 by posing research questions which guided the research. Subsequent to this section, 
the design of the research methodology is detailed and argued for.  
5.4 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY  
Research methodology is explicated as the ways, procedures, techniques and methods employed 
to collect the requisite information pertaining to the research issue; it is a guideline for answering a 
research problem (Abu-Dalbouh, 2013). The research methodology of this study involves two 
sequential stages. Firstly, secondary research of which the aim was to glean learnings from the 
existing body of knowledge was undertaken (Collis & Hussey, 2014; Zikmund & Babin, 2010). The 
subsequently executed stage of research methodology was characterised as primary, thus original, 
investigation (Stewart & Kamins, 1993). This section serves to detail the research methodology 
employed in this study. Firstly, the design of the secondary research is discussed. Thereafter, the 
determination of the primary research methodology is discussed according to the sequence 
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Saunders, Lewis and Thornill (2008:102) put forth, namely regarding the research: philosophy, 
approach, strategy, choice as well as techniques and procedures.  
5.4.1 Secondary research design  
Secondary research has been assumed by means of appraising existing knowledge, which led to 
the presentation of a literature review of the salient aspects related to the research problem in 
chapter two to four in this thesis. The secondary research was conducted with a view to support the 
primary exploration, as the identified problem has not yet been addressed in the available literature 
(Collis & Hussey, 2014; Glass, 1976; Mouton, 2001; Zikmund & Babin, 2010). In the following 
section, elements of the secondary research design are addressed, including the consulted sources, 
the foci and keywords used in literature consultation and the seminal works that have been 
consulted.  
5.4.1.1 Secondary research sources consulted 
Journal articles, print books and Internet sources have been consulted in the review of literature, 
which are detailed below.   
(a)  Journals 
Assorted sources and e-databases of scholarly literature were consulted in the compilation and 
synthesis of the literature review, including various academic books, Google Scholar, EBSCOhost, 
ProQuest, Elsevier and the University of Stellenbosch's JS Gericke Library and Information Service. 
The following academic journals were consulted, including: Journal of Management; Harvard 
Business Review; Strategic Management Journal; Management Decision; The Leadership 
Quarterly; Journal of Management Studies; Organizational Dynamics; Human Resource 
Development Journal; Academy of Management Journal; Long Range Planning; Organization 
Science; Academy of Management Review; Advances in Mergers and Acquisitions; California 
Management Review; MITSloan Management Review; Administrative Science Quarterly; Business 
Horizons; Journal of Creativity and Innovation Management; Strategy & Leadership; Human 
Resource Planning; and Management Science. While this list is not exhaustive of all journal articles 
reviewed, the Reference List can be consulted.  
(b)   Print books  
Regarding print books, the works of reputable authors have been referenced. Well-regarded 
publishers have also been credibly used, such as McGraw-Hill Education, Pearson Education 
Limited, South-Western/Cengage Learning, John Wiley and Sons, Princeton University Press and 
the Oxford University Press as well as Harvard Business School Press, SAGE Publications and 
Palgrave Macmillan.  
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(c)   Internet sources  
Moreover, a handful or so Internet sources were also accessed. A few online-published Harvard 
Business Review articles were retrieved, including: Anderson and Simester (2011); di Fiore (2014); 
Govindarajan (2011); Govindarajan and Srinivas (2013); Hamel and Tennant (2015); as well as 
Hauser and Luca (2015). Furthermore, Forbes was consulted, specifically Ilgaz (2014) as well as 
Koetzier and Alon (2009); Bloomberg, particularly Johnson (2010); Fast Company has also been 
accessed by way of the Kaye and Klepic (2012) article. In addition, the Society for Human Resource 
Management was also consulted for the article by Krell (2015). Some published articles, reports and 
interviews of major consulting organisations have also been retrieved, including: Boston Consulting 
Group’s Taylor (2016), McKinsey’s Barsh et al. (2008) as well as PwC (2014; 2016; 2017). The 
United States Department of Commerce’s (2016) classification of mergers was also reviewed. The 
remaining online resources were those that cite journal articles in press, such as Aghasi et al. (2017).  
5.4.1.2 Foci and keywords used in literature consultation  
Relevant foci vis-à-vis the problem statement were researched to elucidate the knowledge gap. 
Several topics and keywords that were used to uncover relevant secondary information include: 
“organisational level elements that support innovation”; “innovation execution”; “innovation 
experiment”; “business experiment”; “dedicated team”; “M&A motive”; “innovation acquisition”; “M&A 
process”; “M&A research stream”; “post-acquisition integration”; “M&A process perspective”; 
“management” and “leadership”; “team leader”; and the “team development process”. It is salient to 
note that the summarised list above is not exhaustive.  
5.4.1.3 Seminal works consulted  
In the review of literature, it became increasingly evident that certain longstanding seminal works 
today still hold profound sway with researchers and academics; refer to Table 5.1 below. For 
example, two prominent books initially notated in the final decade of the twentieth century have been 
considered in this study, including Haspeslagh and Jemison (1991) as well as Tidd and Bessant 
(2013), similarly to several others of the current decade. More specifically, Haspeslagh and 
Jemison’s (1991) Managing Acquisitions has been consulted in a number of recent studies, such as 
Angwin and Meadows (2015), Graebner et al. (2017) as well as Zaheer, Castaner and Souder 
(2013). Furthermore, Managing Innovation: Integrating Technological, Market and Organizational 
Change by Tidd and Bessant (2013), a fifth edition of the widely cited work in 1997 by these authors 
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text reference of 
the work 
The name of the work  Edition, 










Managing acquisitions: Creating value 
through corporate renewal 







Making innovation work: How to 
manage it, measure it, and profit from 
it 




Managing innovation: Integrating 
technological, market and 
organizational change 
3rd 8214 citations  
Tidd and 
Bessant (2013) 
Managing innovation: Integrating 
technological, market and 
organizational change 
5th 59 citations  
Team/group 
development 
Tuckman (1965) Developmental sequence in small 
groups 
N/A 7256 citations  
Tuckman and 
Jensen (1977)  
Stages of small-group development 
revisited 
N/A 2989 citations  
(Source: Adapted from Google Scholar searches conducted on 9 February 2018) 
Additionally, the number of citations a published work has is indicative of its acceptance within the 
scientific community (Baltussen & Kindler, 2004). As such, the current study has also considered the 
work of Tidd and Bessant (2013) as well as Tuckman (1965) and Tuckman and Jensen (1977). The 
number of times the key seminal works have been consulted in the scientific community is tabulated 
in Table 5.1 above (as at 9 February 2018). The works included in this tabulation include Davila et 
al. (2013), Haspeslagh and Jemison (1991), Tidd et al. (1997), Tidd and Bessant (2013), Tuckman 
(1965) as well as Tuckman and Jensen (1977). Moreover, the following section deals with explaining 
how the knowledge gap was identified.  
5.4.1.4 Identifying the knowledge gap  
One of the principles put forth in The Other Side of Innovation by Vijay Govindarajan and Chris 
Trimble (2010a) is that characteristics of ideal candidates must be identified to populate the most 
effective and efficient team possible. These scholars suggest all conceivable sources ought to be 
considered when hiring team members and put forth three potential avenues for recruitment. These 
include reassigning employees from within the organisation as internal transfers; the second regards 
hiring employees from outside of the organisation; and the third involves the consideration of 
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acquiring small organisations (Govindarajan & Trimble, 2010a:53). The latter, however, constitutes 
an M&A transaction, of which the literature warns organisational practitioners of high failure rates 
(Hitt et al., 2001; Loderer & Martin, 1992; Lubatkin & Lane, 1996; Porter, 1987; Sirower, 1997), 
especially owing to the post-acquisition integration process (Haspeslagh & Jemison, 1991). Given 
this theoretical context, the researcher realised that the consideration of small acquisitions for 
integration at the team level within an innovation initiative may well prove challenging or otherwise.  
At this point, she embarked on a review of the literature to identify whether or not this context has 
been investigated by other scholars previously. However, the researcher could not find or identify 
any research, to her knowledge, that has addressed the integration of small organisations at the 
team level of the acquiring organisation. As a result, this context was deemed fit for examination 
through the vehicle of an exploratory study. The ensuing sections detail the specific research design 
of the exploratory cross-case study undertaken.  
5.4.2 Primary research design  
Primary research is the novel or original research undertaken by a researcher or team thereof and 
flows from the impetus of a specific research question and its ensuing aims (Zikmund & Babin, 2010). 
Furthermore, studies in which primary research is characterised by exploratory, qualitative research 
designs are emergent and should thus be argued for and justified by the researcher (Collis & Hussey, 
2014), explicitly in studies that employ case study research (Meyer, 2001). The order advanced by 
Saunders et al. (2008:102) for determining primary research methodology is utilised in the ensuing 
sections to introduce and describe the study’s primary research methodology. Firstly, the selected 
research philosophy of interpretivism is discussed, followed by the inductive approach employed and 
the case study research strategy. Thereafter, the choice of qualitative research as well as techniques 
and procedures associated with data collection and analysis are detailed.  
5.4.3 Interpretivist research philosophy  
Methodological philosophies or paradigms, particularly as they relate to organisational management 
scientists in the region of South Africa in which the study has been assumed, suffer from tensions in 
the academic community (Goldman, 2016). Essentially, the two dominant paradigms, positivism and 
interpretivism, are considered by local management scholars to be unequal in terms of value gained 
by employing one (Goldman, 2016); therefore, for example, some academics hold positivism to be 
more superior a paradigm than the interpretivist paradigm. It can be said that positivist and 
interpretivist paradigms are easily understood by placing them on a spectrum (Lin, 1998), which is 
illustrated in Figure 5.1 below.  
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FIGURE 5.1: Positivism-interpretivism continuum  
(Source: Adapted from Lin, 1998:162) 
Generally, positivism favours quantitative research methods, whereas interpretivism is partial to 
humanistic, qualitative methods (Maxwell, 2012). In addition, the latter endeavours to comprehend 
the world from subjective perceptions and experiences from the individual’s point of view (Krauss, 
2005). Interpretivists use methodologies oriented around meaning and implication, such as 
interviews or observation: methods which rely on subjective relations between researchers and 
research subjects (Hirschman, 1986).  
Table 5.2 below serves to expand on the spectrum as it has been presented above (in Figure 5.1) 
in a tabulated format. The information presented in the table endows the study with a comprehension 
of the meta-theoretical inferences about positivism and interpretivism on the subjects of: the nature 
of reality; certainties versus opinions; the research object; examples of relevant methods; and 
theories of truth (Weber, 2004). The table is discussed below.  




The nature of reality 
Researcher as an individual and 
reality are isolated 
Researcher as an individual and 
reality are indivisible 
What discriminates 
between certainty from 
opinion 
An objective reality persists beyond 
the limits of human minds 
A subjective reality is conceived by 
lived experiences of a worldview 
Research object Research object possesses inherent 
qualities that exist separate to the 
researcher 
Research object is regarded within 
the individual’s worldview  
Examples of relevant 
methods 
Analysis of statistics and content  Hermeneutics and phenomenology 
Theory of truth Correspondence 
(Truth determined by means of 
demonstrating causal relationships) 
Intentional fulfilment 
(Interpretations relate to lived 
experiences) 
(Source: Adapted from Weber, 2004:iv)  
Firstly, the nature of reality can be construed as the abstract, philosophical conception the individual 
has within themselves, which defines how they understand the world or formulate a worldview. In 
the positivist paradigm, they do not interpret reality, while the perception of the nature of reality in 
 POSITIVISM INTERPRETIVISM POSITIVISM 
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the interpretivist paradigm is the unqualified assumption (Weber, 2004). As managerial and/or 
leadership considerations and the post-acquisition integration process are interpretative constructs, 
they can be deemed as subjective and inseparable from reality.  
Secondly, the discrepancy between certainty and opinion as viewed by these two paradigms shows 
that positivism accepts a predominantly objective reality whereas the supposition of interpretivism 
submits a subjective worldview, one which is linked inextricably to the individual who endeavours to 
make sense of their reality (Weber, 2004). The qualitatively studied person seldom forms an entirely 
objective reality of their external domain; in this case, the innovation acquisition champion’s 
managerial and/or leadership modi operandi are an interpretivist reality.  
Thirdly, the research object (in this case, whether managerial and/or leadership considerations 
unique to the integration of small innovation acquisitions at the team level, while experimenting on a 
novel value offering) was interpretivist, as it might not have been quantifiable, due to the lack of 
existing literature and research propositions that exist in the scholarly realm. Besides, truth is 
perceived as understanding the innovation acquisition champion’s lived experience, which is 
recognised as a phenomenon (Weber, 2004). Thus, Weber (2004) affirms that appropriate research 
methodology in interpretivist studies is the study of phenomena, or phenomenological study, which 
is further discussed in section 5.4.9. The following section serves to detail the inductive research 
approach.  
5.4.4 Inductive research approach  
Inductive reasoning is relevant for research studies that have situations which are complex or 
otherwise ill-defined, and in which natural persons use predictable reasoning methods (Arthur, 
1994). Deductive reasoning, on the other hand, is the logical deduction of reasoning from general 
statements or premises to reach logical and definite conclusions (Sternberg & Sternberg, 2012). 
Whereas deductive reasoning tests an idea or hypothesis from the outset, utilising primary data 
either to confirm or negate the hypothesis, inductive reasoning generally uses primary data to 
generate ideas and hypotheses (Thorne, 2000). The inductive reasoning approach was deployed in 
a case study research strategy.  
5.4.5 Case study research strategy   
The research design ultimately culminated in the selection of a case study research design with the 
use of three cases in which a cross-case analysis. The case study is apposite in studies in which 
researchers aim to explore specific contexts for how phenomena occur (Collis & Hussey, 2014).  
(a) Defining a case study  
Case study research allows scholars to focus on perceiving and interpreting the dynamics which 
exist within a particular setting (Eisenhardt, 1989). Thus, the widespread use of the case study as a 
vehicle for undertaking qualitative primary research (Darke, Shanks & Broadbent, 1998) facilitates 
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scholars’ investigation of phenomena as they occur in natural settings (Bonoma, 1985), which in turn 
facilitates the phenomenological approach (Stake, 1995) discussed above. Cases investigated may 
be an organisation, a group of employees, an event, a process, a single person or any other relevant 
phenomenon (Collis & Hussey, 2014). A recognised strength of the case study methodology is that 
it allows studies to tailor the research design and data collection techniques to the study’s particular 
research questions (Meyer, 2001).  
(b)   The role of context in case study research  
In case study research, context is a central factor to take into consideration as various circumstances 
make up the specific backdrop of each case under analysis and so it was deemed significant to 
regard each case’s particular dynamics (Collis & Hussey, 2014). Furthermore, Bonoma (1985) 
counsels that for case study research to be of value, the researcher ought to be sensitive to the 
context. As such, the researcher in the current study was required to take cognisance of the fact that 
managerial and/or leadership behaviours were present in situational conditions of the cases’ 
contexts. Therefore, these contexts were considered during the stages of data collection (see the 
ensuing section) and analysis as well as the juncture at which findings of the case were written up 
in the sixth chapter.  
(c)   Case study types 
Furthermore, according to Collis and Hussey (2014:68-69), there are various types of case studies, 
including: exploratory; opportunist; comparative; descriptive; illustrative; experimental; and 
explanatory. Firstly, exploratory case studies are used when the existing body of knowledge is 
deemed deficient and lacking at the outset (Collis & Hussey, 2014). Secondly, opportunist case 
studies are selected when the opportunity to research a particular phenomenon presents itself (for 
example, the researcher may be an employee of an organisation in which a phenomenon exists) 
(Otley & Berry, 1994). Thirdly, comparative case studies encompass more than one case in the 
research design, which allows for insights and themes to be realised between cases (Kaarbo & 
Beasley, 1999), which is also known as a cross-case analysis (Goodrick, 2014). Exploratory and 
opportunist case studies can be undertaken on single cases, whereas comparative case studies 
always use multiple cases.  
The latter four types of case studies are descriptive, illustrative, experimental and explanatory 
(Scapens, 1990). The first of these, descriptive, is a suitable design where the research’s aim is 
limited to providing only an account of interventions, such as best practices (Baxter & Jack, 2008).  
Illustrative case studies endeavour to clarify new, innovative and conceivably “best” practices 
implemented by effective organisations (Halinen & Tömroos, 2005:1292). Furthermore, 
experimental case studies are put in action where research serves to examine the efforts involved 
in the execution of novel procedures, processes and techniques within the context of an organisation; 
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in addition, this type of case study also serves to evaluate benefits associated with the experiment 
(Cho, Kim, Kim & Jang, 2005). Lastly, explanatory case studies utilise existing theory to understand 
and explain events (Yin, 1981). Of the types of case study available to the researcher, the exploratory 
case study is the most relevant primary research mechanism for this study as it is the most 
appropriate to address a research problem resulting from a deficient body of existing knowledge 
(Collis & Hussey, 2014).  
(d)   Exploratory cross-case study design 
The exploratory cross-case study served to address the lack of knowledge found. Research 
questions with a main focus on a “what?” can be justifiably well-answered by the research design of 
an exploratory case study, especially to develop important hypotheses from the research questions 
and propose future avenues of research (Yin, 2003:5-6). The primary research question of this study 
had a main focus on a “what?” as it was: “What managerial and/or leadership considerations exist 
for integrating small innovation acquisitions (with more than one individual) at the team level?” Since 
the research problem was novel, the exploratory cross-case study design was apposite; the five 





FIGURE 5.2: Case study research stages  
(Source: Adapted from Collis & Hussey, 2014:69)  
As can be seen in the figure above, the stages are as follows: selecting the cases; preliminary 
investigations; data collection; data analysis; and writing the case studies’ findings (Collis & Hussey, 
2014:69). Furthermore, the research method used in the study was qualitative.  
5.4.6 Qualitative research method 
Primary research designs may encompass either a qualitative or quantitative method or indeed one 
that includes a combination of the two, in which case it is regarded as a mixed methodological 
approach (Creswell, 2013; King & Horrocks, 2010). However, to grasp the nature of these two 
methods as separate entities, Table 5.3 is presented below; it serves to illustrate the characteristic 
features of qualitative and quantitative research. In a broad sense, qualitative inquiry is a 
superordinate that refers to interpretive primary data collection and analysis techniques, which 
 
 Stage 1:  Selecting the cases 
 Stage 2:  Preliminary investigations 
 Stage 3:  Data collection 
 Stage 4:  Data analysis 
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ultimately intend to discern social phenomena through the gleaning of more profound insights 
(Staller, 2010; van Maanen, 1983). Quantitative inquiry can be understood as a paradigm concerned 
with the accurate and precise measurement of data, with a view to express findings numerically, 
which is therefore dissimilar to qualitative inquiry (Creswell, 2016; King & Horrocks, 2010).  
TABLE 5.3: Characteristics of qualitative and quantitative research processes 




Design Emergent design Fixed design 
Views 
expressed 
Research subjects’ views Researchers’ views 
Complexity Higher complexity of scenario or 
context 
Narrower picture 
Researcher bias Probable researcher bias  Little to no researcher bias  
Setting Context or setting is central to 




Data collection  Open-ended data collection Closed-ended data collection 
Data analysis Inductive data analysis Deductive data analysis 
Writing style 
Flexible writing design 
Exceedingly structured 
writing  
(Source: Adapted from Creswell, 2016:15)  
Consistent with the above table, qualitative research was conducted owing to its appropriateness to 
exploratory research studies that require emergent designs which investigate social phenomena. 
Firstly, it permitted the researcher to gather research subjects’ complex thoughts, opinions, answers 
and various accounts that pertain to the research question (Creswell, 2016; Morse & Richards, 2002; 
Zikmund & Babin, 2010). The qualitative research process of this study aimed to cultivate 
understanding centred on gaining profundity of research subjects’ worldviews (Marshall & Rossman, 
2011; Staller, 2010), which allows for gleaning greater complexity of the context (Creswell, 2016). 
The design of the qualitative research has been directed towards attaining deeper findings by the 
means of open-ended data collection techniques which allowed the researcher to grasp complex 
states. The innovation acquisition champions as research subjects’ views were voiced through the 
data collection methodology, which was open-ended to ensure a more natural, interpretive 
exploration of singularities (Creswell, 2016).  
Moreover, in qualitative studies, researcher bias is ever-present (Creswell, 2016). The nature of 
qualitative analysis recognises that the researcher, often without meaning to, insinuates their 
personal beliefs, identity, values and attitudes into the research process (Staller, 2010). Yet, the 
current study attempted to moderate such a bias through framing the study by undertaking 
secondary research from a range of sources, the resulting findings of which were synthesised. 
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Furthermore, this literature review made a significant contribution to the study insofar as it became 
integral to forming the measurement instrument, broadly due to the research design that was 
characterised by qualitative inquiry. In contrast, quantitative studies usually test a model or 
hypothesis, which is generally known from the inception of the research, whereas qualitative studies 
are largely composed of original or emerging designs of primary research techniques. Therefore, by 
utilising a broad frame of reference, researcher bias was moderated (Creswell, 2016).  
Additionally, the setting or context is important in qualitative research designs (Creswell, 2016); in 
fact, sensitivity to the specific context is regarded as a central feature of the qualitative process of 
research (Bryman, Stephens & à Campo, 1996). To aid the interpretation of the data derived from 
qualitative studies, these have need of contextualisation, which is undertaken by gaining information 
pertaining to the background of the research subject and object, for example: location, time and 
influences of an economic, political, social or legal nature (Collis & Hussey, 2014). The depth and 
richness of the study’s findings are thus facilitated by contextualising qualitative data through critical 
reflection on the setting in which the research was undertaken (Cepeda & Martin, 2005). In the study, 
contextualisation of the case study was assumed by undertaking a preliminary investigation of the 
research setting (Collis & Hussey, 2014:69).  
Other characteristics of qualitative research, per Creswell (2016) and which can also be seen in 
Table 5.3 above, include open-ended data collection, inductive data analysis and a flexible writing 
design. Collecting data in qualitative studies is supported by open-ended questions or items in the 
measurement instrument, which provides research subjects with the opportunity to elaborate and 
fully explain their experiences (Fontanella, Campos & Turato, 2006). In addition, data was inductively 
analysed as discussed in section 5.4.4; in other words, themes are identified through the study of 
the open-ended data collected by finding similarities or links in either verbal or printed material 
(Thomas, 2006), across cases in this study. Finally, design of the writing is less structured and more 
flexible than that of quantitative studies (Creswell, 2016). The exploratory purpose of the research 
is discussed in the following section.  
5.4.7 Exploratory purpose of the research  
The purpose of any research undertaking is significant in determining the means by which to 
examine the identified problem, that is to say the process, outcome, paradigm, approach, design 
and data analysis by which inquiry is conducted (Collis & Hussey, 2014). To this end, three types of 
research exist: exploratory, descriptive and causal studies (Zikmund & Babin, 2010); regarding this 
study, the first is appropriate. To move towards understanding why this is the case, Table 5.4 (see 
below) clarifies the differences between the research types. Whereas the latter two, descriptive and 
causal type studies, necessitate a phenomenon(a) shown to be manifest from the study’s 
commencement, the former type of exploratory research does not. As such, this study deals with a 
possible phenomenon(a) that is considered understudied as was not initially evident and thus has 
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been investigated as per the exploratory research type (Collis & Hussey, 2014; Marshall & Rossman, 
2011; Webb & Auriacombe, 2006; Zikmund & Babin, 2010).  
TABLE 5.4: Characteristics of the three main research purposes  
 Research type 
 Exploratory  Descriptive Causal 
Objective of the 
research  
● To ascertain unexplored 
insights, beliefs and 
opinions  
 
● To uncover explanations 
for previously ascertained 
findings from exploratory 
studies 





of research type  
● Versatile  
● In many instances these 
initiate new dialogues 
● Test hypotheses 
● Structured primary 
research designs 
● Manipulate variable(s) to 
determine empirical 
causality 
Hypotheses  ● None or somewhat 
vague and inexact 
hypotheses 




● Slightly uncertain 
 
● Highly specific 
(Source: Adapted from Webb & Auriacombe, 2006:590-591; Zikmund & Babin, 2010:50-54) 
Exploratory research has enabled researchers to: consider and understand phenomena that are 
either as yet unstudied or suffer from a lack of prior academic inquiry; gain greater understandings 
of the significance of research findings through identifying key findings that became evident from 
questioning and probing research subjects; and/or to engender objectives, questions and 
hypotheses for future research (Marshall & Rossman, 2011).  
Furthermore, the characteristics of exploratory research have allowed the researcher to investigate 
relatively unchartered territory that has so far gone unstudied. Thus, hypotheses and research 
questions of exploratory studies are habitually vague and indistinct in nature (Zikmund & Babin, 
2010). At the study’s start, the question of whether phenomena unique to the context exist was 
unclear. In addition, the exploratory study type provides the impetus to initiate a novel dialogue about 
an understudied area recognised from a review of the available and accessible literature. It is also 
pertinent to note that the study did not aim to offer any conclusive evidence owing to its relative 
newness (Zikmund & Babin, 2010). Following the discussion of the qualitative research process, the 
outcome of the research study is discussed in the next section, which, in this case, is basic or pure. 
5.4.8 Basic (pure) research outcome 
At the start of the study, the research did not occupy a specific, quantifiable issue or problem; rather, 
it was concerned with exploring an area as yet disregarded. Thus, the research hoped to contribute 
to a general understanding of integrating small acquisitions at the team level. This overarching 
research question of the study was driven by the researcher’s interest to investigate and add 
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knowledge to an area of research as yet understudied (Jugenheimer, Kelley, Hudson & Bradley, 
2014:5). For this reason, basic or pure research has been undertaken, which initiated understanding 
of the issue. Moreover, the basic research intended to afford a groundwork and perhaps research 
proposition(s) for analysis in future studies, for instance testing of the early theoretical basis 
advanced by this study (Collis & Hussey, 2014). Given the discussion of basic research in this 
section, the subsequent section discusses phenomenological research.  
5.4.9 Phenomenological research  
This study is of a phenomenological nature (Moran, 2000). Founded by Edmund Husserl in the early 
twentieth century, phenomenology is a practice ascribed to the field of philosophy. It can generally 
be expressed as a method of philosophical inquiry with a view to unearth the conscious perceptions 
of individual experiences and matters, often manifest in the collective (Arbnor & Bjerke, 1997; 
Creswell, 1998; King & Horrocks, 2010; Moran, 2000; Morse & Richards, 2002; Polkinghorne, 1989).  
Analyses of the phenomenological tradition of inquiry are centered on several factors proposed by 
Husserl. The phenomenological study is the first of these and it aims to uncover the “essence” of the 
lived experience, which regards the profound meaning that the experience holds to the human 
perception and understanding (Creswell, 1998:52; Dahlberg, 2006:11; Patton, 2002:363). This is 
evident in the dimension of narrative report focus in Table 5.5 below serves as a depiction of the 
phenomenological research.  
TABLE 5.5: Characterising phenomenological research  
Dimension The phenomenological qualitative research approach 
Purpose  To explore or to describe personal experiences of phenomena 
Origin Philosophy 
Data analysis approach 
● Register statements of significance  
● Understand and specify the essence of each statement 
● Ultimately discern the phenomenon’s meaning  
Narrative report focus 
Profound, deep exploration and description of the dominant or essential structures 
of the phenomenal experience (the common qualities or “essences” thereof)  
Primary method of data 
collection  
In-depth interviews (approximately an hour or longer perhaps) 
1 to 10 people (usually with a maximum of 15 people in total) 
(Source: Adapted from Collis & Hussey, 2014:46; Creswell, 1998:112-113; Patton, 2002:363)   
Secondly, this essence mainly requires the conduct and actions assumed by people within their 
perceived reality insofar as the perception is shared by the individuals making up the collective; thus, 
the human perception of reality outweighs the real truth (Creswell, 1998; Morse & Richards, 2002). 
The perceptions of innovation acquisition champions were thus under analysis to study phenomena 
related to managerial and/or leadership considerations. Additionally, Husserlian philosophy decrees 
suspending judgement until such a juncture as findings are discovered in the study of phenomena 
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(Creswell, 1998; 2016; Morse & Richards, 2002); this adds to the significance of decreasing 
researcher bias in the current qualitative study (Creswell, 2016). Lastly, the reality being experienced 
by the research object, in this case the managerial and/or leadership considerations, was only 
perceived as the experience’s interpretation within the individual (leader) (Creswell, 1998). This was 
what the researcher studied to arrive at phenomena (Rapley, 2012). In conclusion, the 
phenomenological approach was considered suitable for this study on the integration of small 
innovation acquisitions. Given the discussion of the research methodology in the above sections, 
the following section details the sampling that was undertaken in the study.  
5.4.10 Sampling  
As per Zikmund and Babin (2010), samples are smaller subsets of larger populations and are used 
in research to gain the information required to serve problem statements. This section discusses the 
unit and levels of analysis of the study as well as the sampling technique, criteria and size. Moreover, 
this section describes the research subjects and entities that were sampled and discusses the 
inclusion of the cases in the study. 
5.4.10.1 Unit and levels of analysis  
The sampling assumed in the current study adhered to the first stage of the case study methodology 
posited by Collis and Hussey (2014). The case selection stage involves several choices, including: 
number of cases; unit of analysis; and sample cases (Meyer, 2001). Regarding the first, this is 
discussed in section 5.4.10.4 on sample size.  
Secondly, it is necessary to delineate the levels of analysis and, indeed, the main unit of analysis of 
the study, as per Meyer (2001). Research subjects related to the selected cases in their capacity as 
being held accountable for integrating acquisitions into teams, referred to in this study as innovation 
acquisition champions, were the study’s unit of analysis (Cavaye, 1996; Perry, 1998).  
The primary characteristic of elements of the greater population, also identified as the first level of 
analysis, were that all possible candidates for the purposive sample should be organisations that 
undertake full or partial acquisitions of smaller organisations. Furthermore, the second level of 
analysis was identified as research subjects that are employed in a managerial and/or leadership 
capacity in which they are accountable for directly managing and leading a post-acquisition 
integration effort at the team level, namely innovation acquisition champions. The final level of 
analysis was that these innovation acquisition champions undertake the effort within the context of 
a team (Zikmund & Babin, 2010).  
5.4.10.2 Purposive sampling technique  
To select these individuals for study, the sampling technique known as purposive (or judgement 
sampling) was employed in this study, which Creswell (1998:118) has advocated for the use of in 
studies of a phenomenological nature and which he terms the “purposeful sampling strategy”. This 
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sampling technique is the considered selection of a research subject due to the qualities they 
possess; furthermore, it is a non-random technique (Etikan, Musa & Alkassim, 2016). The researcher 
finds research subjects who can and are willing to offer information relevant to the study by virtue of 
their experience (Bernard, 2002).  
Purposive sampling is employed in qualitative research to isolate and select those cases which are 
rich with relevant information (Patton, 2002), which means identifying and choosing those individuals 
or groups that are both well-informed and proficient about a phenomenon(a) under study (Creswell 
& Clark, 2011). Moreover, scholars stress the significant of finding research subjects that are 
available and willing to participate as well as having the talent of articulately expressing their opinions 
and experiences in a reflective manner (Bernard, 2002; Spradley, 1979). This study’s target 
population (Zikmund & Babin, 2010) broadly encompassed organisations that undertake small 
innovation acquisitions, either fully or partially, for innovative purposes. Therefore, in the study, 
sampling was purposively carried out and the researcher was able to execute the sampling given 
the parameters posed by sampling criteria discussed in section 5.4.10.3 as well as levels and unit 
of analyses in the previous section.  
The implementation of purposive sampling in this study commenced after ethical approval was 
gained for the primary research to be undertaken. The ethical considerations of the study and 
approval gained is detailed in section 5.4.14 of this chapter. Through a professional social media 
platform, LinkedIn, potential interviewees were contacted. The researcher sent a personalised 
message to each potential subject along with a broad outline of the research and a request for their 
participation. The sampling took place over a three-month period in mid-2018 and 104 prospective 
interviewees were contacted.  
Individuals with the words “acquisition”, “integration” and “M&A” in their profile titles were searched 
for and contacted by means of LinkedIn’s direct messaging service. The organisations of which these 
individuals were employees included: Walgreens, Google, Cisco Systems, Deloitte, Barclays, 
Facebook, NBCUniversal, Rand Merchant Investment Holdings, General Electric, PayPal, Silvertree 
Internet Holdings, International Business Machines Corporation, Hewlett Packard, 7-Eleven, 
Microsoft and Cipla as well as one other organisation that will remain anonymous as it forms part of 
the Rome case which enjoys anonymity in this study. It is salient to note that, in her liaisons with 
potential research subjects, the researcher observed that these innovation acquisition champions 
displayed reluctance to be interviewed on this subject matter. Thus, as very few were willing to 
discuss the integration of acquired innovative organisations at the team level with the researcher 
despite being extended full anonymity, the cases that were selected were willing to be interviewed 
and fulfilled the contextual criteria for the study. Of the 104 prospective research subjects, five 
individuals acquiesced to participate in the study. These five interviewees availed themselves to the 
research interviews in late July 2018 and over the course of August 2018.  
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5.4.10.3 Sampling criteria  
The sampling criteria in this study were necessary to study the possible phenomena (Collis & 
Hussey, 2014) regarding managerial and/or leadership considerations that exist for integrating small 
innovation acquisitions (with more than one individual) at the team level. Three main sampling criteria 
relevant to the current study were: firstly, a full or partial acquisition, secondly, the acquisition of an 
innovative organisation and finally a team-level integration.  
The individual research subjects sampled within the cases were leaders and managers charged with 
the responsibility of integrating small innovation acquisitions at the team level, namely innovation 
acquisition champions. To protect the anonymity of these individuals, they were referred to by 
pseudonyms, such as “Ptah”, “Apollo” and “Romulus”. Prior to interviewing a research subject, they 
were provided with an informed consent form, which outlined and detailed the anonymity extended 
to them as participants; this form can be referred to in Addendum C on page 320. Given the 
discussion of the sampling of this study which eventuated in three cases – referred to anonymously 
as the Egypt case, the Greece case and the Rome case – the next section introduces the 
pseudonyms relevant to each of the cases.  
5.4.10.4 Sample size  
As this study was a cross-case study, it was necessary to select and approach more than one case 
for analysis (Leonard-Barton, 1990). As reaching conclusive statistical generalisations was not an 
objective of the study, a purposive sample set of two or more cases passed muster to gather the 
necessary knowledge by interviewing research subjects related to the selected cases, the study’s 
unit of analysis (Cavaye, 1996; Perry, 1998).  
Three cases were the only ones to consent to participate in the study and the researcher experienced 
an unwillingness among sampled prospective candidates. Given these sampling criteria, these 
cases acquiesced to be a part of the study and met the criteria to varying degrees: the cases of two 
business incubators with dynamic integration and partial acquisition processes as well as one full 
acquisition by resource buy-out of an innovative software start-up. The following section serves to 
introduce the sampled research subjects and cases, which is succeeded by a discussion on the 
inclusion of the cases. 
5.4.10.5 Introduction of the sampled research subjects and cases 
As this study extends full anonymity to its research subjects, their identities, the identities of those 
they mentioned and the organisations they are involved with (as well as any other entities), all parties 
are extended pseudonyms in this study. The following section serves to introduce the organisations 
referred to in the Egypt, Greece and Rome cases.  
 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
  
161 
    
   
(a) Entity pseudonyms of the cases studied 
As there are a number of legal entities at play in the Egypt, Greece and Rome cases, Table 5.6 
below serves to summarise the pseudonyms of the acquirer and the acquired of all three cases, 
which is followed by a discussion of the table.  
TABLE 5.6: Organisation pseudonyms used in the cross-case study  
Case Entity Pseudonym  
Egypt case  Bidder organisation (of 15 per cent stake) Nile 
Target organisation (15 per cent equity stake procured by Nile) Sphinx 
Greece case Bidder organisation (of intended 20 per cent stake)  Ilissos 
Target organisation (intention to acquire 20 per cent equity stake 
by Ilissos)  
Agora 
Rome case  Bidder organisation Tiber 
Target organisation Pantheon  
Previous potential acquirer  Colosseum  
Firstly, the Egypt case consisted of an organisation that acquired an equity stake in a conceptual 
stage micro-organisation made up of four co-founders. The equity stake acquirer is referred to in this 
study as Nile and the initiative in which the stake was acquired is named Sphinx. Similarly to the 
Egypt case, the Greece case consisted of an incubator, which is known as Ilissos in the context of 
the study. Ilissos intended to acquire an equity stake in an early idea-stage partnership, which is 
referred to as Agora in this study. Lastly, the Rome case consisted of an acquiring organisation, 
referred to under the pseudonym Tiber, which procured the majority of a software start-up, Pantheon, 
by undertaking a resource buy-out of the value offering, organisation and some employees. 
However, Pantheon was nearly acquired previously by a similar organisation to Tiber, which is given 
the name Colosseum in this study. Given the introduction of the entities referred to in the study, the 
Table 5.7 below serves to introduce the pseudonyms of the research subjects, their colleagues and 
other direct or indirect stakeholders in the initiatives above; the three sections that follow discuss the 
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TABLE 5.7: Stakeholders’ pseudonyms in the cross-case study  
Case  Stakeholder role Original 
organisation  
Pseudonym  
Egypt case  Managing Director of Nile 
(Indirect stakeholder in Sphinx) 
Nile Amun  
Senior commercialisation manager  
(Indirect stakeholder in Sphinx) 
Nile Osiris 
Project commercialisation manager  Nile Ptah  
Co-founder CEO Sphinx Nun  
Co-founder CTO Sphinx Isis 
Co-founder COO Sphinx Hathor 
Co-founder CFO Sphinx Tawaret  
Greece case  Managing Director of Ilissos Ilissos Hera 
Agora Coach, Ilissos Manager Ilissos Apollo  
Ilissos coach  
(Indirect stakeholder in Agora) 
Ilissos Demeter 
Co-founder, Client and Supplier Relations Agora  Athena  
Co-founder, Finance and Administration  Agora  Hecate  
Rome case  Co-founder, Client and Supplier Relations Pantheon  Romulus  
Co-founder, Finance and Administration  Pantheon  Remus 
(b) Stakeholder pseudonyms of the Egypt case  
As can be seen from the table, the managing director of Nile is an indirect stakeholder in the Egypt 
case as he himself neither manages nor leads the initiative but oversees the strategy and operations 
of the entire Nile organisation; in this study, he is referred to as Amun. Amun agreed to be a research 
subject in the study and provided salient background information on Nile. Furthermore, within the 
ranks of the Nile organisation there are two other stakeholders in Sphinx. The first, Osiris, worked 
with Sphinx approximately two years before the research interviews were conducted and had long 
since transitioned from a direct to indirect stakeholder in the Sphinx venture. The final Nile employee, 
who has been given the pseudonym Ptah, now directly administrates the Sphinx initiative in a project 
management capacity; his title and job description will be further dealt with in the findings chapter 
that follows this one.  
The table above also lists the four innovators who co-founded the Sphinx initiative. In this study, their 
identities are protected by referring to them as Isis, Nun, Hathor and Tawaret, respectively. These 
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four South African women met early on in their careers through a large corporate-sponsored 
competition that serves to recognise and give opportunities to young entrepreneurs. Firstly, Nun was 
the chief executive officer of the Sphinx initiative; while she had been at the forefront of the 
organisation for a number of months, she resigned from the organisation very near to the time of the 
research interviews. Secondly, Isis is Sphinx’s chief technology officer. She is credited with originally 
having the idea for the innovative medical device, which is the main value offering of the Sphinx 
initiative. Isis has since taken over the CEO role from Nun as well as maintaining her role as CTO. 
Thirdly, Sphinx has a chief operations officer referred to in the study as Hathor. Hathor currently 
works at a large organisation and works in product innovation. Finally, Tawaret serves as the chief 
financial officer of the initiative and has an academic background in organisational studies. Given 
the characterisations of the direct- and indirect stakeholders of the Sphinx initiative, the following 
section provides a discussion of the pseudonyms presented in Table 5.7 as it regards the Greece 
case.  
(c) Stakeholder pseudonyms of the Greece case  
As can be seen in Table 5.7 above, in the Greece case, the small organisation was made up of two 
female co-founders; it was managed and coached by one Ilissos employee; and it was overseen by 
the incubator’s Managing Director. The two innovators who co-founded this initiative are given the 
pseudonyms Athena and Hecate; whereas the former underwent Ilissos’ training programme for 
potential incubatees, the latter did not. In this case, the entrepreneurs were integrated into a team, 
which consisted of their coach, who happened to be the manager of Ilissos as well, named Apollo in 
this study, and the acquiring organisation’s managing director, Hera. Lastly, a preliminary interview 
was conducted with Demeter, another coach at Ilissos; while she is, however, not a direct 
stakeholder of the Greece case, she was able to provide valuable contextual information to Ilissos.  
(d) Stakeholder pseudonyms of the Rome case  
With reference to Table 5.7, the organisation acquired by resource buy-out, Pantheon, was started 
by two male co-founders, referred to in this study by the pseudonyms Romulus and Remus. Romulus 
was the research subject that availed himself to the study.  
Given the introduction of the chosen cases, the following section serves to discuss the inclusion of 
the cases in respect of the contextual criteria necessary to study the possible phenomena (Collis & 
Hussey, 2014) in the study, which consisted of the following: a full or partial acquisition; of an 
innovative organisation; and an integration at the team level.  
5.4.10.6 Inclusion of the cases 
This section serves to discussion the inclusion of each of the cases, Egypt, Greece and Rome, using 
Table 5.8 below as a reference point. 
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TABLE 5.8: Comparison of case criteria and inclusion 
 Key findings 
Criteria  Egypt case Greece case Rome case 
Acquisition (full 
or partial) 
Nile undertook a 15 
percent equity stake 
in Sphinx 
Ilissos planned to take 
a 20 percent equity 
stake in Agora 
Pantheon was acquired by 




Sphinx was an 
innovative 
organisation 
developing a medical 
device 













integrated into the 
team with Ptah, the 
innovation acquisition 
champion 
The Agora co-founders 
were integrated into the 
team with Apollo, the 
innovation acquisition 
champion 
The Rome case did not 
meet the third criterium of 
team-level integration  
 
(a) Egypt case inclusion 
As can be seen in Table 5.8 above, in the Egypt case, Nile acquired a 15 percent equity stake in 
Sphinx. The taking of this equity stake was paid for by allocating a Rand amount agreed upon 
between the parties to the Sphinx organisation, which would be paid out for services that aimed to 
develop the organisation. This study defines a partial acquisition as similar to a full acquisition in the 
sense that it is similarly dependent on an existing organisation and enjoys the various advantages 
and disadvantages associated with this dependence (Jakobsen & Meyer, 2008). The acquirer, 
however, does not secure a full claim to the partially-acquired organisation’s earnings, nor does the 
former hold full equity control: the acquisition is only partially undertaken through the acquiring 
organisation purchasing an equity stake in the target business, rather than securing full ownership 
of it (Jakobsen & Meyer, 2008). Nile’s acquisition of an equity stake in Sphinx was purchased with 
money allocated to Sphinx, which was purposed for the payment of services that would serve to 
develop the organisation. The purchase of the equity stake, which was how a partial acquisition was 
defined, was done with money, money which was allocated to the development of the organisation.  
The post-acquisition team increased with the addition of Ptah as innovation acquisition champion, 
who worked closely first with Nun and then with Isis to integrate and manage the members of the 
initiative and the tasks necessary to operate and develop the business. Whereas Isis was the team 
leader amongst Sphinx’s four co-founders due to her technical understanding of the medical device 
and the most time available to dedicate to the initiative of the original co-founders at the time, Ptah 
acted as the innovation acquisition champion in his capacity as advisor, liaison and integrator 
between all team members for decision-making and task planning as well as interfacing with and 
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representing the acquiring organisation, Nile, in the Sphinx team. As a result of these duties as the 
innovation acquisition champion, Ptah was interviewed and not Isis.  
(b) Greece case inclusion 
In the literature review undertaken, the acquisition process was found to be a sequential three-phase 
process, made up of distinct, separate phases: pre-acquisition, acquisition and post-acquisition (von 
Krogh, 2016), the latter of which involved the integration process (Haspeslagh & Jemison, 1991). 
However, in some of the cases studied, the sequential undertaking of these distinct phases was not 
found in reality. Instead, a more dynamic approach to the acquisition process came to light. 
Integration, a task for the post-acquisition phase as found in the literature, started in the pre-
acquisition phase in the Greece case when the Agora co-founders were presented with the 
memorandum of understanding (MOU). They were given a month to sign the MOU during which time 
they were integrated into Ilissos. Thus, in reality, the three-phase acquisition process was not 
sequentially and distinctly applied in the Greece case. In fact, the integration of Agora into Ilissos 
was based on the assumption that the Agora co-founders would sign the memorandum, which they 
did not, as can be seen in Table 5.8. In the Agora case, there was indeed an integration process 
which was assumed during a period of intended acquisition, which culminated in a failed integration 
and therefore an intended acquisition which did not come to fruition.  
(c) Rome case inclusion 
While the Pantheon organisation was indeed acquired by means of resource buy-out, after the 
acquisition of these resources, the organisation that once existed there no longer existed as the 
value offerings, human resources and all other parts of the organisation had been moved or bought. 
In other words, upon the acquisition by resource buy-out of Pantheon, Pantheon as a separate entity 
ceased to exist. Having said that, however, it is the case that team integration did not take place (as 
can be seen in Table 5.8) with a view to develop or commercialise a value offering as in Pantheon’s 
case, the offering was mature enough to operate independently. However, the Rome case not 
meeting all three of the criteria explained the differences in the first five themes identified in both the 
Egypt and Greece cases. The Rome case was retained in the study as it allowed the research to 
consider differences with regards to the size and nature of the acquisition.  
Given the discussion of inclusion of the cases, criteria and size presented above, the following 
section describes the collection of the study’s data. 
5.4.11 Data collection  
According to Collis and Hussey (2014), data collection methods used in case study methodology 
often include interviews, observation and documentary analysis. The data collection of this study 
was undertaken through a series of semi-structured, in-depth interviews (Flick, 1998:368; King & 
Horrocks, 2010; Roberts et al., 2003) with managers and/or leaders in the team scenario, which 
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were complemented by observation and preliminary investigation (Collis & Hussey, 2014). This 
section serves to discuss the issues of reliability, validity and generalisability as well as the 
preliminary investigation interviews and, finally, the data collection methods.  
5.4.11.1 Reliability, validity, generalisability and trustworthiness 
It is important to discuss the matters of reliability, validity and generalisability (Noble & Smith, 2015) 
and trustworthiness (Rolfe, 2006) of the cases selected.  
(a) Reliability 
Regarding the first, reliability is the accurateness and exactness of the measurement undertaken in 
a given study to the extent that the results of the research would be repeatable if the study were 
replicated (Collis & Hussey, 2014:52-53). One way in which reliability is demonstrated in interpretivist 
studies is if a certain observation or interpretation is made on separate occasions (Collis & Hussey, 
2014). In this cross-case study, a finding was considered reliable if it was observed or interpreted in 
two or more of the cases; in other words, only cross-case findings were reported as the key findings 
of the study.  
(b) Validity 
Concerning the second matter, that of validity, this concept is defined as the degree to which an 
investigation assesses what the researcher wants it to assess and the findings reflect the 
phenomena relevant to the study (Collis & Hussey, 2014:53). The validity of the study was protected 
by selecting cases relevant to the study by considering its contextual criteria, which were as follows: 
a full or partial acquisition of an innovative organisation, which was integrated at the team level. One 
individual from an organisation that was not a business incubator availed himself to the study; he is 
the co-founder of a software start-up which was acquired by resource buy-out. The others who were 
willing to be interviewed work in business incubators in which the organisation acquires an equity 
stake in its incubatees – in other words, partially acquires a small organisation. The research 
subjects within the three cases were selected based on their managerial and/or leadership 
responsibilities in the small innovation acquisitions’ integrations at the team level. The meeting of 
these contextual criteria in the selection of cases and research subjects allowed the researcher to 
uncover findings relevant to the phenomena of interest in the study.  
(c) Generalisability 
Furthermore, generalisability is the degree to which the findings of the research can be applied 
generally, that is to say to similar cases or to a larger population (Shi, Hodges, Drummond, Ahn, Li, 
Hu, Augustovski, Hay & Smeeding, 2010). As attaining conclusive generalisable results was not an 
objective of the exploratory study, the purposive sample set of three cases was considered 
satisfactory for the purposes of gathering the early findings in the field by interviewing the innovation 
acquisition champions of these cases (Cavaye, 1996; Perry, 1998). In interpretivist studies, it is 
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possible to gain an understanding of the phenomena at play in a particular setting with few cases 
and generalise these findings into similar settings (Collis & Hussey, 2014; Gummesson, 2000). In 
this study, the research questions posed aimed to provide some managerial and/or leadership 
considerations for integrating small innovation acquisitions at the team level; these considerations 
should thus be generalisable to similar settings.  
(d) Trustworthiness 
Firstly, to address the issue of triangulation, the researcher conducted preliminary interviews with 
research subjects that acquiesced to make themselves available to participate in the study. 
Specifically, in the Egypt and Greece cases, the colleagues of Ptah and Apollo were interviewed to 
get an additional viewpoint on these cases by an additional interviewee. Secondly, regarding 
checking the contribution of the research subjects, the verbatim data was continually revisited by the 
researcher when and where relevant to ensure trustworthiness of all key findings and cross-cases 
themes found as they would therefore be based on verbatim statements made by interviewees 
during their interviews. Given the discussion of trustworthiness in terms of triangulation and the 
members’ contribution (research subjects), the preliminary investigation interviews undertaken in the 
study are undertaken. 
5.4.11.2 Preliminary investigation interviews  
Once the cases were chosen and approved by Stellenbosch University and the research subjects, 
initial investigations of the cases were undertaken. This involved the researcher becoming familiar 
with the context of each case through preliminary conversations and observation (Collis & Hussey, 
2014). In two of the three cases, a preliminary interview was granted and conducted with an 
additional colleague of the innovation acquisition champion, which allowed the researcher more 
insight into the broader context of the case as well as the previously separate legal entities. These 
interviews were undertaken with Amun of the Egypt case and Demeter of the Greece case. These 
preliminary interviews were conducted using the same interview guide used with the innovation 
acquisition champions, Ptah and Apollo, respectively in these cases, which is detailed and discussed 
in the following section.  
5.4.11.3 Data collection methods 
Besides what has been discussed above, this section also serves to explore: qualitative data 
collection techniques; in-depth interviews; semi-structured interviews; the broad outline of the semi-
structured interview designed and undertaken; its probing capability; both advantages and 
drawbacks of face-to-face interviews; and, lastly, the fieldwork that was assumed.  
(a)   Qualitative data collection techniques 
Several techniques are available for the collection of qualitative primary research, including: focus 
group interviews; in-depth interviews; conversations; and free association techniques. Firstly, in this 
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qualitative research study, a focus group interview was not utilised due to the constraint of having 
too few a number of research participants which had availed themselves. Secondly, the 
conversational technique was considered too informal to be suitable for such an academic study. 
Additionally, free association techniques were not expected to provide enough significant insights as 
this technique does not allow for probing by the interviewer. However, the primary research 
technique employed in this study was the in-depth interview, as it was considered most appropriate 
for the exploratory research problem at hand (Collis & Hussey, 2014; Zikmund & Babin, 2010).  
(b)   The in-depth interview 
In-depth interviews are one-on-one discussions or meetings, which share certain traits of 
conventional therapeutic techniques used by psychoanalysts. The technique of in-depth interviewing 
was employed in the study to question research subjects, allowing for engagement with the 
interviewer; furthermore, interviewees were given the opportunity to provide detailed answers 
centred on their personal knowledge and experience (Zikmund & Babin, 2010). The in-depth 
interview is an appropriate technique for case study research (Collis & Hussey, 2014). Morse and 
Richards (2002) characterise the diverse qualitative interview techniques, all of which are associated 
with in-depth interviews or phenomenological studies, as can be seen in Table 5.9 below.  
TABLE 5.9: Techniques for personal interviews in qualitative research 





● Fewer questions that have been prepared beforehand 
● Researcher listens actively to the subject and 
endeavours to learns from them 
● Unanticipated, spontaneous questions are often 
asked 
● These interviews allow for probing 












● Open-ended questions are devised and established in 
advance 
● Prepared probes are included (often italicised)  






(Source: Adapted from King & Horrocks, 2010:182-186; Morse & Richards, 2002:91) 
Firstly, unstructured, interactive interviews are not wholly typical of emergent research designs 
(Creswell, 2016), such as in this study, as there were many prepared questions and anticipated 
probes, which can be seen in Addendum D. During the interviews, the researcher actively listened 
to interviewees to acquire learnings from them by using unanticipated probes and lines of 
questioning in response to subjects’ statements and answers (Lillrank, 2012).  
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Secondly, informal conversations are commonly utilised in phenomenological studies; nonetheless, 
the informality of the interviewer-interviewee interaction led to it not being the selected technique. 
However, the researcher played an active part during interviews, which allowed for superior 
exploration for understanding subjects’ experiences (King & Horrocks, 2010).  
Moreover, King and Horrocks (2010) and Smith and Osborn (2008) assert that the final technique 
shown above in Table 5.9 – the semi-structured interview – is the most applicable and suitable form 
of qualitative, phenomenological, exploratory research studies.  
(c)   The semi-structured interview 
Semi-structured interviews, as can be seen in the table above, have open-ended questions 
(Millwood & Heath, 2000), which this study’s measurement instrument (Addendum D) was mainly 
comprised of. Essentially, open-ended questions are not dualistic, one-word answer questions; 
instead, these measurement instrument items allowed the interviewees to elaborate on their 
perspectives and experiences with the phenomena studied (Creswell, 2016; King & Horrocks, 2010), 
which are, in this study, the post-acquisition integration managerial and/or leadership considerations 
relevant to integrating a small innovation acquisition at the team level.  
Furthermore, prepared probes are also a distinguishing factor of semi-structured interviews (Chan, 
Fung & Chien, 2013; Morse & Richards, 2002). Moreover, the interview also followed the semi-
structured interview format as some of the research subjects’ answers and responses had already 
adequately answered upcoming items; thus, the need for elaboration on these items were not 
necessitated by follow-up questions, which was moderated by the researcher’s discretion (King & 
Horrocks, 2010). In other words, the researcher endeavoured not to repeat items which had already 
been addressed in the research subject’s answers.  
(d)  Broad outline of the semi-structured interview 
The broad outline of the study’s phenomenological semi-structured interview is illustrated in Figure 
5.3, which Creswell (2016) refers to as the protocol of the interview (Rabionet, 2011). As can be 
seen in the figure below, the interview is made up of three sequential phases of which the second 
has six consecutive parts. Regarding the first phase of the interview (items 1.1 through 1.8), Emory 
(1976) submits that interviewers ought to open the interaction with introductory conversation of a 
warm, courteous nature in an effort to put the research subject at ease and build rapport, which 
allows the parties to establish confidence in one another (Whiting, 2008:37). Furthermore, Creswell 
(2016) asserts that basic information concerning the interview is recorded along with a brief 
introduction to the research study is given. These steps are presented in the measurement 
instrument in Addendum D and further detailed in items 1.1 through 1.8 in Figure 5.3 below.  
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
  
170 
    






FIGURE 5.3: Broad interview protocol used in the study 
(Source: Adapted from Creswell, 2016:129-132)   
Phase one grouped items 1.1 to 1.8 together, which are the introductory and interviewee welcome, 
rapport-building and essential information items concerning the interview, as can be seen in the 
above figure. Item 1.1 served to welcome the interviewee, recognise them for their participation and 
convey the gratitude of the researcher for the contribution of time, effort and knowledge they made 
to the study. Item 1.2 and 1.3 reassured the subject that their anonymity would be retained in the 
writing up of the study and that confidentiality and ethics would be upheld. Item 1.4 gave the 
interviewee a brief overview of the purpose of the study. Additionally, Item 1.5 asks for confirmation 
of consenting to participate in the study while Item 1.6 requests consent to audio record the research 
subject’s responses during the interview. Item 1.7 asks whether the subject has any additional 
questions or concerns before the second phase of items commences (see figure above). Lastly, the 
final item of the first phase reassures the interviewee that there are no right or wrong answers in the 
succeeding phases of the interview (Creswell, 2016). Moreover, the interview schedule or protocol 
discussion guide was designed to ask content questions so that the spoken responses of the 
interviewed party were recorded on an electronic device for later transcription (Creswell, 2016; 
Rabionet, 2011). 
Besides, Figure 5.3 above expands on the protocol’s second phase as containing additional opening 
questions, content questions and probes, which together form the “long interview protocol” Creswell 
(1998:113) refers to. The phase two items and prepared probes can be reviewed in Addendum D. 
Regarding the opening questions of this phase, in Part 2.1, item 2.1.1 was the maiden question of 
the content questions; it is: “I understand that you are currently or have previously been involved in 
a team which was made up – at least in part – of an acquired start-up’s employees, is that correct?” 
PHASE 1:  
Meeting/welcome, 
build rapport, give 





and thanks for time. 
Items: 3.1-3.5. 
PART 2.1 Regarding the innovation acquisition champion  
Regarding the team and the acquisition PART 2.2 
Regarding post-acquisition integration process and 
the innovation acquisition champion’s role 
PART 2.3 
PHASE 2:  
Opening questions, content questions, 
planned probes and opportunities for 
unanticipated probes during the semi-
structured interview.  
Items: 2.1.1-2.3.7. 
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This serves as an easy initial enquiry about the research subject, which is followed by more items 
asking more about the individual’s title, managerial and/or leadership role, how they came to occupy 
the position and whether or not they have led and managed a post-acquisition integration of a small 
innovation acquisition into a team. In some instances in the semi-structured interviews, some of 
these items had already been covered by previous items and probes as well as the research 
subject’s unsolicited explanation, which led the researcher to move on to other items. This part’s 
items are further supported by prepared probes, demonstrated by italicising these prepared probes, 
such as regarding their managerial and/or leadership role: “[H]ow would you describe it? How did 
you come to occupy this position? Were there other leaders in the team?” These questions serve to 
get to know the research subject, give them an idea of the question format and further build rapport 
with the interviewer. Item 2.2.1 follows in a similar vein by asking whether there is an organisational 
strategy or policy for innovation exists, whether it applies to teams and, if so, whether the interviewee 
can offer a description of it.  
Regarding the content questions and probes following the opening items of the second phase (Part 
2.2, refer to figure above and Addendum D), the subsequent items were grouped in parts related to 
the subject matter of the items’ content. As can be seen in the above figure, these content questions 
and probes’ subject matters include:  
● The innovation acquisition champion (Part 2.1; Items 2.1.1-2.1.4); 
● The team and the acquisition (Part 2.2; Items 2.2.1-2.2.7);  
● The post-acquisition integration process and the innovation acquisition champion’s role (Part 2.3; 
Items 2.3.1-2.3.7).  
 
Lastly, the interview’s concluding items and thanks were grouped together in the third phase, which 
spanned item 3.1 through 3.5, served to resolve the interview constructively. Firstly, they offered the 
subject the chance to add any remaining comments on assorted keywords of the subject matter, 
including:  
● The post-acquisition integration process within the team; 
● The innovation experiments and the innovation acquisition champion’s role;  
● Any final insights about integrating small acquisitions within the team while developing their 
innovation. 
 
Subsequently, a last opportunity was given for the research subject to add concluding comments, 
about any field or topic, and the final item of the measurement instrument, item 3.5, which thanked 
the interviewee for their contribution and once again accentuated the gratitude of the interviewer.  
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(e)   The capability of probing 
The semi-structured, in-depth interview (Flick, 1998:368; Roberts et al., 2003) gave the interviewer 
the chance to probe research subjects on their responses to collect the most exhaustive and detailed 
responses possible during the interview (Zikmund & Babin, 2010). Probing was employed where 
interviewees did not respond to the question satisfactorily in terms of whether it met objectives of the 
given item was intended to achieve. Besides, bias was a conceivable consequence of probing as 
new, unplanned for prompts and questions were insinuated in the verbal exchange. These may have 
created a slight deviation in the interview’s direction; therefore, interviewer neutrality was the 
particular purpose of the probe (Bryman & Bell, 2003; Emory, 1976; Hill & Wright, 2001). The 
interviewer was aware of various probing styles and devices to execute probing neutrally and 
effortlessly; for instance, a pregnant pause, once again repeating the question or an unprejudiced 
comment on the response given stimulated interviewees to respond more fittingly (Cooper & 
Schindler, 2003). Therefore, probing was employed during the interviews to address fully the 
exploratory overarching research question of the study.  
(f)   Advantages and drawbacks of face-to-face interviews 
The interviews conducted in the study were undertaken in face-to-face settings, which advantage 
primary research in a number of ways. Face-to-face interviews have the benefits of superior 
response rates, the capability of probing, the chance to explain ambiguous or vague questions 
(items) respondents may have misunderstood or misinterpreted and, finally, interpret participant 
reactions – be it facial, verbal or body language – which can be perceived first-hand and recorded 
in writing with an accompanying notebook if significant (Persaud, 2010). These advantages and 
disadvantages can be seen in Table 5.10 below.  
TABLE 5.10: Face-to-face interviews’ advantages and disadvantages 
Advantages Disadvantages 
Higher response rate (percentage) than is common 
in self-administered surveys 
Research subjects are required to supply answers 
in real time, which may possibly decrease 
accuracy 
Lessens the number of ‘do not know’ responses as 
probes can be used to counter and request more 
insight   
Interviewers require excellent social skills to 
achieve cooperation and trust between 
themselves and their research subjects  
Interviewer has the opportunity to clarify questions 
which the subject does not immediately understand  
Poorly undertaken interview administration as well 
as interviewer bias may result in errors, such as 
measurement error 
Acquire useful additional information, such as body 
language and other reactions  
Definitively higher cost in terms of time, effort and 
money (among other things)  
(Source: Adapted from Persaud, 2010:633-637) 
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Regarding the disadvantages of face-to-face interviews, it is possible that subjects may feel 
providing responses on the spot does not allow for sufficient time to reflect on the questions asked, 
firstly; this drawback may reduce the accuracy of data gained. Secondly, interviewers require good 
social skills to stimulate the research subject’s trust and cooperation without which a face-to-face 
interview may suffer from subject mistrust and a lack of cooperation from them (Persaud, 2010). 
Thirdly, if items are not correctly administered, bias and error can be input into the study, which may 
lead to less valid, reliable data collected. Moreover, a major disadvantage of in-depth, face-to-face 
interviews are the levels of high costs in terms of committing resources, including money, time and 
effort (Persaud, 2010).  
The discussion guide used in the primary research conducted in this study was created by 
considering the primary research methodologies discussed above, namely: qualitative data 
collection techniques; the in-depth interview; the semi-structured interview; broad outline of the semi-
structured interview; the capability of probing; as well as advantages and disadvantages of face-to-
face interviews. The discussion guide can be referred to in Addendum D on page 324.  
Given the discussion of the design of the study’s interview guide in this section, the measurement 
instrument was submitted and approved by the DESC; the proof of ethical clearance can be referred 
to Addendum A on page 307. The researcher implemented the in-depth, semi-structured 
phenomenological interviews with the innovation acquisition champions identified in section 
5.4.3.1(a) from July to August 2018. The execution of the primary research, namely the fieldwork, is 
detailed in the following section.  
(g)   Fieldwork 
The actual collection of data was undertaken by means of a measurement instrument to analyse 
data for results and conclusions to be drawn (Zikmund & Babin, 2010). In this study, a single 
researcher undertook the fieldwork. All the approximately hour-long face-to-face interviews were 
audio-recorded on a portable mobile device. Although these recordings were transcribed verbatim 
by the researcher for the purposes of data analysis, they have not been made available to this study 
in the addenda as these transcriptions compromise the anonymity extended to the research 
subjects. Thus, those relevant quotations which do not explicitly or implicitly identify participants, 
their colleagues or organisations have been extracted and quoted to add depth to the cross-case 
thematic findings of the study.  
Given the discussion of data collection methodology of the third stage of case study methodology in 
this section, the study utilised in-depth phenomenological, semi-structured interviewing as this was 
deemed to be the most suitable inquiry method for the exploratory case study (King & Horrocks, 
2010). The analysis of the qualitative data that emerged from the fieldwork is dealt with in the next 
section.  
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5.4.12 Data analysis  
Regarding data analysis in case study methodology, there are two broad options available for the 
research: within-case and cross-case. As the study comprised of three cases, cross-case analysis 
was undertaken by interpreting the resultant data of the primary research, which consisted of 
transcribed verbatim answers of the interviewees. The researcher then drew out and described key 
findings found, particularly with a view to uncovering phenomena, which was the main aim of this 
phenomenological study (Collis & Hussey, 2014). Qualitative data collection often culminates in 
large, complex texts that are the direct result of focus groups and interviews (Tong, Sainsbury & 
Craig, 2007) as well as written documents and field notes (Ritchie & Spencer, 2002:176). Qualitative 
data analysis – more specifically, interpretative phenomenological analysis – was assumed to 
identify key findings within the distinctive cases and themes across the interviews, which were written 
up and summarised in the next chapter, which focuses on findings. The interpretation of the verbatim 
data took place by means of coding, which is recognised as the most utilised point of departure in 
analysing qualitative data (Bryman & Bell, 2003:435). More specifically, interpretative 
phenomenological analysis (IPA) took place.  
5.4.12.1 Qualitative data analysis  
Prior to the data analysis stage, Miles and Huberman (1994) put forth that the initial stage comprises 
a full read-through of all the texts (Miles & Huberman, 1994); while examining the verbatim 
transcriptions of the interviews, the researcher noted her early thinking about the research questions 
and the possible strategies she might have employed in coding the raw data to arrive at key findings 
(Miles & Huberman, 1994). Furthermore, the qualitative data analysis process consisting of four 
stages developed by Bryman (2012:576-577) was used to frame the analysis of the raw, transcribed 
text and was undertaken as follows:  
1. Stage one: Read over initial array of transcripts, field notes and any other relevant 
documents.  
2. Stage two: Read over it once again.  
3. Stage three: Code the raw text.  
4. Stage four: Relate general theoretical ideas to the codes and text.  
These stages are also presented in Bryman and Bell (2003:435-436). Firstly, the text in its entirety 
was read over by the researcher, which was necessary to gain a general understanding of the broad 
subject matter and discover findings (Bryman & Bell, 2003:435; Gibbs, 2011a). The value of fully 
reading through all raw data is consistent with the argument of Miles and Huberman (1994). At the 
culmination of this stage, the researchers are advised to make note of those general areas of interest 
that strike them as significant, relevant and prominent (Bryman, 2012:576; Gibbs, 2011a), which was 
undertaken by the researcher of the current study.  
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
  
175 
    
   
Secondly, the researcher returned to the original raw data once again and reviewed it in a scrutinising 
and detailed manner by marking the text with highlighting, underlining and circling (Gibbs, 2011a). 
This manner was demonstrated by the researcher making as many relevant notes as possible in the 
raw text’s margins insofar as these notes regarded the important remarks made by research subjects 
and observations made by the interviewer on the former’s behaviours during the interviews (Bryman 
& Bell, 2003:435-436). Bryman (2012:576-577) puts forth that these early notes may be very basic 
in nature, such as identifying prominent and often occurring keywords, which together make up an 
index of terms that assist in interpreting and theorising based on the data; this is known as coding.  
5.4.12.2 Coding 
According to Gibbs (2011a), coding is the identification of ideas, concepts and themes within the raw 
text and naming them clearly so as to represent the finding or phenomenon. Analysing the data by 
means of coding, which is one key mechanism of analysing the qualitative data (Bryman, 2012:577), 
was undertaken in the study by determining the categories, relationships and assumptions that 
contributed to the research subjects’ worldviews (Basit, 2003). As a result, the raw data was 
transformed into meaningful parts by coding key findings in a systematic and scrutinising way and 
presenting verbatim quotations from the interviews in the findings chapter (Basit, 2003).  
The third stage of qualitative data analysis is one in which Bryman (2012:577) enjoins that the codes 
should be reviewed to avoid the following coding pitfalls: having redundant phrases or words 
describing phenomena, in which case codes are consolidated; having codes that already exist in the 
secondary research, in which case existing codes or keywords are used; and, lastly, not noticing 
connections that exist between the codes, which perhaps represent associations or causation 
factors, in which case these should be categorised and sub-categorised accordingly. With the 
knowledge of these common pitfalls, the researcher consciously avoided them in her coding of the 
raw data. Gibbs (2011a) regards this as the systematic coding of the raw text and calls for awareness 
of the potential connections, which are to be grouped together. Moreover, qualitative researchers 
may find that this stage culminates in a plethora of codes but these can be reduced in number at the 
later stage (Gibbs, 2011a).  
The last stage entailed linking the general theoretical ideas gained throughout the coding process 
with the data and codes (Bryman, 2012:577). At this juncture, the researcher generated some broad 
theoretical ideas that had been interpreted from the data and attempted to ascertain connections 
linking concepts, findings and categories the research developed. Coding was undertaken in the 
systematic manner and process as outlined in this section with the aim of uncovering key findings, 
especially thematic findings across the cases.   
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5.4.12.3 Thematic coding  
Gibbs (2011b) advocates for thematic coding as researchers are essentially searching for central 
themes through the review of the raw primary data, which become thematic codes and require 
thematic analysis. There are a number of types of thematic analysis: grounded theory; interpretative 
phenomenological analysis; template analysis; framework analysis; analytic induction; and theory-
led thematic analysis (O’Neil & Koekemoer, 2016). As the research approach of this study is 
phenomenological, the researcher utilised this appropriate form of thematic analysis. The 
phenomenological analysis undertaken comprised of listing and classifying the important responses 
recording during the in-depth interviews and interpreting the meanings of statements. This allowed 
the researcher to ascertain the ‘essences’ of the phenomena (Creswell, 1998:52; Dahlberg, 2006:11; 
Patton, 2002:363). Moreover, the identified phenomena were linked back to the research questions, 
which framed the study (Creswell, 1998; Patton, 2002) in the findings chapter.  
5.4.12.4 Interpretative phenomenological analysis  
Moreover, according to Gibbs (2011b), interpretative phenomenological analysis is a coding 
approach that encompasses characteristics of other methods, particularly owing to the iterative 
approach it takes. IPA is a type of qualitative analysis that seeks to explore, understand and interpret 
the meanings of subjects’ experiences, state of mind and their worldviews or perspectives (Smith & 
Osborn, 2004), known in phenomenology as their ‘essences’ (Creswell, 1998:52; Dahlberg, 2006:11; 
Patton, 2002:363), which has been discussed above and in section 5.4.2.5 of this chapter. This type 
of analysis also required the researcher to conduct interpretative work in an effort to make sense of 
the words, stories and events which the interviewees had related to her. IPA is also significantly 
influenced by phenomenology and, thus, the term interpretative phenomenological analysis is 
appropriately descriptive of this type of analysis, as it encompasses both interpretation and 
phenomenology (Smith & Osborn, 2004). 
In terms of the IPA conducted in the primary research of this study, the analysis started by 
interrogating case studies in detail, in order to submit intimate portrayals of personal experiences 
within each case (Smith & Osborn, 2007). In line with the norm of research subjects usually 
numbering between five and ten (Smith, 2004), the current study had a sample size of five 
interviewees. According to Smith and Osborn (2004), IPA is also consistent with the use of purposive 
sampling (Cavaye, 1996; Creswell, 1998:118; Perry, 1998), which was employed in this study, as 
discussed in section 5.4.3.1. Moreover, IPA researchers are interested in cognitive and emotional 
elements of the phenomena under exploration, which is to say they are concerned with uncovering 
what research subjects think and feel about the experiences they relate (Smith & Osborn, 2004). In 
addition, IPA researchers collect data through the vehicle of the semi-structured interview, which 
has been designed for the study (see Addendum D) is discussed in section 5.4.3.3, and which is 
audio recorded and transcribed verbatim (Smith & Osborn, 2004). Furthermore, IPA is an apposite 
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type of analysis in studies where the research problem is novel or suffers from a lack of prior 
investigation, where the issues explored are either complex or ambiguous and in which the 
overarching themes of process and change are under consideration (Smith & Osborn, 2004). Due 
to the aforementioned factors, IPA was considered a relevant form of data analysis to the current 
study and the researcher utilised IPA to conduct the analysis, which is further discussed in the 
following section.  
5.4.12.5 Analysing the data using interpretative phenomenological analysis  
This section discusses the systematic approach which IPA requires in its data analysis and which 
the researcher of this study implemented, in accordance with Smith and Osborn (2004). The 
researcher searched through the first of the interview transcripts and identified findings that arose in 
it. Thereafter, the researcher forged connections, which led to the isolation of superordinate findings 
for the first case. Once the initial case had been analysed, the researcher moved on to the second 
and third, and repeated the above IPA analysis strategy until all three cases had been systematically 
searched through. At this juncture, the researcher then sought patterns between the cases with the 
goal of finding master themes across the Egypt, Greece and Rome case studies, which are 
presented with quoted examples of each theme to support it (Smith & Osborn, 2004). Thus, the data 
analysis employed in the case study primary research design assisted the researcher in arriving at 
key thematic findings across the cases. 
5.4.12.6 Writing the cross-case study findings 
Proceeding the IPA of the data, which eventuated in key findings within each case and thematic 
findings across the cases, these findings were written up in the sixth chapter. As this study followed 
the interpretivist paradigm, quoting from the raw, transcribed data extensively is significant (Collis & 
Hussey, 2014). In the findings chapter, comparisons across the cases were drawn and alluded to 
with a view to identifying common phenomena across the cases (Collis & Hussey, 2014). In terms 
of employing the interpretative phenomenological analysis approach, once the researcher has 
presented the themes found across the case studies, she proceeded to convert the list of themes 
into a consolidated narrative account by introducing the topic and theme in turn (Smith & Osborn, 
2004). In this account, themes were described as well as supported with verbatim extracts taken 
from the transcribed interviews with research subjects; in this manner, participants were given a 
voice or presence in the written-up sixth chapter of the thesis (Smith & Osborn, 2004).  
5.4.13 Ethical considerations of the study  
In all research studies necessitating direct interaction with natural persons, conducting primary 
research ethically is important to add to protecting the dignity, safety, rights and well-being of actual 
and potential participants in economic, social, behavioural and educational research undertaken 
(Human Research (Humanities) Ethics, 2018). As this study did not solely involve the consultation 
of secondary data in a literature review format, primary research was undertaken in the manner and 
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methods described in this chapter, in which the participation of respondents was made necessary 
by interviews (DESC, 2012).  
The Departmental Ethics Screening Committee (DESC) of Stellenbosch University has outlined a 
process by which university-affiliated studies are required to adhere. The procedure determines the 
level of risk associated with the research methods employed. Studies categorised as medium or high 
ethical risk undergo further screening before gaining ethical approval. To mitigate ethical risk, 
clarifications or small modifications may be necessitated for approval (DESC, 2012). Studies that 
are judged to be of minimal or low risk, ethical clearance is granted early on. Notwithstanding, these 
studies are restricted to the following only: studies merely undertaking secondary research analysis; 
those including market research surveys with uncontentious subject matter; uncontroversial 
research foci and objectives; and studies only involving mature, adult participants, to protect 
vulnerable youths (DESC, 2012).  
As the current research study required research subjects to reveal their identities to the researcher 
and her supervisors for the purposes of informed consent to the study but not to publish or allude to 
their identities in publicly available publications, this study was considered of low risk. The researcher 
also informed the participants in the study that they may stop participating in the study at any time. 
The ethical clearance of the thesis can be referred to in Addendum A on page 307; the ethics 
reference number of this study is ONB-2018-6702. Given the ethical considerations of the study 
discussed in this section, the following section deals with researcher bias.  
5.4.14 Researcher bias   
In qualitative studies, researcher bias is ever-present (Creswell, 2016). Bias can be defined as any 
inclination that prevents unprejudiced deliberation of a question and can transpire in any research 
phase, including research design, the collection of data, the analysis of the data and writing the 
findings (Pannucci & Wilkins, 2010). Researcher bias arises when a researcher’s personal biases or 
the assumptions they regard as self-evident, which they are unable to set aside, are transferred into 
the research by means of their interaction with research subjects, tarnishing study procedures or 
vitiating the techniques used for collecting data (Onwuegbuzie & Leech, 2007).  
The nature of qualitative analysis recognises that the researcher, often without meaning to, 
insinuates their personal beliefs, identity, values and attitudes into the research process (Staller, 
2010). Yet, the current study attempted to moderate such a bias through framing the study by 
undertaking secondary research from a range of sources, the resulting findings of which were 
synthesised. Furthermore, the study’s literature review made a significant contribution to the study 
insofar as it became integral to forming the measurement instrument, broadly due to the research 
design that was characterised by qualitative inquiry. In contrast, quantitative studies usually test a 
model or hypothesis, which is generally known from the inception of the research, whereas 
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qualitative studies are largely composed of original or emerging designs of primary research 
techniques. Therefore, by utilising a broad frame of reference, researcher bias was moderated 
(Creswell, 2016).  
A flawed research design is one source of researcher bias (Pannucci & Wilkins, 2010). According to 
Smith and Noble (2014), selecting a research design appropriate to meet the aims of the study as 
well as articulating the rationale behind the methodology chosen can reduce researcher bias. As 
primary research studies characterised by exploratory, qualitative research designs are emergent 
and should thus be argued for and justified by the researcher (Collis & Hussey, 2014); the 
appropriateness and reasoning behind the emergent primary research methodology undertaken in 
this study was articulated and argued for in section 5.4.2. In addition, ethics committees, such as the 
DESC, play an important role in their consideration of the appropriateness of the proposed research 
design as well as methodological approaches in addressing the research question being explored 
(Smith & Noble, 2014). As this study has been submitted to the DESC for ethical approval, which 
has been granted (see Addendum A on page 307), this role has been fulfilled; that is to say, the 
research design of the study has been deemed appropriate and able to culminate in answers to the 
research questions it posed. The justification of the research methodological approaches taken in 
this study has been undertaken with a view to motivating the research design and ensuring that it is 
devised in such a way as to gain valuable, real insights from the lived experiences of the research 
subjects.  
In qualitative studies which are not confirmatory – such as exploratory studies that might be 
considered precursors to studies of a confirmatory nature (Sasaki, 2000) – researchers structure 
their interviews with open-ended questions that seek to reveal expansively the worldviews, 
phenomena and perspectives of research subjects (Chenail, 2011; Qu & Dumay, 2011). Bias 
management is a critical challenge for qualitative researchers who utilise interviewing as a data 
collection technique, which can be addressed with a pilot study (Chenail, 2011). Such a pilot is a 
means of testing a specific research instrument before employing it more widely (Baker, 1994). 
Furthermore, it is advantageous in that it provides the investigator with sufficient prior warning of 
potential weaknesses in the research instrument or protocol, such as where it may be difficult to 
follow, inappropriate or overly complicated (van Teijlingen & Hundley, 2001). The data collected in 
the pilot studies are typically excluded from the data analysis of the main study (Chenail, 2011).  
In this study, one pilot interview was undertaken with an anonymous research subject who 
acquiesced to be interviewed in late June 2019; this research subject was a project manager 
operating in the innovation milieu. It was during this interview that the researcher had the opportunity 
to test the measurement instrument, the semi-structured interview guide (see Addendum D on page 
324). The interview lasted just over an hour and the interviewer had the opportunity to test the semi-
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structured guide. In this interview, the researcher focussed on covering the significant thematic items 
in the interview guide, building rapport with the interviewee and probing for the relevant, sought after 
information. Thus, this interview provided the researcher the opportunity to conduct the interview, 
with which she was satisfied and considered ready to deploy in the main part of the research, namely 
the conducting of interviews with the sample of research subjects. As the interview progressed, the 
investigator realised that while the research subject had experience and knowledge of integrating 
small innovation acquisitions at the team level post-acquisition, he had very little (if any) direct 
experience and knowledge of the management and leadership thereof. In addition to this interview 
being undertaken as a pilot study for the research, which is typically excluded from the data analysis 
(Chenail, 2011), this research subject did not fully meet the criteria for being considered in this study; 
as such, the collected data was excluded from the main part of the study and was not analysed.  
5.5 CONCLUSION 
The current chapter considered the study’s research methodology, which explored whether and 
which managerial and/or leadership challenges exist that are posed by the integration of small 
innovation acquisitions at the team. The research design specifically addressed this research 
purpose, which was deployed to serve the identified knowledge gap. Moreover, an exploratory cross-
case study was assumed by means of qualitative, in-depth, semi-structured interviews to create a 
cross-case report. Phenomena were searched for within the primary raw data – verbatim 
transcriptions of the interviews – by means of data analysis using manual thematic interpretation.  
In the following chapter, the cross-case study findings are presented, which emerged from the data 
analysis methodology discussed. The structure of the cross-case study assumed a three-part 
configuration. Firstly, the cases are presented by considering the preliminary investigations 
undertaken as well as offering descriptions of the roles and titles of each research subject, innovation 
acquisition champions, are presented. Secondly, a summary of key findings within each case, 
particularly phenomena, of the in-depth, semi-structured interviews are presented according to the 
IPA discussed in the final two stages of the exploratory cross-case study methodology. Specifically, 
as the current study followed the interpretivist paradigm, extensive quoting from the primary verbatim 
interview findings was undertaken to add depth to the qualitative findings (Collis & Hussey, 2014). 
Thereafter, the findings that occurred across two or more cases are identified and discussed as the 
study’s key themes.   
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The study had the aim to explore managerial and/or leadership considerations posed by the 
integration of small innovation acquisitions (with more than one individual) at the team level. In order 
to arrive at relevant findings pertaining to the research problem, secondary research was proceeded 
by undertaking primary qualitative research. The primary research methodology was detailed and 
justified in the previous chapter and culminated in an exploratory cross-case study arrived at by 
means of a series of qualitative, in-depth, semi-structured interviews, which were transcribed 
verbatim and underwent interpretative phenomenological analysis by the researcher to uncover key 
thematic findings across the Egypt, Greece and Rome cases.  
Thus, this chapter presents the case studies and the key findings uncovered through the primary 
research conducted. The outline of the findings chapter is as follows: firstly, the three cases are 
introduced and described; secondly, the key findings are presented and discussed for each case; 
thirdly, the common and idiosyncratic thematic findings across two cases or more are isolated and 
detailed; and the chapter culminates in final remarks. 
6.2 CASE STUDIES 
The primary research included three ventures, all of which enjoy full confidentiality in the study. 
Therefore, as previously mentioned in the research methodology chapter, the cases will be referred 
to as “Egypt”, “Greece” and “Rome”. To protect the acquiring organisations’ identities, they are 
anonymously referred to as “Nile”, “Ilissos” and “Tiber”; in addition, the small innovation acquisitions 
of the study are respectively referred to as “Sphinx”, “Agora” and “Pantheon”. The anonymity of the 
research subjects’ and the stakeholders they have mentioned in the interviews have also been 
extended full anonymity by means of referring to them by pseudonyms as well. Thus, this section 
introduces and describes the Egypt, Greece and Rome case studies and discusses relevant 
components thereof by means of sub-sections per case that separately deal with and describe the 
following: pseudonyms used to refer to anonymous stakeholders and entities; background 
information regarding the acquirer; background information regarding the acquired; titles and job 
descriptions of the innovation acquisition champion; and a discussion surrounding the integration 
itself.  
6.2.1 Egypt case  
The first case for consideration in this study is referred to anonymously in this study as the Egypt 
case. As there are many stakeholders and entities of relevance to the first case study, they are all 
collectively encompassed under the Egypt case title, for ease of reference; the pseudonyms used to 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
  
182 
    
   
refer to these various entities and stakeholders are dealt with in the following section. Thereafter 
background information is presented on Nile and Sphinx, as well as a discussion of the title and job 
description of Ptah; the section closes in a discussion of the Nile-Sphinx integration.  
6.2.1.1 Egypt case pseudonyms  
While the legal entities and natural person stakeholders in the Egypt case have been respectively 
presented in Table 5.6 and Table 5.7 and discussed, the relevant pseudonyms are briefly detailed 
in this section. The Egypt case includes the partial acquirer, Nile, and the partially acquired 
organisation, Sphinx. The innovation acquisition champion is known as Ptah. His colleagues are 
indirect stakeholders of the Nile Sphinx initiative; they are the managing director of Nile, Amun, and 
the commercialisation manager, Osiris. The co-founder and other team members (direct 
stakeholders) of the Sphinx organisation are Isis, Nun, Hathor and Tawaret. Given the discussion of 
entities as well as the direct and indirect stakeholders of the Sphinx initiative, the organisation which 
acquired a 15 per cent stake in Sphinx will be introduced in the next section.  
6.2.1.2 Background information regarding Nile 
Nile is a market-orientated technology incubator which provides tailored support to the highly-skilled 
organisations in which it holds stakes throughout their development journeys, from the conceptual 
early stages to the market launch. In exchange for providing services it offers as an incubator, Nile 
requires an equity stake in return. The size of the equity stake (percentage) is agreed upon by the 
innovators and incubator management. This section serves to provide background information of the 
Nile organisation, including: the Nile organisational model and incubation process; the team 
development that takes place during this process; the entrepreneur complement programme it uses 
for best results; and the mentorship component it offers to incubated organisations.  
(a) The Nile organisational model and incubation process   
Nile has an incubation process that consists of five phases. Firstly, there is the internal funding 
phase. This entails signing the organisation on, preparing it for funding, undertaking due diligence 
and securing early fundraising, which entails presenting its incubated innovator(s) to the Nile 
fundraising committee. If the committee approves, Nile provides the organisation with seed funding 
of over half a million Rands. 
The second phase is external funding. Amun describes this phase as the “genesis” of the 
organisation and the partnership of Nile and the incubated organisation, which can be understood in 
other words as the inception of this partnership. According to Amun, this stage often entails 
establishing organisations around the technological value offering the innovator has conceptualised 
or invented. Establishing an organisation around the innovator encompasses ensuring that the 
technology is appropriately ready so that further development within Nile can lead to a market-ready 
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technology, even with limited funding. Regarding the phase in which Nile requires and takes an 
equity stake in its incubated organisations, Amun says the following: 
“Typically, we won't take equity in the [external funding] stage, we will go to them 
after [external funding] and say, 'Right, if you want us to help you further, we're going 
to take an equity stake.'” 
Thus, at the conclusion of the external funding stage, Nile has a discussion with the organisations it 
is assisting and stipulates that it will require an equity stake, which is typically between 15 per cent 
and 25 per cent to continue the organisational relationship. Moreover, the second phase prepares 
the incubated organisation for the subsequent round of funding, which is essentially the third phase 
of the Nile process. Securing additional funding signifies the inception of the technology development 
phase.  
The main objective of the third phase, technology development, is to begin forming an organisation 
that is commercial and market-orientated by reducing the technology risk through product 
development and consumer validation. At the end of this phase, the incubated organisations emerge 
with a validated value offering, which Amun refers to as “a commercially relevant product”. The final 
phase of the Nile process involves launching the product in a test market first, which entails phase 
four, and, subsequently, a foreign market, which is phase five.  
According to Ptah, the length of this phased process “depends on what stage [the organisations to 
be incubated] come in at and it also depends on the industry or the device itself.” In other words, the 
amount of time that it takes an organisation incubated by Nile to get to market is contingent on its 
maturity, industry and the value offering. Ptah says, “So, it just varies. There's six months all the way 
through to five years.” Therefore, the process detailed above varies in length by organisation but 
should be complete in a minimum of half a year and a maximum of five years. Given this discussion 
of the Nile process and its length, the dynamic approach Nile takes towards its integrations with 
incubated organisations is discussed below.  
(b) The dynamic Nile integration process  
The integration process of Nile deviates from that described in the literature, which explicates the 
integration process post-acquisition as a highly structured and formulaic process and which has 
been detailed, described and discussed in the literature review in the third chapter of this study 
(Birkinshaw et al., 2000:395-396; Galpin & Herndon, 2007:77; Gomes et al., 2013:14-28; 
Haspeslagh & Jemison, 1991:122-135; von Krogh, 2016:307-308; Wuebben, 2007:39-51). Thus, the 
primary research of this study has found the Nile integration process more dynamic in nature than 
the more structured processes found in the secondary research. This is evident in the Egypt case, 
as integration of the organisation into the equity stake acquirer commences prior to Nile taking an 
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equity stake, whereas the literature describes the integration process as taking place after the 
acquisition has been contractually finalised (Wuebben, 2007).  
Amun provides context to this dynamism by acknowledging that Nile has learned hard lessons from 
its past experiences of acquiring equity stakes in small organisations where Nile’s workforce has not 
worked well with the people of these organisations. He details this in the statement below: 
“We've been around the block a few times so we realise that there is no point in 
getting involved in businesses where we can't work with people. We have been down 
that road, we have burned our fingers... It's unpleasant.” 
In this statement, it is clear that Nile does not acquire equity stakes in organisations unless the Nile 
employees are familiar with the organisation’s people. To ensure that Nile can gain a level of 
familiarity with the human resources of its incubated organisations before it considers taking an 
equity stake in these organisations, it does the following, according to Amun: 
“Look, we don't take equity stakes in our businesses straight up front. We work with 
them for a while. Typically, we ensure that we integrate with them – we know we can 
work with them, we build a relationship.” 
In the above statement, Amun details how Nile builds on its relationship with the incubated 
organisations during incubation but before taking an equity stake. It is clear that the incubator uses 
the time during the first two phases of the Nile process, namely the internal and external funding 
phases, to work with the people of the organisation. By working closely with them during the first two 
phases, Amun says that a relationship is built between the parties, which allows Nile employees to 
know whether or not they can productively align with the organisation’s employees. Furthermore, 
Amun states, “we ensure that we integrate with them”; in this statement, it is clear that working 
closely with the organisation for the duration of the initial Nile process phases allows for a level of 
integration to occur prior to taking an equity stake in the organisation. Thus, integration between Nile 
and its incubated organisations takes place in relationship-building prior to the equity stake being 
taken and the integration continues in the technology development phases during which the parties 
work together to develop commercialisable value offerings.  
The dynamism that is present in the Nile integration process insofar as it deviates from the more 
formulaic process found in the literature has been detailed in this section in the description of Nile’s 
alternative approach to its equity stake acquisitions, in which it integrates incubated organisations 
before taking a 15 per cent stake in the organisation, which is preceded by the technology 
development phase in which product development takes place. In the following section, the team 
development process and approach that Nile assumes, which takes place after external funding has 
been secured and Nile has taken an equity stake in the organisation, is discussed. 
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(c) Team development  
Amun asserts that single innovators are usually referred to Nile or approach the incubator of their 
own volition. He stresses that the majority of these individuals are technically skilled and driven and 
have little to no interest in becoming an entrepreneur. Thus, once enough funding has been secured 
during the first two phases of the process discussed above, Nile says, “Okay, let’s go and build 
ourselves a team,” according to Amun. It is at this stage when Nile assumes the challenge of 
sourcing and hiring suitable professionals to make up the team around the innovator. It is salient to 
note that the team building Amun is referring to here regards peopling tis group with the relevant 
individuals and skill-sets, which is different from the concept of team-building discussed in section 
2.3.5.2a.  
Amun emphasises the importance of building these teams of the right skilled people on board, as he 
says, “The competitive advantage that you build is within your team so you need to build that team. 
So, that team becomes a techie team.” In other words, Nile views technically skilled teams as critical 
foundations for building an organisation’s strategic advantage that can allow it to compete in the 
market. At first, this team is focused on developing the product to make it market ready; however, 
Nile also saw the need for adding a person to the team that has a commercial focus and possesses 
a broad skill-set across organisational functions. For this reason, Nile created an entrepreneur 
complement programme, which is detailed in the following section.  
(d) Entrepreneur complement  
As Nile saw a need for adding an entrepreneur to the team, the incubator has recently started an 
internship programme for experienced and entrepreneurially-oriented individuals with broad skill-
sets to become team members. The value of these entrepreneurs is in their ability to complement 
the technical skills already present in the team. According to Amun, these individuals should apply 
a strategic mindset to the organisation, which will enable them to see the areas and functions which 
a given organisation is lacking in and work to support those functions. Nile is currently developing 
an entrepreneur-complement candidate pool, which it can draw on for future organisations. In 
addition to the entrepreneur complement programme, Amun also emphasises the importance of a 
mentor to counsel and advise incubated innovators and their team members.  
(d)  Mentor  
Amun is currently championing a mentorship programme for incubated innovators to be counselled 
and advised by mentors who have industry experience as well as a moderate degree of 
entrepreneurial experience and understanding. Therefore, recently, Nile is increasingly introducing 
a mentor to the team, especially to the innovator, as early on in the Nile process as is possible. In 
the few cases in which this individual has been present, it has been successful; however, Nile does 
not currently have a standardised process in place that matches every innovator or leader in the 
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incubator with a mentor, although this is the vision for the programme. A factor that restrains the 
maturity of the mentorship programme is that while many people have availed themselves to Nile to 
be mentors, Amun does not feel that there are many he would formally present to his organisations 
as he finds the candidates lacking. Given the above description of the role the mentor plays in the 
Nile ecosystem, the following subsection presents background information on the Sphinx 
organisation.  
6.2.1.3 Background information regarding Sphinx 
Sphinx is a medical innovation start-up that has been operating since 2014. However, the 
organisation is still pre-market as it has not yet received enough funding to go forward with a robust 
product development process, which would constitute the technology development phase of the Nile 
process. Thus, Sphinx is currently in the second phase of the Nile process.   
6.2.1.4 Title and job description of Ptah 
Ptah works as a project and commercialisation manager at Nile. He describes the role as “to make 
sure that as they're developing – whatever it is that they need – we’re developing it towards a goal 
and making sure that... you don't deviate too much – that you can always bring it back to that goal.” 
He describes his role as ensuring that his team members are constantly keeping the end goal of the 
venture in mind and acting in the best interests of achieving it. Moreover, Ptah goes on to say, “It's 
keeping them on track but also sometimes there are a lot of resources gaps. So, I try to support them 
in that when I can.” He manages the ventures he works with in a supportive capacity.  
Amun similarly describes Ptah’s role as essentially being Sphinx’s “commercial support”, which 
refers to Ptah’s role in getting Sphinx to market by taking them through the stages of the Nile process. 
Amun also alludes to the significant involvement Ptah has with the Sphinx initiative, emphasising the 
“in” in the following statement, “He’s… he’s in that dynamic.” Thus, Ptah is intimately involved with 
the Sphinx innovation initiative and has project management responsibilities in the Egypt case.  
6.2.1.5 Nile-Sphinx integration   
When asked about the background of the Nile-Sphinx case, Ptah refers to his personal involvement 
as he had joined Nile as an employee after the initial pre-acquisition conversations had taken place:  
“So, I joined Nile in Feb last year [2017]. They initialised discussions for that the year 
before [2016]. There were four people involved with that company...” 
At the time that Sphinx was being introduced into the Nile incubator, before the equity stake was 
taken, it was 2016. Once Sphinx had joined Nile officially, it was early 2017. Ptah joined the case as 
the project commercialisation manager in February 2017. At the time, Nun was the only Sphinx team 
member doing the work of the initiative full-time. Therefore, Nun was at the forefront of the 
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organisation in conjunction with Ptah for a number of months. Ptah describes this in the following 
words: 
“No, only one of them was full-time involved and she was doing all the pitching and 
that kind of thing. She is the one who was at the forefront, certainly of the 
engagement between Nile and them to get them [Sphinx] on board. “ 
Nun was driving the engagement between Nile and Sphinx as a part of her dedicated role on the 
Sphinx case while she was based in Cape Town; the other three co-founders were based in 
Johannesburg at the time. She had taken on the work of “onboarding” (slang used in Nile that refers 
to integrating team members) the other Sphinx team members to the Nile process in her liaisons 
with them. Ptah describes this and how the cooperation was undertaken during the early stages of 
incorporation: 
“She was in Cape Town. At the time, [the rest of them] were all in Jo'burg. So, they 
ran the weekly meetings and she would have to sell the [Nile] process there... So, 
she would then sell us to them and that's how the negotiation went.”  
Given that the Sphinx team’s majority were and still remain part-time contributors to the Sphinx 
initiative, the team holds weekly meetings in which the Sphinx co-founders discuss their progress. 
During early 2017, the weekly meetings largely focused on bringing the Johannesburg-based team 
members round to the Nile process. These meetings served as important times to align the four co-
founders’ views on Nile and on Ptah. As mentioned, Nun was at the forefront of driving engagement 
between Nile and Sphinx to gain alignment between all stakeholders.  
However, Nun came increasingly under pressure to finish two incomplete Master’s degrees. She 
required an income to do so and so secured a part-time job, which Ptah details in the following: 
“She was under pressure to get her Master's degrees done otherwise they roll over 
and there are cost implications… She [had]… reached the point where she said, 'I 
need to go make money.' She managed to get a part-time gig.” 
Thus, Nun left her dedicated role on the Sphinx initiative to earn an income through part-time 
employment that would support her while she completed her Master’s degrees. Ptah describes how 
her involvement with the Sphinx initiative changed after she had secured this employment in the 
following quote: 
“Then, to get cash, she did a part-time gig as well, which took a lot of her attention 
away… and one of the other partners came down [from Johannesburg].” 
In the above, Ptah explains how Nun’s attention was diverted by her new part-time job and from the 
Sphinx initiative. As she was no longer as available to the Sphinx initiative as she once had been in 
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her dedicated, full-time role as CEO, one of the other Sphinx team members relocated from 
Johannesburg to Cape Town to take Nun’s place. Ptah details this change in the following account: 
“So, [Isis] took over the reins and the project has been running since late last year 
with [Isis] at the forefront.”  
Thus, since Nun left her full-time position as Sphinx CEO, Isis, the CTO, has been running the 
initiative from Sphinx’s side and collaborating with Ptah, the Nile project commercialisation manager. 
In terms of the organisation and product maturity of the Sphinx initiative, Ptah has the following to 
say: 
“They were sort of in a conceptual phase when we got them. Now, they're in a 
[external funding] phase [and] we're concluding that and going into a technology 
development phase.”  
Therefore, at the start of Sphinx’s interaction with Nile, the former was at an ideational stage, in 
which its value offering had not yet been developed. In other words, Sphinx was an idea stage 
organisation when it started undergoing the Nile process, beginning at the internal funding stage. At 
the time the researcher conducted the interview with Ptah, Sphinx was finishing the external funding 
phase. As previously mentioned, Nile typically takes an equity stake in its incubated organisations 
at the termination of the external funding stage before the technology development phase 
commences (please refer to section 6.2.1.2a). However, in the case of Sphinx, despite the fact that 
the external funding phase has not yet been terminated, an equity stake had already been taken by 
Nile at the time the interview was conducted.  
Thus, an equity stake in Sphinx has been taken by Nile, which Ptah details in the following statement: 
“The agreement [with Sphinx] was 15 per cent. If we don't secure tech dev, then 
that then drops down to a certain percentage. So, there's a claw-back mechanism 
if Nile does not perform...”  
Therefore, at the time of the interview, Nile had secured a 15 per cent equity stake in Sphinx, which 
is contractually contingent on Nile’s performance as a technology development and 
commercialisation partner. Ptah goes on to further explain, “They struggled to get funding. They 
came to us to get funding… So, the five per cent is there to stay.” From this statement, it is clear that 
the Sphinx team approached Nile for initial funding, which Nile granted them in exchange for a five 
per cent stake. As the relationship between Sphinx and Nile was built over the past two years, an 
additional agreement has been made, which is that Nile is granted a 15 per cent equity stake. 
However, in Ptah’s previous statement, he mentions that there exists a claw-back mechanism in the 
Nile-Sphinx agreement. Ptah explains the obligations of the agreement and the eventuality that may 
occur if Nile does not perform to its contractually agreed upon obligations: 
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“We've been awarded 15 [per cent]; however, that is contingent on us... on our 
getting the technology development funding... Then, we just have to make sure we 
see them through [technology development], into the market, otherwise that 15 per 
cent means nothing.” 
In other words, Ptah explains that Nile is obligated to accomplish two major goals. The first is to 
secure additional funding, which he refers to as “technology development funding”. The second is 
for Nile to “see [Sphinx] through [technology development], into the market.” As has been previously 
mentioned in section 6.2.1.2a, which serves to details the Nile process, the technology development 
phase is concerned with forming a market-orientated organisation from the initiative. This 
encompasses removing the technology risk by means of undertaking product development. Once 
the value offering has been developed, it undergoes consumer validation. The end of stage three, 
technology development, is reached when incubated organisations emerge with a validated value 
offering. As has also been previously mentioned in section 6.2.1.2a, the final phases of the Nile 
process are test market launch and global launch.  
Thus, it is the obligation of Nile to assist Sphinx through commercial support and project 
management to develop their medical innovation, validate the device with consumers, launch the 
technology in a test market – such as South Africa – and, finally, launch the innovation on a global 
scale. If Nile succeeds in these steps, it retains its 15 per cent equity stake in Sphinx; if, however, it 
does not succeed in completing these steps, its equity stake is reduced by 10 per cent and reverts 
back to the initial agreement of five per cent, which was given in exchange for initial funding.  
At the time of the interview, which took place in August 2018, Ptah says, “we're concluding [the 
external funding phase] and going into a technology development phase.” In other words, Ptah has 
explained that Sphinx will likely commence with product development in late 2018 or perhaps 2019; 
however, the future of the Nile-Sphinx initiative lies beyond the parameters this study considers. In 
conclusion, section 6.2.1 has dealt with introducing the relevant pseudonyms to the Egypt case, 
providing background information regarding Nile and Sphinx, identifying the title and describing of 
Ptah and, finally, a discussion of the Nile-Sphinx integration.  
6.2.2 Greece case 
The Greece case, for the purposes of this study, refers to the entire case regarding the integration 
of a small innovation acquisition at the team level as well as all the various stakeholders that are 
involved in this case, the second of the study. For ease of reference, the pseudonyms used to refer 
to these various entities and stakeholders are dealt with in the following section. Thereafter, 
background information is presented on Ilissos and Agora, as well as a discussion of the title and 
job description of Apollo; thereafter, the section closes in a discussion of the Ilissos-Agora 
integration.  
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6.2.2.1 Greece case pseudonyms  
While the legal entities and natural person stakeholders in the Greece case have been respectively 
presented in Table 5.6 and Table 5.7 and discussed, the relevant pseudonyms are briefly detailed 
in this section. The Greece case includes the business incubator, Ilissos, and the organisation, 
Agora. The innovation acquisition champion and coach is known as Apollo and the project’s head 
strategist is Hera; an indirect stakeholder of the Ilissos-Agora initiative is Demeter, who is also an 
Ilissos coach and provided the researcher and the study a preliminary interview. The co-founders of 
the Agora organisation are Athena and Hecate. Given the discussion of entities as well as the direct 
and indirect stakeholders of the Agora initiative, the following section provides background 
information on the Ilissos incubator.  
6.2.2.2 Background information regarding Ilissos 
Ilissos was an incubator that focused on crafting a supportive process and ecosystem in which young 
entrepreneurs can develop personally and professionally with a view to accelerating their business 
ideas to profitable businesses.  
(a) The Ilissos incubation and integration process  
Regarding the incubation and integration process, Ilissos did not have a formally mapped process 
to guide its interactions with their incubated organisations. Rather, the organisation opted to first hold 
an eight-week full-time training course free of charge to entrepreneurs whom Ilissos deemed to have 
potentially profitable ideas. The training was provided with a view to interview promising candidates 
at the end of the course. It was during the training course that the integration between the 
entrepreneurs and Ilissos began, despite no acquisition having yet taken place; as such, the Ilissos 
integration process might be considered dynamic in nature. This is further discussed in section 
6.2.2.2b.  
Furthermore, the post-training interviews serve as a selection process to identify entrepreneurs with 
early idea-stage start-ups to incubate. Ilissos’ training revolves around organisational principles, 
particularly lean start-up principles, and how to assume organisational planning, according to 
Demeter. In the words of Apollo, he adds the crafting of an organisational model canvas and 
generating ideas to Demeter’s list:  
“We would take them through various things – business model canvases, idea 
generation, so very early stage, idea-driven businesses is where we were focussed.” 
Thus, Ilissos offered business incubation to organisations with low maturity levels. In addition, Apollo 
mentions that the entrepreneurs also underwent personal development:  
“Then, there would be… some self-development support as well, so counselling and 
therapy.” 
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In other words, Ilissos included components of personal development in the training to support the 
entrepreneurs as well, which included having a psychologist on staff, as Demeter explained by 
saying, “We have a life coach – a therapist.” This individual’s services are made available to the 
people during the training, according to Apollo’s statement above, as well as during the incubation 
of the organisations. Apollo goes on to explain the introduction of the incubator’s counsellor to the 
entrepreneurs during the training programme: 
“Once they've been introduced to the life coach/therapist, the onus is on them if they 
want to see them more.” 
From the above statement, Apollo emphasises that it is the duty of the entrepreneur to schedule time 
with the therapist and attend sessions with her in order to conduct personal development and ensure 
that the entrepreneur is coping with the demands on themselves.  
After the training has been concluded, Ilissos’ manager and coach conduct a series of interviews 
with the entrepreneurs that have undertaken the training, which Apollo explains:  
“It [starts with] training and then there's a two week break and then we have like 
seven days’ worth of interviews and then we decide. Then, at the interview, we give 
the MOU and then it's thirty days from there.” 
Thus, these interviews are carried out with the goal of selecting organisations to incubate. 
Proceeding the interviews, Ilissos takes two weeks to determine which early-stage ideas will be 
incubated. Once the organisations have been selected, Ilissos presents the entrepreneur(s) with a 
memorandum of understanding (MOU) detailing the relationship between the Ilissos entity and the 
incubated entity, which in this case is Agora. Apollo describes the presentation of the MOU to the 
entrepreneurs as follows: 
“What happens is they come to us and then they have thirty days to sign an MOU, 
memorandum of understanding. That's kind of like the Term Sheet...” 
The MOU outlines the rights and responsibilities of the stakeholders and entities involved in the 
agreement and details the acquired equity stake. In exchange for incubating the idea to support the 
concept’s commercialisation, Ilissos requires a 20 per cent stake in the entity, as Demeter explains: 
“With that idea, when they got into the incubator, we got 20 per cent of the company 
and we put in R150 000 value in cash into the company.” 
Therefore, the selected idea-stage organisations who are to join the incubator are given R150 000 
funding in exchange for a 20 per cent equity stake in the organisation. The organisation’s owner who 
is selected for incubation may review the MOU for a 30-day period, at the end of which the MOU is 
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either signed or not, with the consequence being an agreement as to whether the incubation is either 
accepted or not. The entrepreneur is, however, persuaded by Ilissos to gain a legal understanding 
of the document as Apollo explains: 
“…we say you should take it to a lawyer as well and, yeah, you never know who they 
seek advice from but we always encourage them to seek external advice.” 
The legal understanding which the entrepreneur is encouraged to attain is that of external legal 
counsel from a lawyer or organisation not associated with Ilissos. The signing of the MOU signifies 
the completion of the acquisition. Given the discussion of the Ilissos process, the dynamism present 
in the process is presented in the following section.  
(b) The dynamic Ilissos integration process  
Similarly to Nile, the integration process of Ilissos deviates from that found in the literature, which 
explains the PAIP as a fixed and rigid process which has been addressed in the literature review in 
the third chapter of this study (Birkinshaw et al., 2000:395-396; Galpin & Herndon, 2007:77; Gomes 
et al., 2013:14-28; Haspeslagh & Jemison, 1991:122-135; von Krogh, 2016:307-308; Wuebben, 
2007:39-51). Therefore, the primary research of this study has found the Ilissos integration process 
more dynamic in nature than the more rigid processes described in the literature. This is evident in 
the Greece case, as integration of the organisation into the equity stake acquirer commences prior 
to Ilissos taking an equity stake, whereas the literature describes the integration process as taking 
place after the acquisition has been contractually finalised (Wuebben, 2007). According to Demeter, 
Ilissos does not follow a formally standardised process. However, the dynamism in Ilissos’ 
integration approach toward their incubated organisations is present at the start of the process, 
similarly to the Egypt case.  
In the Greece case, initial integration before an equity stake is acquired takes place, as was seen in 
the Egypt case. In the current case, the two-month training that takes place allows Ilissos to transfer 
some of their knowledge and strategic thinking to the entrepreneurs over the course of the 
programme. This represents the early stages of Ilissos’ integration process as the entrepreneurs are 
orientated to the incubator during the training. This is evidenced in the account of Demeter who says 
that this training programme’s purpose was two-fold:  
“...we used to do a training for two months... just to give them the mind [for us] and, 
for us, it was almost to get to know the entrepreneur as well because if we're going 
to get them into the incubator [it's a relationship].” 
In the above statement, Demeter draws attention to the two most important aspects of the training 
in her view. Firstly, she submits that the two-month training informs and educates the entrepreneurs 
according to Ilissos’ thinking. This training revolves around organisational principles, particularly lean 
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start-up principles, and how to assume organisational planning. Secondly, Demeter puts forth that 
the training was undertaken so that Ilissos’ people would have the opportunity to become familiar 
with entrepreneurs that the organisation might potentially incubate. When asked whether the training 
programme Ilissos ran was an immersive experience for entrepreneurs after the researcher had 
learned from the interviewee that the training required dedicated, full-time attendance, Apollo agreed 
strongly and went on to explain:  
“Definitely. Especially the training was. I mean, they were here for two months every 
day. That's as immersive as it gets for an entrepreneur. Working on their own 
business but spending full days here is quite hectic...” 
From Apollo’s description of the training, it is clear that it is an immersive time for the entrepreneur 
to gain insight into Ilissos’ ways of working, which furthermore affords them a comprehensive 
consciousness of the incubator’s process after the training is concluded and once the organisation 
is set up in the incubator. By the end of the training, relationships and trust have been built and 
fostered between coaches and entrepreneurs, which, once the incubation process begins, allows 
them to conduct business with each other as familiar acquaintances rather than strangers.  
As has been discussed in section 6.2.2.2a, it is at the end of the training that the graduates of the 
programme are interviewed to determine whether or not their idea-stage organisations will be 
incubated by Ilissos. If an entrepreneur’s idea is selected for the Ilissos incubator, they are presented 
with a MOU and given thirty days in which to review and sign the agreement, as has been discussed. 
During this 30-day period, however, whether or not the MOU has been signed, certain steps towards 
further integration are taken, which Apollo explains as follows: 
“In that process, we don't sit back and wait, we start working on the business.” 
Thus, during this 30-day period in which no formal, written agreement has yet been reached and 
signed, Ilissos begins incubating the organisation. During the first meeting Hera and the coach had 
with the Agora initiative, Apollo describes the main focus of the gathering as follows:  
“We say, ‘What are the areas where you feel you guys are lacking?' And then we'll 
focus on building that. If they highlight that they don't work well together even though 
they are partners, then we'll address that.” 
Therefore, during this time, Ilissos’ approach constitutes identifying which skills are lacking in the 
entrepreneurs’ combined skill-set. Apollo further explains this in the following verbatim quote:  
“All of our businesses that we partner with, we try our best to get the entrepreneur to 
lead in terms of, 'What skills can you bring to the table? Where are you lacking? 
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Where can we start filling gaps, internally or where do we need to bring someone 
else in?'” 
Consequently, Apollo explains that by isolating what the single entrepreneur or the co-founder team 
is lacking, Ilissos’ employees focus on fulfilling the skills that are lacking, either internally or by adding 
an additional team member from an external source to Ilissos or the incubated initiative. In this way, 
the skills that complement those of the entrepreneur(s) are brought into the initiative from Ilissos’ 
side, which works towards creating a team, as Demeter says: 
“…we come in and we merge with this entrepreneur as a three-man team, which is 
pretty strong.” 
In the above statement, Demeter is referring to the incubated initiatives that arrived with only one 
entrepreneur, not a co-founder team. Nevertheless, the same approach was taken with co-founder 
teams in which there was more than one entrepreneur as Apollo says, regarding his previous quote 
above:  
“That, I would say, is our policy for starting and we follow that quite to the T.”  
In the above statement, it is clear that the approach Ilissos has to integrating the team – made up of 
the coach, the entrepreneur(s) and Hera – is informal as there is no actual written or structured policy 
and Ilissos does not alter the approach it takes when there is more than one founder. Furthermore, 
during this 30-day period in which the entrepreneur(s) have occasion to review the MOU, Ilissos 
arranges meetings in which it identifies the skills that are lacking, provides those skills to the initiative 
from an Ilissos employee and, thus, establishes a team. In terms of how the team’s progress is 
measured, Demeter explains that: 
“…with the weekly meetings, we'll say, 'Okay, you lead the meetings and you decide 
what metrics you're going to use in order to measure your progress and let's see 
how that goes’.” 
In the above, it is clear that Ilissos places most of the responsibility of the initiative’s progress on the 
entrepreneur, requesting that the entrepreneur set their own metrics to determine progress.  
Thus, the Greece case presents an integration process that is more dynamic than those described 
in the literature, all of which occur post-acquisition (Wuebben, 2007). Ilissos’ informal and uncodified 
integration process begins first with orientating the entrepreneur(s) to the incubator’s ways of 
working during an eight-week training programme. Thereafter, if the graduated entrepreneur’s idea 
is selected during the interviews, Ilissos begins integrating the initiative into a team within the 
incubator with incubator employees, namely a coach and strategic oversight in the form of Hera. 
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However, this often takes place without the innovator founder(s) having a signed agreement in the 
form of the MOU yet, which equates to the acquisition stage found in the literature (Wuebben, 2007). 
Therefore, it can be said that Ilissos’ integration process begins prior to acquisition of the equity 
stake. Given the discussion of the dynamism present in the Greece case, which is similar to that of 
the Egypt case, the following section provides some background information about Agora, the 
organisation in which a stake was acquired.  
6.2.2.3 Background information regarding Agora 
Agora was an initiative born out of the partnership of two female occupational therapists who had 
private practice experience from separate organisations; for the purposes of this study, their names 
are Athena and Hecate. They joined Ilissos with an innovative idea that centred on producing a 
product line of games that would stimulate, empower and reward children with certain neurological 
conditions. As previously mentioned, whereas Athena had undergone the two-month Ilissos training 
programme, Hecate had not.  
6.2.2.4 Title and job description of Apollo  
Apollo’s title at Ilissos is that of manager, although he feels he does not quite understand what that 
encompasses besides his role of delegating tasks to colleagues and entrepreneurs enrolled in the 
incubator, when he says:  
“My title says ‘manager’. I always laugh because I'm the manager of what? Myself 
and not even so much really, Demeter. But I kind of delegate tasks to myself sort of 
things and to the entrepreneurs [I work with].”  
Apollo further describes the team dynamic that is developed during the 30-day period when Ilissos 
begins to integrate the entrepreneur into the incubator by creating a team made up of Hera, an Ilissos 
coach and the entrepreneur(s). In the case of Agora, Apollo explains that he functioned as the coach 
as he says, “I would be the coach in that instance.” In his interactions with Athena and Hecate, Apollo 
would meet with both of them and Hera at a weekly check-in meeting as well as separately working 
with the entrepreneurs as individuals when he states: 
“Then, there would probably be – like I said – Hecate and I meeting another time. 
And then there would be me meeting with Athena to go to suppliers and stuff like 
that.” 
Besides the one-on-one interactions Apollo has with the entrepreneurs, he also explains that part of 
his managerial role is to be what he refers to as the “in-between” person who is responsible for 
interfacing between Hera, Hecate and Athena and goes on to explain this in the following words:  
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“Yes, the interface between it all. There's a lot of reflecting and I would then have 
conversations with Hera… and then I would have to relay some other information, 
some bits and pieces that I pick up here and there...” 
In the above quote, Apollo’s role of coach extends to performing interface management between the 
other key stakeholders of the initiative, namely Hera from Ilissos’ strategic management perspective 
and Athena and Hecate from the Agora incubated organisation perspective. Thus, Apollo’s role can 
be described as a manager, a coach and an interface.  
6.2.2.5 Ilissos-Agora integration   
In the research interview with the Ilissos manager and Agora coach, Apollo, he described the 
particulars of the integration and cooperation of the Greece case. He started by explaining that the 
one co-founder entrepreneur, Athena, had participated in the Ilissos training programme while the 
other, Hecate, had not, which Apollo accounts as follows: 
“One of them joined us... Athena came in and joined us. She seemed to be the driver 
of the business that they had called Agora. She went through the eight-week course 
with us.” 
In the above statement, Apollo also draws attention to the fact that Athena gave the impression that 
she was the driving force behind the Agora initiative as well as attending the Ilissos training 
programme. However, the other co-founder of the Agora initiative had not participated in the training 
programme but did become involved once the initiative was selected for incubation, as Apollo says: 
“Yes, yes, yes. We had both of them signing up for that.” 
Furthermore, Apollo recognises that Ilissos foresaw some issues prior to the integration that took 
place from the point that Hecate joined, which he explains: 
“We knew it was going to be slightly tricky because we had one signing up for the 
course and learned how we were thinking... So, one was on board with that and the 
other not so much.” 
From the above statement, it is clear that Apollo and his Ilissos colleagues realised that the training 
programme had onboarded Athena to the Ilissos ways of thinking and working whereas Hecate was 
not as familiar as she had not had the opportunity to learn the same lessons regarding the incubator’s 
modus operandi. Thus, he implies that Athena was integrated into Ilissos by the start of the 
incubation while Hecate was not integrated. He further explains this in terms of how it played out: 
“I suppose, to use an analogy... she's got a bit of FOMO [Fear of Missing Out]. Like 
one was part of this club of thinking and the other was getting bit-part, relay 
messaging sort of thing.” 
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In Apollo’s words above, he describes how Hecate felt. As she had not had the opportunity to 
participate in the training programme, she felt isolated from the way of thinking that was shared 
between Ilissos and her organisational partner, Athena, who had had opportunity to undertake the 
training programme. The result of this disparity was that the Ilissos way of thinking, which Athena 
had adopted during the training, was transferred piecemeal to her from the stakeholders of the 
Ilissos-Agora initiative. Essentially, the integration of Athena into the Ilissos’ way of thinking and the 
non-integration of Hecate led to the feeling of isolation that the latter experienced during the early 
incubation process.  
To create a team dynamic between all of the stakeholders at the very start of the initiative, Apollo 
mentions that the team consisting of himself, Hera, Athena and Hecate started to have regular 
meetings, as he says: 
“We started to have regular meetings with the both of them and then what we were 
finding is [that] they would leave and they would have another meeting without us.” 
Thus, early on in the incubation, Apollo and Hera who were working on the team from Ilissos’ side 
realised that Athena and Hecate were having private founder meetings, to which Ilissos was not 
invited. To attempt to lessen these undisclosed interactions that Athena and Hecate were having 
without Apollo and Hera, the latter pair went about trying to separate the founders by giving them 
distinctive roles. Apollo explains this as follows: 
“Well, I'd say, by trying to give them roles [we tried to address the dynamic between 
them]... trying to kind of separate them so that they didn't spend [so much time 
together].”  
Therefore, Apollo tried to define their roles more exhaustively and more clearly to all the stakeholders 
directly involved in the case. He and Hera realised that the founders had fairly comparable roles, 
which he states as follows: 
“We also tr[ied] to define [their] roles.... They were both in a way similar. They 
performed similar functions…” 
As a result of the similarity of the roles they played at the start of the incubation process, Apollo and 
Hera tried to allocate roles to them according to what the organisation needed to grow and potentially 
thrive with the additional goal of separating them by organisational function so that they would have 
fewer meetings on their own, without Ilissos representatives. Apollo details the roles he had tried to 
orientate Athena and Hecate around as follows: 
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“…we tried to get the one to focus more on finances and administration and the other 
one to focus more on client relationships and business development... Both of them 
would be involved in the ideation, creating the new product.” 
Therefore, while both co-founders of the Agora initiative would continue to play equal roles in the 
product development process of the organisation, the other organisational functions which Agora 
required were divided between the two. Firstly, Apollo mentions that one co-founder was given the 
role of performing administrative and financial duties; later, he explains that Hecate was trained in 
and held responsible for this role by Ilissos. Secondly, the other co-founder was given the role of 
client relations and organisational development, to which Apollo later added supplier relations as 
well. Therefore, the focus moved more towards training the co-founders in these roles and 
completing the relevant tasks that they would have to carry out in their new roles. Apollo states this 
but also recognises that this increased role- and task-orientation led to an unintended consequence 
in terms of the human integration: 
“From that respect, that's probably why Hera thought that we're moving forward with 
the tasks “but the people dynamic is probably the biggest stick in the wheel there, 
yeah.” 
In the above statement, Apollo admits that there was a greater task orientation at play in the early 
incubation of the Agora initiative, which was partly due to addressing the private meetings Athena 
and Hecate were having by defining more structured and task-oriented roles of them. In the 
researcher’s preliminary interview with Demeter, she mentioned that the Ilissos integration approach 
is more task-orientated than human-orientated in the following statement: 
“I think the confusion was that because we are task-based and task-driven was that 
that hampered on the human integration, I feel.”  
Thus, the approach of Ilissos towards its integration process of incubated organisations is centered 
around and driven by tasks. Demeter feels that this focus impeded the integration of the people. 
Apollo goes on to explain how this trade-off of task integration over human integration played out in 
the Agora initiative: 
“I don't think we focused enough on… team development. I think we assumed that 
focusing here and getting task-based successes would result in a strong team 
dynamic. But then things happen, an entrepreneur fails to deliver a task...” 
In this statement, it is clear that Apollo believes that there was not enough attention paid to team 
development in the Agora initiative. He continues by saying that Ilissos was under the impression 
that a task-based model would become the basis of a strong team consisting of himself, Athena, 
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Hecate and Hera. However, this was a misapprehension as this model would likely only have 
worked, according to Apollo, if the tasks undertaken were mainly successful. He goes on to say: 
 “We miss a task or something like that and then things start falling apart because 
you haven't prepped for failure from a team perspective.” 
Therefore, it is clear that Apollo feels that the task-oriented integration undertaken in this initiative 
only prepared the team for successful outcomes and did not make the team a strong and resilient 
unit to withstand failures. Due to a combination of factors, the Ilissos-Agora integration failed, as 
Apollo explains: 
“They didn't last in our incubator for long. They were with us for maybe a month. Just 
as I started to really sink my teeth into it, they decided not to [go ahead with it]. Before 
they even signed the MOU.”  
Thus, Athena had been integrated into the Ilissos ways of working and thinking during the training 
programme and Hecate had not. In addition, the task-based orientation of the integration negatively 
impacted the integration of the human element. The end result of the Ilissos-Agora initiative was that 
it did not culminate in a successful acquisition of an equity stake but in a failure of integration. Given 
the discussion of the Greece case, the third and final case of the study, the Rome case, is introduced 
and detailed in the following section.  
6.2.3 Rome case  
The third and final case for consideration in this study is referred to anonymously as the Rome case. 
As there are many stakeholders and entities in this case of relevance to the study, they are all 
collectively encompassed under the Rome case title, for ease of reference. The first subsection 
within this section deals with the pseudonyms given to the anonymous legal entities and 
stakeholders in the study. Secondly, background information is presented on Tiber and, thirdly, on 
Pantheon as well. Moreover, a discussion of the title and job description of Romulus is presented, 
which is followed by a section detailing the failed acquisition attempt of Pantheon by another 
organisation, known in the study as Colosseum. Finally, the section closes in a discussion of the 
Tiber-Pantheon integration. 
6.2.3.1 Rome case pseudonyms  
While the legal entities and natural person stakeholders in the Rome case have been respectively 
presented in Table 5.6 and Table 5.7 and discussed, the relevant pseudonyms are briefly detailed 
in this section. The Rome case includes the acquirer, Tiber, and the start-up procured by resource 
buy-out, Pantheon. The co-founder and innovation acquisition champion is known as Romulus; his 
partner and co-founder is referred to as Remus in the study. One other entity is of interest to the 
study, which is that of the failed acquirer, Colosseum. Given the discussion of entities as well as the 
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direct and indirect stakeholders of the Pantheon initiative, the following section provides background 
information on the Tiber organisation.  
6.2.3.2 Background information regarding Tiber 
Tiber is a global software development organisation that supports web developers and designers. It 
is still a relatively young organisation in that it has not yet been operating for ten years (at the time 
of thesis submission in January 2019). As this organisation is very singular and distinctive in nature, 
growing rapidly as an organisation and pioneering in its industry, no more descriptive background 
information can be offered to this study.   
6.2.3.3 Background information regarding Pantheon 
Pantheon is an online software tool that connects millions of professionals on a daily basis. It is a 
start-up that was founded by Romulus and Remus and was majority-owned and managed by 
themselves until they decided to pursue acquisition. At that stage, they first were considered for 
acquisition by Colosseum, a rival software development organisation; however, this acquisition 
proved a failure, which is discussed in section 6.2.3.5. Although the Colosseum acquisition did not 
eventuate, Pantheon was acquired by resource buy-out by another organisation, called Tiber in this 
study. As Pantheon is also a very distinctive start-up and now standalone project within Tiber, more 
information on the innovation and the organisation cannot be given without encroaching on the 
anonymity extended to research subject Romulus; therefore, the following section will not deal with 
introducing Romulus’ role in the Tiber organisation post-acquisition by resource buy-out.  
6.2.3.4 Title and job description of Romulus 
Romulus is the co-founder of Pantheon acquired by resource buy-out by Tiber. In his new position 
at Tiber, Romulus was tasked with running a brand new project with team members unknown to him, 
which he describes as follows:  
“Yes... I was kind of day one on the job not ‘jolling’ it up [at the international 
conference] but, at the keyboard, working. I was basically given a bunch of 
individuals and… told to build a product.”  
Thus, Romulus explains that his new role at Tiber was as if he had been hired as a single employee 
and he went to work with a new team to build a new software product.  
Regarding his role vis-à-vis the Pantheon software post-acquisition, Romulus first acted as an 
informal ad hoc innovation acquisition champion towards the three other human resources acquired 
by Tiber. The role was informal as the Pantheon software was acquired to run as a separate project 
that fell under the Tiber organisation’s activities. The software was mature enough to operate 
independently of human intervention, which is further discussed below in section 6.2.3.6. However, 
despite its maturity, the Pantheon software was not immune to external changes in the online 
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environment; it was in these instances of change that Romulus was ipso facto responsible for 
attending to the issue. He carried this out by assembling the Pantheon-cum-Tiber employees to 
respond to changes when they arose and the ad hoc team resolved the issue. Since then, the Tiber 
organisation has added a dedicated role to maintaining the Pantheon software over the long term. 
This dedicated human resource was one of the acquired Pantheon employees. This individual 
reports directly to Romulus, which is now an element of the latter’s current role within Tiber.  
6.2.3.5 The failed acquisition attempt of Pantheon by Colosseum   
The Pantheon start-up reached a stage in its growth where the software and product it had 
developed had plateaued and acquisition became an attractive option as a next step. It was as a 
result of this that Pantheon approached a potential acquirer, referred to as Colosseum in this study. 
Romulus describes the period of time proceeding their approach: 
“Really, we were tending for the acquisition side. We got back in touch with 
Colosseum and then we went through quite an intensive period of time. There was 
backwards and forwards.”  
Thus, to the start-up’s co-founders who were interested in Pantheon being acquired, Colosseum 
seemed interested in undertaking the acquisition, evidenced in their rigorous approach to the 
negotiation, which is described by Romulus as a back-and-forth process. At this stage, Romulus and 
Remus were hopeful and somewhat certain that the acquisition would in fact take place, as Romulus 
describes: 
“That went very far – as far as us thinking, possibly a little bit stupidly that we thought 
it had been successful. There were handshakes around board tables. It was well 
down the line.” 
Romulus gives his account of how those with the authority to do so within Colosseum led him and 
Remus to believe that the acquisition would be approved and undertaken. Colosseum’s behaviour 
was such that they shook hands with Romulus and Remus, an informal manner of reaching an 
agreement on a deal in the formal setting of one of Colosseum’s boardrooms.  
 “We were discussing visas. But there was no Term Sheet, obviously. Nothing was 
signed – it was a handshake." 
In fact, according to Romulus’ delineation, it went as far as Colosseum’s stakeholders talking about 
arranging work visas for the Pantheon’s employees with its co-founders Romulus and Remus. While 
Colosseum was giving Pantheon the impression that an acquisition was certain to take place, 
however, no contracts or documentation had been drawn up and signed by either party, including a 
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term sheet. The agreement rested on an informal handshake agreement entirely. Very shortly 
afterwards, the acquisition negotiation came to an abrupt end, in Romulus’ words:  
“So, when that did collapse... Financially, it was very late to be going out and looking 
for a Series A. We were in quite a difficult position”.  
The failure of the acquisition of Pantheon by Colosseum had put the former in an unfavourable 
financial position, which made it challenging to consider seeking a Series A, which is essentially the 
pursuit and attainment of significant equity financing from venture capitalists in the first potential 
round of funding (Tomczak & Brem, 2013). While Pantheon still had a desire to be acquired, there 
were no other offers on the table from other potential acquirers, despite Romulus and Remus having 
sent out tentative proposals to other potential acquirers. Romulus and Remus broke the news to 
their employees, as Romulus recounts: 
“When it fell through... We informed our staff, 'Look, there's this much money in the 
bank. We'll pay you for as long as we have money… If you… have to go 
out...  looking for new jobs, we won't hold that against you.’”  
Thus, once Romulus and Remus realised that the acquisition would not take place, they resolved to 
share the news with their employees. At this juncture, the co-founders transparently communicated 
that there was only a finite amount of liquid money left with which they could remunerate the 
employees. Furthermore, they encouraged their staff to take paid time out of the working day to 
secure new positions at other organisations. It was at this stage that one of the tentative proposals 
for acquisition by alternative acquirers was answered by an organisation similar to Colosseum, which 
is given the pseudonym Tiber in this study.  
6.2.3.6 Tiber-Pantheon integration  
Romulus starts explaining the Rome case with Tiber’s acquisition by resource buy-out of Pantheon. 
Due to the failed acquisition attempt of Pantheon by Colosseum, Tiber realised that it could 
successfully secure the Pantheon resources for a good price, as Romulus says: 
“They correctly assessed the situation and realised they could get Pantheon for a 
fairly good price and then we moved very quick[ly] on that."  
As Pantheon, its co-founders and employees were put in an unfavourable position by Colosseum 
not actually undertaking the acquisition, Romulus and Remus quickly acquiesced to the offer by 
Tiber, even though it was less than they had anticipated making from the deal. Nevertheless, they 
decided to go forward with the acquisition by resource buy-out and started working on the details of 
the acquisition. According to Romulus, the key details for him were reaching agreement on how the 
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Pantheon employees and technology would be handled in the acquisition, which he explains as 
follows: 
“The key thing was looking at what was going to happen with the staff – will they 
have a good place to land? And really all those kind of details – what happens to the 
technology? …That happened really quickly.” 
Thus, the negotiations around the Pantheon workforce and technology was undertaken and 
concluded fairly soon during the acquisition. Romulus states that the acquisition by resource buy-
out was the fastest route to acquisition for both entities, Pantheon and Tiber, when Romulus 
explains: 
“They basically buy out all your staff, buy out your technology but they... leave the 
company because there's a lot more risk in basically buying a company… They can 
move fairly quickly because they don't have to worry too much.” 
Therefore, Romulus suggests that a resource buy-out approach, which he defines as purchasing 
Pantheon’s human resources’ contracts by putting them on the acquirer’s payroll and purchasing the 
Pantheon software, Tiber could achieve the same objectives as an acquisition without having to fully 
undertake an acquisition.  
At the time of the acquisition, Pantheon had a personnel consisting of 11 people, as Romulus says: 
“About 11 staff, including the two co-founders.” 
However, from the 11-strong staff of Pantheon, only four employees moved over to the Tiber 
organisation by resource buy-out. Two of the Pantheon employees were marketers not offered 
positions at Tiber. The remaining five Pantheon employees decided not to remain with Pantheon 
after the acquisition and become staff members of Tiber for individual reasons, which Romulus 
explains by saying: 
“…quite a few people chose to go on and do separate things.” 
Thus, the acquisition by resource buy-out of four of the Pantheon staff members took place; among 
them were the two co-founders, Romulus and Remus, as well as two engineers. These four people 
represented the Pantheon human resources bought out by Tiber. 
Days after the acquisition by resource buy-out was decided upon with certainty, Pantheon’s bought-
out human resources were invited to an international conference of Tiber’s employees. Each 
Pantheon employee “came on as [an] employee in [Tiber]” and effectively started working as a Tiber 
staff member some days before or on the day of travelling to the conference. Romulus, for instance, 
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officially started working as a Tiber employee on the day he was set to travel to the conference by 
plane; however, this was not his first day actually working. That morning at start of business, as his 
flight was boarding, he received a phone call from the Tiber human resources department personally 
welcoming him as a new employee to the organisation. During the conference, Romulus and his 
employees from Pantheon had the opportunity to meet their co-workers for the first time. Thus, the 
integration of Pantheon into Tiber started on the first day of the international conference where 
Pantheon employees spent approximately half of their time with each other, according to Romulus: 
“Some of the time we were together and some of the time we were… hanging out 
with our new colleagues. I'd say it was about fifty-fifty… it was pretty important at 
that time to meet all our new colleagues.” 
In the above statement, it is clear that the four Pantheon employees divided their time between 
spending time with one another and spending time with their new Tiber co-workers fairly equally. 
Romulus describes the earliest post-acquisition by resource buy-out days as follows: 
“…we all were thrown into this new company…”  
From this statement and Romulus’ lack of any other statements pertaining to integration processes, 
it is clear that there were very few, if any. Romulus goes on to further explain how the Pantheon 
team members were placed in the Tiber organisation: 
“What happened with the team, which was a mistake definitely, was that we all got 
split apart to different parts of the company. I started running a new project… and 
then everyone kind of went their own ways…” 
Thus, it is clear that the Pantheon team became separated once they integrated into the acquirer, 
such as Romulus who started in the role of managing a new project. The different employees were 
integrated as individuals into the team within the acquirer that was relevant to their particular skill-
set, which Romulus explains:  
“Yeah, so it was pretty much like people didn't carry on in their Pantheon roles. 
Basically, the guy who had been doing the front-end development joined the front-
end development team; the guy from infrastructure joined the infrastructure team.”  
In the Tiber organisation, the employees previously with Pantheon were separated into the various 
teams of Tiber, such as front-end development and infrastructure. Despite the separation that they 
faced once they joined Tiber as employees, Romulus says that they were managing the Pantheon 
technology in their spare time in an unofficial capacity, as he explicates: 
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“Pantheon was really something we were managing kind of on the side and now I've 
got like one full-time person working on it. He's one of the original people and he's 
doing a fantastic job.”  
Therefore, the Pantheon software, which was bought out as a resource by Tiber, was being managed 
by the Pantheon-cum-Tiber employees as an additional project. A while later, one of the original 
Pantheon staff members took over working on the software in a dedicated role, which still continues 
today. The reason that the Pantheon technology did not need to be more officially managed in the 
early months after the acquisition by Tiber is as Romulus explains: 
“Sure and it still is. It almost runs itself. It doesn't need a huge amount of input. It ran 
pretty much... with a million users a month for a year – with no one touching it. It just 
kind of ticked by because it's been built in a [certain] way...”  
Thus, the reason Pantheon’s employees did not need to take up dedicated roles on a dedicated 
Pantheon team was because the confidential software technology which the organisation had 
developed was mature. According to Romulus in the quote above, this meant that the innovation 
was designed by Pantheon to run itself. However, there were times when the ad hoc Pantheon team 
had to reassemble to work on the technology in the following circumstances which Romulus notes: 
“All the issues we had were always related to change. So, you change something 
and then it breaks. But obviously we fix it right away. We would also try to make sure 
that that particular problem would also self-correct next time.” 
From the above, it is evident that the Pantheon technology was mature enough to run on its own at 
the start of the acquisition. However, whenever one variable altered in the environment in which it 
was operating or if the Pantheon team made a change to the software, it would fail and crash. During 
these periods of change, the Pantheon team would gather, ad hoc, to work together on solving the 
problem. The way in which they would resolve the issues that came up with the technology would 
be to sustain the level of maturity of the software in a changing online environment, which is to say 
that the ad hoc team would fix the problem in such a way that, if the same problem occurred in future, 
the software would be able to resolve the issue automatically without need of their assistance. 
Furthermore, Romulus describes his role in the ad hoc team as one of leadership in the following 
statement:  
“I kind of led on the side, which was pretty much in my own hours, I led... Pantheon 
and we would get together for that…”  
Therefore, it was only in Romulus’ spare time that he continued leading the Pantheon initiative in 
cases where issues arose and the ad hoc team would have to gather to solve them. Despite Romulus 
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working with a person who is dedicated to the Pantheon technology, there are still occasionally times 
when issues arise that require the team members to come together and solve problems, as Romulus 
explains: 
“No, it was mostly bringing the team together and it's still the case... On occasion, 
we have one sort of issue… and then the Pantheon people inside the company 
hopped on a call and dealt with that.” 
While the team will gather for that if necessary, the dedicated role that facilitates the Pantheon 
technology allows Romulus and the full-time person to give the Pantheon innovation direction and 
goals, according to Romulus: 
“Well, we definitely... the team get together. Well, I have a weekly meeting with the 
guy who is working on it full-time now… Now there's this one guy working only on 
Pantheon… I have a weekly meeting with him and I set direction, I set goals and all 
of that stuff yeah.” 
Therefore, the mature technology that was acquired by Tiber could sustain itself online and was 
managed reactively at the start of the post-acquisition period by an ad hoc Pantheon team. While 
the ad hoc Pantheon team still exists in the Tiber organisational structure today, the management of 
the Pantheon technology has undergone a more proactive than reactive transformation with the 
addition of the dedicated role. This concludes the Rome case as this is the most recent information 
relevant to the case.  
Section 6.2 served as an introduction and discussion of the Egypt, Greece and Rome cases, which 
has encompassed: an introduction of the cases’ pseudonyms; background information regarding the 
acquired and the acquirer; the title and job description of the research interviewee as an innovation 
acquisition champion in the post-acquisition team; and, lastly, integration case for each of the three 
cases, namely, the Nile-Sphinx, Ilissos-Agora and Tiber-Pantheon integrations. Table 6.1 below 
serves to provide a full summary of the entities and stakeholders dealt with in the study, including 
the overarching case title, context of the case, pseudonyms of its acquirer and acquired as well as 






Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
  
207 
    
   
TABLE 6.1: Summarising the cases’ entities and stakeholders  
Cases Egypt Greece Rome 
Context Incubator partially acquiring a 
15 per cent equity stake in a 
start-up that is developing a 
new medical device 
Incubator partially acquiring a 
20 per cent equity stake in an 
organisation that is developing 
innovative products for use in 
occupational therapy 
Existing organisation fully 
acquiring a start-up by 
resource buy-out that has 
mature software used by 
professionals 
Acquirer Nile Ilissos Tiber 
Acquired Sphinx Agora Pantheon 
Stake-
holders 




































Co-founder CEO Nun Managing director 
of Ilissos 
Hera   
Co-founder CTO Isis Coach at Ilissos Demeter   
Co-founder COO Hathor     
Co-founder CFO Tawaret     
Given the introduction of the cases, the following section isolates and discusses the key findings of 
the Egypt case; the two sections that follow section 6.3, which are namely section 6.4 and 6.5, serve 
to identify and examine the key findings for the Greece and Rome cases, respectively.  
6.3 EGYPT CASE FINDINGS 
In this section, each of the identified key findings of the Egypt case are discussed, with regards to 
the responses given in the semi-structured interviews conducted with Ptah and Amun of Nile 
regarding the acquired equity stake and partnership with Sphinx and its co-founders, Nun, Isis, 
Hathor and Tawaret. 
6.3.1 Egypt case finding 1: The impact of distance 
In the semi-structured research interview with Ptah in August 2018, it was uncovered that the Sphinx 
team is currently mostly based in Johannesburg as its members are employed in full-time roles there 
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in various organisations. The only team member in Cape Town, the city in which Nile is based as 
well, is the CTO, Isis. At the start of Ptah’s tenure on the project in the first few months of 2017, he 
was largely dealing with Nun until such a time as she left her full-time involvement with the venture 
for an income-generating part-time job, which took her from Cape Town to Johannesburg. Since 
then, the CTO and scientist Isis moved to Cape Town to take over from Nun and she became the 
Sphinx representative for the team.  
The roles and responsibilities of the Sphinx team members have been considered and referred to in 
Table 6.1 above; these team members are namely Ptah as the innovation acquisition champion as 
well as the four co-founders, Nun, Isis, Hathor and Tawaret. However, Ptah, who is based in Cape 
Town and does not attend the after-hours weekly meetings of the Sphinx team, struggles to 
participate in the Sphinx team dynamic due to the impact that geographical distance has on the 
project, as he says: 
“I think distance is a big factor here. It's a big factor. If they were all here, it would be 
great”. 
From this citation, it may be inferred that Ptah believes that the presence of the team nearer to the 
incubator would add value to the initiative. As the project commercialisation manager, Ptah struggles 
to add value to the decision-making of the initiative as a managerial stakeholder to the organisation. 
He speaks of the challenge of not attending meetings with them in a decision-making capacity with 
the following statement: 
“I think the challenge is that I haven't actually been in meetings with all of them, 
making decisions. I think that's the difference.” 
Thus, it can be surmised that it is Ptah’s desire to attend weekly meetings with his fellow team 
members, Nun, Isis, Hathor and Tawaret.  
6.3.2 Egypt case finding 2: Central contact  
The original Sphinx team holds weekly meetings in Johannesburg, in both virtual and face-to-face 
gathering formats; however, the Sphinx team prefers to meet in-person whenever and wherever 
possible, as Ptah says, “It’s… in-person, when they can.” These weekly liaisons between the Sphinx 
team members are what Ptah refers to as the “process on the other side” in the verbatim quote 
below:  
“Well, it’s worked better going through one person for most things. So, having a 
central contact, because there is a process on the other side so making sure it's up 
to speed so this process happens as it should.” 
From this statement by Ptah, the project commercialisation manager of Nile, it is understood that 
when the team’s members are physically separated by geographical location, it is necessary for the 
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innovation acquisition champion to have a central contact within the team. This individual becomes 
the point of contact between the acquiring organisation and the small innovation acquisition, 
particularly in cases where the team is spread out geographically.   
6.3.3 Egypt case finding 3: Multidimensional skills  
In the preliminary interview with Nile’s owner and CEO, Amun, he described the Sphinx team as 
“multidimensional”, drawing attention to their varying professional backgrounds in the following 
statement:  
“It's a team of four and that was an interesting, multidimensional team…They came 
on board as a team of four… With an engineer, a scientist, a... CA and somebody 
else…” 
In the above description of the team, Amun describes the team in terms of its diversity of skill-sets, 
likening members’ professional backgrounds with dimensions and viewing the team as a composite 
of their varying professional dimensions. Amun later goes on to describe the Sphinx teams as 
consisting of the “right types of people” with the “right backgrounds.” He uses the descriptor “right” 
in terms of asserting that these four women, together, represent an appropriate combination of skills 
for driving the technological innovation forward to the market.  
Ptah, similarly, sees a single innovator as a challenge in itself as a single individual only provides a 
single skill-set to the hardware organisation he, as a project commercialisation manager, oversees. 
The following statement by Ptah showcases this: 
“If there is one person involved… [that] has its own challenges because one person 
brings one particular skill-set and you often need quite a few skill-sets to make these 
hardware businesses go.” 
In this assertion, Ptah highlights that hardware organisations which he project manages and provides 
commercialisation support for require a pool of multiple skill-sets from which to draw to successfully 
build and develop hardware-driven organisation. The context in which he was speaking in this 
statement was in reference to the Sphinx initiative he works on as a Nile employee. The medical 
innovation conceptualised and researched by Sphinx and developed in conjunction with Nile’s 
commercial support, under the management of Ptah, thus requires a pool of multiple skill-sets to 
draw from for best results in executing technological innovations. For this reason, Amun refers to the 
multidimensional team of Sphinx as the right grouping of professionals, peopled with a scientist, two 
engineers and a chartered accountant. Thus, it can be argued that a desirable trait of small 
innovation acquisitions is having a multidimensional skill-set among the members of the team.  
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6.3.4 Egypt case finding 4: Providing guidance as leadership  
When asked if he is required to demonstrate leadership qualities in his role as project 
commercialisation manager of the Sphinx initiative, Ptah replied in the affirmative and went on to 
explain that he is required to consider where all the team members are in both their personal and 
professional lives, which is to say, the events that are taking place in each person’s private life and 
their work life with the verbatim quote:  
“Yeah, I had to [have leadership qualities] because I think [about] where everybody 
is in their personal lives, in their professional lives.” 
For instance, Ptah and the Sphinx team have not experienced a high level of involvement from one 
of the team members, Tawaret, as she recently delivered a premature baby; the child required 
significant medical care and Tawaret spent nearly six months at the hospital overseeing the health 
of the new-born. Ptah goes on to say that he considers the junctures of the individual team members’ 
professional lives as well. As their professional lives pertain to the Sphinx initiative and not their own, 
separate careers and full-time jobs, Ptah says:  
 “They haven't been as structured as they could have been so you sort of have to 
say, 'You need to do this to be able to do this and this.' And, 'Have you done it yet?' 
It's more like guiding and not leading...” 
Ptah interestingly describes his role as guiding the Sphinx team members to apply more structure 
and accountability among themselves that will support the end goal of their technological innovation 
execution. To facilitate and provide great levels of organisation among the team members, Ptah 
suggests steps forward, emphasises their importance for future successes and growth, and ensures 
that the actions that need to be taken in order to achieve goals are completed. In these ways, he 
guides the Sphinx team on their journey to achieving their organisational goals. Ptah further explains 
the guidance he speaks of in the following words: 
“It's more guiding… showing her or them the logic of this opportunity versus the 
other. Then… saying where it makes the most sense to operate or play…”  
In the above statement, Ptah describes the guidance he provides Sphinx through presenting the 
team with different options and opportunities. When presenting these to his fellow Sphinx team 
members, he takes the time to explain the options available to them, advising them on which 
opportunity makes the best strategic sense. This enables the other Sphinx team members, who 
retain majority shareholding, to make the best possible decisions for the commercialisation of the 
value offering.  
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6.3.5 Egypt case finding 5: Goal-oriented project management  
Ptah describes his role as mainly involving project management in the commercialisation of the value 
offerings, particularly to keep teams and members focused on the end goal they are trying to achieve, 
which will provide them with the best possibility of success. His statement below describes this 
project management role:  
“[My role has] project management to make sure that as they're developing – 
whatever it is that they need – we’re developing it towards a goal and making sure 
that you don't deviate too much – that you can always bring it back to that goal.”  
In this statement, Ptah emphasises that a key component of his role is keeping project teams on 
target and focused on the goal. He further explains:  
“So, you've always got to make sure that the guys or the ladies are always working 
towards a goal that is going to ensure the best chance of success.” 
Thus, according to Ptah, the end goal of a project or venture should be continually brought to mind 
among the team members working towards it. It seems that a goal-orientation of this nature has the 
power to ensure that the research, development and other innovation and organisational activities 
which take place in the commercialisation of an innovative value offering will increase the probability 
of achieving successful outcomes in the market. This is made evident by Ptah’s statement above of 
ensuring that the people working towards a strategic goal have the “best chance of success.” 
6.3.6 Egypt case finding 6: Relationship-building as integration   
When Ptah started working on the Sphinx project as a manager, he was dealing with the venture’s 
first central contact, Nun. While she was still on the project, her position was chief operations officer 
and, according to Ptah, her approach was single-minded and she wanted to be in control of the 
venture. This was ascertained from Ptah’s following statement: 
“So, initially she… like her approach was very much, 'I'm COO – I’m running this 
thing.'“ 
Ptah alludes to the challenge he faced in trying to get Nun, given her single-minded and seemingly 
controlling approach, to work with him and allow him to add value to the initiative. To overcome this 
challenge, Ptah took it upon himself to attempt to build a relationship and sense of trust between 
them, which he describes as follows: 
“So, it started, I guess, with getting her comfortable with me as a person. Getting her 
to start sharing things with me so that I could give her input on things.”  
From the above, it may be deduced that Ptah wanted to open lines of communication between 
himself and Nun so that she could share information regarding the project and its furthering with him. 
It was Ptah’s thinking that increased communication between them and Nun sharing news with him 
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would then allow him to be heard by her and give voice to some of the recommendations he might 
have to improve the project. Therefore, Ptah undertook to make sure Nun felt at ease around him 
on a personal level by doing the following: 
“Some of the ways I helped bridge that was sort of just introduce her to opportunities 
and stuff.”  
Ptah attempted to overcome this barrier between himself and Nun by suggesting interesting 
possibilities for the Sphinx venture’s development and success. The research subject implied that 
making opportunities known to Nun demonstrated that he could add to the initiative in valuable 
strategic ways, which made his opinion both relevant and sought-after by the COO. Ptah continues 
by saying:  
“And, yeah, that's how I sort of got her to be a little bit more integrated into it. Then 
she started listening to me a little bit more. Then I was like, 'Yeah! I'm there now.'” 
Here, he speaks of how this tactic of introducing opportunities to Nun was successful in building a 
relationship with her and achieving the level of trust she needed to have in him to allow him to advise 
her on what steps she should take on behalf of Sphinx going forward.  
It is apposite to note in the research subject’s account above that he refers to his success in securing 
and building a relationship with the COO, Nun, as integrating her into the Nile process of working 
with a project commercialisation manager to the end of achieving mutually beneficial organisational 
goals. Thus, building interpersonal relationships seems to be a key consideration for the integration 
of acquired team members at the team level within Nile and into the process of Nile.  
6.3.7 Egypt case finding 7: Weekly meetings manage expectations  
As mentioned previously in section 6.3.2, Sphinx’s team members hold weekly meetings either face-
to-face or virtually. When Ptah was asked about how expectations are managed in the initiative, he 
strongly emphasised the weekly meetings that he and the central contact (see section 6.3.2) would 
have together; he explains this as follows: 
“I think the weekly meetings helped a lot. A lot, a lot… because we're constantly 
updating each other on where we are and the implications of doing this versus not 
doing it. Knowing where this is going...” 
Therefore, according to Ptah, a key purpose for the weekly meetings he had with a single central 
contact from Sphinx, which was first Nun and then Isis, was the ability it had to manage expectations. 
Thus, the weekly meeting is a tool Ptah and the central contact uses to manage expectations, which 
is the key issue dealt with in these meetings. Through the project commercialisation manager and 
the Sphinx central contact consistently apprising each other on a weekly basis on the latest 
developments, they each had a more robust understanding of where the project stood and how it 
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would continue to develop in the foreseeable future. Moreover, Ptah also refers to that fact that these 
weekly meetings gave the two individuals an opportunity to discuss possible consequences of their 
decisions, which also allowed for expectation management for both Sphinx and Nile.  
6.3.8 Egypt case finding 8: Personal professional development  
When Isis assumed the role of central contact of the Sphinx initiative, she displayed an inherent 
understanding of her strengths and weaknesses as well as being open to be advised by Ptah as he 
says:   
“I mean, she's grown from then – but she knew where her strengths were and where 
they weren't. So, I think she's happy to step back and take a bit of guidance...” 
Isis realised, as a scientist and self-proclaimed “technical person”, according to Ptah, that she would 
require assistance and advice on the commercial part of the initiative as opposed to the scientific 
and technological side. Therefore, her behaviour towards Ptah was such that she sought his support 
in organisational roles, according to his account: 
“Yes, she's a scientist… So, she was very much, 'I'm the scientist; please help me 
on the [business side].'” 
Furthermore, Ptah suggested that Isis had developed a great deal as an organisational professional 
since she started in the role of central contact in terms of thinking more strategically about various 
elements regarding the Sphinx initiative. Ptah describes this in the following assertion: 
“Yeah and she's changed… grown quite a bit. So, she's thinking more strategically 
about a lot of things.” 
During her tenure as central contact and leader in the project, Isis has personally and professionally 
developed, particularly with regards to her strategic thinking capabilities.  
6.3.9 Egypt case finding 9: Acquisition team culture  
In the Egypt case, the team made up of Nun, Isis, Hathor and Tawaret had been operating since 
2014 and had joined Nile in 2016. Early on in the project, Ptah had joined as the project 
commercialisation manager and experienced the Sphinx team as patently having its own culture, 
which was evidenced to him in how the team members portrayed their ways of working or “how we 
operate”. This was made clear to the researcher from his following statement: 
“Yeah, they definitely did have their own sort of vibe like, 'This is the team. This is 
how we operate. This is what we do.'”  
The team had been working together for approximately three years before Ptah became a 
stakeholder in the Sphinx initiative. From Ptah’s statement above, it appears likely that the Sphinx 
team had built an organisational culture by the time it began its incubation and integration within 
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Nile. This has seemingly continued relatively unchanged despite Nile taking an equity stake in the 
Sphinx organisation and working closely with its co-founders to commercialise their medical value 
offering. However, while working with Ptah, their Sphinx team dynamic did undergo a change, 
evident from his assertion below:  
“…we have introduced just a little bit more structure with that because we do work 
very closely with the companies we do technology with.” 
Nile works and collaborates “very closely” or intimately with the technology organisation it incubates 
and invests in, in exchange for an equity stake. According to Ptah, it is due to this close working 
relationship between the people in the two entities, the one being Nile and the other the incubated 
organisation, such as Sphinx, that some changes can take place in the latter. For example, Ptah 
says that as a result of the close working relationship Nile has with its equity stake organisations, 
the culture of Sphinx underwent a slight change in that it is more structured than before.  
6.3.10 Egypt case finding 10: Team consensus  
When asked whether there were any issues that he did not foresee in working with more than one 
innovator, Ptah was quick to state that there was indeed a particular issue he did not foresee, the 
issue of reaching consensus, as he describes below: 
“Yeah... Getting them to sign documents! Because they would go deliberate first – 
this, that and the other – reach consensus and, then, yeah [sign].” 
From this verbatim quotation, it is seems that Ptah finds the process of the Sphinx team’s deliberation 
on a matter and reaching a consensus a lengthy and difficult one. To illustrate the difference, he 
compares it to the same process undertaken with a single innovator and not a team, as follows: 
“Rather than if it was one person. One person can look this over and say, 'Well, I'm 
going to take this home and come back tomorrow.'” 
In the above statement, it appears evident that changes that need to be documented and signed off 
on are more easily dealt with when only one innovator needs to agree and sign. It is also a far quicker 
process as the individual in question can take the document home, make a decision on whether or 
not it reflects their point of view and return the next day with a decision. However, it is more 
challenging to reach consensus within a group and transfer that consensus onto paper, which is 
reflected in Ptah’s following statement:  
“But now you have to coordinate with four people and they have to make sure that 
each of their views are reflected in that document being signed.”  
From Ptah’s above answer, it is apparent that coordinating with more than one person, and in the 
case of Sphinx, four individuals, to ensure that each of their points of view are duly reflected in every 
agreement is a lengthy process which is also difficult to achieve. However, when it comes to either 
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urgent or informal decisions, Isis gains consensus by phoning Sphinx’s direct stakeholders and 
gaining verbal consensus. For example, Ptah references an event which required Sphinx to employ 
new intellectual property counsel, which occurred as follows:  
“If there's anything additional, they do phone calls. For instance, they wanted to 
change IP [intellectual property] attorneys and they didn't get a chance to meet and 
they needed to make a decision so Isis picked up the phone and said, 'I think we 
should do this.' And got the buy-in.” 
In this event, when the research subject said, “they didn't get a chance to meet and they needed to 
make a decision”, he implied that there was certain urgency in the decision to retain new lawyers. 
The verbal agreement to change counsel was enough across the members of the team due to the 
level of urgency, which was communicated by Isis suggesting the course of action of getting a 
particular organisation and attorney to help.   
6.3.11 Egypt case finding 11: Hardware technology readiness level  
Ptah asserts that his role in commercially supporting and managing the project is dependent, in part, 
on the stage of maturity of the technology. The technology readiness level (TRL) is a means of 
evaluating the maturity of a given technology; a method developed by the United States of America’s 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) (Mankins, 1995). In the case where a 
technology is in its early stages of development, the nature of the commercial support that young 
organisations need is more towards gaining additional funding, which will go towards developing and 
refining the technology further and improving its market readiness, which is reflected in Ptah’s 
following statement: 
“Yes, that's there but the companies are still, pretty much, in very early stage 
technology stages. They still need to find a lot of money to refine their tech…” 
He goes on to compare hardware technological development with that of software, which typically 
matures far faster than hardware as iterative changes to the software can be quickly undertaken and 
tested in the following statement (which leads on from the previous verbatim quotation above):  
“…unlike software companies with quick iterations to get to market. With these 
projects, you can't just quickly change a module... You've got to build something, test 
it, make sure everything works, get it certified, push it out, you know, so...” 
In the above verbatim quotation, Ptah again emphasises and illustrates the lengthier nature of 
hardware technological innovation projects’ technological innovation execution as opposed to that 
of software projects. Over the course of this process, Ptah’s role as commercialisation support and 
manager changes with the changing maturity of the technology; when the technology is more mature, 
there is less need for funding and the role changes to market launch. As Ptah and the Sphinx co-
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founders were working towards securing additional funding to develop the technology for a test 
market launch, the Sphinx hardware was at TRL three and ready to be further developed into 
prototypes before being earmarked for commercialisation (Mankins, 1995).  
6.3.12 Egypt case finding 12: Founder-only meetings  
Ptah isolates one of the main challenges he faces in dealing with the Sphinx team on a continual 
basis, which is that the team of four women have a weekly meeting. These meetings are only 
attended by the four founders and they take place after working hours, when the other team 
members based in Johannesburg with full-time jobs have the chance to meet. It is in these weekly 
meetings that key decision-making takes place. Ptah describes his exclusion from these meetings 
as a challenge in the following words: 
“I think the challenge is that I haven't actually been in meetings with all of them, 
making decisions. I think that's the difference.”  
He continues by explaining that, in lieu of his attendance at the meeting, Ptah endeavours to 
convince the central contact he has among the Sphinx founders of potential opportunities and 
decisions for the future; Ptah’s central contact was formerly Nun and was, at the time of writing this 
in late September 2018, Isis. Ptah liaises with Isis to ensure that his voice is heard at the team 
meeting, albeit through Isis carrying the messages to the other co-founders. This is clear in Ptah’s 
following statement: 
“Still, I'm generally just speaking to one person but [I'm] always just cognisant that 
there are a few other people I need to convince.”  
However, even though he tries to advocate for his voice in their team dynamic in this way, there is 
certainly a barrier between him and the rest of the team, evident in the following quotation: 
“They generally decide – in their meetings – they decide on a path and then they 
resolve to follow that path so you kind of know where everybody stands as time 
progresses. So, I might talk to Isis and she might tell me, 'Actually, the team is 
thinking this.' Then, you sort of know...” 
The above explains how the founder team arrives at decisions and paths to pursue at their weekly 
meetings, which is followed by communicating those decisions to Nile’s manager, Ptah, through the 
central contact, Isis.  
6.3.13 Egypt case finding 13: Communication and perspective   
While Ptah and Nile were able introduce more structure to the Sphinx initiative, this has not yet 
allowed for Ptah to join the founders’ weekly meetings, which they have after-hours. As mentioned 
above, the central contact, Isis, delivers the decisions made at the meeting to Nile and Ptah. 
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However, the latter acknowledges and understands that what is submitted to him is done so from a 
particular point of view, which he refers to as “one perspective” in the quotation below: 
“They usually have their team meetings in the evening so... I know what's presented 
to me from one perspective [but] I don't know, sort of, the full breadth and depth of 
the discussions they have.” 
This exclusion from the weekly founders’ meetings therefore also appears to carry additional 
consequences beyond being excluded from decision-making in these meetings. The first of the 
additional consequences is that Ptah recognises that the reports of these meetings are delivered 
from one perspective and contain bias. This issue might be eliminated if Ptah was included in the 
meetings as the limited and inexhaustive account of what had been discussed during the meeting 
that is provided subsequent to it, usually by Isis, will not provide the robust understanding of context 
and subtext that his presence at the meeting would allow.  
6.3.14 Egypt case finding 14: Innovative teams need complementary skills 
The preliminary interview with Nile’s director Amun gave the researcher rich background information 
regarding the early stages of the Nile process. According to him, innovators and entrepreneurs 
approach the Nile incubator as they are high-skilled in the area of technical expertise but relatively 
weaker in terms of commercialising their value offerings, which is why they require a team with other 
people that have skill-sets that complement their own. Amun explains this in the following statement: 
“The reason they approach us is because they are typically very good at their science 
but very poor on the commercial side of things... Our goal is to try and build teams 
around those.” 
It is during Nile’s seed phase that team development takes place, which is commenced with 
identifying each team member’s individual strengths and weaknesses with a view to analysing 
comprehensively the pool of skills and capabilities in the team already. This analysis of existing team 
strengths is undertaken by Nile’s managers, according to Amun, who describes this as follows:  
“The goal of seed is to start building the team, start to identify the team, get to know 
[their] strengths and weaknesses… which then tries to look at what they need and 
when they need it.” 
Thus, once Nile has analysed the team for existing skills, the analysis continues to ascertain which 
skills and competencies are necessary in the team, which were not identified in the existing team 
members. It may be the case that certain skills will be necessary to the team at some future juncture 
but are not required in the earlier stages. To illustrate this potential eventuality in the seed phase 
team skills analysis, Amun states: 
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“So, often, in the early stages of tech development, you don't need the marketing 
guy. You can say, 'Well, we are going to need one somewhere down the line but... 
we're not there yet.'”  
From the above example Ptah gives, it can be inferred that marketing skills are important in selling 
the product at launch and going forward thereafter. However, marketing is not a necessary skill 
during the product development stage, during which technical skills and capabilities are relatively 
more important to research and develop the technology; this was emphasised by Amun when he 
mentioned, “[In the early stages] it's often more around the technical capabilities that you need.” He 
further describes the approach Nile has to prioritising which skills justify an external hire with the 
following: 
“So, often we'll outsource a lot of stuff in the early stages so you don't want to bring 
people on board and then, six months later, you kind of say, 'Well, we don't need you 
anymore.'”  
Thus, Nile looks for skills that are going to be needed and valued by the initiative for years to come 
before hiring someone in a permanent position. To prevent this, Nile outsources work to service 
providers and focuses its energies on hiring new employees based on the complementary skills that 
entrepreneurs will need for future years, rather than only over the short term.  
6.3.15 Egypt case finding 15: Unaltered process approach  
Most initiatives that are incubated within Nile are single entrepreneur organisations. In other words, 
Nile employees are habituated to integrating as well as providing commercial support and project 
management to one-person organisations. Amun describes the usual situation of how a lone 
innovator arrives at the Nile incubator as follows: 
“So, typically, what happens is... we typically get approached by an inventor or an 
innovator on their own, largely. So, people who come through the door are largely 
on their own.” 
When Ptah was asked as to whether Nile has a strategy or policy that deals with how to integrate a 
technology initiative of two or more entrepreneurs into the incubator, he replied: 
“From what I've seen is it's just take it as it comes.”  
According to Ptah, who had been working at Nile for 18 months at the time of the interview, Nile has 
no policy or strategy in places that outlines the considerations for managing initiatives of two or more 
co-founders; the initiative seems to be largely approached in the same way as those of the others. 
Ptah continues his explanation of the approach with the following:  
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“So, what generally happens is, even if there's a bunch of people that are behind a 
company, you only really – especially in the start-up phase – you only really are 
talking to one or two at a time...” 
From the above statement, it may be surmised that if there are a number of innovators that have 
partnered to begin an early idea-stage initiative and are joining the Nile incubator, the project 
commercialisation manager would generally liaise only with one or two of them in early phases of 
the Nile process. Thus, it was made evident that Nile does not have a policy or other formal strategy 
for dealing with initiatives that have more than one person in them and uses the same process and 
approach to deal with these organisations, which can be called an unaltered process approach.  
6.3.16 Egypt case finding 16: Entrepreneurs want autonomy  
When Ptah was asked whether he had experienced any resistance from the Sphinx initiative, he 
answered: 
“I've encountered very little resistance… the only resistance was initially with the 
equity thing.” 
From the above quotation it may be deducted that, except for the acquisition of a 15 per cent equity 
stake in Sphinx by Nile, there has been little other resistance by the Sphinx initiative. The resistance 
against the 15 per cent equity stake caused Nile to introduce a claw-back mechanism which can 
reduced the stake to five per cent if Nile is not performing as it is contractually bound to do.  
In addition, the four co-founding entrepreneurs, now three (as at August 2018) due to the resignation 
of Isis, in the Sphinx initiative conduct weekly meetings to which Ptah, the project commercialisation 
manager, is not invited, as has been previously discussed. Ptah struggles to play a meaningful role 
in the decision-making of the Sphinx initiative due to his isolation from these alignment and progress 
meetings. Thus, these meetings represent the autonomy that the Sphinx entrepreneurs desire as 
they largely exclude Ptah, a representative from Nile, which owns a 15 per cent stake in Sphinx, 
from partaking in decision-making. Thus, this section has served to present the 16 key findings 
uncovered through interpretative phenomenological analysis of the verbatim transcriptions of the 
research interviews. The section that follows will serve the same purpose in its consideration of the 
Greece case.  
6.4 GREECE CASE FINDINGS 
In this section, each of the identified key findings of the Greece case are discussed, with regards to 
the responses given in the semi-structured interviews conducted with Apollo and Demeter of Ilissos 
regarding the intended acquired equity stake and partnership with Agora and its co-founders, Athena 
and Hecate.  
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6.4.1 Greece case finding 1: Unaltered process approach  
The majority of the initiatives that are incubated within Ilissos are one-person organisations. This is 
to say that the Ilissos employees are accustomed to training, interviewing and integrating as well as 
collaborating with single entrepreneurs. When the researcher asked Demeter, another of the Ilissos 
coaches, whether there were many cases in which there was more than one entrepreneur joining 
the incubator and the Ilissos process, she replied: 
“No, we had one team that was a two-member team and that already that didn't go 
well.” 
From the above statement, it can be inferred that Demeter recalls only one case of an idea-stage 
organisation coming in to the incubator. She goes on to say that this integration did not succeed in 
its aims; it was the observation of the researcher that the latter statement was emphasised by the 
research subject who was alluding to the challenging nature of this case because there was more 
than one entrepreneur to manage. It follows that Demeter was implying that organisations with single 
entrepreneurs are easier to work with in terms of integrating and incubating them into the Ilissos 
ways of working. As the researcher perceived, Demeter (the Ilissos coach), appeared to differentiate 
between integrating a single entrepreneur compared to integrating multiple co-founders of a 
particular initiative. As such, the researcher probed Apollo as to whether Ilissos has a strategy or 
policy that pertains to more than one founder or if indeed there is an uncodified approach that the 
incubator takes to these integrations. To this question, Apollo answered: 
“No, I wouldn't say that there is a policy that underlies it. I think we approached it 
similarly to how we approached the others.” 
From the above response, it may be reasoned that the Ilissos incubator approaches the organisation 
incubation and the various activities in initiatives with multiple founders in a similar manner as it 
approaches those incubations and integrations of single entrepreneurs. Therefore, Ilissos 
approaches the training, interviewing and integrating as well as entrepreneur collaboration of the 
former in a comparable way to the latter.  
6.4.2 Greece case finding 2: Innovative teams need complementary skills 
In the early stages of organisation incubation, it is the approach of the Ilissos incubator to ask the 
entrepreneurs what their personal strengths and weaknesses are vis-à-vis the organisation’s 
requirements. Asking the entrepreneurs this question takes place within the context of the first team 
meeting that Ilissos hosts for new organisations entering the incubator, where the team refers to the 
coach, the managing director Hera and the entrepreneur(s). Apollo explains this approach with the 
following: 
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“All of our businesses that we partner with… [we ask] 'What skills can you bring to 
the table? Where are you lacking? Where can we start filling gaps, internally, or 
where do we need to bring someone else in?'” 
From the above, it is seems evident that Hera and Ilissos’ coaches ask entrepreneurs these 
questions with a view to isolating which skills make up the entrepreneur’s skill-set, which gives them 
a better understanding of the skills the entrepreneur is lacking. The skills which the entrepreneur 
lacks and the organisation requires are the complementary skills that the initiative will need to 
develop and thrive. As these skills are necessary for this reason, Ilissos tries either to provide them 
to the initiative by drawing on the skill-sets of its existing employees or, if the skills do not exist within 
Ilissos internally, the incubator sets about finding the right skilled people to join the team. Thus, 
Ilissos values highly the combination of the right skills for each initiative, which it decides on a case-
by-case basis in collaboration with its entrepreneur(s). The fact that Ilissos values the right 
combination of skills in its teams is evidenced in its prioritisation of this as the identification of the 
entrepreneur’s skills are dealt with in the first meeting of the team, which is followed by the team 
being chosen and built around the skills they lack by providing complementary skill-sets.  
6.4.3 Greece case finding 3: Weekly meetings manage expectations 
In the research interview with Demeter, she mentioned that the team holds a weekly meeting with 
the entrepreneur, which she describes in the following: 
“So, we would have every week meetings for an hour, which would be a status 
meeting but also a strategic meeting.” 
Thus, it can be said that these weekly meetings were an opportunity for the team to gather for an 
hour. The purpose of these meetings was twofold, according to Demeter. Firstly, this meeting is a 
“status meeting”, which means this time is used to update the relevant stakeholders on the recent 
progress of the initiative on a regular basis. Secondly, Demeter also describes this weekly meeting 
as being strategic as well. In the Agora initiative, the weekly meetings also took place as Apollo says: 
“And we started to have regular meetings with the both of them.” 
However, Apollo only describes the intention of the weekly meetings as a progress meeting for all 
the members of the team, including the entrepreneur(s), the coach and Ilissos’ managing director, 
which he refers to in the following: 
“So, the check-in meetings… would be with Hera, the coach and the entrepreneur.” 
Later in the interview, Apollo went on to say that, in the case of Agora, it was likely the situation that 
the team met even more regularly than the usual weekly meetings during the first few weeks:  
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“I'd say every week because we met a lot. Like I'm trying to think... we met and did 
a lot for a thirty day period. There might have even been like two meetings in a week 
at the early stage.” 
The progress updates that these meetings are intended for are used in the Ilissos early integration 
and continued organisation incubation processes to manage the expectations of the team members 
by keeping everyone up to date with recent headway and the next steps.  
6.4.4 Greece case finding 4: Founder-only meetings 
In the case of Agora, Apollo and Hera found that after the team meetings Athena and Hecate would 
attend with them, the two co-founders would have an additional meeting to which Ilissos would not 
be invited, which he explains: 
“And then what we were finding is [that] they would leave and they would have 
another meeting without us…” 
After the additional meetings Athena and Hecate would have on their own, Athena, who was more 
integrated than Hecate, would visit Ilissos and speak with Apollo and Hera about the issues Hecate 
was having, which he describes in the following words: 
“Then, possibly, Athena would come tell us, 'Yeah, Hecate is not happy.' So, Hecate 
never felt comfortable to bring stuff up in the meetings with us.”  
In the Agora case, these additional meetings took place as Hecate did not feel at ease with the 
Ilissos team and, therefore, did not share her opinion or contribute to the weekly team meetings if 
she disagreed or needed to bring something up.  
6.4.5 Greece case finding 5: Interface management  
Apollo describes the interface management he was responsible for and conducted during the 
integration as being the “in-between” among Hera and the two co-founding entrepreneurs. Referring 
to the feedback he received from Athena on the additional meetings she would have with Hecate, 
Apollo describes the interfacing he performed during the early incubation as follows: 
“…then you have Athena reporting to us about her meetings she's having with 
Hecate and how it's uncomfortable. [And she would ask me] 'Do you mind having a 
chat with her?' And then it's me having a chat with Hecate…”  
From the above statement, it appears evident that Apollo was put in the position where he was asked 
by Athena to have a conversation with Hecate to gain her buy-in. Thereafter, Apollo would report 
back to Hera, the most senior of the Ilissos workforce, which he describes below: 
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“Definitely because you've got me reporting to Hera with what happens when it's me 
on my own with Athena, when I'm on my own with [Hecate]... Oh, it's all starting to 
sound like Days of Our Lives now [laughs].”  
Thus, the interface management that was required in the Greece case was of such a nature that the 
coach and innovation acquisition champion, Apollo, was interfacing on both an individual basis with 
each member of the team as well as collectively during the weekly team meetings. The one-on-one 
interfacing that was required of Apollo was often to carry message and persuade the individual team 
members.  
6.4.6 Greece case finding 6: One-on-one interactions 
In the Agora case, much of Apollo’s role as coach and innovation acquisition champion took place 
by him interacting with the members of the team in one-on-one interactions. He describes these 
interactions in the following: 
“Then, there would probably be – like I said – Hecate and I meeting another time. 
And then there would be me meeting with Athena to go to suppliers and stuff like 
that.” 
Thus, Apollo was meeting with the co-founder of the Agora initiative on individual bases to assist 
and coach them in their roles; as can be seen above, he would meet with Athena to visit suppliers 
for the organisation. He would similarly meet with Hecate alone to assist her in her role, as he 
explains below: 
“...Trying to have a conversation with Hecate in between working on the finances, 
just the two of us, like, 'How do you feel this whole process is going?”' 
Therefore, it is seems evident that Apollo and Hecate would meet alone, without the other team 
members, to work together on the financial control function of the Agora initiative. It was during these 
occasions when Apollo was alone with Hecate that he would try to have a one-on-one interaction 
with her to get an understanding of how she felt the Ilissos process was progressing. Thus, the one-
on-one interactions Apollo was having with the other team members involved gaining buy-in on the 
process from each of these stakeholders as well as coaching the co-founders in the skills they would 
needs in their respective roles: Athena, in developing relationships with suppliers and clients; and 
Hecate, controlling the financial and administrative functions of the organisation.  
6.4.7 Greece case finding 7: Task-based team development   
According to Apollo, there was not a strong enough focus on the team development and building a 
resilient team dynamic in the Agora case. He explicates his view on this as follows:  
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“I don't think we focused enough on that team development. I think we assumed that 
focusing here and getting task-based successes would result in a strong team 
dynamic.”  
It is manifest from the above quote that Apollo believes that the initial view was that a task-based 
integration in the Agora case would result in a resilient team dynamic and cohesion between the 
members of the team, which would be achieved by creating small wins in what he refers to as “task-
based successes.” However, Apollo is critical of this stance, describing it as an assumption that was 
made by Ilissos, in which the researcher observed Apollo’s body language showing that this 
assumption was unfounded and ill-advised by a wave of his hand as he said the word, “assumed.” 
Furthermore, Apollo gives depth to this “strong” team dynamic that he had hoped to achieve in the 
Agora initiative in the following: 
“But then things happen, an entrepreneur fails to deliver a task... We miss a task or 
something like that and then things start falling apart because you haven't prepped 
for failure from a team perspective.” 
In this statement, it can be deduced that Apollo has experienced times when entrepreneurs have 
failed in the tasks they set out to achieve, which leads to failures of a more permanent nature in 
which the team starts to break down. He draws attention to the need for the team to have prepared 
in some way for failures as a team, which referring to his previous statement, would involve building 
that collective strength and resilience teams need to succeed beyond failures.  
6.4.8 Greece case finding 8: Task-based over human-based integration 
In addition to the task-based focus on the Agora team development and dynamic, a task-oriented 
integration over human-oriented integration also proved a challenging consideration. As it regards 
the Agora initiative, Apollo says: 
“Yeah, from that respect, that's probably why Hera thought that we're moving forward 
with the tasks but the people dynamic is probably the biggest stick in the wheel there, 
yeah.” 
From this statement, while Ilissos’ Hera believed that the tasks Athena, Hecate and Apollo were 
completing represented successes, it appears that there was not enough of a focus on the human 
integration. Apollo refers to this as “the people dynamic” and describes it as the “biggest stick in the 
wheel” of the initiative. In other words, Apollo feels that the task-based orientation towards integration 
was not sufficient to ensure a successful integration as, despite the fact that progress was being 
made in terms of tasks completed successfully, the human element of integration posed the biggest 
barrier to effective integration.  
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6.4.9 Greece case finding 9: Relationship-building as integration 
According to Apollo, Hecate did not feel comfortable bringing up issues in the weekly team meetings 
with Ilissos in contrast to Athena, who did not have the same problem, which he explains below: 
“…Hecate never felt comfortable to bring stuff up in the meetings with us and Athena 
obviously didn't have a problem because she… had kind of broken that any-
awkwardness-barrier just from a person-to-person perspective.” 
Therefore, it seems to be apparent in the above quote that Athena had come into the incubator with 
the relationships she had built during the training programme with the Ilissos coaches, which made 
her more comfortable raising issues. As such, the relationships that Athena had built during the 
training had integrated her into the Ilissos ways of thinking and working, which was not the case with 
Hecate, who was not integrated. Apollo continues with the following statement:  
“...Trying to have a conversation with Hecate… just the two of us, like, 'How do you 
feel this whole process is going?' I remember trying to address that and just trying to 
get her to let down her guard a bit…” 
It may be reasoned from Apollo’s statement above that he was attempting to initiate and develop a 
relationship with Hecate by asking her in a one-on-one interaction how she felt the process was 
unfolding. By endeavouring to address her stance on this with her, Apollo was hoping that she would 
lower her guard to trust him enough to raise issues with him. He further explains: 
 “…there seemed to be something that didn't sit well with her and it was a case of 
how do I get this out. At least, communicate what it is you feel is going on.” 
From this, it appears evident that Apollo sensed there was something bothering Hecate; as a result, 
he tried to open channels of communication in the one-on-one interactions he had with her. Apollo 
did this to uncover what issues she had with the Ilissos integration by persuading her to communicate 
more openly with him. Thus, according to Apollo, he was trying to establish trust and communication 
with Hecate, comparable to that of Athena; therefore, Apollo was trying to build a relationship with 
Hecate which would integrate her into Ilissos by empowering her to contribute to the process through 
raising issues with the team.  
6.4.10 Greece case finding 10: Team consensus 
In addition, the Agora initiative was also subject to Ilissos’ team consensus culture in which, as a 
team of the coach, Hera and the entrepreneur(s), any payments for goods and services that the 
initiative might require needed to be discussed and voted on to be approved, which Apollo explains: 
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“Depending on the needs of whatever company there was, we would agree as a 
team that, 'Yes, that's a good thing to pay money for. Let's authorise the payment.' 
So, that's how that relationship worked.” 
This is how Apollo describes the team consensus that would have to be reached before any 
purchases were to be approved and paid for. In the case of Agora, Apollo identifies the purchases 
that were approved by the team during the incubation period in the following words: 
“In their case, we would pay for some samples… of their [products];… we would pay 
for some adverts via Facebook; …we would pay to get their website made up; we 
would pay to get a patent registered…” 
The payments authorised and agreed upon by the team in the Agora initiative included: some 
prototype examples of the products that the children with certain neurological conditions would use; 
some digital marketing on the Facebook social media platform; the creation of a website for the 
organisation; and registering a patent for the Agora products. Thus, team consensus seemed to be 
both necessary and reached in the Ilissos-incubated Agora initiative.  
6.4.11 Greece case finding 11: Entrepreneurs want autonomy  
In the case of the Sphinx initiative, the two co-founders undertook two courses of action towards the 
end of their engagement in the Ilissos incubator. The first was a small launch of their products that 
sold a few items and caused excitement for Athena and Hecate; Apollo describes this small launch 
in the following: 
“They ended up going ahead with a mini-launch despite our saying they shouldn't. 
So, they went on with the mini-launch, got some sales, got very excited…” 
Ilissos advised against this launch of their products as their production was not such that if they 
received a large order, they could fulfil it. Secondly, the entrepreneurs saw an opportunity to gain 
some brand awareness by engaging in an impromptu media interview, which culminated in a short 
public relations clip. These two actions by the co-founders of Agora led to thoughts of: 
“'Why should we give away our twenty per cent?' And 'We're doing this on our own. 
They...?' It became this whole we-and-they situation. They ended up coming through 
and saying, 'Look, we are keen to go at this on our own.'” 
In the above statement, it is may be inferred that Apollo felt that these two marketing undertakings 
by Athena and Hecate led to a dynamic between Agora and Ilissos that might be characterised as 
us-versus-them. The co-founders did not want to give up their autonomy in the decision-making 
about promotional activities as well as in the equity stake of the organisation, which they felt like they 
didn’t need to part with. It was for these reasons, all of which amounted to full autonomy that the co-
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founding entrepreneurs of Agora wanted, that Athena and Hecate likely left the Nile incubator. Given 
the identification of the 11 key findings in the Greece case in this section, the following section deals 
with the Rome case.  
6.5 ROME CASE FINDINGS 
In this section, each of the identified key findings of the Rome case are discussed, with regards to 
the responses given in the semi-structured interview conducted with Romulus of Pantheon and Tiber 
regarding the resource buy-out acquisition of Pantheon and its co-founders, Romulus and Remus.  
6.5.1 Rome case finding 1: Software technology readiness level  
At the time of the acquisition by resource buy-out of Pantheon by Tiber, the Pantheon software 
technology was highly mature. Romulus, one of two co-founders of the acquired, describes the 
maturity of the software as follows: 
“Sure and it still is. It almost runs itself. It doesn't need a huge amount of input. It ran 
pretty much without anyone touching it… It just kind of ticked by because it's been 
built in a [certain] way...”  
In the above statement, Romulus appears to pronounce the Pantheon software to be mature to the 
point of running largely without human intervention as it has been designed and developed to be 
autonomous. The Pantheon software was mature, commercialised and mostly autonomous at the 
time of acquisition by resource buy-out and, according to NASA’s TRLs, it was at TRL nine as it was 
and continues to be applied commercially (Mankins, 1995). Romulus goes on to further explain: 
“All the issues we had were always related to change. So, you change something 
and then it breaks. But obviously we fix it right away. We would also try to make sure 
that that particular problem would… self-correct next time.”  
From Romulus’ quote above, it may be deduced that the human intervention the Pantheon software 
innovation needed was only required in circumstances where something related to the technology 
had changed. The changes would then require Pantheon employees to fix it right away, which would 
entail the following, in Romulus’ words: 
“It was mostly bringing the team together and it's still the case... On occasion, we 
have one sort of issue like an outage that was caused by our cloud provider and the 
Pantheon people inside the company… dealt with that.” 
Therefore, to fix an issue that has arisen with the mature and mostly autonomous software, the 
Pantheon team are gathered from around the Tiber organisation and work together to deal with the 
problem. Referring to Romulus’ previous quote, the Pantheon team fix the problem so that it will self-
correct next time.  
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6.5.2 Rome case finding 2: Growing start-ups have less time to lead integrations 
When asked whether Romulus believed that the integration of the Pantheon employees into the 
Tiber organisation was supported by leadership of the acquirer’s top executives, Romulus answered: 
“No, I mean there wasn't much of that. I don't think the company is really set up for 
that… it's not like an established company here maybe they have a team that deals 
with this [integration].”  
In the above statement, Romulus explains that there was not much leadership that supported the 
integration of the Pantheon employees as the Tiber organisation was not established enough at the 
time to have a dedicated team that sees acquisitions through integration within the organisation. The 
lack of leadership was largely due to the fact that Tiber was in a high-growth phase at the time of 
acquisition, which has essentially continued until July 2018 when the research interview took place. 
Romulus describes this growth in the following: 
“Tiber is on the hockey-stick part of the start-up curve. Things are growing very… 
quickly… All start-ups in this period of growth... It's really a matter of where is the 
greatest pain and kind of everything else gets left behind.”  
As Romulus came from a start-up in which he was one of two co-founding entrepreneurs, he is 
familiar with and sympathetic to the inner workings of a growing start-up, in which the top executives 
do not have the time to lead integrations.  
6.5.3 Rome case finding 3: Entrepreneur wants autonomy  
For Romulus, however, the fact that the top executives of the growing Tiber start-up had no time to 
lead the Pantheon integration was actually seen as a positive by him, as he says: 
“The one thing that was kind of interesting during that phase, which I really actually 
liked, was that I didn't actually have – just because it's such a fast-growing company 
– I didn't actually have a boss.”  
As the Tiber start-up was in a high growth phase, Romulus did not have a boss, which he explains 
was due to the role he would have reported to being vacant at the time and therefore being held by 
the CEO, who had a demanding schedule due to the growth phase. In Romulus’ words, he describes 
this below: 
“The role that I was reporting in to was being held in the interim by the CEO, who's 
obviously very busy. So, really, my communication with him was [limited]…” 
Thus, as a result of the CEO’s demanding schedule, the communication between he and Romulus 
was very limited, which Romulus later goes on to elaborate what was in fact communicated: 
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“He pointed me in a direction that he wanted me to go, with what he wanted me to 
build with these six or seven guys that I was handed. And then really for four or five 
months, I just got on with that and we hardly spoke…”  
Therefore, the CEO briefed Romulus on the project that the latter would be taking over as a new 
Tiber employee in terms of what software the project was tasked with developing. However, after 
the briefing, Romulus and the CEO scarcely communicated. Romulus describes his experience of 
this below: 
“…but actually it was a great way to land because I was used to that from being my 
own boss... I was not used to reporting up... Because there was no one I had to 
manage up to for the past four or five years. That actually suited me.”  
As he was accustomed to being his own boss in the Pantheon start-up for four to five years prior to 
the Tiber acquisition, Romulus was unused to reporting to someone more senior than himself and in 
fact enjoyed the lack of communication from the CEO. He further explicates: 
“[The CEO] was sort of like, 'I'm really sorry that I can't spend more time with you.' 
And I loved it and I think, you know, it was really successful...”  
From the above quote, it is apparent that while the CEO was remorseful for his lack of communication 
and leadership of Romulus, the latter seemed to feel that this was an effective interaction, which he 
also appeared to value. The autonomy this situation gave Romulus allowed him to have a measure 
of freedom, which he describes in the following verbatim quotation: 
“I did some things that were really different from the normal Tiber way… I didn't have 
to justify it to anyone. Obviously, the team… but I managed to bring them on board 
and we built a great process…” 
It may be inferred from Romulus’ statement that the autonomy granted him by the lack of 
communication from the CEO gave the former the freedom to lead and manage his project team as 
he saw fit, with only his subordinates to be accountable and substantiate his actions to. The process 
Romulus instituted differed from the accepted and standard process of the Tiber organisation. 
However, he succeeded in persuading his team to work according to this process. Romulus 
continues with the following quote: 
“So, that was great because it was kind of like I was running my own team still, which 
was nice. But, in terms of communication, it wasn't strong, but it just so happened to 
work.” 
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From the above, it is apparently evident that Romulus certainly enjoyed the autonomy of managing 
his own project team without a superior to report to often. Despite the lack of communication from 
the CEO, this worked for Romulus’ integration into the Tiber organisation. Thus, in this case, the 
acquired entrepreneur wanted and enjoyed autonomy.  
6.5.4 Rome case finding 4: Cultural absorption  
As previously mentioned, the acquisition of Pantheon by resource buy-out included the acquisition 
of four human resources who were brought into the Tiber organisation as employees and integrated 
as team members in separate teams. Romulus describes the integration as follows: 
“You know, when there are four of you joining a hundred and thirty people, you’ve 
just got to jump on board.” 
In the case of the Pantheon acquisition, the four human resources became part of an organisation 
at least thirty times larger than they are. In the statement above, Romulus draws attention to the 
attitude and approach that the acquired employees should be willing to assimilate to the acquiring 
culture. He goes on to explain the cultural change that the Pantheon employees underwent:  
“…but I think most of it was very positive… So there was a cultural change but it was 
a very positive cultural change.” 
While Romulus explains the idiosyncratic cultural differences of Tiber compared to the culture of 
Pantheon, these cannot be detailed in this study as these would identify the organisation in question 
and violate the confidentiality and anonymity extended to the research subjects. However, it may be 
said that the acquisition represented a significant cultural change, which Romulus personally 
believes to have been a positive change for himself and his team members. As such, Romulus was 
generally amenable to the cultural change, which allowed him to be absorbed into the Tiber corporate 
culture without resistance.  
6.5.5 Rome case finding 5: Expectation management as transparent communication 
When asked whether he had to undertake the management of expectations of his Pantheon team 
members and new Tiber colleagues, Romulus stated:  
“So, managing the expectations of the employees... I think what worked was just to 
be like being as open as we could for as long as we could.”  
In the above statement, Romulus emphasised the importance of being honest and transparent with 
the employees who are likely to be acquired during the negotiation process. He went on to say: 
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“Obviously, when you are transparent, it does get messy but I think that people 
appreciate the honesty. For the most part, I've never heard someone say, 'This is 
totally disorganised.'” 
Thus, while Romulus recognises that there are drawbacks to maintaining transparency with staff 
during a negotiation process as organisational activities become disordered, he advocates for 
transparency with staff as people recognise the full worth of being openly informed about the 
acquisition’s progress and next steps.   
6.5.6 Rome case finding 6: Communication with the acquired team members  
Lastly, as Romulus, Remus and the other Pantheon employees were integrated as individuals into 
the Tiber organisation in separate teams, Romulus mentions the communication that the Pantheon 
team members had after the acquisition: 
“So, there wasn't really a lot of communication... Obviously, I kept up the 
communication – and I still do – with those guys but there was nothing structured.” 
Thus, while the levels of communication were not high, Romulus maintained contact with the 
Pantheon team members and still continued to do so until the time the research interview took place 
in July 2018. In this section, the key findings of the Rome case have been presented and discussed. 
Given the previous two sections which have served the same purpose for the Egypt and Greece 
case respectively, Table 6.2 below tabulates the key findings within each case and the key thematic 
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TABLE 6.2: Summary of the key findings of the cases 
 Key findings 
Findings Egypt case Greece case Rome case 
1 Unaltered process approach Unaltered process 
approach 
 





3 Innovative teams need 
complementary skills 
Innovative teams need 
complementary skills 
 
4 Weekly meetings manage 
expectations  
Weekly meetings manage 
expectations  
 
5 Founder-only meetings  Founder-only meetings   




Entrepreneur wants autonomy  
7 Team consensus  Team consensus  
8 Technology readiness level 
(hardware)  
 Technology readiness level 
(software)  
9 The impact of distance   
10 Central contact    
11 Multidimensional skills   
12 Providing guidance as 
leadership  
  
13 Goal-orientated project 
management  
  
14 Personal professional 
development  
  
15 Acquisition team culture    
16 Communication as 
perspective  
  
17  Interface management   
18  One-on-one interactions  
19  Task-based over human-
based team development  
 
20  Task-based over human-
based team development  
 
21   Growing start-ups have less 
time to lead integrations  
22   Cultural absorption  
23   Expectation management as 
transparent communication 
24   Communication with the 
acquired team members  
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Given the isolation and description of key findings in the three cases and the above tabulated 
summary thereof, the subsequent section serves to discuss the findings across the three cases. 
6.6 CROSS-CASE FINDINGS  
Across the three case studies’ key findings, there exist findings that are common and similar to those 
of other cases. This section presents the eight key thematic findings uncovered across the cases in 
the study and discusses them.  
6.6.1 Cross-case finding 1: Unaltered process approach  
The first cross-case finding is the unaltered process approach, which was found across the Egypt 
and Greece cases; please refer to section 6.3.15 for the Egypt case finding and section 6.4.1 for the 
Greece case finding. In summary, the unaltered process approach involves the organisation 
acquiring an equity stake in the initiative incubating and integrating the team initiative with the same 
approach as these acquiring organisations would incubate and integrate an individual innovator. 
6.6.2 Cross-case finding 2: Relationship-building as integration  
The second cross-case finding is relationship-building as a means of integration, which was found 
in the Egypt and Greece cases; please refer to section 6.3.6 for the Egypt case finding and section 
6.4.9 for the Greece case finding. Relationship-building on an individual basis was undertaken by 
the coaches and project commercialisation managers with a view to integrate the members of the 
team on individual bases.  
6.6.3 Cross-case finding 3: Innovative teams need complementary skills 
Moreover, another cross-case finding of the study is that innovative teams need complementary 
skills, which was found in the Egypt and Greece cases; please refer to section 6.3.14 for the Egypt 
case finding and section 6.4.2 for the Greece case finding. In both these cases, it was found that the 
team’s combined skill-set is analysed with a view to identifying which skills the team needs and which 
it possesses and lacks. The latter are then considered complementary skills, which the equity 
acquirers work to provide internally or, alternatively, externally source the people with the required 
skills to join the team. This is the case in these innovative teams that are early idea-stage initiatives, 
which need the right skill-set to develop.  
6.6.4 Cross-case finding 4: Weekly meetings manage expectations 
Furthermore, an additional cross-case finding is that weekly meetings serve to manage expectations; 
this finding was uncovered across the Egypt and Greece cases; please refer to section 6.3.7 for the 
Egypt case finding and section 6.4.3 for the Greece case finding. In these two cases, it was found 
that team weekly meetings are held where the members of the team are given the opportunity to 
update their colleagues on their progress in developing the initiatives. These meetings have the 
intended and desired consequence of managing the expectations of the team members.  
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6.6.5 Cross-case finding 5: Founder-only meetings  
The fourth cross-case finding from the Egypt and Greece cases is that meetings take place in which 
those in attendance are only the initiative’s original founders (the founders of the innovative 
organisation who were acquired by Nile and Ilissos respectively). These meetings take place without 
opening the meeting to attendance by a representative of the organisation that has an acquired 
equity stake in the initiative; please refer to section 6.3.12 for the Egypt case finding and section 
6.4.4 for the Greece case finding.  
6.6.6 Cross-case finding 6: Entrepreneurs want autonomy  
The sixth cross-case finding in the study is that entrepreneurs seek autonomy, which was found 
across all three cases, which is to say, Egypt, Greece and Rome; please refer to section 6.3.16 for 
the Egypt case finding, section 6.4.11 for the Greece case finding and section 6.5.3 for the Rome 
case finding. The finding that entrepreneurs desire autonomy is found in each of the cases. In the 
Egypt and Greece cases, the entrepreneurs query and resist the size of the equity stake taken by 
the incubator as well as undertake separate founder meetings in which decisions are made that the 
incubator does not vote on, despite the fact that both the incubators under consideration in this study 
own sizeable equity stakes. In the case of Rome, the entrepreneur appreciated the neglect of his 
reporting manager in managing and communicating with him, namely Romulus; in fact, he revelled 
in the freedom and autonomy he enjoyed without a reporting manager.  
6.6.7 Cross-case finding 7: Team consensus  
The seventh cross-case finding from the Egypt and Greece cases is that team consensus needs to 
be achieved for consequential decisions to be made. The consensus is achieved among the co-
founding team members of the partially acquired initiatives in conjunction with the stakeholders of 
the acquiring entity; please refer to section 6.3.10 for the Egypt case finding and section 6.4.10 for 
the Greece case finding.  
6.6.8 Cross-case finding 8: Technology readiness level    
The eighth cross-case finding prominent in both the Egypt and Rome cases is that the level of 
technological maturity of the acquired value offering generally dictates the nature and frequency of 
relations between post-acquisition team members on the innovation project (please refer to section 
6.3.11 for the Egypt case finding and section 6.5.1 for the Rome case finding). In the Egypt case, 
the amount of time an organisation is incubated by and integrated into Nile in order to achieve market 
readiness is dependent on the maturity of its value offering (please see section 6.2.1). While this 
period varies in length, Ptah puts forth that it can take six months for more mature value offerings 
and up to five years for those that are less mature. Moreover, Ptah compared the maturing of 
hardware technology with that of software, asserting that the latter typically matures much faster 
than hardware as iterative changes to the software can be quickly applied and tested. At the time of 
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interviewing, Ptah and the Sphinx co-founders were working towards securing additional funding to 
develop the technology for a test market launch. At that time, the Sphinx hardware was at TRL three 
and ready to be further developed into prototypes before being earmarked for commercialisation 
(Mankins, 1995).  
In the Rome case, the Pantheon software was mature, commercialised and mostly autonomous at 
the time of acquisition by resource buy-out. According to NASA’s TRLs, the Pantheon software was 
at TRL nine as it was and continues to be applied commercially (Mankins, 1995). Thus, the Pantheon 
ad hoc team was assembled from their separate positions and teams in the Tiber organisation to 
work together on resolving issues the software faced. A recent development in the Tiber organisation 
is the addition of a dedicated position reporting to Romulus, which deals with any and all issues 
relating to the Pantheon software. Thus, the maturity of the acquired value offering at the 
commencement of post-acquisition integration can largely determine the nature and frequency of 
dealings between post-acquisition team members on the innovation project.  
Therefore, in summary, the eight cross-case findings of the three case studies under consideration 
in this study are: unaltered process approach; relationship-building as integration; innovative teams 
need complementary skills; weekly meetings manage expectations; founder-only meetings take 
place; entrepreneurs want autonomy; team consensus; and technology readiness level.  
6.7 CONCLUSION  
This chapter has firstly served to introduce the three case studies and their contexts, which went into 
the cross-case study methodology. Moreover, this chapter dealt with identifying the key findings of 
the cases separately. Thereafter, the themes that emerged across the cases were isolated and 
discussed. Given the findings presented in this chapter, the following chapter presents the summary, 
limitations and recommendations of the study.  
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
SUMMARY, RECOMMENDATIONS, LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH  
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
The study explored managerial and/or leadership considerations for integrating small innovation 
acquisitions (with more than one individual) at the team level. Thus, research was conducted through 
secondary and primary means to address the research questions of the exploratory study. The 
existing literature was reviewed first and presented in chapters two through four. Successively, 
primary research was undertaken through identifying and studying three cases for cross-case key 
thematic findings pertaining to the overarching research question.  
Given the eight key thematic findings identified and discussed in the previous chapter, the current 
chapter provides a summary of the thesis as well as its limitations and recommendations. The 
chapter begins with a synopsis of the study, which addresses the relevant literature pertaining to its 
subject matter. Subsequently, the key themes found are summarised by reviewing the cross-case 
findings. Recommendations are presented thereafter. However, the three cases and the study pose 
limitations, which are addressed. Moreover, suggestions for future research are considered. Lastly, 
the thesis culminates in final concluding remarks.  
7.2 SUMMARY OF THE STUDY 
The study began by presenting an introduction and overview of the study, in which salient terms 
were defined and apposite factors were reviewed; in addition, it served to describe the initial 
delineation of the research to be undertaken. Thereafter, the existing literature was reviewed and 
the relevant literature presented in the chapters two, three and four; to the end of synopsising the 
literature reviewed, the below summarises the main secondary research findings. 
There have been waves of heightened mergers and acquisitions activity since the late 1800s (Viviers 
et al., 2014). In recent decades, M&A have progressively been undertaken for the purposes of 
procuring innovation as a basis for competitive advantage (Ahuja & Novelli, 2014). These innovation 
acquisitions are advantageous for acquiring organisations as they source outsiders with different 
skill-sets and mindsets, allowing them to challenge widely-held assumptions; these acquisitions also 
allow for the procurement of patents and other intellectual property rights (Govindarajan & Trimble, 
2010a; 2010b). Nonetheless, notwithstanding small innovation acquisitions’ benefits, they are also 
likely to pose challenges to acquiring organisations, as is mostly the case when two previously 
independent organisations merge or are integrated post-acquisition. Typically, the issues leaders 
struggle with in M&A are associated with culture, change, transformation and teamwork (Galpin & 
Herndon, 2007). 
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Successful innovation is largely a matter of managing the process effectively and consistently (Tidd 
& Bessant, 2013). Organisations planning on commercialising innovations that require higher levels 
of research and development find that depending on past data alone is insufficient; thus, 
organisations ought to consider undertaking organisational experiments (Anderson & Simester, 
2011). Govindarajan and Trimble (2010a) have advanced a framework for executing innovations, in 
which organisations research, develop and commercialise innovations in the content of a partnership 
between a dedicated team and the organisation’s ongoing operations, which Govindarajan and 
Trimble (2010a) refer to as its performance engine. In their model, the DT is an entity focused on 
commercialising the innovation. The most promising candidates are to be hired for the population of 
this team and they are to comprise key team positions. All potential sources for these employees 
should be considered, including internal transfers, external recruitment and acquisitions of smaller 
organisations (Govindarajan & Trimble, 2010a; 2010b). 
The final source of outsiders, acquisitions of smaller organisations, is of importance to this study. 
However, it seems that little attention has been paid to the particular phenomena surrounding the 
managerial and/or leadership considerations for integrating small innovation acquisitions (with more 
than one individual) into teams, such as dedicated teams, as proposed in a framework designed by 
Govindarajan and Trimble (2010a). In order to analyse the current situation and garner a few early 
findings in the field, an exploratory cross-case study was used to explore the primary research 
question and its corresponding secondary questions.  
The overarching primary research question of the study was: “What managerial and/or leadership 
considerations exist for integrating small innovation acquisitions (with more than one individual) at 
the team level?” The primary research deployed to explore and start to answer this questions was a 
series of qualitative, in-depth, semi-structured interviews with innovation acquisition champions. 
These audio-recorded interviews were transcribed verbatim and underwent interpretative 
phenomenological analysis by the researcher to uncover key findings. Therefore, the primary 
research culminated in three cases, which made up the exploratory cross-case study.  The findings 
from the three cases were examined in the previous chapter; the following section serves to 
summarise the key thematic findings from the cross-case study undertaken.  
7.3 RELATING THE CROSS-CASE THEMATIC FINDINGS TO THE LITERATURE 
The primary research undertaken in this study has led to the learning of essentially novel material in 
the literature, as is perceived by the author. Through the interviewing of three key innovation 
acquisition champions who had integrated small innovation acquisitions at the team level, eight 
cross-case key thematic findings emerged. In this section, each of these key themes will be 
synthesised and integrated with the literature.  
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7.3.1 Cross-case finding 1: Unaltered process approach  
The first cross-case finding was that the innovation acquisition champions interviewed did not alter 
their approach or process towards integrating partially acquired team members and developing the 
teams for initiatives with two or more co-founders. Their previous experience and their acquirer’s 
modus operandi had only considered integrating single entrepreneurs and innovators. When a team 
of co-founder entrepreneurs were partially acquired, the innovation acquisition champions did not 
change the process. This finding emerged from the Egypt and Greece cases.  
With regards to the existing literature, this finding addresses a gap within it. This study was initiated 
to explore what unique managerial and/or leadership considerations exist for the process of 
integrating small innovation acquisitions (with more than one individual) at the team level. To the 
knowledge of the author, no prior research has been carried out which seeks to explore, describe or 
test the causal factors of an innovation acquisition champion assuming the managerial and/or 
leadership duties of undertaking the post-acquisition integration process, the team development 
process and the innovation execution process concurrently. As a result, this study has sought to 
address a gap in the literature and this first key cross-case thematic finding suggests that innovation 
acquisition champions currently do not alter their process approach for the integration of teams. This 
appears to be a novel finding of the research which might only be synthesised and integrated with 
existing literature with difficulty.  
7.3.2 Cross-case finding 2: Relationship-building as integration  
The second cross-case finding of the primary research undertaken by the researcher is that of 
relationship-building as a means of integration, which was found in the Egypt and Greece cases. 
The research subjects Ptah and Apollo told of their efforts to build relationships on individual bases 
to integrate the members of the team on an individual basis first. The importance of relationship-
building in post-M&A integration has been studied and documented in organisation level studies, 
such as Galpin and Herndon (2007), which can be referred to in section 3.12.2.2(e). These scholars 
state that key talent within the integration should be re-recruited for the best hopes of success, by 
which they mean (and go on to further explain) that influential employees should be included in the 
management of the merger to achieve good interpersonal relationships between integrating groups 
(Galpin & Herndon, 2007).  
In terms of the literature on team development, relationship-building has been identified as important 
during the forming stage of the team by Tuckman (1965) as well as Tuckman and Jensen (1977), 
which can be referred to in section 4.2.1.1 of this dissertation. At the first stage of team development, 
namely that of team forming, group members focus their energies on orienting themselves around 
both the task behaviours and interpersonal relationships that will be required of them throughout the 
remainder of the team’s existence (Tuckman & Jensen, 1977). The interpersonal relational structure 
initiated and developed from the forming to norming stages becomes the basis for executing tasks, 
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which necessitates a strong foundation of internal team relationships (Bonebright, 2010). 
Relationship building in the team, especially in its early stages, is necessary for effective listening 
and communicating in later stages. Teams that suffer from ineffectiveness often attribute issues to 
internal jealousy, hostility and politicking (Isaksen & Tidd, 2006; Tidd & Bessant, 2013) 
This relationship-building also resonates with the literature on factors of team climate that can 
influence innovation by Isaksen and Tidd (2006) as well as Tidd and Bessant (2013), discussed in 
section 2.3.3.2(a). Innovative team climates are characterised by internal team relationships that 
extend emotional safety to those directly involved and are underlined by openness and trust; in these 
contexts, team members feel that an open platform for suggesting ideas without judgement exists 
(Isaksen & Tidd, 2006; Tidd & Bessant, 2013). Moreover, the duty of integrating members and 
building the research and development team has been argued as particularly important in the early 
stages of an R&D project (Kim et al., 1999) to build relationships between team members (Pirola-
Merlo et al., 2002).  
The building of relationships is considered in the literature as a leadership quality (Maccoby, 2000), 
which may be referred to in the literature review on management and leadership, particularly in 
section 4.3.1.4. In the literature related to project leadership, the importance of collaboration is 
emphasised as a social competence to manage relationships in the project as accentuated by Turner 
and Müller (2005). Thus, this cross-case finding of the current study, relationship-building as 
integration, extends to all of the four bodies of literature reviewed in this study: post-M&A integration; 
innovation; management and leadership; and team development.  
7.3.3 Cross-case finding 3: Innovative teams need complementary skills 
Furthermore, the third cross-case finding of this study is that innovative teams require 
complementary skills, which was uncovered in the Egypt and Greece cases. In both these cases, it 
was found that the team’s combined skills were analysed at the outset of simultaneously undertaking 
the post-acquisition integration process, the team development process and the innovation 
execution process. This finding inferred from the qualitative data that the team skill-set analysis was 
conducted with a view to identifying which skills the team requires on a case-by-case basis and, 
particularly, which it possesses and lacks at the start of the post-acquisition integration and team 
formation. It was further deduced from the research subjects’ statements that skills the team lacks 
are then regarded as complementary skills, which the equity stake acquirers endeavour to provide 
internally or, alternatively, externally source complementary skilled individuals to join the team. This 
seems to be the case particularly in the innovative teams that are early idea-stage initiatives with 
less mature technologies that require the right skill-sets to mature their innovations towards 
commercialisation and market launch, which was the event in the Egypt and Greece cases.  
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Regarding the innovation literature, Govindarajan and Trimble (2010a; 2010b) and Virta (2017) have 
advanced the importance of having a dedicated team with the right skill-sets. In assembling a DT, 
Govindarajan and Trimble (2010a; 2010b) prescribe three critical steps: firstly, identify the skills 
needed; secondly, hire the best people the leader can find; and, thirdly, match the initiative to the 
project team’s organisational model (Govindarajan & Trimble, 2010b). Prior to hiring individuals 
based on their capabilities, the skills required for the innovation initiative should be identified. This 
modus operandi will ensure all necessary personal know-how (tacit knowledge), practical previous 
experience, technical competencies and creativity characterises the DT. Once the skills have been 
identified, the pool of insiders should be reviewed for potential candidates as well as considering 
capable outsiders who possess skills that are perhaps not as prevalent in the organisation at the 
time (Govindarajan & Trimble, 2010a; 2010b).  
In this study, the importance of complementary skills to the existing members of the partially acquired 
Sphinx and Agora start-ups was emphasised in the Egypt and Greece cases, respectively. 
Therefore, in these cases, skills were identified as necessary to analyse at the start of team 
development and the integration process, before any steps towards innovation execution had yet 
taken place. However, these organisations had arrived with innovative ideas and relevant expertise 
to the technologies that they intended to commercialise. Thus, while these innovation acquisitions 
were not undertaken for the skills they possessed alone, as Govindarajan and Trimble (2010a; 
2010b) suggested, they still required complementary skills within their wider team.  
7.3.4 Cross-case finding 4: Weekly meetings manage expectations 
Moreover, a fourth cross-case finding was that weekly meetings function as a regular opportunity to 
manage stakeholders’ expectations, which was found in the Egypt and Greece cases. In both of 
these cases, it was found that team weekly meetings are held where the members of the team are 
given the opportunity to update their colleagues on their progress in developing the initiatives. These 
meetings have the intended and desired consequence of managing the expectations of the team 
members.  
In the literature pertaining to the process perspective lens of the M&A literature, it is argued that 
M&A success over the long term can be realised only by the following means: managing the M&A 
process; effectively communicating with all employees, existing and acquired; as well as 
understanding of the expectations and the apprehensions on both the bidder and target’s sides 
(Bastien, 1987; Birkinshaw et al., 2000; Blake & Mouton, 1985; Cartwright & Cooper, 1993). Thus, it 
may be stated that the management of stakeholder expectations is a necessary and important 
consideration for successful acquisitions. At the inception of the post-acquisition integration process, 
varied expectations are at play among the stakeholders of the PAIP, especially the acquiring and 
acquired employees (Haspeslagh & Jemison, 1991). In acquisitions where learning needs to take 
place, managers are continually managing the expectations of themselves and their subordinates 
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as well as maintaining a focus of learning during the integration and achieving the objectives as they 
were stipulated at the outset (Haspeslagh & Jemison, 1991).  
Moreover, in innovation projects where there is some level of uncertainty, the project’s stakeholders 
require an expectation management style, which comprises: recurrently evaluating and reviewing 
project progress; regularly ascertaining and recording the learning that has taken place; and 
constantly refining learning further through revising plans (Govindarajan & Trimble, 2010a:113-115; 
Sheasley, 1999).  
Therefore, expectation management has been identified in the literature on post-acquisition 
integration processes and executing uncertain innovation projects for commercialisation. It can 
therefore be said that the management of expectations on a weekly basis (in the form of team 
meetings) was undertaken for the purpose for which it was intended, namely managing stakeholder 
expectations.  
7.3.5 Cross-case finding 5: Founder-only meetings  
The fifth cross-case finding emerged from the Egypt and Greece cases. This thematic finding can 
be explained as founder-only meetings in which the initiative’s original founders meet in private. In 
other words, they are the only team members of the initiative present without opening the meeting 
up to be attended by a representative of the organisation that has an acquired equity stake in the 
initiative. Firstly, in one case (Egypt), this was carried out by the co-founders, who conducted their 
weekly meeting of the partially acquired entity (Sphinx) meetings which the project commercialisation 
manager (Ptah) had knowledge of but was not included in. Similarly, in the Greece case, the co-
founders (Athena and Hecate) also had founder-only meetings, which mainly preceded the weekly 
expectation-managing team meeting attended by themselves as well as the acquiring organisation’s 
coach and strategic liaison (Apollo and Hera, respectively). However, in the Greece case, the 
founder-only meetings were more informal as they happened in a casual discussion format during 
Athena and Hecate’s journey home after the formal team meeting. Neither Apollo nor Hera were 
invited to these informal founder-only meetings.  
With regards to the secondary research, this key thematic cross-case finding addresses a gap in the 
literature with an early finding in the field, to the knowledge of the author. As such, this finding is 
novel and can only be related to the secondary research with difficulty because it currently does not 
appear to afford explored findings or quantified results of the managerial and/or leadership 
considerations in the aforementioned context.  
7.3.6 Cross-case finding 6: Entrepreneurs want autonomy  
The sixth cross-case finding in the study is that entrepreneurs seek autonomy, which was found 
across the Egypt, Greece and Rome cases. In two of the cases, the desired autonomy was revealed 
by the founders in the Egypt case as well as the founders in the Greece case in their querying and 
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resistance of the size of the acquired equity stake required by the partial acquirers (Nile and Ilissos, 
respectively). The autonomy entrepreneurs want might also be said to be demonstrated by both 
cases’ occurrences of separate founder-only meetings; in these meetings, decisions are made that 
the partial acquirer does not vote on, despite both relevant incubators possessing equity stakes in 
the partially acquired organisations (Sphinx and Agora). Furthermore, in the case of Rome, the 
entrepreneur apparently appreciated the neglect of his reporting manager in the months after the 
acquisition by resource buy-out. The inattention displayed by his reporting manager was 
demonstrated in the latter’s lack of communication with the acquired co-founder and management 
of him. Despite the acquired entrepreneur being largely overlooked by his manager, however, it 
seems he actually revelled in the freedom and autonomy he enjoyed without reporting to someone 
higher in the chain of command.  
Regarding the secondary research, the issue of organisational autonomy was one that arose in the 
literature as well (Graebner et al., 2017; Steigenberger, 2016), as has been discussed in section 
3.6.2 and in section 3.10. In an acquisition, the managers of an integration are faced with choosing 
an integration approach, ranging from completely absorbing the acquisition to preserving the 
acquired organisation’s autonomy, which is a significant decision that can affect the PAIP 
(Haspeslagh & Jemison, 1991; Pablo, 1994; Puranam et al., 2009; Zollo & Singh, 2004). In this 
study, entrepreneurs desired autonomy, which is consistent with the literature.  
7.3.7 Cross-case finding 7: Team consensus  
The seventh cross-case finding that emerged from the Egypt and Greece cases is that of the need 
for team consensus to be reached in order to make consequential decisions. This consensus is 
achieved by the co-founding team members of the partially acquired initiatives as well as the 
acquiring entities’ stakeholders unanimously agreeing on a choice to be made.  
In reference to the secondary research, the key thematic cross-case finding of team consensus 
addresses a gap in the literature with an early finding in the field, to the knowledge of the author. As 
such, this finding is considered novel and can only be related to the secondary research with difficulty 
as it does not currently appear to have been addressed.  
7.3.8 Cross-case finding 8: Technology readiness level  
From the Egypt and Rome cases, the eighth cross-case finding emerged; this finding is namely that 
the maturity of the technological value offering, either partially or fully acquired, directs the frequency 
and nature of liaisons among post-acquisition team members on the innovation project. This finding 
is consistent with the literature on technology readiness levels (TRLs), which are a means of 
evaluating the maturity of a given technology, a method developed by the USA’s NASA (Mankins, 
1995).   
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In the Egypt case, an organisation is incubated by and integrated into the partial acquirer for the 
length of the time period it requires to achieve market readiness, which is dependent on the 
technology’s maturity. While this period varies in length, the project commercialisation manager 
(Ptah) suggested that it ranges from a minimum of six months value offerings that are mature and a 
maximum of five years for those that are less mature. Additionally, the project commercialisation 
manager (Ptah) contrasted hardware technology maturity with software technology maturity, 
emphasising that software archetypally develops faster than hardware because the former can be 
modified and tested more quickly than the latter.  
In the Rome case, the software of the acquired entity (Pantheon) was mature enough to be 
essentially autonomous at the time of acquisition by resource buy-out, according to one of the co-
founders (Romulus). The maturity of this software meant that the acquired ad hoc team assembled 
from their dispersed positions and teams within the acquiring organisation in order to work together 
on solving issues the software faced. At the time the research interview was conducted with the 
research subject (Romulus) in late July 2018, a contemporary development in the bidder 
organisation was the adding of a full-time position responsible for resolving issues relating to the 
acquired software and reporting to the research subject. Therefore, it can be said that the technology 
readiness level at the beginning of the post-acquisition integration may largely determine the 
frequency and nature of relations between post-acquisition team members in the innovation initiative.  
In respect of the literature, the Govindarajan and Trimble (2010a; 2010b) framework was consulted 
in the secondary research as it bears relevance to the development of a team which executes 
innovation to the end of arriving at a commercialisable value offering. However, in this piece of 
literature, echoed by Virta (2017), the maturity of a value offering is null and void; this is because 
their framework allows for the acquisition of small organisations for the purpose of populating the 
innovation team with skilled people to create an innovative idea and not for the acquisition of an 
innovative idea or value offering that already exists (Govindarajan & Trimble, 2010a; 2010b).  
Therefore, this study has found that small innovation acquisitions are undertaken on organisations 
that already have an idea, such as the partially acquired organisations in this study (Sphinx and 
Agora), or already have an operational and commercialised value offering, such as the mature 
software developed by the acquired start-up (Pantheon). Therefore, this study has found that the 
readiness level of the technology plays a key role in the necessary steps that occur in the PAIP. In 
the partially acquired (Sphinx and Agora) initiatives, teams were established with a view of adding 
complementary skills to the innovative ideas they already possessed. In the acquired by resource 
buy-out initiative (Pantheon), the technology was adequately mature at the time of acquisition that it 
did not require further experimentation; thus, it was integrated into the acquirer and the team 
assembled when the software had an issue that needed to be resolved.  
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Given the discussion of the cross-case findings’ relationships to the literature in this section, the 
following section serves to reconcile the findings with the primary and secondary research questions 
of the study. 
7.4 RECONCILING THE RESEARCH QUESTIONS WITH THE FINDINGS  
The interpretative phenomenological analysis undertaken on the collected qualitative data allowed 
the primary and secondary research questions to be answered. In this section, these questions are 
reconciled to the cross-case findings. Firstly, the secondary research questions are consecutively 
reconciled. Thereafter, the reconciliation of the primary research question is reconciled.  
7.4.1 Reconciliation of secondary research question 1 
The first of the secondary research questions was: “Do innovation acquisition champions integrate 
small innovation acquisitions (with more than one individual), either fully or partially, similarly or 
differently to how they integrate acquired individuals into the team?” The first cross-case study 
finding was that innovation acquisition champions do not alter the process of integrating multiple 
entrepreneurs into their teams; they instead opt for applying the same process for multiple 
entrepreneurs as they deploy for the integration of individual entrepreneurs. Thus, the first cross-
case study finding addressed the first secondary research question as the finding of the unaltered 
process approach essentially showed that innovation acquisition champions integrated small 
innovation acquisitions, either fully or partially, similarly to how they integrated individuals into the 
team. 
7.4.2 Reconciliation of secondary research question 2 
The final secondary research question was as follows: “What managerial and/or leadership 
considerations should innovation acquisition champions take into account while integrating small 
innovation acquisitions (with more than one individual) at the team level?” The remaining cross-case 
study findings, namely key thematic finding two through eight, address and answer this particular 
secondary research question as these findings are considerations for innovation acquisition 
champions to take into account in their management and leadership of these cases. Thus, the unique 
managerial and/or leadership considerations that emerged from this exploratory research study are 
as follows: relationship-building as integration; innovative teams need complementary skills; weekly 
meetings manage expectations; founder-only meetings; entrepreneurs want autonomy; team 
consensus; and technology readiness level.  
7.4.3 Reconciliation of the primary research question 
This exploratory research study posed the following primary research question: “What managerial 
and/or leadership considerations exist for integrating small innovation acquisitions (with more than 
one individual) at the team level?” The primary research question is similarly answered by the latter 
eight key thematic findings of the study, which have been listed above in section 7.4.2. Thus, it may 
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be said that the primary research question of this study has been answered with these early findings 
in this field. The answering of this exploratory research question has created a basis for scientists to 
start a meaningful dialogue around the managerial and/or leadership considerations for team level 
integrations of small innovation acquisitions (with more than one individual), whether in full or in part. 
Furthermore, it is the contention of this thesis that the intersection between the processes of post-
acquisition integration, team development and innovation execution deserve more analysis in future 
research. This section has reconciled the research questions with the key cross-case thematic 
findings found in the primary research of this study. 
7.5 SYNOPSIS OF MANAGERIAL AND LEADERSHIP CONSIDERATIONS FOR THE 
PROCESS OF INTEGRATING SMALL INNOVATION ACQUISITIONS AT THE TEAM 
LEVEL   
This section presents the M&A process and the managerial and leadership considerations this study 
proposes for the process of integrating small innovation acquisitions at the team level; please refer 
to Figure 7.1 below. As discussed in section 3.11, the M&A process is made up of three phases 
(Appelbaum et al., 2000a; Salus, 1989; Schertzinger, 2009; von Krogh, 2016; Wuebben, 2007); in 
this study, the names of the phases submitted by von Krogh (2016:307-308) are referred to, which 
are: “pre-acquisition”, “acquisition” and “post-acquisition”. The post-acquisition integration process 
detailed in the literature is a structured and formulaic process as discussed in the literature review 
in the third chapter of this study (Birkinshaw et al., 2000:395-396; Galpin & Herndon, 2007:77; 
Gomes et al., 2013:14-28; Haspeslagh & Jemison, 1991:122-135; von Krogh, 2016:307-308; 
Wuebben, 2007:39-51). However, in the first two cases of this study (Egypt and Rome), the post-
acquisition integration process undertaken was dynamic in nature relative to the more structured 
processes found in the secondary research as discussed above. The dynamism refers to the 
obscuring of the distinct phases, which became evident in integration activities taking place prior to 
concluding a contract or auctioning a corporate transaction, for example. As such, the managerial 
and leadership considerations put forth in this study should span more than just the post-acquisition 
phase of the M&A process to reflect the dynamism observed in the real implementation of the PAIPs. 
As a result, many of the considerations proposed are not isolated to a single phase of the M&A 
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FIGURE 7.1:  Synopsis of managerial and leadership considerations for the process of 
integrating small innovation acquisitions at the team level   
To illustrate this, the three phases – pre-acquisition, acquisition and post-acquisition – are presented 
in Figure 7.1 above as headings. Below these headings are the considerations advanced in this work 
for the attention of innovation acquisition champions charged with small innovation acquisitions’ 
integrations into teams. These are as follows: considered process approach; relationship-building as 
integration; innovative teams need complementary skills; weekly meetings manage expectations; 
founder-only meetings take place; entrepreneurs want autonomy; team consensus; and technology 
readiness level.  
7.5.1 Consideration 1: Considered process approach  
Firstly, the unaltered process approach finding is relevant to the considered process approach 
consideration in the figure above. It is proposed that this consideration is relevant throughout the 
M&A process. As the pre-acquisition stage should see attention given to contemplating the target’s 
employees (Christensen et al., 2011) as well as thinking about how to instil the values of the 
purchaser in each new acquisition (Kuratko et al., 2011), the acquirer should reflect on how to 
integrate an acquisition with more than one individual to impart the former’s values and culture. If 
the acquisition is actioned in the second phase, the considered process approach should be further 
devised in this second phase and implemented in the post-acquisition phase as scholars suggest 
Pre-acquisition Acquisition Post-acquisition 
Considered process approach  
Relationship-building as integration  
Innovative teams need complementary skills 
Weekly meetings manage 
expectations 
Founder-only meetings 
Entrepreneurs want autonomy  
Team consensus 
Technology Readiness Level 
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that integration measures should be implemented which are suited to the specific circumstances at 
play in each new acquisition (Bach, 2014; Wuebben, 2007).  
7.5.2 Consideration 2: Relationship-building as integration 
Secondly, relationship-building as integration is a consideration for innovation acquisition champions 
involved in the M&A process from pre-acquisition through to post-acquisition. Building a relationship 
with the target organisation’s employees can begin as early as the first meetings when targets are 
considered for procurement in the pre-acquisition phase; it is during this time that the target 
organisation is profiled and inspected (Bach, 2014; Wuebben, 2007). If innovation acquisition 
champions are involved in these occasions, they are provided with opportunities to become 
acquainted.  
7.5.3 Consideration 3: Innovative teams need complementary skills  
Thirdly, the innovative teams need complementary skills finding poses a consideration for innovation 
acquisition champions. The required skills should be identified when the acquisition is being 
undertaken, from as early as when the parties are signing the letter of intent if desired (Bach, 2014; 
Wuebben, 2007), to ensure that the team has the combined skill-set it needs in the post-acquisition 
phase. Alternatively, if there are uncertainties about whether the acquisition will be finalised, this 
consideration could be post-phoned until the final offer is accepted (Bach, 2014; Wuebben, 2007) or 
could be left for consideration during the post-acquisition phase (von Krogh, 2016).  
7.5.4 Consideration 4: Weekly meetings manage expectations  
Additionally, it was found that weekly meetings are used as opportunities to exercise expectation 
management within the team post-acquisition. As such, these regular meetings are a consideration 
for innovation acquisition champions to implement as an integration measure which is suited to the 
specific circumstances at play (Bach, 2014; Wuebben, 2007). Scholars emphasise the importance 
of the post-acquisition integration implementation (Haleblian et al., 2009; Steigenberger, 2016). This 
consideration provides a means of implementing expectation management as put forth by 
Haspeslagh and Jemison (1991) as these scholars recognise that at the inception of the PAIP, varied 
expectations are at play among the acquiring and acquired organisation’s employees, which need 
to be managed.  
7.5.5 Consideration 5: Founder-only meetings  
Furthermore, founder-only meetings were found to take place, which the acquiring organisation’s 
members were not invited. As all parties with a vested interest (Bach, 2014; Wuebben, 2007) should 
be represented in decision-making and communications regarding the team post-acquisition, it is a 
consideration for innovation acquisition champions that it should be decided that all meetings should 
be open to all team members to attend. In addition, this consideration can be reflected on as early 
as the second phase of the M&A process, namely during the acquisition proceedings, as the decision 
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to open all meetings up to all team members could form part of the contractual agreements made in 
this phase to protect the interests of all parties.   
7.5.6 Consideration 6: Entrepreneurs want autonomy  
Moreover, the entrepreneurs that are acquired were found to desire autonomy. This should be 
considered in the pre-acquisition phase when profiling and inspecting the potential acquisition to be 
made as well as at the outset of combining the two organisations post-acquisition, their integration 
potential should be analysed and planned (Bach, 2014; Wuebben, 2007). A decision must be made 
regarding the level of integration, which has been referred to as the integration-autonomy dilemma 
(Aghasi et al., 2017; Pablo, 1994; Puranam et al., 2009). This consideration should also be reflected 
on during the acquisition phase in the case that the degree of autonomy needs to be agreed upon 
contractually. This is thus an important consideration for innovation acquisition champions 
throughout the M&A process from pre-acquisition, through acquisition, to post-acquisition.  
7.5.7 Consideration 7: Team consensus  
In addition, it was found that teams reached consensus when making consequential decisions, which 
was achieved by the co-founding team members of the partially acquired initiatives as well as the 
acquiring entities’ stakeholders unanimously agreeing on a choice to be made. The issue of team 
consensus needs to be addressed in the acquisition agreement (the acquisition phase) as well as 
during the PAIP (the post-acquisition phase). It is thus a managerial and leadership consideration to 
bear in mind how decisions will be reached after the acquisition, which should be clearly written and 
agreed upon contractually in advance of the PAIP.  
7.5.8 Consideration 8: Technology readiness level 
Finally, the maturity of the innovation, known as technology readiness level (Mankins, 1995), is also 
an important consideration for innovation acquisition champions. It can be said that the technology 
readiness level at the beginning of the post-acquisition integration may largely determine the 
frequency and nature of relations between post-acquisition team members in the innovation initiative. 
The less mature a technology or innovation is, the more innovation execution and resources will be 
necessary to research, experiment and develop the value offering. This is an important managerial 
and leadership consideration for the activities the team will be charged with and held accountable 
for (Govindarajan & Trimble, 2010a). It can be said that the TRL at the beginning of the post-
acquisition integration may largely determine the frequency and nature of relations between post-
acquisition team members in the innovation initiative.  
Given the managerial and leadership considerations for the process of integrating small innovation 
acquisitions at the team level that have been presented and discussed in this section, the following 
section presents and discusses study recommendations.   
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7.6 RECOMMENDATIONS  
Firstly, this study has found that the managers and leaders interviewed do not alter their approach 
towards the integration, team development and innovation execution processes when undertaking 
these processes with more than one individual, which was the context of the acquisitions most 
commonly undertaken by the acquirers. Therefore, the study recommends that innovation 
acquisition champions integrate either partially or fully acquired organisations using an approach 
that might be altered to address the differences that exist in integrating a team over integrating an 
individual, which are further addressed below.  
Secondly, it was found that innovation acquisition champions employed by the acquiring entity 
undertake relationship-building on individual bases with their either partially or fully acquired team 
members with a view to aid integration of the acquired team into the post-acquisition project team. 
Consequently, it is the recommendation of the study that innovation acquisition champions place 
emphasis on fostering and sustaining relationships with the new team members to engender 
potentially more successful integration outcomes.  
Thirdly, teams that are charged with innovation execution require multiple skill-sets. When the teams 
of the acquired organisations are first assembled post-acquisition, the existing skill-set should be 
analysed. This analysis is undertaken with a view to identifying which additional skills and skill-sets 
the team will require to accomplish its goals over the long term. Thus, it may be said that the 
innovative teams are analysed to see which complementary skills they require.  
Moreover, it is also a finding of the study that expectation management for the direct stakeholders 
of the initiatives is conducted by the vehicle of weekly meetings. In these meetings, the post-
acquisition team uses this as an opportunity to inform all direct stakeholders of the recent progress 
made towards commercialising the innovation, in whichever stage of innovation execution the team 
is. Through reporting on progress in these weekly meetings, the team members actively and 
regularly manage one another’s expectations. Thus, the study recommends that the post-acquisition 
team holds weekly meetings with a view to report on progress and manage stakeholder expectations.  
Furthermore, this exploratory study found that founder-only meetings occurred in isolation from the 
aqcuirer team. These meetings are attended and open to only the founding entrepreneurs of the 
initiative and in the examined cases were undertaken both in secret and with full knowledge by all 
other direct stakeholder parties. However, even when the innovation acquisition champions, who 
were not co-founders in these cases, knew of these meetings, these still hampered the former’s 
ability to manage and lead the project. Accordingly, it is the recommendation of the study that 
founder-only meetings are discouraged by the innovation acquisition champion and the acquiring 
entity. 
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Additionally, another key finding across the cases considered in this study was that entrepreneurs 
desire autonomy. The study thus recommends that autonomy is granted to acquired entrepreneurs 
but that the degree extended to them is determined on a case-by-case basis under the discretion of 
the direct and indirect stakeholders of the initiative that are employed by the acquiring entity.  
The seventh main thematic finding of the current study was that of the necessity of reaching team 
consensus on major decisions made regarding the initiative. It is a recommendation of the study that 
the modes of achieving team consensus is contractually agreed upon during the acquisition 
negotiation.  
Finally, the readiness level of the technology acquired either partially or fully has a significant bearing 
on the regularity and nature of the relations between the previously sovereign entities’ team 
members. Therefore, the study recommends that innovation acquisition champions undertake an 
evaluation of the technology’s maturity. This evaluation might include an analysis of the foreseeable 
development stages of the technology to inform the agreement insofar as it relates to the delineation 
of relations between the entities’ stakeholders for the purposes of innovation execution.  
In conclusion, this study has afforded the literature a few early findings on the subject matter of 
managerial and/or leadership considerations for the process of integrating small innovation 
acquisitions (with more than one individual) at the team level. It is the overarching recommendation 
of this study that these findings be considered in the management and leadership context – on the 
team level, rather than the overarching organisational level – both in practice as well as in future 
studies. Thus, the previous eight recommendations might be considered in the alteration of the 
approach to integrating an acquired organisation at the team level rather than integrating single 
employees. Table 7.1 below relates each of the study’s key findings and recommendations to the 
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TABLE 7.1: Relating the recommendations to the literature 
Relevant 
thematic finding 
Recommendation Level of consistency with the literature 
Unaltered 
process approach  
Innovation acquisition 
champions consider the 
differences that exist in 
integrating a team over 
integrating an individual and 
approach the integration process 
accordingly.  
As this finding appears to be novel, it might only be 
synthesised and integrated with existing literature 
with difficulty. Thus, there is little literature on this 
finding and recommendation for the purposes of its 





champions place emphasis on 
fostering and sustaining 
relationships with the new team 
members to engender potentially 
more successful integration 
outcomes. 
The literature on the acquisition process at the 
organisational level of analysis (Galpin & Herndon, 
2007) as well as on team development (Tuckman, 
1965; Tuckman & Jensen, 1977), team climate 
(Isaksen & Tidd, 2006; Tidd & Bessant, 2013) and 
leadership (Maccoby, 2000; Turner & Müller, 2005) 
all regard relationship-building as important for 
various reasons, demonstrating the high 






Innovative teams are analysed to 
see which complementary skills 
they require. 
The literature on innovative teams emphasises the 
importance of having the right skill-sets among the 
individuals within the team (Govindarajan & 




The post-acquisition team holds 
weekly meetings with a view to 
report on progress and manage 
stakeholder expectations. 
This finding regarding expectation management is 
consistent with the literature on the post-acquisition 
integration process (Haspeslagh & Jemison, 1991) 
and leading innovation projects (Govindarajan & 
Trimble, 2010a; Sheasley, 1999). 
Founder-only 
meetings  
Founder-only meetings are 
discouraged by the innovation 
acquisition champion and the 
acquiring entity.  
As this finding appears to be novel, it might only be 
synthesised and integrated with existing literature 
with difficulty. Thus, there is little literature on this 
finding and recommendation for the purposes of its 
level of consistency with the literature. 
Entrepreneurs 
want autonomy 
While autonomy may be granted 
to acquired entrepreneurs, the 
degree of autonomy extended to 
them is determined by the 
discretion of initiative stake-
holders of the acquiring entity.  
The desire many entrepreneurs have for autonomy 
is consistent with the post-acquisition integration 
process literature (Graebner et al., 2017; 
Steigenberger, 2016). 
Team consensus  The modes of achieving team 
consensus is contractually 
agreed upon during the 
acquisition negotiation.  
As this finding appears to be novel, it might only be 
synthesised and integrated with existing literature 
with difficulty. Thus, there is little literature on this 
finding and recommendation for the purposes of its 
level of consistency with the literature. 
Technology 
readiness level  
Innovation acquisition 
champions undertake an 
evaluation of the technology’s 
maturity.   
As this finding appears to be novel, it might only be 
synthesised and integrated with existing literature 
with difficulty. Thus, there is little literature on this 
finding and recommendation for the purposes of its 
level of consistency with the literature. 
 
Given the recommendations presented and discussed in the section, the following provides the 
study’s limitations.  
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
  
252 
    
   
7.7 LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY 
The research strategy and purpose of this study was exploratory in nature (see section 5.4.2.1). 
Therefore, it was not the study’s aim to deliver conclusive evidence on the research problem. Indeed, 
the purpose of the study was to initiate a dialogue surrounding unique considerations for innovation 
acquisition champions in their endeavour to execute successfully and simultaneously the processes 
of innovation execution, post-acquisition integration and team development. This exploratory 
research has been conducted to provide innovation acquisition champions with a few early 
considerations to add value to their management and leadership approaches in dealing with the 
context discussed in the study. However, as this study was exploratory, it is apposite to note that 
quantifiable and irrefutable evidence did not emerge.  
Secondly, the study included three acquiring entities that were all medium-sized organisations 
around the time of acquiring an equity stake in an innovative organisation (in two of the cases) and 
acquiring the start-up by resource buy-out (in the last case). In other words, the three acquiring 
entities considered in the study were not large organisations, which may be able to undertake full 
acquisitions due to their probably more extensive resources, relative to those available to mid-sized 
organisations. Large acquirers and their integration managers were contacted over a three-month 
period dedicated to sampling and securing interviews with research subjects that fulfilled the criteria 
for the study; however, none of these individuals availed themselves to the study. Therefore, it is a 
limitation of the study that one or more full acquisitions in larger organisations were not included in 
the cross-case study. 
In addition, of the acquiring entities whose innovation acquisition champions avail themselves to the 
primary research, two were incubators. These fulfilled the contextual criteria of the study, which were 
namely: a full or partial acquisition; of an innovative organisation; and an integration at the team 
level. However, the study was also somewhat limited due to its relative dependence on information 
gained from partial acquirers that perceive themselves as business incubators. The objectives of 
incubators may vary from those of non-incubator organisations; in the case of the latter, it is possible 
that the aim of the acquisition may well be that the initial equity stake will be rapidly or, from the early 
stages post-acquisition, be scaled to full ownership. Such cases may yield different findings in terms 
of the integration and team development processes followed as well as the level and nature of the 
outcomes they seek. The subsequent section aims to suggest future avenues for research in the 
field.  
7.8 SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH  
While the integration process has been studied by researchers for years at the individual and 
organisational levels of analysis, the team level has largely been neglected. Therefore, it may be 
said that this study benefits the literature in initiating a dialogue surrounding post-acquisition 
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integrations of small organisations at the team level. As such, future research can build on the 
subject matter in various ways.  
One such future research undertaking might include a larger number of research participants that 
number greater than the sample size of five individuals considered in this study, namely three 
innovation acquisition champions and two preliminary interviewees (Collis & Hussey, 2014:69). A 
small sample size poses a limitation only insofar as the qualitative exploratory primary research 
conducted could not be quantified; this, however, was not an objective of the study. Therefore, 
conclusive evidence might possibly be realised through future studies conducting a quantitative 
survey across innovation acquisition champions. Thus, this proposition for future research could 
result in a title such as: “A quantitative analysis of managerial and/or leadership considerations for 
the post-acquisition integration of small innovation acquisitions at the team level.” 
Additionally, a future study might consider gaining the perspectives of all the different direct and 
indirect stakeholders of the post-acquisition integration of a small innovation acquisition at the team 
level. Per this study, it may be expected that the stakeholders extend to the following roles beyond 
the innovation acquisition champion: acquired organisation founder or co-founder; acquired 
employees of the start-up; acquirer integration leadership; acquirer innovation acquisition champion; 
and acquirer management and leadership. Therefore, this proposition for future research might be 
entitled: “Stakeholder perspectives of the post-acquisition integration of small innovation acquisitions 
at the team level.” 
Lastly, a further opportunity for future research is an exploratory study on full acquisitions of 
organisations that are integrated at the team level post-acquisition. Such a study might provide 
further early findings in the field, which can then be quantifiably tested in later quantitative studies. 
A possible future study that could be initiated from this research opportunity might be called: 
“Managerial and/or leadership considerations for the post-acquisition integration small innovation 
acquisitions at the team level as regards full acquisitions.” 
7.9 CONCLUSION 
The main contribution of this study is in its exploration of an area that has been chiefly 
underrepresented thus far. This area regards the managerial and/or leadership considerations for 
integrating small innovation acquisitions (with more than one individual) into teams within the 
acquirer, especially relating to innovation acquisition champions. As mergers and acquisitions have 
been shown to often fall prey to failure as a result of unsuccessful post-acquisition integration 
processes, this study was undertaken to endeavour to further the collective knowledge of 
researchers and practitioners undertaking the post-acquisition integration process, with a focus on 
integration at the team level. It identified how three cases of small innovation acquisitions, partial or 
full, can provide some starting point for enlightenment for other organisations. Recommendations 
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were made to advance a dialogue for M&A integrations at the team level to benefit future 
integrations. Innovation provides a lucrative and exciting means of continually engaging consumers 
as well as forming a desirable basis for a modern competitive advantage. In some cases, the 
acquisition of innovations and innovative human resources might be more attractive than creating 
these value offerings and capabilities in-house. However, a failed innovation acquisition may lead to 
an erosion of the value of the investment and strained relationships with acquired human resources. 
To honour the innovation that consumers will purchase and the people who made that possible with 
an exciting idea they built their organisation around, these acquisitions should be given more 
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NOTICE OF APPROVAL 
REC Humanities New Application Form 
6 May 2018 
Project number: 6702 
Project Title: MANAGERIAL AND LEADERSHIP CONSIDERATIONS FOR THE PROCESS OF 
INTEGRATING ACQUIRED INNOVATION START-UPS AT THE DEDICATED TEAM LEVEL 
Dear Miss Katelyn Anderson 
Your REC Humanities New Application Form submitted on 6 April 2018 was reviewed and approved 
by the REC: Humanities. 
Please note the following for your approved submission: 
Ethics approval period: 
Protocol approval date (Humanities) Protocol expiration date (Humanities) 
6 May 2018 5 May 2021 
 
GENERAL COMMENTS: 
Title       Comment 
5. Please upload the informed   The researcher should check the informed consent  
consent template that will  form for editorial mistakes i.e. incorrect punctuation 
be used to confirm consent   used in the section addressing the procedures of  
from participants   the study. 
 
Please take note of the General Investigator Responsibilities attached to this letter. You may 
commence with your research after complying fully with these guidelines. 
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If the researcher deviates in any way from the proposal approved by the REC: Humanities, 
the researcher must notify the REC of these changes. 
Please use your SU project number (6702) on any documents or correspondence with the REC 
concerning your project. 
Please note that the REC has the prerogative and authority to ask further questions, seek additional 
information, require further modifications, or monitor the conduct of your research and the consent 
process. 
FOR CONTINUATION OF PROJECTS AFTER REC APPROVAL PERIOD 
Please note that a progress report should be submitted to the Research Ethics Committee: 
Humanities before the approval period has expired if a continuation of ethics approval is required. 
The Committee will then consider the continuation of the project for a further year (if necessary) 
Included Documents: 
Document Type File Name Date Version 
Research 
Protocol/Proposal 
























REC Coordinator: Research Ethics Committee: Human Research (Humanities) 
National Health Research Ethics Committee (NHREC) registration number: REC-050411-032. 
The Research Ethics Committee: Humanities complies with the SA National Health Act No.61 2003 as it 
pertains to health research. In addition, this committee abides 
by the ethical norms and principles for research established by the Declaration of Helsinki (2013) and the 
Department of Health Guidelines for Ethical Research: 
Principles Structures and Processes (2nd Ed.) 2015. Annually a number of projects may be selected 
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Investigator Responsibilities 
Protection of Human Research Participants 
Some of the general responsibilities investigators have when conducting research involving human 
participants are listed below: 
1. Conducting the Research. You are responsible for making sure that the research is conducted 
according to the REC approved research protocol. You are also responsible for the actions of all 
your co-investigators and research staff involved with this research. You must also ensure that the 
research is conducted within the standards of your field of research. 
2. Participant Enrollment. You may not recruit or enroll participants prior to the REC approval date 
or after the expiration date of REC approval. All recruitment materials for any form of media must be 
approved by the REC prior to their use. 
3. Informed Consent. You are responsible for obtaining and documenting effective informed 
consent using only the REC-approved consent documents/process, and for ensuring that no human 
participants are involved in research prior to obtaining their informed consent. Please give all 
participants copies of the signed informed consent documents. Keep the originals in your secured 
research files for at least five (5) years. 
4. Continuing Review. The REC must review and approve all REC-approved research proposals 
at intervals appropriate to the degree of risk but not less than once per year. There is no grace 
period. Prior to the date on which the REC approval of the research expires, it is your responsibility 
to submit the progress report in a timely fashion to ensure a lapse in REC approval does not occur. 
If REC approval of your research lapses, you must stop new participant enrollment, and contact the 
REC office immediately. 
5. Amendments and Changes. If you wish to amend or change any aspect of your research (such 
as research design, interventions or procedures, participant population, informed consent document, 
instruments, surveys or recruiting material), you must submit the amendment to the REC for review 
using the current Amendment Form. You may not initiate any amendments or changes to your 
research without first obtaining written REC review and approval. The only exception is when it is 
necessary to eliminate apparent immediate hazards to participants and the REC should be 
immediately informed of this necessity. 
6. Adverse or Unanticipated Events. Any serious adverse events, participant complaints, and all 
unanticipated problems that involve risks to participants or others, as well as any research related 
injuries, occurring at this institution or at other performance sites must be reported to Malene Fouche 
within five (5) days of discovery of the incident. You must also report any instances of serious or 
continuing problems, or non-compliance with the RECs requirements for protecting human research 
participants. The only exception to this policy is that the death of a research participant must be 
reported in accordance with the Stellenbosch University Research Ethics Committee Standard 
Operating Procedures. All reportable events should be submitted to the REC using the Serious 
Adverse Event Report Form. 
7. Research Record Keeping. You must keep the following research related records, at a minimum, 
in a secure location for a minimum of five years: the REC approved research proposal and all 
amendments; all informed consent documents; recruiting materials; continuing review reports; 
adverse or unanticipated events; and all correspondence from the REC. 
8. Provision of Counselling or emergency support. When a dedicated counsellor or psychologist 
provides support to a participant without prior REC review and approval, to the extent permitted by 
law, such activities will not be recognised as research nor the data used in support of research. Such 
cases should be indicated in the progress report or final report. 
9. Final reports. When you have completed (no further participant enrollment, interactions or 
interventions) or stopped work on your research, you must submit a Final Report to the REC. 
10. On-Site Evaluations, Inspections, or Audits. If you are notified that your research will be 
reviewed or audited by the sponsor or any other external agency or any internal group, you must 
inform the REC immediately of the impending audit/evaluation. 
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REC Humanities Amendment Form 
21 June 2018 
Project number: 6702 
Project Title: MANAGERIAL AND LEADERSHIP CONSIDERATIONS FOR THE PROCESS OF 
INTEGRATING ACQUIRED INNOVATION START-UPS AT THE DEDICATED TEAM LEVEL 
Dear Miss Katelyn Anderson 
Your REC Humanities Amendment Form submitted on 12 June 2018 was reviewed and approved 
by the REC: Humanities.  
Please note the following for your approved submission: 
Ethics approval period: 
Protocol approval date (Humanities) Protocol expiration date (Humanities) 




Please take note of the General Investigator Responsibilities attached to this letter. You may 
commence with your research after complying fully with these guidelines. 
If the researcher deviates in any way from the proposal approved by the REC: Humanities, 
the researcher must notify the REC of these changes. 
Please use your SU project number (6702) on any documents or correspondence with the REC 
concerning your project. 
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Please note that the REC has the prerogative and authority to ask further questions, seek additional 
information, require further modifications, or monitor the conduct of your research and the consent 
process. 
FOR CONTINUATION OF PROJECTS AFTER REC APPROVAL PERIOD 
Please note that a progress report should be submitted to the Research Ethics Committee: 
Humanities before the approval period has expired if a continuation of ethics approval is required. 
The Committee will then consider the continuation of the project for a further year (if necessary) 
Included Documents: 
Document Type File Name Date Version 
Research 
Protocol/Proposal 
KAnderson 16952278 - SU 









REC Coordinator: Research Ethics Committee: Human Research (Humanities) 
National Health Research Ethics Committee (NHREC) registration number: REC-050411-032. 
The Research Ethics Committee: Humanities complies with the SA National Health Act No.61 2003 as it 
pertains to health research. In addition, this committee abides 
by the ethical norms and principles for research established by the Declaration of Helsinki (2013) and the 
Department of Health Guidelines for Ethical Research: 
Principles Structures and Processes (2nd Ed.) 2015. Annually a number of projects may be selected 
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Investigator Responsibilities 
Protection of Human Research Participants 
Some of the general responsibilities investigators have when conducting research involving human 
participants are listed below: 
1. Conducting the Research. You are responsible for making sure that the research is conducted 
according to the REC approved research protocol. You are also responsible for the actions of all 
your co-investigators and research staff involved with this research. You must also ensure that the 
research is conducted within the standards of your field of research. 
2. Participant Enrollment. You may not recruit or enroll participants prior to the REC approval date 
or after the expiration date of REC approval. All recruitment materials for any form of media must be 
approved by the REC prior to their use. 
3. Informed Consent. You are responsible for obtaining and documenting effective informed 
consent using only the REC-approved consent documents/process, and for ensuring that no human 
participants are involved in research prior to obtaining their informed consent. Please give all 
participants copies of the signed informed consent documents. Keep the originals in your secured 
research files for at least five (5) years. 
4. Continuing Review. The REC must review and approve all REC-approved research proposals 
at intervals appropriate to the degree of risk but not less than once per year. There is no grace 
period. Prior to the date on which the REC approval of the research expires, it is your responsibility 
to submit the progress report in a timely fashion to ensure a lapse in REC approval does not occur. 
If REC approval of your research lapses, you must stop new participant enrollment, and contact the 
REC office immediately. 
5. Amendments and Changes. If you wish to amend or change any aspect of your research (such 
as research design, interventions or procedures, participant population, informed consent document, 
instruments, surveys or recruiting material), you must submit the amendment to the REC for review 
using the current Amendment Form. You may not initiate any amendments or changes to your 
research without first obtaining written REC review and approval. The only exception is when it is 
necessary to eliminate apparent immediate hazards to participants and the REC should be 
immediately informed of this necessity. 
6. Adverse or Unanticipated Events. Any serious adverse events, participant complaints, and all 
unanticipated problems that involve risks to participants or others, as well as any research related 
injuries, occurring at this institution or at other performance sites must be reported to Malene Fouche 
within five (5) days of discovery of the incident. You must also report any instances of serious or 
continuing problems, or non-compliance with the RECs requirements for protecting human research 
participants. The only exception to this policy is that the death of a research participant must be 
reported in accordance with the Stellenbosch University Research Ethics Committee Standard 
Operating Procedures. All reportable events should be submitted to the REC using the Serious 
Adverse Event Report Form. 
7. Research Record Keeping. You must keep the following research related records, at a minimum, 
in a secure location for a minimum of five years: the REC approved research proposal and all 
amendments; all informed consent documents; recruiting materials; continuing review reports; 
adverse or unanticipated events; and all correspondence from the REC. 
8. Provision of Counselling or emergency support. When a dedicated counsellor or psychologist 
provides support to a participant without prior REC review and approval, to the extent permitted by 
law, such activities will not be recognised as research nor the data used in support of research. Such 
cases should be indicated in the progress report or final report. 
9. Final reports. When you have completed (no further participant enrollment, interactions or 
interventions) or stopped work on your research, you must submit a Final Report to the REC. 
10. On-Site Evaluations, Inspections, or Audits. If you are notified that your research will be 
reviewed or audited by the sponsor or any other external agency or any internal group, you must 
inform the REC immediately of the impending audit/evaluation. 
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4.3.1.2 
4.6.2 
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4.3.1.3 
4.8.1 
Control x  x  x  x x x  x x x  x   










































 x            x    
4.3.2.3 Character/ 
integrity  


























    x    x  x       
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
  
319 
    


















































































































































































































































































































































































































    x x            
 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
  
320 
    






























































































































































































































































































































     x            
4.6.2.2 Manage 
knowledge  
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4.6.2.3 Understand 
the context of 
the initiative 
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4.8.3.2b Nurture 
collaboration  














   x x    x         
4.9.1 Create 
urgency  




           x      
4.9.1 Empower 
employees to 
act on vision 
           x      




           x      
4.9.1 Turn out more 
wins and 
change  
           x      
4.9.1 Link changes 
to culture  
           x      
4.9.2 Work within 
policies and 
procedures  
           x      
4.9.2 Employee 
onboarding 
           x      
4.9.2 Incentivise 
employees 
           x      
4.10.1 Don’t rely on 
early outlooks 
            x     
4.10.1 Not overly 
cautious 
            x     
4.10.1 Not overly 
laissez faire 
            x     
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4.10.3 Gatekeep at the 
interface 










    x       x    x  
4.11.3 Influence with 
ideal scenarios 





     x          x  
4.12.2.2 Clear roles and 
responsibilities 
                x 
4.12.2.2 Seek out results                 x 
4.12.2.2 Monitor 
performance 
                x 
4.12.2.2 Give feedback                 x 
4.12.2.4 Gain team 
members’ 
commitment  
                x 
4.12.2.5 Foster a team 
climate of 
collaboration 
                x 
4.12.2.6 Merit promoting 
standards 
                x 
4.12.2.7 External support, 
recognition  




making decisions  
                x 





        x        x 
 
(Source: Adapted from the literature review presented in chapters 2-4; please refer to Column 1 for reference) 
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CONSENT TO PARTICIPATE IN RESEARCH 
 
 
To whom it may concern  
 
Katelyn Anderson, a researcher from the Department of Business Management at Stellenbosch University, 
has approached you to assist in either being a research participant or facilitating the introduction of the 
researcher and a possible research subject. Possible participants for the study include people who have had 
experience as a leader or manager charged with innovation-related activities in a project team.  
 
1. PURPOSE OF THE STUDY 
 
This study aims to understand if there are any unique factors to consider – whether they are challenges or any 
other factors – that arise when a team leader/manager of a project has to integrate a small acquisition within 
a team.  
 
2. WHAT WILL BE ASKED OF ME?  
 
Those who participate in the study are required to avail a one-hour time slot in which an interview can take 
place at a location of your choice in the Cape Town, RSA area, which is sufficiently quiet or via an online 
telecommunications platform, such as Skype.  
 
3. POSSIBLE RISKS AND DISCOMFORTS 
 
Besides the one-hour allotment of time by participants, there are very few, if any, foreseeable and possible 
risks or discomforts they might expect.  
 
4. POSSIBLE BENEFITS TO PARTICIPANTS AND/OR TO THE SOCIETY 
 
This research question has not, to the knowledge of the researcher, been posed before; as a result, this study 
is expected to be beneficial to society in its enrichment of knowledge.  
 
5. PAYMENT FOR PARTICIPATION 
 
This is a study that is undertaken voluntarily by research subjects without expectation of payment as a result 
of the lack of funding for the study.  
 
6. PROTECTION OF YOUR INFORMATION, CONFIDENTIALITY AND IDENTITY 
 
Any information you share with the researcher, Katelyn Anderson, during this study which could possibly 
identify the participants will be protected. This will be done by ensuring your anonymity and others’ by not 
mentioning you, your colleagues or your organisation by name.  
 
Instead, any thesis or publications that happen as a result of your involvement will use a pseudonym, such as 
if your name is Jane/John/Jay Smith, you will be referred to as “Apollo”, “Venus” or “Janus” as examples; 
similarly, if your organisation’s name is Smith (Pty) Ltd, it will be referred to as “Agora” as an example. The 
only people who will have access to your information will be the researcher and her supervisors, mainly for the 
purpose of you giving your consent to participate in the study’s interviews.  
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At this point, it is not known whether the study will be submitted to, qualify for or appear in any publications or 
for any other purpose in the future; if so, your, your colleagues and your organisation’s anonymity and 
confidentiality will be upheld as described above.  
 
As the interview will be audio-recorded by the interviewer on an electronic device, you as the participant will 
have the opportunity to have access to the audio clip upon your instruction. The tape(s) will only be used for 
educational purposes and then they will be erased.  
 
7. PARTICIPATION AND WITHDRAWAL 
 
Research subjects may choose whether to participate in this study or not. If you agree to take part in this study, 
you may withdraw at any time without any consequence. You may also refuse to answer any questions you 
do not want to answer and still remain in the study. The researcher may withdraw you from this study if any 
exceptional circumstances arise that make that action necessary.  
 
8. RESEARCHER’S CONTACT INFORMATION 
 
If you have any questions or concerns about this study, please feel free to contact Katelyn Anderson at (+27) 
083 391 1031 or e-mail her at katelyna@live.co.uk, and/or the supervisors, Prof Gert Human at 
ghuman@sun.ac.za or Dr Awie Vlok at avlok@sun.ac.za.  
 
9.   RIGHTS OF RESEARCH PARTICIPANTS 
 
You may withdraw your consent at any time and discontinue participation without penalty.  You are not waiving 
any legal claims, rights or remedies because of your participation in this research study. If you have questions 
regarding your rights as a research participant, contact Ms Maléne Fouché [mfouche@sun.ac.za; 021 808 
4622] at the Division for Research Development. 
 




DECLARATION OF CONSENT BY THE PARTICIPANT 
 
As the participant, I confirm that: 
● I have read the above information and it is written in a language that I am comfortable with. 
● I have had a chance to ask questions and all my questions have been answered. 




By signing below, I ______________________________ agree to take part in this research study, as 
conducted by Katelyn Anderson.  
 
_______________________________________ _____________________ 
Signature of Participant Date 
 
 
DECLARATION BY THE PRINCIPAL INVESTIGATOR 
 
As the principal investigator, I hereby declare that the information contained in this document has been 
thoroughly explained to the participant. I also declare that the participant has been encouraged (and has been 
given ample time) to ask any questions. In addition, I would like to select the following option:  
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The conversation with the participant was conducted with the assistance of a translator (who 
has signed a non-disclosure agreement), and this “Consent Form” is available to the 





________________________________________ _____________________   
  
Signature of Principal Investigator,   Date 
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SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEW GUIDE  
PHASE 
1 




Item Source: Adapted 
from 
1.1 Welcome. Thank you for making the time to meet with me. I really 
appreciate it.  
Emory, 1976; 
Moustakas, 1994 
1.2 I would like to take this opportunity to reassure you of your anonymity in 
this study; nowhere on any document or publication will your name be 




1.3 I also want to assure you that confidentiality and ethics are both important 
to the study. You have the right to stop participating in the study at any 
time. 
Corti, Day & 
Backhouse, 2000 
1.4 Regarding the objectives of the study, I would like to give you an overview 
of the reason the study is being undertaken.  
Through the interviews I’m conducting, I hope to gain insights into the 
integration of start-ups into teams of larger businesses while 
experimenting on and creating marketable products and/or services.  
Fox, 2009 
1.5 Given all of this, do you consent to participate in the study? If so, please 
sign this waiver.  
Corti et al., 2000 
1.6 Are you comfortable with your statements being audio recorded? 
● If “yes”: Thank you. 
● If “no”: In that case, I will transcribe by hand. 
Moustakas, 1994 
1.7 Do you have any questions or concerns before we begin? Emory, 1976; 
Moustakas, 1994 
1.8 The questions have no right or wrong answers; their aim is simply to gain 


















I understand that you are currently or have previously been involved in a 
team which was made up – at least in part – of an acquired start-up’s 
employees, is that correct? 
Govindarajan & 
Trimble, 2010a 
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2.1.2 What is (was) your title? 
● ‘Innovation leader’ (Govindarajan & Trimble, 2010a:10); 
● ‘Innovation project manager’ (Beaume, Maniak & Midler, 2009:10; 
Tomala & Sénéchal, 2004:337) 
In-text references in 
item alongside 
2.1.3 Did you have a managerial and/or leadership role?  
● If so, how would you describe it?  
● How did you come to occupy this position? 
o Recruited/headhunted externally? 
o Transferred internally? 
o In team, emerged as the leader organically? 
o Other? 
● Were there other leaders in the team? 
o If “yes”:  
▪ What were the other positions and did they assist you 
in leading and/or managing the team and the 




2.1.4 Have you ever lead and managed the integration of an acquisition into a 
team before? 
● If “yes”: Do you find that the acquisition’s integration into the team is 
different from bringing others in? 
o For example: “others” such as externally recruiting a new 
employee or transferring an employee from a different 
department or division? 











Item Source: Adapted 
from 
2.2.1 Is (was) there a business strategy/policy for integration within the 
acquiring firm?  
● Does it apply to teams? 
o If “yes”: Can you describe it? 
Yu, Engleman & 
van de Ven, 2005 
2.2.2 
What did the acquiring company call the team? 
o If clarification is needed, the following examples may be 
given:  
▪ ‘Dedicated team’ (Magnusson & Berggen, 2001:106); 
▪  ‘Innovation initiative’ (Govindarajan & Trimble, 
2010a:5); 
▪ ‘Project team’ (Govindarajan & Trimble, 2010a:27; 
O’Connor, 1998:151); 
▪ Or other? 
In-text references in 
item alongside 
2.2.3 
At this point, I’d like to ask you about the team.  
● How do (did) you understand the team’s purpose?  
● When was the team formed and how long for? 
Paré & Dubé, 1999; 
Wolcott & Lippitz, 
2007 
2.2.4 
Let us talk more about the members of the team.  
● How many people were in your team altogether?  
Govindarajan & 
Trimble, 2010a 
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● Was the team comprised of team members that were dedicated to the 
innovation initiative/project (team)/_____?  
o In other words: did they work on only this project full-time? 
● And how many made up the following sub-groupings:  
o Existing employees (of the acquiring firm) 
o Acquired employees of the start-up  
▪ Did all of the start-ups employees join the acquiring 
firm? Did some leave? 
o Recruited outsiders 
● Outside of the team, were there other staff members involved in the 
pursuit of the team’s purpose?  
o Such as a sponsor or other role? 
 
2.2.5 
How were the existing, acquired and externally recruited employees first 
introduced to each other? 
● Did you oversee the introductions alone or were you working with 
someone else? 
● What kind of social context was created for the first few meetings?  
o Was it successful? 
▪ If “yes”: How so? 
▪ If “no”: What went wrong? 
Bonebright, 2010;  
Tuckman, 1965; 
Tuckman & Jensen, 
1977 
2.2.6 
Did the team undertake team-building activities? 
● What were they? Can you describe them? 
● Were they once-off or continuously undertaken? 
● If the latter, were they continuously undertaken over the length of the 
initiative/project? 
● In your opinion, did the team develop together effectively? 
Bonebright, 2010; 
Tuckman, 1965; 
Tuckman & Jensen, 
1977 
2.2.7 
● Did you find an approach(es) in your management and leadership of 
the team that assisted the development of the team given the added 
activity of integrating newcomers? 
● In your opinion, would you say that the integration of the acquisition 
into the team was different to developing the team minus an 
acquisition?  
o Only with internally transferred and externally recruited 
individuals? 
● Did you find that the acquisition’s integration influenced the project’s 
activities? 
o In the sense that it either facilitated or impeded the progress 
of these activities? 
 











Item Source: Adapted 
from 
2.3.1 
On the subject of integrating newcomers, did you foresee any integration-
related issues in the initiative?  
● Were there issues you did not foresee? 
● Can you identify them? 
● Can you describe them? 
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2.3.2 
Do you feel employees resisted the integration? 
● If “yes”:  
o How so? (If clarification is needed ask whether employees:) 
▪ Worked against the integration?  
▪ Resigned or otherwise left the firm? 
▪ Responded adversely? 
▪ Or unimaginatively?  
▪ Reduced their commitment?  
▪ Acted to change unfavourably?  
▪ Sabotaged operations?  
Gomes, Angwin, 




If there was employee resistance, do you feel it erodes(d) the value of the 
acquisition?  
● If “yes”: probe given answers.  
● If “no”: ask next question. 
Have you found an approach(es) in your management and leadership of 
employees that results in lessened resistance?  
o (If clarification is needed, probe:)  
▪ Such as prioritising spending time with them, being 
empathetic or other behaviours? 
o If something did manage to lessen resistance:  
▪ Do you feel that this additional approach took away 
from the integration of tasks and achieving the 
strategic objectives of the acquisition?  
▪ For example: slowed down the activities associated 




On the subject of integration leadership:  
● Did the integration receive enough proactive, hands-on leadership 
from senior managers who have the authority to lead credibly? 
o That is to say, those external to the team? 
● If not, did you find that you had to fill this vacuum? 
o If so, how did you operationalise this? 





KSFs for PAIP questions (address these topics if they have not yet been 
touched on with the subject):  
● integration strategy and approach;  
● post-acquisition leadership;  
● speed of integration implementation;  
● post-acquisition-leadership team and disregard of daily activities;  
● communication during implementation;  
● managing corporate and cultural differences;  
● human resource management.  
Gomes et al., 2013 
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2.3.6 
Did you find:  
● That you had to manage your own expectations and those of others 
within the initiative? 
o If “yes”: Which expectations and how? 
● That authority-invested people within the acquiring organisation were 
actively involved in the realisation of the initiative’s objectives? 
o If “yes”: How?  
o Was it enough? 
o Were these people the ones you would expect to be actively 
involved? 
● That you had to manage the interfaces, also known as boundaries, 
between the initiative and its external stakeholders?  
o Such as: senior managers, sponsors, ongoing operations, etc.  
o How did you execute this? 





In your opinion, do you think that your management and leadership of 
following the processes of innovating, integrating and developing the team 
simultaneously cause you to manage and lead differently in this context? 
● If “yes”: How so? 
● Do certain problems arise from this or are there other 
considerations?  









Item Source: Adapted 
from 
3.1 Is there perhaps anything else you wish to add on:  
● The post-acquisition integration process within the team 
● The innovation experiments and the innovation acquisition 
champion’s role 
● Any final insights about integrating small acquisitions within the 
team while developing their innovation 
● Is there perhaps anything else you wish to add in general?  
Govindarajan & 
Trimble, 2010a;  
Haspeslagh & 
Jemison, 1991 
3.2 Do you have any questions at this point?  Taffel, 1955 





3.4 May I contact you after this interview if there is some clarification or follow-
up? 
Richards, 1996 
3.5 Thank you for your participation in this study. I really appreciate the 
contribution you have made.  
Bolderston, 2012 
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